MMH1 


THE  GREATEST  fAILURE 
IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


JOHN    SPARGO 


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"THE    GREATEST    FAILURE 
IN   ALL    HISTORY" 


Books  by 
JOHN  SPARGO 

"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE  IN  ALL  HISTORY" 

RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  BOLSHEVISM 

BOLSHEVISM 

AMERICANISM  AND  SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY 

SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY  EXPLAINED 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  NEW  YORK 
Established   1817 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 
IN   ALL   HISTORY" 

A    Critical   Examination   of 

The  Actual  Workings  of 

Bolshevism  In  Russia 

BY 

JOHN   SPARGO 

AUTHOR   OF 
"BOLSHEVISM"  "THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  BOLSHEVISM" 
"RUSSIA    AS    AN    AMERICAN    PROBLEM" 
"SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY   EXPLAINED" 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


The  Greatest  Failure  in  all  History 

Copyright,  1920,  by  Harper  &  Brothers 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 

Published  August,  1020 

G-U 


Y 


P 

sU 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


To  The 
MISGUIDED,  THE  MISTAKEN, 
AND   THE  MISINFORMED 

Who  Have  Hailed  Bolshevism  in  Russia  as  the  Advent  of 

A  NEW  FREEDOM 
I  Submit  a  Part  of  the  Indisputable  Evidence  Upon  Which,  as 
a  Socialist,  Who  Believes  in  Democracy  in  Government  and  In- 
dustry— and  in  the  Generous  Individualism  Which  Commu- 
nism of  Opportunity  Alone  Can  Give — FBase  My  Condemna- 
tion of  Bolshevism  as  a  Mad  Attempt,  by  a  Brutal  and 
Degrading  Tryanny,  to  Carry  Out  an  Impossible  Program 


J  i  » 4 


*  •  *     8 


** 


NOTE 

My  thanks  are  due  to  many  friends,  in  this  coun- 
try and  in  Europe,  for  their  kindly  co-operation, 
assistance,  and  advice.  I  do  not  name  them  all — 
partly  because  many  of  them  have  requested  me 
not  to  do  so.  I  must,  however,  express  my  thanks 
to  Mr.  Henry  L.  Slobodin  of  New  York,  for  kindly 
placing  his  materials  at  my  disposal;  Dr.  S.  Inger- 
man  of  New  York,  for  his  valuable  assistance; 
Mr.  Jerome  Landfield  of  New  York,  for  most 
valuable  suggestions;  Prof.  V.  I.  Issaievof  London, 
for  personal  courtesies  and  for  the  assistance  de- 
rived from  his  valuable  collection  of  data;  Dr. 
Joseph  M.  Goldstein,  author  of  Russia,  Her 
Economic  Past  and  Future;  Mr.  Gregor  Alexinsky; 
Mr.  Alexander  Kerensky,  former  Premier  of 
Russia;  Madame  Catherine  Breshkovsky;  Dr.  J. 
O.  Gavronsky  of  London;  the  editors  of  Pour  la 
Russie,  Paris;  Gen.  C.  M.  Oberoucheff,  military 
commander  of  the  Kiev  District  under  the  Provi- 
sional Government;  Mr.  J.  Strumillo,  of  the  Rus- 
sian Social  Democratic  Party;  Mr.  G.  Soloveytchik 
of  Queen's  College,  Oxford;  to  the  Institute  for 
Public  Service  for  the  diagram  used  on  page  65; 
and,  finally,  my  old  friend  and  colleague  of  twenty- 
five  years  ago,  Col.  John  Ward,  C.B.,  C.M.G., 
member  of  the  British  House  of  Commons,  founder 
of  the  Navvies'  Union,  whose  courageous  struggle 
against  Bolshevism  has  won  for  him  the  respect 
and  gratitude  of  all  friends  of  Russian  freedom. 

J.  S. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Note vii 

Preface xi 

I.  Why  Have  the  Bolsheviki  Retained  Power?.  i 

II.  The  Soviets 8 

III.  The  Soviets  under  the  Bolsheviki    ....  20 

IV.  The  Undemocratic  Soviet  State 38 

V.  The  Peasants  and  the  Land 67 

VI.  The  Bolsheviki  and  the  Peasants     ....  90 

VII.  The  Red  Terror 140 

VIII.  Industry  under  Soviet  Control 192 

IX.  The  Nationalization  of  Industry — I     .    .    .  240 

X.  The  Nationalization  of  Industry — II    .    .    .  280 

XI.  Freedom  of  Press  and  Assembly 309 

XII.  "The  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat"  .    .  352 

XIII.  State  Communism  and  Labor  Conscription    .  369 

XIV.  Let  the  Verdict  Be  Rendered 410 

Documents 453 

Index 473 


PREFACE 

Like  the  immortal  Topsy,  this  book  may  be 
said  to  have  "just  growed."  In  it  I  have  simply 
assembled  in  something  like  an  orderly  arrange- 
ment a  vast  amount  of  carefully  investigated  evi- 
dence concerning  the  Bolshevist  system  and  its 
workings — evidence  which,  in  my  judgment,  must 
compel  every  honest  believer  in  freedom  and 
democracy  to  condemn  Bolshevism  as  a  vicious  and 
dangerous  form  of  reaction,  subversive  of  every 
form  of  progress  and  every  agency  of  civilization 
and  enlightenment. 

I  do  not  discuss  theories  in  this  book,  except  in 
a  very  incidental  way.  In  two  earlier  volumes  my 
views  upon  the  theories  of  Bolshevism  have  been 
set  forth,  clearly  and  with  emphasis.  On  its  the- 
oretical side,  despite  the  labored  pretentiousness 
of  Lenin  and  his  interminable  "Theses,"  so  sug- 
gestive of  medieval  theology,  Bolshevism  is  the 
sorriest  medley  of  antiquated  philosophical  rubbish 
and  fantastic  speculation  to  command  attention 
among  civilized  peoples  since  Millerism  stirred 
so  many  of  the  American  people  to  a  mental 
process  they  mistook  for  and  miscalled  thinking. 

No  one  who  is  capable  of  honest  and  straight- 
forward   thinking    upon    political    and    economic 


xii  PREFACE 

questions  can  read  the  books  of  such  Bolshevist 
writers  as  Lenin,  Trotsky,  and  Bucharin,  and  the 
numerous  proclamations,  manifestoes,  and  decrees 
issued  by  the  Soviet  Government  and  the  Com- 
munist Party,  and  retain  any  respect  for  the  Bol- 
sheviki  as  thinkers.  Neither  can  any  one  who  is 
capable  of  understanding  the  essential  difference 
between  freedom  and  despotism  read  even  those 
official  decrees,  programs,  and  legal  codes  which 
they  themselves  have  caused  to  be  published  and 
doubt  that  the  regime  of  the  Bolsheviki  in  Russia 
is  despotic  in  the  extreme.  The  cretinous-minded 
admirers  and  defenders  of  Bolshevism,  whether  they 
call  themselves  Liberals,  Radicals,  or  Socialists — 
dishonoring  thereby  words  of  great  and  honorable 
antecedents—"  bawl  for  freedom  in  their  senseless 
mood"  and,  at  the  same  time,  give  their  hearts' 
homage  to  a  monstrous  and  arrogant  tyranny. 

In  these  pages  will  be  found,  I  venture  to  assert, 
ample  and  conclusive  evidence  to  justify* to  any 
healthy  and  rational  mind  the  description  of 
Bolshevism  as  "a  monstrous  and  arrogant  tyranny." 
That  is  the  purpose  of  the  volume.  It  is  an  in- 
dictment and  arraignment  of  Bolshevism  and  the 
Bolsheviki  at  the  bar  of  enlightened  public  opinion. 
The  evidence  upon  which  the  indictment  rests  is  so 
largely  drawn  from  official  publications  of  the 
Soviet  Government  and  of  the  Communist  Party, 
and  from  the  authorized  writings  of  the  foremost 
spokesmen  of  Russian  Bolshevism,  that  the  book 
might  almost  be  termed  a  self-revelation  of  Bol- 
shevism and  the  Bolsheviki.  Such  evidence  as  I 
have  cited  from  non-Bolshevist  sources  is  of  minor 


PREFACE  xiii 

importance,  slight  in  quantity  and  merely  corrobo- 
rative of,  or  supplementary  to,  the  evidence  drawn 
from  the  Bolshevist  sources  already  indicated. 
Much  of  the  evidence  has  been  published  from  time 
to  time  in  numerous  articles,  state  reports,  and 
pamphlets,  both  here  and  in  England,  but  this  is 
the  first  volume,  I  believe,  to  bring  the  material 
together  in  a  systematic  arrangement. 

Following  the  publication  of  my  Bolshevism  I 
found  myself  called  upon  to  deliver  many  addresses 
upon  the  subject.  Some  of  these  were  given  before 
college  and  university  audiences — at  Dartmouth, 
Princeton,  Columbia,  Barnard,  and  elsewhere — ■ 
while  others  were  given  before  a  wide  variety  of 
public  audiences.  The  circulation  of  my  book  and 
many  magazine  and  newspaper  articles  on  the  sub- 
ject, together  with  the  lectures  and  addresses,  had 
the  result  of  bringing  me  a  veritable  multitude  of 
questions  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  The  ques- 
tions came  from  men  and  women  of  high  estate 
and  of  low,  ranging  from  United  States  Senators  to 
a  group  of  imprisoned  Communists  awaiting  de- 
portation. Some  of  the  questions  were  asked  in 
good  faith,  to  elicit  information;  others  were  obvi- 
ously asked  for  quite  another  purpose.  For  a  long 
time  it  seemed  that  every  statement  made  in  the 
press  about  Bolshevism  or  the  Bolsheviki  reached 
me  with  questions  or  challenges  concerning  it. 

To  every  question  which  was  asked  in  apparent 
good  faith  I  did  my  best  to  reply.  When — as  often 
happened — the  information  was  not  in  my  pos- 
session, I  invoked  the  assistance  of  those  of  my 
Russian   friends  in   Europe  and  this  country  who 


xiv  PREFACE 

have  made  it  their  special  task  to  keep  well  informed 
concerning  developments  in  Russia.  These  friends 
not  only  replied  to  my  specific  questions,  but  sent 
me  from  time  to  time  practically  every  item  of 
interest  concerning  developments  in  Russia.  As  a 
result,  I  found  myself  in  the  possession  of  an  im- 
mense mass  of  testimony  and  evidence  of  varying 
value.  Fully  aware  of  the  unreliability  of  much 
of  the  material  thus  placed  in  my  hands,  for  my 
own  satisfaction  I  weeded  out  all  stories  based  upon 
hearsay,  all  stories  told  by  unknown  persons,  all 
rumors  and  indefinite  statements,  and,  finally,  all 
stories,  no  matter  by  whom  told,  which  were  not 
confirmed  by  dependable  witnesses.  This  winnow- 
ing process  left  the  following  classes  of  evidence  and 
testimony:  (i)  Statements  by  leading  Bolsheviki, 
contained  in  their  official  press  or  in  publications 
authorized  by  them;  (2)  reports  of  activities  by  the 
Soviet  Government  or  its  officials,  published  in  the 
official  organs  of  the  government;  (3)  formal  docu- 
ments—decrees, proclamations,  and  the  like — is- 
sued by  the  Soviet  Government  and  its  responsible 
officials;  (4)  statements  made  by  well-known  Rus- 
sian Socialists  and  trades-unionists  of  high  stand- 
ing upon  facts  within  their  own  knowledge,  where 
there  was  confirmatory  evidence;  (5)  the  testimony 
of  well-known  Socialists  from  other  countries,  upon 
matters  of  which  they  had  personal  knowledge  and 
concerning  which  there  was  confirmatory  evidence. 
Every  scrap  of  evidence  adduced  in  the  following 
pages  belongs  to  one  or  other  of  the  five  classes 
above  described.  Moreover,  the  reader  can  rest 
assured  that  every  possible  care  has  been  taken  to 


PREFACE  xv 

guard  against  misquotation  and  against  quotation 
which,  while  literally  accurate,  nevertheless  mis- 
represents the  truth.  This  is  often  done  by  un- 
fairly separating  text  from  context,  for  example, 
and  in  other  ways.  I  believe  that  I  can  assure  the 
reader  of  the  freedom  of  this  book  from  that  evil; 
certainly  nothing  of  the  sort  has  been  intentionally 
included.  While  I  have  accepted  as  correct  and  au- 
thentic certain  translations,  such  as  the  transla- 
tions of  Lenin's  Soviets  at  Work  and  his  State  and 
Revolution,  both  of  which  are  largely  circulated  by 
pro-Bolshevist  propagandists,  and  such  collections 
of  documents  as  have  been  published  in  this  coun- 
try by  the  Nation — the  Soviet  Constitution  and 
certain  Decrees — and  by  Soviet  Russia,  the  official 
organ  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  this  country,  I 
have  had  almost  every  other  line  of  translated 
quotation  examined  and  verified  by  some  competent 
and  trustworthy  Russian  scholar. 

The  book  does  not  contain  all  or  nearly  all  the 
evidence  which  has  come  into  my  possession  in  the 
manner  described.  I  have  purposely  omitted  much 
that  was  merely  harrowing  and  brutal,  as  well  as 
sensational  incidents  which  have  no  direct  bearing 
upon  the  struggle  in  Russia,  but  properly  belong  to 
the  category  of  crimes  arising  out  of  the  elemental 
passions,  which  are  to  be  found  in  every  country. 
Crimes  and  atrocities  by  irresponsible  individuals 
I  have  passed  over  in  silence,  confining  myself 
to  those  things  which  reflect  the  actual  purposes, 
methods,  and  results  of  the  regime  itself. 

I  have  not  tried  to  make  a  sensational  book,  yet 
now  that  it  is  finished  I  feel  that  it  is  even  worse 


xvi  PREFACE 

than  that.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  a  terrible  book. 
The  cumulative  effect  of  the  evidence  of  brutal 
oppression  and  savagery,  of  political  trickery  and 
chicane,  of  reckless  experimentation,  of  adminis- 
trative inefficiency,  of  corrupt  bureaucratism,  of 
outraged  idealism  and  ambitious  despotism,  seems 
to  me  as  terrible  as  anything  I  know — more  terrible 
than  the  descriptions  of  czarism  which  formerly 
harrowed  our  feelings.  When  I  remember  the 
monstrous  evils  that  have  been  wrought  in  the 
name  of  Socialism,  my  soul  is  torn  by  an  indescrib- 
able agony. 

Yet  more  agonizing  still  is  the  consciousness  that 
here  in  the  United  States  there  are  men  and  women 
of    splendid    character   and    apparent  intelligence 
whose  vision  has  been  so  warped  by  hatred  of  the 
evils   of  the   present    system,    and    by    a   cunning 
propaganda,  that  they  are  ready  to  hail  this  loath- 
some thing  of  hatred,  this  monstrous  tyranny,  as 
an  evangel  of  fraternalism  and  freedom;    ready  to 
bring  upon  this  nation — where,  despite  every  short- 
coming, we   are   at   least  two  centuries   ahead  of 
Bolshevized  Russia,  politically,  economically,  mor- 
ally— the  curse  which  during  less  than  thirty  months 
has  afflicted  unhappy  Russia  with  greater  ills  than 
fifty  years  of  czarism. 

They  will  not  succeed.  They  shall  strive  in  vain 
to  replace  the  generous  spirit  of  Lincoln  with  the 
brutal  spirit  of  Lenin.  For  us  there  shall  be  no 
dictatorship  other  than  that  of  our  own  ever- 
growing conscience  as  a  nation,  seeking  freedom  and 
righteousness  in  our  own  way. 

We  shall  defeat  and  destroy  Bolshevism  by  keep- 


PREFACE 


xvii 


ing  the  light  shining  upon  it,  revealing  its  ugliness, 
its  brutality,  its  despotism.  We  do  not  need  to 
adopt  the  measures  which  czarism  found  so  un- 
availing. Oppression  cannot  help  us  in  this  fight, 
or  offer  us  any  protection  whatsoever.  If  we  would 
destroy  Bolshevism  we  must  destroy  the  illusions 
which  surround  it.  Once  its  real  character  is  made 
known,  once  men  can  see  it  as  it  is,  we  shall  not 
need  to  fear  its  spread  among  our  fellow-citizens. 
Light,  abundant  light,  is  the  best  agent  to  fight 
Bolshevism. 

John  Spargo. 

"  Nestledown," 
Old  Bennington,  Vermont, 
May,  IQ20. 


"THE    GREATEST    FAILURE 
IN   ALL    HISTORY" 


"THE    GREATEST    FAILURE 
IN    ALL    HISTORY" 

I 

WHY   HAVE    THE    BOLSHEVIKI    RETAINED    POWER? 

PHE  Bolsheviki  are  in  control  of  Russia.  Never, 
-*■  at  any  time  since  their  usurpation  of  power  in 
November,  1917,  have  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and 
their  associates  been  so  free  from  organized  internal 
opposition  as  they  are  now,  after  a  lapse  of  more 
than  two  and  a  quarter  years.  This  is  the  central 
fact  in  the  Russian  problem.  While  it  is  true  that 
Bolshevist  rule  is  obviously  tottering  toward  its 
fall,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  anti-Bolshevist 
forces  of  Russia  have  been  scattered  like  chaff 
before  the  wind.  While  there  is  plenty  of  evidence 
that  the  overwhelming  mass  of  the  Russian  people 
have  been  and  are  opposed  to  them,  the  Bolsheviki 
rule,  nevertheless.  This  is  what  many  very  thought- 
ful people  who  are  earnestly  seeking  to  arrive  at 
just  and  helpful  conclusions  concerning  Russia 
find  it  hard  and  well-nigh  impossible  to  understand. 
Upon  every  hand  one  hears  the  question,  "How 
is  it  possible  to  believe  that  the  Bolsheviki  have 


I 


2  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

been  able  for  so  long  to  maintain  and  even  increase 
their  power  against  the  opposition  of  the  great  mass 
of  the  Russian  people?" 

The  complete  answer  to  this  question  will  be 
developed  later,  but  a  partial  and  provisional  answer 
may,  perhaps,  do  much  to  clear  the  way  for  an  in- 
telligent and  dispassionate  study  of  the  manner  in 
which  Bolshevism  in  Russia  has  been  affected  by 
the  acid  test  of  practice.  In  the  first  place,  it 
would  be  interesting  to  discuss  the  naivete  of  the 
question.  Is  it  a  new  and  unheard-of  phenomenon 
that  a  despotic  and  tyrannical  government  should 
increase  its  strength  in  spite  of  the  resentment  of 
the  masses?  Czarism  maintained  itself  in  power 
for  centuries  against  the  will  of  the  people.  If  it 
be  objected  that  only  a  minority  of  the  people  of 
Russia  actively  opposed  czarism,  and  that  the 
masses  as  a  whole  were  passive  for  centuries,  no 
such  contention  can  be  made  concerning  the  period 
from  1901  to  1906.  At  that  time  the  country  was 
aflame  with  passionate  discontent;  the  people  as 
a  whole  were  opposed  to  czarism,  yet  they  lacked 
the  organized  physical  power  to  overthrow  it. 
Czarism  ruled  by  brute  force,  and  the  methods 
which  it  developed  and  used  with  success  have  been 
adopted  by  the  Bolsheviki  and  perfected  by  them. 

However,  let  a  veteran  Russian  revolutionist 
answer  the  question:  Gen.  C.  M.  Oberoucheff  is  an 
old  and  honored  member  of  the  Party  of  Socialists- 
Revolutionists  of  Russia  and  under  the  old  regime 
suffered  imprisonment  and  exile  on  account  of  his 
activities  in  the  revolutionary  movement.  Under 
the  Provisional  Government,  while  Kerensky  was 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  3 

Premier,  he  was  made  Military  Commissary  of  Kiev, 
at  the  request  of  the  local  Soviet.  General  Oberou- 
cheff  says: 

"Americans  often  ask  the  question:  'How  can 
it  be  explained  that  the  Bolsheviki  hold  power?  .  .  . 
Does  this  not  prove  that  they  are  supported  by 
the  majority  of  the  people?'  For  us  Russians  the 
reply  to  this  question  is  very  simple.  The  Czars 
held  power  for  centuries.  Is  that  proof  that  their 
rule  was  supported  by  the  will  of  the  people?  Of 
course  not.  They  held  power  by  the  rule  of  blood 
and  iron  and  did  not  rest  at  all  upon  the  sympathies 
of  the  great  masses  of  the  people.  The  Bolsheviki 
are  retaining  their  power  to-day  by  the  same  iden- 
tical means.  .  .  .  Russia  of  the  Czars'  time  was 
governed  by  Blue  gendarmes.  Great  Russia  of 
to-day  is  ruled  by  Red  gendarmes.  The  distinc- 
tion is  only  in  color  and  perhaps  somewhat  in 
methods.  The  methods  of  the  Red  gendarmes  are 
more  ruthless  and  cruel  than  those  of  the  old  Blue 
gendarmes." 

The  greater  part  of  a  year  has  elapsed  since  these 
words  were  written  by  General  Oberoucheff.  Since 
that  time  there  have  been  many  significant  changes 
in  Russia,  including  recently  some  relaxation  of  the 
brutal  oppression.  Czarism  likewise  had  its  periods 
of  comparative  decency.  It  still  remains  true, 
however,  that  the  rule  of  the  Bolsheviki  rests 
upon  the  same  basis  as  that  of  the  old  regime.  It 
is,  in  fact,  only  an  inverted  form  of  czarism. 

As  we  shall  presently  see,  the  precise  methods 
by  which  monarchism  was  so  long  maintained 
have    been    used    by   the    Bolsheviki.     The    main 


4  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

support  of  the  old  regime  was  an  armed  force, 
consisting  of  the  corps  of  gendarmes  and  special 
regiments  of  guards.  Under  Bolshevism,  cor- 
responding to  these,  we  have  the  famous  Red 
Guards,  certain  divisions  of  which  have  been  main- 
tained for  the  express  purpose  of  dealing  with 
internal  disorder  and  suppressing  uprisings.  Just 
as,  under  czarism,  the  guard  regiments  were 
specially  well  paid  and  accorded  privileges  which 
made  them  a  class  apart,  so  have  these  Red  Guards 
of  the  Bolsheviki  enjoyed  special  privileges,  in- 
cluding superior  pay  and  rations. 

Under  czarism  the  Okhrana  and  the  Black  Hun- 
dreds, together  with  the  Blue  gendarmes,  imposed 
a  reign  of  terror  upon  the  nation.  They  were  as 
corrupt  as  they  were  cruel.  Under  the  Bolsheviki 
the  Extraordinary  Committees  and  Revolutionary 
Tribunals  have  been  just  as  brutal  and  as  corrupt 
as  their  czaristic  predecessors.  Under  the  Bol- 
sheviki the  system  of  espionage  and  the  use  of 
provocative  agents  can  be  fairly  described  as  a 
continuance  of  the  methods  of  the  old  regime. 

Czarism  developed  an  immense  bureaucracy;  a 
vast  army  of  petty  officials  and  functionaries  was 
thus  attached  to  the  government.  This  bureau- 
cracy was  characterized  by  the  graft  and  corruption 
indulged  in  by  its  members.  They  stole  from  the 
government  and  they  used  their  positions  to  extort 
blackmail  and  graft  from  the  helpless  and  unhappy 
people.  In  the  same  manner  Bolshevism  has  de- 
veloped a  new  bureaucracy  in  Russia,  larger  than 
the  old,  and  no  less  corrupt.  As  we  shall  see  later 
on,  the  sincere  and  honest  idealists  among  the  Bol- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  3 

sheviki  have  loudly  protested  against  this  evil. 
Moreover,  the  system  has  become  so  burdensome 
economically  that  the  government  itself  has  become 
alarmed.  By  rilling  the  land  with  spies  and  making 
it  almost  impossible  for  any  man  to  trust  his  neigh- 
bor, by  suppressing  practically  all  non-Bolshevist 
journals,  and  by  terrorism  such  as  was  unknown 
under  the  old  regime,  the  Bolsheviki  have  main- 
tained themselves  in  power. 

There  is  a  still  more  important  reason  why  the 
Bolshevist  regime  continues,  namely,  its  own 
adaptability.  Far  from  being  the  unbending  and 
uncompromising  devotees  of  principle  they  are 
very  generally  regarded  as  being,  the  Bolshevist 
leaders  are,  above  all  else,  opportunists.  Notwith- 
standing their  adoption  of  the  repressive  and  op- 
pressive methods  of  the  old  regime,  the  Bolsheviki 
could  not  have  continued  in  power  had  they  re- 
mained steadfast  to  the  economic  theories  and 
principles  with  which  they  began.  No  amount  of 
force  could  have  continued  for  so  long  a  system  of 
government  based  on  economic  principles  so  ruin- 
ous. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Bolsheviki  have  con- 
tinued to  rule  Russia  because,  without  any  change 
of  mind  or  heart,  but  under  pressure  of  relent- 
less economic  necessity,  they  have  abandoned  their 
theories.  The  crude  communism  which  Lenin  and 
his  accomplices  set  out  to  impose  upon  Russia 
by  force  has  been  discarded  and  flung  upon  the 
scrap-pile  of  politics.  That  this  is  true  will  be 
abundantly  demonstrated  by  the  testimony  of  the 
Bolsheviki  themselves. 

No  study  of  the  reasons  for  the  success  of  the 


G  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Bolsheviki  can  De  regarded  as  complete  which  does 
not  take  into  account  the  fact  that  Russia  has  been 
living  upon  the  stored-up  resources  of  the  old  order. 
When  the  Bolsheviki  seized  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment there  were  in  the  country  large  stores  of  food, 
of  raw  materials,  of  manufactured  and  partially 
manufactured  goods.  There  were  also  large  num- 
bers of  industrial  establishments  in  working  order. 
With  these  things  alone,  even  without  any  augmen- 
tation by  new  production — except,  of  course,  agri- 
cultural production— the  nation  could  for  a  con- 
siderable time  escape  utter  destruction.  With 
these  resources  completely  in  the  hands  of  the 
government,  any  opposition  was  necessarily  placed 
at  a  very  great  disadvantage.  The  principal 
spokesmen  of  the  Bolsheviki  have  themselves 
recognized  this  from  time  to  time.  On  January  3, 
1920,  Pravda,  the  official  organ  of  the  Communist 
Party — that  is,  of  the  Bolsheviki — said: 

We  must  not  forget  that  hitherto  we  have  been  living 
on  the  stores  and  machinery,  the  means  of  production, 
which  we  inherited  from  the  bourgeoisie.  We  have  been 
using  the  old  stores  of  raw  material,  half-manufactured 
and  manufactured  goods.  But  these  stores  are  getting 
exhausted  and  the  machinery  is  wearing  out  more  and 
more.  All  our  victories  in  the  field  will  lead  to  nothing 
if  we  do  not  add  to  them  victories  gained  by  the  hammer, 
pick,  and  lathe. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  continued  rule  of 
the  Bolsheviki  has,  to  a  very  considerable  extent, 
been  due  to  the  political  ineptitude  and  lack  of 
coherence  on   the   part   of  their  opponents.     The 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  7 

truth  is  that  on  more  than  one  occasion  the  over- 
throw of  the  Bolsheviki  might  easily  have  been 
brought  about  by  the  Allies  if  they  had  dared  do 
it.  The  chancelleries  of  Europe  were,  at  times, 
positively  afraid  that  the  Bolshevist  Government 
would  be  overthrown  and  that  there  would  be  no 
sort  of  government  to  take  its  place.  In  the 
archives  of  all  the  Allied  governments  there  are 
filed  away  confidential  reports  warning  the  govern- 
ments that  if  the  Bolsheviki  should  be  overthrown 
Russia  would  immediately  become  a  vast  welter  of 
anarchy.  Many  European  diplomats  and  states- 
men, upon  the  strength  of  such  reports,  shrugged 
their  shoulders  and  consoled  themselves  with  the 
thought  that,  however  bad  Bolshevist  government 
might  be,  it  was  at  least  better  than  no  govern- 
ment at  all. 

Finally,  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  the 
mere  existence  of  millions  of  people  who,  finding 
it  impossible  to  overthrow  the  Bolshevist  regime, 
devote  their  energies  to  the  task  of  making  it  en- 
durable by  bribing  officials,  conspiring  to  evade 
oppressive  regulations,  and  by  outward  conform- 
ity, tends  to  keep  the  national  life  going,  no  matter 
how  bad  the  government. 


8  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


II 

THE    SOVIETS 

THE  first  articulate  cry  of  Bolshevism  in  Rus- 
sia after  the  overthrow  of  the  monarchy  was 
the  demand  "All  power  to  the  Soviets!"  which  the 
Bolshevist  leaders  raised  in  the  summer  of  1917 
when  the  Provisional  Government  was  bravely 
struggling  to  consolidate  the  democratic  gains  of 
the  March  Revolution.  The  Bolsheviki  were  in- 
spired by  that  anti-statism  which  one  finds  in  the 
literature  of  early  Marxian  Socialism.  It  was  not 
the  individualistic  antagonism  to  the  state  of  the 
anarchist,  though  easily  confounded  with  and  mis- 
taken for  it.  It  was  not  motivated  by  an  exaltation 
of  the  individual,  but  that  of  a  class.  The  early 
Marxian  Socialists  looked  upon  the  modern  state, 
with  its  highly  centralized  authority,  as  a  mere  in- 
strument of  class  rule,  by  means  of  which  the 
capitalist  class  maintained  itself  in  power  and  in- 
tensified its  exploitation  of  the  wage-earning  class. 
Frederick  Engels,  Marx's  great  collaborator,  de- 
scribed the  modern  state  as  being  the  managing 
committee  for  the  capitalist  class  as  a  whole. 

Naturally,  the  state  being  thus  identified  with 
capitalist  exploitation,  the  determination  to  over- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  9 

throw  the  capitalist  system  carried  with  it  a  like 
determination  to  destroy  the  political  state.  Given 
a  victory  by  the  working-class  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive to  enable  it  to  take  possession  of  the  ruling 
power,  the  state  would  either  become  obsolete,  and 
die  of  its  own  accord,  or  be  forcibly  abolished. 
This  attitude  is  well  and  forcibly  expressed  by 
Engels  in  some  well-known  passages. 

Thus,  in  his  Socialism,  Utopian  and  Scientific, 
Engels  says: 

The  modern  state,  no  matter  what  its  form,  is  essen- 
tially a  capitalistic  machine,  the  state  of  the  capitalists, 
the  ideal  personification  of  the  total  national  capital. 
The  more  it  proceeds  to  the  taking  over  of  productive 
forces  the  more  does  it  actually  become  the  national 
capitalist,  the  more  citizens  does  it  exploit.  .  .  .  Whilst 
the  capitalist  mode  of  production  .  .  .  forces  on  more 
and  more  the  transformation  of  the  vast  means  of  pro- 
duction, already  socialized,  into  state  property,  it  shows 
itself  the  way  to  accomplish  this  revolution.  The  pro- 
letariat seizes  political  power  and  turns  the  means  of 
production  into  state  property. 

What  Engels  meant  is  made  clear  in  a  subsequent 
paragraph  in  the  same  work.  He  argues  that  as 
long  as  society  was  divided  into  antagonistic  classes 
the  state  was  a  necessity.  The  ruling  class  for  the 
time  being  required  an  organized  force  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protecting  its  interest  and  particularly  of 
forcibly  keeping  the  subject  class  in  order.  Under 
such  conditions,  the  state  could  only  be  properly 
regarded  as  the  representative  of  society  as  a  whole 
in   the   narrow   sense  that  the   ruling   class   itself 


10  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

represented  society  as  a  whole.  Assuming  the  ex- 
tinction of  class  divisions  and  antagonisms,  the 
state  would  immediately  become  unnecessary: 

The  first  act  by  virtue  of  which  the  state  really  con- 
stitutes itself  the  representative  of  the  whole  of  society — 
the  taking  possession  of  the  means  of  production  in 
the  name  of  society — this  is,  at  the  same  time,  its  last 
independent  act  as  a  state.  State  interference  in  social 
relations  becomes,  in  one  domain  after  another,  super- 
fluous, and  then  dies  out  of  itself;  the  government  of 
persons  is  replaced  by  the  administration  of  things  and 
by  the  conduct  of  processes  of  production.  The  state 
is  not  "abolished."    It  dies  out. 

In  another  work,  The  Origin  of  the  Family ,  Private 
Property,  and  the  State,  Engels  says: 

We  are  now  rapidly  approaching  a  stage  of  evolution 
in  production  in  which  the  existence  of  classes  has  not 
only  ceased  to  be  a  necessity,  but  becomes  a  positive 
fetter  on  production.  Hence  these  classes  must  fall  as 
inevitably  they  once  rose.  The  state  must  irrevocably 
fall  with  them.  The  society  that  is  to  reorganize  pro- 
duction on  the  basis  of  a  free  and  equal  association  of 
the  producers  will  transfer  the  machinery  of  state  where 
it  will  then  belong:  into  the  museum  of  antiquities,  by 
the  side  of  the  spinning-wheel  and  the  bronze  ax. 

These  passages  from  the  classic  literature  of 
Marxian  Socialism  fairly  and  clearly  express  the 
character  of  the  anti-statism  which  inspired  the 
Bolsheviki  at  the  outset.  They  wanted  to  develop 
a  type  of  social  organization  in  which  there  would 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  11 

be  practically  no  "government  of  persons,"  but 
only  the  "administration  of  things"  and  the 
"conduct  of  the  processes  of  production."  Modern 
Socialist  thinkers  have  fairly  generally  recognized 
the  muddled  character  of  the  thinking  upon  which 
this  anti-statism  rests.  How  can  there  be  "ad- 
ministration of  things"  without  "government  of  : 
persons"?  The  only  meaning  that  can  possibly 
be  attached  to  the  "administration  of  things"  by 
the  government  is  that  human  relations  estab- 
lished through  the  medium  of  things  are  to  be 
administered  or  governed.  Certainly  the  "con- 
duct of  the  processes  of  production"  without  some 
regulation  of  the  conduct  of  the  persons  engaged  in 
those  processes  is  unthinkable. 

We  do  not  need  to  discuss  the  theory  farther  at 
this  time.  It  is  enough  to  recognize  that  the 
primitive  Marxian  doctrine  which  we  have  outlined 
required  that  state  interference  with  the  individual 
and  with  social  relations  be  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
if  not  wholly  abolished.  It  is  a  far  cry  from  that 
conception  to  the  system  of  conscript  labor  recently 
introduced,  and  the  Code  of  Labor  Laws  of  Soviet 
Russia,  which  legalizes  industrial  serfdom  and 
adscription  and  makes  even  the  proletarian  sub- 
ject to  a  more  rigid  and  despotic  "government  of 
persons"  than  has  existed  anywhere  since  the  time 
when  feudalism  flourished. 

The  Bolsheviki  believed  that  they  saw  in  the 
Soviets  of  factory-workers,  peasants,  and  Socialists 
the  beginnings  of  a  form  of  social  organization 
which  would  supplant  the  state,  lacking  its  coer- 
cive features  and  better  fitted  for  the  administra- 


12  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

tion  of  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  The  first 
Soviet  of  Workmen's  Deputies  appeared  in  October, 
1905,  in  Petrograd,  at  the  time  of  the  abortive 
revolution.  The  idea  of  organizing  such  a  council 
of  workmen's  representatives  originated  with  the 
Mensheviki,  the  faction  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party  opposed  to  the  Bolsheviki.  The  sole  aim  of 
the  Soviet  was  to  organize  the  revolutionary  forces 
and  sentiment.  But,  during  the  course  of  its  brief 
existence,  it  did  much  in  the  way  of  relieving  the 
distress.  The  Socialists-Revolutionists  joined  with 
the  Mensheviki  in  the  creation  of  this  first  Soviet, 
but  the  Bolsheviki  were  bitterly  opposed  to  it, 
denouncing  it  as  "the  invention  of  semi-bourgeois 
parties  to  enthrall  the  proletariat  in  a  non-partizan 
swamp."  When  the  Soviet  was  well  under  way, 
however,  and  its  success  was  manifest,  the  Bol- 
sheviki entered  it  and  became  active  participants 
in  its  work.  With  the  triumph  of  czarism,  this 
first  Soviet  was  crushed,  most  of  its  leaders  being 
banished  to  Siberia. 

Even  before  the  formation  of  the  Provisional 
Government  was  completed,  in  March,  1917,  the 
revolutionary  working-class  leaders  of  Petrograd 
had  organized  a  Soviet,  or  council,  which  they 
called  the  Council  of  Workmen's  Deputies  of 
Petrograd.  Like  all  the  similar  Soviets  which 
sprang  up  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  this  was 
a  very  loose  organization  and  very  far  from  being 
a  democratic  body  of  representatives.  Its  members 
were  chosen  at  casual  meetings  held  in  the  factories 
and  workshops  and  sometimes  on  the  streets.  No 
responsible  organizations  arranged  or  governed  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  13 

elections.     Anybody  could  call  a  mass-meeting,  in 
any    manner    he    pleased,    and    those    who    came 
selected — usually  by  show  of  hands — such  "depu- 
ties"  as  they  pleased.     If  only  a  score  attended 
and  voted  in  a  factory  employing  hundreds,  the 
deputies  so  elected  represented  that  factory  in  the 
Soviet.     This  description  equally  applies  to  prac- 
tically all  the  other  Soviets  which  sprang  up  in  the 
industrial  centers,  the  rural  villages,  and  in  the  army 
itself.     Among  the  soldiers  at  the  front  company 
Soviets,  and  even  trench  Soviets,  were  formed.     In 
the  cities  it  was  common  for  groups  of  soldiers 
belonging  to  the  same  company,  meeting  on  the 
streets    by    accident,    to    hold    impromptu    street 
meetings  and  form  Soviets.     There  was,  of  course, 
more  order  and  a  better  chance  to  get  representative 
delegates  when  the  meetings  were  held  in  barracks. 
Not   only  were  the  Soviets   far   from  being  re- 
sponsible  democratically  organized   representative 
bodies;  quite  as  significant  is  the  fact  that  the  depu- 
ties selected  by  the  factory-workers  were,  in  many 
instances,  not  workmen  at  all,  but  lawyers,  uni- 
versity professors,  lecturers,  authors   and  journal- 
ists, professional  politicians,  and  so  on.     Many  of 
the  men  who  played  prominent  roles  in  the  Petro- 
grad  Soviet,  for  example,  as  delegates  of  the  factory- 
workers,  were  Intellectuals  of  the  type  described. 
Any  well-known  revolutionary  leader  who  happened 
to  be  in  the  public  eye  at  the  moment  might  be 
selected  by  a  group   of  admirers  in   a  factory  as 
their   delegate.     It  was  thus  that    Kerensky,   the 
brilliant  lawyer,  found  himself  a  prominent  mem- 
ber of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  of  Workmen's  Depu- 


14  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ties,  and  that,  later  on,  Trotsky,  the  journalist,  and 
Lenin,  the  scholar,  became  equally  prominent. 

It  was  to  such  bodies  as  these  that  the  Bolsheviki 
wanted  to  transfer  all  the  power  of  the  government 
— political,  military,  and  economic.  The  leaders  of 
the  Provisional  Government,  when  they  found  their 
task  too  heavy,  urged  the  Petrograd  Soviet  to  take 
up  the  burden,  which  it  declined  to  do.  That  the 
Soviets  were  needed  in  the  existing  circumstances, 
and  that,  as  auxiliaries  to  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment and  the  Municipal  Council,  they  were  capable 
of  rendering  great  service  to  the  democratic  cause, 
can  hardly  be  questioned  by  any  one  familiar  with 
the  conditions  that  prevailed.  The  Provisional 
Government,  chosen  from  the  Duma,  was  not,  at 
first,  a  democratic  body  in  the  full  sense  of  that 
word.  It  did  not  represent  the  working-people. 
It  was  essentially  representative  of  the  bourgeoisie 
and  it  was  quite  natural,  therefore,  that  in  the 
Soviets  there  was  developed  a  very  critical  attitude 
toward  the  Provisional  Government. 

Before  very  long,  however,  the  Provisional 
Government  became  more  democratic  through  the 
inclusion  of  a  large  representation  of  the  working- 
class  parties,  men  who  were  chosen  by  and  directly 
responsible  to  the  Petrograd  Soviet.  This  arrange- 
ment meant  that  the  Soviet  had  definitely  entered 
into  co-operation  with  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment; that  in  the  interest  of  the  success  of  the 
Revolution  the  working-class  joined  hands  with 
the  bourgeoisie.  This  was  the  condition  when,  in 
the  summer  of  1917,  the  Bolsheviki  raised  the  cry 
"All  power  to  the  Soviets!"     There  was  not  even 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  15 

the    shadow   of   a    pretense    that    the    Provisional 
Government  was  either  undemocratic  or  unrepre- 
sentative.    At   the  same  time   the  new  municipal 
councils  were  functioning.     These  admirable  bodies 
had  been  elected  upon  the  basis  of  universal,  equal, 
direct,    and    secret    suffrage.     Arrangements    were 
far  advanced  for  holding — under  the  authority  of 
the  democratically  constituted  municipal  councils 
and  Zemstvos — elections  for  a  Constituent  Assem- 
bly, upon  the  same  basis  of  generous  democracy: 
universal,  equal,  direct,  and  secret  suffrage,  with 
proportional  representation.     It  will  be  seen,  there- 
fore, that  the  work  of  creating  a  thoroughly  demo- 
cratic  government   for    Russia  was   far   advanced 
and  proceeding  with  great  rapidity.     Instead  of  the 
power  of  government  being  placed  in  the  hands  of 
thoroughly  democratic   representative   bodies,  the 
Bolsheviki  wanted  it  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
hastily  improvised   and  loosely  organized  Soviets. 
At  first  the  Bolsheviki  had  professed  great  faith 
in,  and  solicitude  for,  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
urging  its  immediate  convocation.     In  view  of  their 
subsequent    conduct,    this    has    been    regarded    as 
evidence   of  their    hypocrisy    and    dishonesty.     It 
has  been  assumed  that  they  never  really  wanted  a 
Constituent    Assembly    at    all.     Of    some    of   the 
leaders  this  is  certainly  true;    of  others  it  is  only 
partially  true.     Trotsky,    Lenin,    Kamenev,   Zino- 
viev,  and  others,  during  the  months  of  June  and 
July,   1917,  opposed  the  policy  of  the  Provisional 
Government  in  making  elaborate  preparations  for 
holding  the  elections  to  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
They  demanded  immediate  convocation  of  the  Con- 


16  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

stituent  Assembly,  upon  the  basis  of  "elections" 
similar  to  those  of  the  Soviets,  knowing  well  that 
this  would  give  them  an  irresponsible  mass-meeting, 
easily  swayed  and  controlled  by  the  demagoguery 
and  political  craft  of  which  they  were  such  perfect 
masters.  Had  they  succeeded  in  their  efforts  at 
that  time,  the  Constituent  Assembly  would  not 
have  been  dispersed,  in  all  probability.  It  would 
have  been  as  useful  an  instrument  for  their  purpose 
as  the  Soviets.  When  they  realized  that  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  was  to  be  a  responsible  repre- 
sentative body,  a  deliberative  assembly,  they  be- 
gan their  agitation  to  have  its  place  taken  by 
the  Soviets.  They  were  perfectly  well  aware  that 
these  could  be  much  more  easily  manipulated  and 
controlled  by  an  aggressive  minority  than  a 
well-planned,  thoroughly  representative  assembly 
could  be. 

The  Bolsheviki  wanted  to  use  the  Soviets  as 
instruments.  In  this  simple  statement  of  fact 
there  is  implicit  a  distinction  between  Soviet  gov- 
ernment and  Bolshevism,  a  distinction  that  is  too 
often  lost  sight  of.  Bolshevism  may  be  defined 
either  as  an  end  to  be  attained — communism — or  as 
a  policy,  a  method  of  attaining  the  desired  end. 
Neither  the  Soviet  as  an  institution  nor  Soviet 
government,  as  such,  had  any  necessary  connection 
with  the  particular  goal  of  the  Bolsheviki  or  their 
methods.  That  the  Bolsheviki  in  Russia  and  in 
Hungary  have  approved  Soviet  government  as  the 
form  of  government  best  adapted  to  the  realization 
of  their  program,  and  found  the  Soviet  a  desirable 
instrument,  must  not  be  regarded  as  establishing 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  17 

either  the  identity  of  Bolshevism  and  Soviet 
government  or  a  necessary  relation  between  the 
Soviet  and  the  methods  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The 
same  instrument  is  capable  of  being  used  by  the 
conservative  as  well  as  by  the  radical. 

In  this  respect  the  Soviet  system  of  government 
is  like  ordinary  parliamentary  government.  This, 
also,  is  an  instrument  which  may  be  used  by  either 
the  reactionary  or  the  revolutionist.  The  defender 
of  land  monopoly  and  the  Single-taxer  can  both 
use  it.  To  reject  the  Soviet  system  simply  be- 
cause it  is  capable  of  being  used  to  attain  the  ends 
of  Bolshevism,  or  even  because  the  advocates  of 
Bolshevism  find  it  better  adapted  to  their  purpose 
than  the  political  systems  with  which  we  are 
familiar,  is  extremely  foolish.  Such  a  conclusion 
is  as  irrational  as  that  of  the  superficial  idealists 
who  renounce  all  faith  in  organized  government 
and  its  agencies  because  they  can  be  used  op- 
pressively, and  are  in  fact  sometimes  so  used. 

It  is  at  least  possible,  and,  in  the  judgment  of 
the  present  writer,  not  at  all  improbable,  that  the 
Soviet  system  will  prove,  in  Russia  and  elsewhere, 
inclined  to  conservatism  in  normal  circumstances. 
Trades-unions  are  capable  of  revolutionary  action, 
but  under  normal  conditions  they  incline  to  a 
cautious  conservatism.  The  difference  between  a 
trades-union  and  a  factory  Soviet  is,  primarily,  that 
the  former  groups  the  workers  of  a  trade  and  dis- 
regards the  fact  that  they  work  in  different  places, 
while  the  latter  groups  the  workers  in  a  particular 
factory  and  disregards  the  fact  that  they  pursue 
different  trades  or  grades  of  labor.     What  is  there 


18  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

in  this  difference  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that 
the  factory-unit  form  of  organization  is  more  likely 
to  adopt  communist  ideals  or  violent  methods 
than  the  other  form  of  organization?  Surely  the 
fact  that  the  Bolsheviki  have  found  it  neces- 
sary to  restrict  and  modify  the  Soviet  system, 
even  to  the  extent  of  abolishing  some  of  its  most 
important  features,  disposes  of  the  mistaken  no- 
tion that  Bolshevism  and  the  Soviet  system  are 
inseparable. 

It  is  not  without  significance  that  the  leading 
theoretician  of  Bolshevism,  Lenin,  on  the  basis  of 
pure  theory,  opposed  the  Soviets  at  first.  Nor  is 
the  fact  that  many  of  the  bitterest  opponents  of 
Bolshevism  in  Russia,  among  the  Socialists-Revo- 
lutionists, the  Mensheviki,  the  Populists,  the 
leaders  of  the  co-operatives  and  the  trades-unions, 
are  stanch  believers  in  and  defenders  of  the 
Soviet  system  of  government,  and  confidently 
believe  that  it  will  be  the  permanent  form  of 
Russian  government. 

For  reasons  which  will  be  developed  in  subse- 
quent chapters,  the  present  writer  does  not  accept 
this  view.  The  principal  objection  to  the  Soviet 
system,  as  such,  is  not  that  it  is  inseparable  from 
Bolshevism,  that  it  must  of  necessity  be  associated 
with  the  aims  and  methods  of  the  latter,  but  that — 
unless  greatly  modified  and  limited — it  must  prove 
inefficient  to  the  point  of  vital  danger  to  society. 
This  does  not  mean  that  organizations  similar  in 
structure  to  the  Soviets  can  have  no  place  in  the 
government  or  in  industrial  management.  In 
some  manner  the  democratization  of  industry  is  to 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  19 

be  attained  in  a  not  far  distant  future.  When  that 
time  comes  it  will  be  found  that  the  ideas  which 
gave  impulse  to  syndicalism  and  to  Soviet  govern- 
ment have  found  concrete  expression  in  a  form 
wholly  beneficent. 


20  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


III 

THE    SOVIETS    UNDER   THE    BOLSHEVIKI 

AFTER  the  coup  d'hat,  the  Soviets  continued  to 
■  be  elected  in  the  same  haphazard  manner  as 
before.     Even  after  the  adoption,  in  July,  191 8,  of 
the  Constitution,  which  made  the  Soviets  the  basis 
of  the  superstructure  of  governmental  power,  there 
was   no   noticeable   improvement   in   this    respect. 
Never,  at  any  time,  since  the  Bolsheviki  came  into 
power,  have  the  Soviets  attained  anything  like  a 
truly  representative  character.     The  Constitution 
of  the   Russian   Socialist   Federal  Soviet  Republic 
stamps  it  as  the  most  undemocratic  and  oligarchic 
of  the   great   modern   nations.     The   city   Soviets 
are  composed  of  delegates  elected  by  the  employees 
of  factories  and  workshops  and  by  trades  and  pro- 
fessional unions,  including  associations  of  mothers 
and  housewives.     The  Constitution  does  not  pre- 
scribe the  methods  of  election,  these  being  deter- 
mined   by   the   local   Soviets   themselves.     In   the 
industrial  centers  most  of  the  elections  take  place 
at  open  meetings  in  the  factories,  the  voting  being 
done  by  show  of  hands.     In  view  of  the  elaborate 
system  of  espionage  and  the  brutal  repression  of 
all  hostile  criticism,  it  is  easy  to  understand  that 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  21 

such  a  system  of  voting  makes  possible  and  easy 
every  form  of  corruption  and  intimidation. 

The  whole  system  of  government  resulting  from 
these  methods  proved  unrepresentative.  A  single 
illustration  will  make  this  quite  plain: 

Within  four  days  of  the  Czar's  abdication,  the 
workers  of  Perm,  in  the  Government  of  the  Urals, 
organized  a  Soviet — the  Urals  Workers'  and  Sol- 
diers' Soviet.  At  the  head  of  it,  as  president,  was 
Jandarmov,  a  machinist,  who  had  been  active  in 
the  Revolution  of  1905,  a  Soviet  worker  and  trades- 
unionist,  many  times  imprisoned  under  the  old 
regime.  This  Soviet  supplemented  and  co-operated 
with  the  Provisional  Government,  worked  for  a 
democratic  Constituent  Assembly,  and,  after  the 
first  few  days  of  excitement  had  passed,  greatly 
increased  production  in  the  factories.  But  when 
the  Bolshevist  regime  was  established,  after  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the  Government  of 
the  Urals,  with  its  four  million  inhabitants,  did  not 
represent,  even  on  the  basis  of  the  Soviet  figures, 
more  than  72,000  workers.  That  was  the  number 
of  workers  supposedly  represented  by  the  dele- 
gates of  the  Soviet  Government.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  in  that  number  was  included  the  anti-Bol- 
shevist strength,  the  workers  who  had  been  out- 
voted or  intimidated,  as  the  case  might  be.  When 
the  peasants  elected  delegates  they  were  refused 
seats,  because  they  were  known  to  be,  or  believed  to 
be,  anti-Bolshevists.  This  is  the  much-vaunted 
system  of  Soviet  "elections"  concerning  which  so 
many  of  our  self-styled  Liberals  have  been  lyrically 
eloquent. 


22  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Of  course,  even  under  the  conditions  described, 
anti-Bolshevists  were  frequently  elected  to  the 
Soviets.  It  was  a  very  general  practice,  in  the 
early  days  of  the  Bolshevist  regime,  to  quite 
arbitrarily  "cleanse"  the  Soviets  of  these  "unde- 
sirable counter-revolutionaries,"  most  of  whom 
were  Socialists.  In  December,  1917,  the  Soviets  in 
Ufa,  Saratov,  Samara,  Kazan,  and  Jaroslav  were 
compelled,  under  severe  penalties,  to  dismiss  their 
non-Bolshevist  members;  in  January,  1918,  the 
same  thing  took  place  at  Perm  and  at  Ekater- 
inburg; and  in  February,  I9i8,the  Soviets  of  Mos- 
cow and  Petrograd  were  similarly  "cleansed." 

It  was  a  very  ordinary  occurrence  for  Soviets  to 
be  suppressed  because  their  "state  of  mind"  was 
not  pleasing  to  the  Bolsheviki  in  control  of  the 
central  authority.  In  a  word,  when  a  local  Soviet 
election  resulted  in  a  majority  of  Socialists-Revo- 
lutionists or  other  non-Bolshevist  representatives 
being  chosen,  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commis- 
saries dissolved  the  Soviet  and  ordered  the  elec- 
tion of  a  new  one.  Frequently  they  used  troops 
— generally  Lettish  or  Chinese — to  enforce  their 
orders.  Numerous  examples  of  this  form  of  des- 
potism might  be  cited  from  the  Bolshevist  official 
press.  For  example,  in  April,  191 8,  the  elections 
to  the  Soviet  of  Jaroslav,  a  large  industrial  city 
north  of  Moscow,  resulted  in  a  large  majority  of 
anti-Bolshevist  representatives  being  elected.  The 
Council  of  the  People's  Commissaries  sent  Lettish 
troops  to  dissolve  the  Soviet  and  hold  a  new  "elec- 
tion." This  so  enraged  the  people  that  they  gave 
a  still  larger  majority  for  the  anti-Bolshevist  par- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  23 

ties.  Then  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commis- 
saries issued  a  decree  stating  that  as  the  working- 
class  of  Jaroslav  had  twice  proved  their  unfitness  for 
self-government  they  would  not  be  permitted  to 
have  a  Soviet  at  all!  The  town  was  proclaimed  to 
be  "a  nest  of  counter-revolutionaries."  Again  and 
again  the  workers  of  Jaroslav  tried  to  set  up  local 
self-government,  and  each  time  they  were  crushed 
by  brutal  and  bloody  violence.1 

L.  I.  Goldman,  member  of  the  Central  Committee 
of  the  Russian  Social  Democratic  Labor  Party, 
made  a  report  to  that  body  concerning  one  of  these 
Jaroslav  uprisings  in  which  he  wrote: 

The  population  of  that  city  consists  mainly  of  work- 
men. Having  the  assistance  of  a  military  organization 
under  the  leadership  of  General  Alexiev  and  General 
Savinkov,  the  laborers  of  all  the  plants  and  factories 
took  part  in  the  uprising.  Before  the  uprising  began  the 
leaders  declared  that  they  would  not  allow  it  unless  they 
had  the  sympathy  of  the  laborers  and  other  classes. 
Trotsky  sent  a  message  stating  that  if  the  revolt  could 
not  be  quelled  he  would  go  as  far  as  having  the  city  of 
Jaroslav  with  its  40,000  inhabitants  completely  destroyed. 
.  .  .  Though  surrounded  by  17,000  Red  Guards,  Jaroslav 
resisted,  but  was  finally  captured  by  the  Bolsheviki,  due 
to  the  superiority  of  their  artillery.  The  uprising  was 
suppressed  by  bloody  and  terrible  means.  The  spirit 
of  destruction  swayed  over  Jaroslav,  which  is  one  of  the 
oldest  Russian  cities. 

1  The  salient  facts  in  this  paragraph  are  condensed  from  L'Ouvrier 
Russc,  May,  1918.  See  also  Bullard,  The  Russian  Pendulum — Au- 
tocracy, Democracy,  Bolshevism,  p.  92,  for  an  account  of  the  same 
events. 


24  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Bearing  in  mind  that  the  sole  aim  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Jaroslav — led  by  Socialist  workmen — was  to 
establish  their  own  local  self-government,  the  invi- 
olability of  the  Soviet  elections,  let  us  examine  a 
few  of  the  many  reports  concerning  the  struggle 
published  in  the  official  Bolshevist  organs.  Under 
the  caption  "Official  Bulletin,"  Izvestia  published, 
on  July  21,  191 8,  this  item: 

At  Jaroslav  the  adversary,  gripped  in  the  iron  ring  of 
our  troops,   has  tried  to  enter  into  negotiations.      The 

reply  has  been  given  under  the  form  of  redoubled  artillery 
fire. 

Four  days  later,  on  July  25th,  Izvestia  published  a 
military  proclamation  addressed  to  the  inhabitants 
of  Jaroslav,  from  which  the  following  passage  is 
taken: 

The  General  Staff  notifies  to  the  population  of  Jaro- 
slav that  all  those  who  desire  to  live  are  invited  to 
abandon  the  town  in  the  course  of  twenty-four  hours  and 
to  meet  near  the  America  Bridge.  Those  who  remain 
will  be  treated  as  insurgents,  and  no  quarter  will  be  given 
to  any  one.  Heavy  artillery  fire  and  gas-bombs  will  be 
used  against  them.  All  those  who  remain  will  perish  in 
the  ruins  of  the  town  zvith  the  insurrectionists,  the  traitors, 
and  the  enemies  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Revolution. 

On  the  day  following,  July  26th,  Izvestia  pub- 
lished an  article  to  the  effect  that  "after  minute 
questionings  and  full  inquiry"  a  special  commission 
of  inquiry  appointed  to  investigate  the  Jaroslav 
insurrection   had    listed   three    hundred    and    fifty 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  25 

persons  as  having  "taken  an  active  part  in  the  in- 
surrection and  had  relations  with  the  Czecho- 
slovaks," and  that  the  commissioners  had  ordered 
the  whole  three  hundred  and  fifty  to  be  shot. 

Throughout  the  summer  the  struggle  went  on,  and 
in  the  Severnaya  Communa,  September  10,  1918,  the 
following  despatch  from  Jaroslav  was  published: 

Jar.oslav,  Qth  September. — In  the  whole  of  the  Jaroslav 
government  a  strict  registration  of  the  bourgeoisie  and 
its  partizans  has  been  organized.  Manifestly  anti-Soviet 
elements  are  being  shot;  suspected  persons  are  interned 
in  concentration  camps;  non-working  sections  of  the 
population  are  subjected  to  forced  labor. 

Here  is  further  evidence,  from  official  Bolshevist 
sources,  that  when  the  Soviet  elections  went  against 
them  the  Bolshevist  Government  simply  dissolved 
the  offending  Soviets.  Here  are  two  despatches 
from  Izvestia,  from  the  issues  of  July  28  and  August 
3,  1918,  respectively: 

Kazan,  July  26th. — As  the  important  offices  in  the 
Soviet  were  occupied  by  Socialists-Revolutionists  of  the  Left, 
the  Extraordinary  Commission  has  dissolved  the  Provisional 
Soviet.  The  governmental  pozver  is  now  represented  by  a 
Revolutionary  Committee. 

Kazan,  August  1st. — The  state  of  mind  of  the  workmen 
is  revolutionary.  //  the  Mensheviki  dare  to  carry  on  their 
propaganda  death  menaces  them. 

By  way  of  confirmation  we  have  the  following, 
from  Pravda,  August  6,  191 8: 


26  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Kazan,  August  4th. — The  Provisional  Congress  of  the 
Soviets  of  the  Peasants  has  been  dissolved  because  of 
the  absence  from  it  of  poor  peasants  and  because  its 
state  of  mind  is  obviously  counter-revolutionary. 

Whenever  a  city  Soviet  was  thus  suppressed  a 
military  revolutionary  committee,  designated  by 
the  Bolsheviki,  was  set  up  in  its  place.  To  these 
committees  the  most  arbitrary  powers  were  given. 
Generally  composed  of  young  soldiers  from  distant 
parts,  over  whom  there  was  practically  no  restraint, 
these  committees  frequently  indulged  in  frightful 
acts  of  violence  and  spoliation.  Not  infrequently 
the  Central  Government,  after  disbanding  a  local 
Soviet,  would  send  from  places  hundreds  of  miles 
away,  under  military  protection,  members  of  the 
Communist  Party,  who  were  designated  as  the 
executive  committee  of  the  Soviet  for  that  locality. 
There  was  not  even  a  pretense  that  they  had  been 
elected  by  anybody.  Thus  it  was  in  Tumen:  Pro- 
tected by  a  convoy  of  eight  hundred  Red  Guards, 
who  remained  there  to  enforce  their  authority,  a 
group  of  members  of  the  Communist  Party  arrived 
from  Ekaterinburg  and  announced  that  they  were 
the  executive  committee  of  the  Soviet  of  Tumen 
where,  in  fact,  no  Soviet  existed.  This  was  not  at 
all  an  unusual  occurrence. 

The  suppression  by  force  of  those  Soviets  which 
were  not  absolutely  subservient  to  the  Central 
Bolshevik  Government  went  on  as  long  as  there 
were  any  such  Soviets.  This  was  especially  true 
in  the  rural  villages  among  the  peasantry.  The  fol- 
lowing statement  is  by  an  English  trades-unionist, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  27 

H.  V.  Keeling,  a  member  of  the  Lithographic 
Artists'  and  Engravers'  Society  (an  English  trades- 
union),  who  worked  in  Russia  for  five  years — 
1914-19: 

In  the  villages  conditions  were  often  quite  good,  due 
to  the  forming  of  a  local  Soviet  by  the  inhabitants  who 
were  not  Bolshevik.  The  villagers  elected  the  men 
whom  they  knew,  and  as  long  as  they  were  left  alone 
things  proceeded  much  as  usual. 

Soon,  however,  a  whisper  would  reach  the  district 
Commissar  that  the  Soviet  was  not  politically  straight; 
he  would  then  come  with  some  Red  soldiers  and  dissolve 
the  committee  and  order  another  election,  often  im- 
porting Bolshevik  supporters  from  the  towns,  and  these 
men  the  villagers  were  instructed  to  elect  as  their  com- 
mittee. Resistance  was  often  made  and  an  army  of 
Red  Guards  sent  to  break  it  down.  Pitched  battles 
often  took  place,  and  in  one  case  of  which  I  can  speak 
from  personal  knowledge  twenty-one  of  the  inhabitants 
were  shot,  including  the  local  telegraph-girl  operator  who 
had  refused  to  telegraph  for  reinforcements. 

The  practice  of  sending  young  soldiers  into  the  vil- 
lages which  were  not  Bolshevik  was  very  general;  care 
was  taken  to  send  men  who  did  not  come  from  the  dis- 
trict, so  that  any  scruples  might  be  overcome.  Even 
then  it  would  happen  that  after  the  soldiers  had  got  food 
they  would  make  friends  with  the  people,  and  so  compel 
the  Commissar  to  send  for  another  set  of  Red  Guards.1 

In  the  chapter  dealing  with  the  relation  of  the 
Bolsheviki  to  the  peasants  and  the  land  question 
abundant  corroboration  of  Mr.  Keeling's  testimony 
is  given.     The  Bolsheviki  have,  however,  found  an 

1  Bolshevism,  by  H.  V.  Keeling,  pp.  185-186. 


28  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

easier  way  to  insure  absolute  control  of  the  Soviets: 
as  a  general  rule  they  do  not  depend  upon  these 
crude  methods  of  violence.  Instead,  they  have 
adopted  the  delightfully  simple  method  of  per- 
mitting no  persons  to  be  placed  in  nomination 
whose  names  are  not  approved  by  them.  As  a 
first  step  the  anti-Bolshevist  parties,  such  as  the 
Menshevist  Social  Democrats,  Socialists-Revolu* 
tionists  of  the  Right  and  Center,  and  the  Constitu- 
tional Democrats,  were  excluded  by  the  issuance  of 
a  decree  that  "the  right  to  nominate  candidates  be- 
longs exclusively  to  the  parties  of  electors  which 
file  the  declaration  that  they  acknowledge  the 
Soviet  authorities." 

The  following  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  All- 
Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  on  June 
14,  1918: 

The  representatives  of  the  Social  Revolutionary  Party 
(the  Right  wing  and  the  Center)  are  excluded,  and  at  the 
same  time  all  Soviets  of  Workers',  Soldiers',  Peasants', 
and  Cossacks'  Deputies  are  recommended  to  expel  from 
their  midst  all  representatives  of  this  faction. 

This  resolution,  which  was  duly  carried  into  effect, 
was  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  clause  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  Soviet  Republic  which  pro- 
vides that  "guided  by  the  interests  of  the  working- 
class  as  a  whole,  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal 
Soviet  Republic  deprives  all  individuals  and  groups 
of  rights  which  could  be  utilized  by  them  to  the 
detriment  of  the  Socialist  Revolution."  Thus  en- 
;  tire  political  parties  have  been  excluded  from  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  29 

Soviets  by  the  party  in  power.  It  is  a  noteworthy  ] 
fact  that  many  of  those  persons  in  this  country, 
Socialists  and  others,  who  have  been  most  vigorous 
in  denouncing  the  expulsion  from  the  New  York 
Legislature  of  the  elected  representatives  of  the 
Socialist  Party  are,  at  the  same  time,  vigorous  j 
supporters  of  the  Bolsheviki.  Comment  upon  the 
lack  of  moral  and  intellectual  integrity  thus  mani- 
fested is  unnecessary. 

Let  us  consider  the  testimony  of  three  other 
witnesses  of  unquestionable  competence:  J.  E. 
Oupovalov,  chairman  of  the  Votkinsk  Metal 
Workers'  Union,  is  a  Social  Democrat,  a  working- 
man.  He  was  a  member  of  the  local  Soviet  of 
Nizhni-Novgorod.  Three  times  under  Czar  Nich- 
olas II  this  militant  Socialist  and  trades-unionist 
was  imprisoned  for  his  activities  on  behalf  of  his 
class.  Here,  then,  is  a  witness  who  is  at  once  a 
Russian,  a  Socialist,  a  trades-unionist,  and  a  wage- 
worker,  and  he  writes  of  matters  of  which  he  has 
intimate  personal  knowledge.  He  does  not  indulge 
in  generalities,  but  is  precise  and  specific  in  his 
references  to  events,  places,  and  dates: 

In  February,  1919,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  shameful 
Brest-Litovsk  Treaty,  the  Soviet  of  Workmen's  Dele- 
gates met  in  Nizhni-Novgorod  for  the  purpose  of  elect- 
ing delegates  to  the  All-Russian  Congress,  which  would 
be  called  upon  to  decide  the  question  of  peace.  The 
Bolsheviks  and  the  Left  Social-Revolutionaries  obtained 
a  chance  majority  of  two  votes  in  the  Soviet.  Taking 
advantage  of  this,  they  deprived  the  Social  Democrats  and 
Right  Social-Revolutionaries  of  the  right  to  take  part  in 
the  election  of  delegates.     The  expelled  members  of  the 

3 


30  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Soviet  assembled  at  a  separate  meeting  and  decided  to 
elect  independently  a  proportionate  number  of  dele- 
gates. But  the  Bolsheviks  immediately  sent  a  band  of 
armed  Letts  and  we  were  dispersed. 

In  March,  1918,  the  Sormovo  workmen  demanded 
the  re-election  of  the  Soviet.  After  a  severe  struggle  the 
re-elections  took  place,  the  Mensheviks  and  the  Social- 
Revolutionaries  obtaining  a  majority.  But  the  former 
Bolshevist  Soviet  refused  to  hand  over  the  management  to 
the  newly  elected  body,  and  the  latter  zvas  dispersed  by 
armed  Red  Guards  on  April  8th.  Similar  events  took  place 
in  Nizhni-Novgorod,  Kovrov,  Izhevsk,  Kolo'ma,  and 
other  places.  Who,  therefore,  would  venture  to  assert 
that  power  in  Russia  belongs  to  the  Soviets? 

Equally  pertinent  and  impressive  is  the  testimony 
of  J.  Strumillo,  also  a  Social  Democrat  and  trades- 
unionist.  This  militant  working-man  is  a  member 
of  the  Social  Democratic  Party,  to  which  both 
Lenin  and  Trotsky  formerly  belonged.  He  is  also 
a  wage-worker,  an  electric  fitter.  He  is  an  official 
of  the  Metal  Workers'  Union  and  a  member  of  the 
Hospital  Funds  Board  for  the  town  of  Perm.  He 
says: 

.  .  .  the  Labor  masses  began  to  draw  away  from  Bol- 
shevism. This  became  particularly  evident  after  the 
Brest-Litovsk  Peace,  which  exposed  the  treacherous  way 
in  which  the  Bolsheviks  had  handed  over  the  Russian 
people  to  the  German  Junkers.  Everywhere  re-elections 
began  to  take  place  for  the  Soviets  of  Workmen's  Dele- 
gates and  for  the  trades-unions.  On  seeing  that  the 
workmen  were  withdrawing  from  them,  the  Bolsheviks 
started  by  forbidding  the  re-elections  to  be  held,  and 
finally  declared  that  Cue  Bolsheviks  alone  had  the  right  to 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  31 

elect  and  be  elected.  Thus  an  enormous  number  of  workmen 
ivere  disfranchised.  .  .  .  The  year  1918  saw  the  complete 
suppression  of  the  Labor  movement  and  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party.  All  over  Russia  an  order  was  issued 
from  Moscow  to  exclude  representatives  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party  from  the  Soviets,  and  the  party  itself  was 
declared  illegal. 

V.  M.  Zenzinov,  a  member  of  the  Central  Com- 
mittee of  the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists, 
came  to  this  country  in  February,  1919,  and  spent 
several  weeks,  during  which  time  the  present  writer 
made  his  acquaintance.  Zenzinov  was  many  times 
arrested  under  czarism  for  his  revolutionary  ac- 
tivities, and  more  than  once  sent  into  Siberian 
exile.  He  was  a  member  of  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly, and  later,  in  September,  191 8,  at  the  Ufa 
Conference,  was  elected  member  of  the  Directory. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Directory  was 
forcibly  overthrown  and  the  Kolchak  Government 
set  up  in  its  place.  Zenzinov  is  an  anti-Bolshevik, 
but  his  testimony  is  not  to  be  set  aside  on  that 
account.  He  says:  "The  Soviet  Government  is 
not  even  a  true  Soviet  regime,  for  the  Bolsheviki 
have  expelled  the  representatives  of  all  the  other 
political  parties  from  the  Soviets,  either  by  force  or 
by  other  similar  means.  The  Soviet  Government 
is  a  government  of  the  Bolshevist  Party,  pure  and 
simple;  it  is  a  party  dictatorship — not  even  a  dic- 
tatorship of  the  proletariat." 

The  apologists  for  the  Bolsheviki  in  this  country 
have  frequently  denied  the  charge  that  the  Soviets 
were  thus  packed  and  that  anti-Bolshevist  parties 
were  not  given  equal  rights  to  secure  representation 


32  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

in  them.  Of  the  facts  there  can  be  no  question, 
but  it  is  interesting  to  find  such  a  well-known  pro- 
Bolshevist  writer  as  Mr.  Arthur  Ransome  stating, 
in  the  London  Daily  News,  January  n,  1919,  that 
"the  Mensheviki  now  stand  definitely  on  the 
Soviet  platform"  and  that  "a  decree  has  accord- 
ingly been  passed  readmitting  them  to  the  Soviets." 
Does  not  the  statement  that  a  decree  had  been 
passed  "readmitting"  this  Socialist  faction  to  the 
Soviets  constitute  an  admission  that  until  the 
passing  of  the  decree  mentioned  that  faction,  at 
least,  had  been  denied  representation  in  the  Soviets? 
Yet  this  same  Mr.  Ransome,  in  view  of  this  fact, 
which  was  well  known  to  most  students  of  Russian 
conditions,  and  of  which  he  can  hardly  have  been 
ignorant,  addressed  his  eloquent  plea  to  the  people 
of  America  on  behalf  of  the  Soviet  Government  as 
the  true  representative  of  the  Russian  people! 

Even  the  trades-unions  are  not  wholly  assured 
of  the  right  of  representation  in  the  Soviets.  Only 
"if  their  declared  relations  to  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment are  approved  by  the  Soviet  authorities"  can 
they  vote  or  nominate  candidates.  Trades-unions 
may  solemnly  declare  that  they  "acknowledge  the 
Soviet  authorities,"  but  if  their  immediate  rela- 
tions with  the  People's  Commissaries  are  not  good — 
if  they  are  engaged  in  strikes,  for  example — there 
is  little  chance  of  their  getting  the  approval  of  the 
Soviet  authorities,  without  which  they  cannot 
vote.  Finally,  no  union,  party,  faction,  or  group 
can  nominate  whomever  it  pleases;  all  candidates 
must  be  acceptable  to,  and  approved  by,  the  central 
authority! 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  33 

Numerous  witnesses  have  testified  that  the 
Soviets  under  Bolshevism  are  "packed";  that 
they  are  not  freely  elected  bodies,  in  many  cases. 
Thus  H.  V.  Keeling  writes: 

The  elections  for  the  various  posts  in  our  union  and 
local  Soviet  were  an  absolute  farce.  I  had  a  vote  and 
naturally  consulted  with  friends  whom  to  vote  for. 
They  laughed  at  me  and  said  it  was  all  arranged,  "we 
have  been  told  who  to  vote  for."  I  knew  some  of  these 
"nominated"  men  quite  well,  and  will  go  no  farther  than 
saying  that  they  were  not  the  best  workmen.  It  is  a 
simple  truth  that  no  one  except  he  be  a  Bolshevik  was 
allowed  to  be  elected  for  any  post.1 

In  A  Memorandum  on  Certain  Aspects  of  the 
Bolshevist  Movement  in  Russia,  published  by  the 
State  Department  of  the  United  States,  January, 
1920,  the  following  statement  by  an  unnamed 
Russian  appears  in  a  report  dated  July  2,  1919: 

Discontent  and  hatred  against  the  Bolsheviks  are 
now  so  strong  that  a  shock  or  the  knowledge  of  approach- 
ing help  would  suffice  to  make  the  people  rise  and  anni- 
hilate the  Communists.  Considering  this  discontent 
and  hatred,  it  would  seem  that  elections  to  different 
councils  should  produce  candidates  of  other  parties. 
Nevertheless  all  councils  consist  of  Communists.  The 
explanation  is  very  plain.  That  freedom  of  election  of 
which  the  Bolsheviks  write  and  talk  so  much  consists 
in  the  free  election  of  certain  persons,  a  list  of  which 
had  already  been  prepared.  For  instance,  if  in  one 
district  six  delegates  have  to  be  elected,  seven  to  eight 

1  Keeling,  op.  cit.,  p.  159. 


34  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

names  are  mentioned,  of  which  six  can  he  chosen.  Very 
characteristic  in  this  respect  were  the  elections  February 

last  in  the  district  of ,  Moscow  Province,  where  I 

have  one  of  my  estates.  Nearly  all  voters,  about  200, 
of  which  twelve  Communists,  came  to  the  district  town. 
Seven  delegates  had  to  be  elected  and  only  seven  names 
were  on  the  prepared  list,  naturally  all  Communists. 
The  local  Soviet  invited  the  twelve  communistic  voters  to 
a  house,  treated  them  with  food,  tea,  and  sugar,  and  gave 
each  ten  rubles  per  day;  the  others  received  nothing,  not 
even  housing.  But  they,  knowing  what  they  had  to  ex- 
pect from  former  experiences,  had  provided  for  such  an 
emergency  and  decided  to  remain  to  the  end.  The  day 
of  election  was  fixed  and  put  off  from -day  to  day.  After 
four  postponements  the  Soviet  saw  no  way  out.  The 
result  was  that  the  seven  delegates  elected  by  all  against 
twelve  votes  belonged  to  the  Octobrists  and  Constitu- 
tional-Democrats. But  these  seven  and  a  number  of  the 
wealthier  voters  were  immediately  arrested  as  agitators 
against  the  Soviet  Republic.  New  elections  were  an 
nounced  three  days  later,  but  this  time  the  place  was  sur- 
rounded by  machine-guns.  The  next  day  official  papers 
announced  the  unanimous  election  of  Communists  in  the 
district  of  Verea.  After  a  short  time  peasant  revolts 
started.  To  put  down  these,  Chinese  and  Letts  were 
sent  and  about  300  peasants  were  killed.  Then  began 
arrests,  but  it  is  not  known  how  many  were  executed. 

Finally,  there  is  the  testimony  of  the  workman, 
Menshekov,  member  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party,  who  was  himself  given  an  important  posi- 
tion in  one  of  the  largest  factories  of  Russia,  the 
Ijevsky  factory,  in  the  Urals,  when  the  Bolsheviki 
assumed  control.  This  simple  workman  was  not, 
and    is   not,    a    "reactionary   monarchist,"    but    a 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  35 

Social  Democrat.  He  belonged  to  the  same  party 
as  Lenin  and  Trotsky  until  the  withdrawal  of 
these  men  and  their  followers  and  the  creation  of 
the  Communist  Party.     Menshekov  says: 

One  of  the  principles  which  the  Bolsheviki  proposed 
is  rule  by  the  Workers'  Councils.  In  June,  191 8,  we 
were  told  to  elect  one  of  135  delegates.  We  did,  and  only 
fifty  pro-Bolsheviki  got  in.  The  Bolshevist  Government 
was  dissatisfied  with  this  result  and  ordered  a  second  election. 
This  time  only  twenty  pro-Bolsheviki  were  elected. 
Now,  I  happen  to  have  been  elected  a  member  of  this 
Workers'  Council,  from  which  I  was  further  elected  to 
sit  on  the  Executive  Council.  According  to  the  Bol- 
sheviki's  own  principle,  the  Executive  Council  has  to 
do  the  whole  administration.  Everything  is  under  it. 
But  the  Bolshevist  Government  withheld  this  right  from 
us.  For  two  weeks  we  sat  and  did  nothing;  then  the 
Bolsheviki  solved  the  problem  for  themselves.  They 
arrested  some  of  us — I  was  arrested  myself — and,  in- 
stead of  an  elected  Council,  the  Red  Government  appointed 
a  Council  of  selected  Communists,  and  formed  there,  as 
everywhere,  a  special  privileged  class.1 

All  such  charges  have  been  scouted  by  the  de- 
fenders of  the  Bolsheviki  in  this  country  and  in 
England.  On  March  22,  1919,  the  Dyelo  Naroda, 
organ  of  the  Socialists-Revolutionists,  reproduced 
the  following  official  document,  which  fully  sustains 
the  accusation  that  the  ordering  of  the  "election" 
of  certain  persons  to  important  offices  is  not  "an 
invention  of  the  capitalist  press": 

1  Menshekov's  account  is  from  a  personal  communication  to  the 
present  writer,  who  has  carefully  verified  the  statements  made  in  it. 


3G  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Order  of  the  Department  of  Information  and  Instruc- 
tion of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  of  Work- 
ers' and  Peasants'  Delegates  of  the  Melenkovski  District: 

No.  994.     Town  of  Melenki  (Prov.  of  Vladimir) 

Feb.  25,   1919 
To  the  Voinovo  Agricultural  Council: 

The  Provincial  Department  instructs  you,  on  the  basis 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  Soviet  (Russian  Socialist 
Federative  Soviet  Republic),  Section  43,  Sub-section 
6,  letter  a,  to  proceed  without  fail  with  elections  for  an 
Agricultural  Executive  Committee. 

The  following  must  be  elected  to  the  committee:  As 
president,  Nikita  Riabov;  as  member,  Ivan  Soloviev; 
and  as  secretary,  Alexander  Krainov.  These  people, 
as  may  be  gathered  from  the  posts  to  which  they  are 
named,  must  be  elected  without  fail.  The  non-fulfilment 
of  this  Order  will  result  in  those  responsible  being 
severely  punished.  Acknowledge  the  carrying  out  of 
these  instructions  to  Provincial  Headquarters  by  ex- 
press. 

Head  of  Provincial  Section. 
I  Signed]  J.  Nazarov. 

Surely  there  never  was  a  greater  travesty  of 
representative  government  than  this — not  even 
under  czarism!  This  is  worse  than  anything  that 
obtained  in  the  old  "rotten  boroughs"  of  England 
before  the  great  Reform  Act.  Yet  our  "Liberals" 
and  "Radicals"  hail  this  vicious  reactionary 
despotism  with  gladness. 

If  it  be  thought  that  the  judgment  of  the  present 
writer  is  too  harsh,,  he  is  quite  content  to  rest  upon 
the  judgment  pronounced  by  such  a  sympathizer 
as  Mr.  Isaac  Don  Levine  has  shown  himself  to  be. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  37 

In  the  New  York  Globe,  January  5,  1920,  Mr. 
Levine  said:  "To-day  Soviet  Russia  is  a  dictator- 
ship, not  of  the  proletariat,  but  for  the  proletariat. 
It  certainly  is  not  democracy."  And  again:  "The 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in  Russia  is  really  a 
dictatorship  of  the  Bolshevist  or  Communist  Party. 
This  is  the  great  change  wrought  in  Soviet  Russia 
since  191 8.  The  Soviets  ceased  functioning  as  par- 
liamentary  bodies.  Soviet  elections,  which  were 
frequent  in  1918,  are  very  rare  now.  In  Russia, 
where  things  are  moving  so  fast  and  opinions  are 
changing  so  rapidly,  the  majority  of  the  present 
Soviets  are  obsolete  and  do  not  represent  the 
present  view  of  the  masses." 

If  the  government  is  really  a  dictatorship  of  the 
Communist  Party — which  does  not  include  in  its 
membership  1  per  cent,  of  the  people  of  Russia — 
if  the  Soviets  have  ceased  functioning  as  parlia- 
mentary bodies,  if  the  majority  of  the  Soviets  are 
obsolete  and  do  not  represent  the  present  view  of 
the  masses,  the  condemnation  expressed  in  this 
chapter  is  completely  justified. 


38  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


IV 

THE    UNDEMOCRATIC   SOVIET   STATE 

MR.  LINCOLN  STEFFENS  is  a  most  amiable 
idealist  who  possesses  an  extraordinary  genius 
for  idealizing  commonplace  and  even  sordid  realities. 
He  can  always  readily  idealize  a  perfectly  rotten 
egg  into  a  perfectly  good  omelet.  It  is  surely  sig- 
nificant that,  in  spite  of  his  very  apparent  efforts 
to  justify  and  even  glorify  the  Soviet  Government 
and  the  men  who  have  imposed  it  upon  Russia, 
even  Mr.  Steffens  has  to  admit  its  autocratic 
character.     He  says: 

The  soviet  form  of  government,  which  sprang  up  so 
spontaneously  all  over  Russia,  is  established. 

This  is  not  a  paper  thing;  not  an  invention.  Never 
planned,  it  has  not  yet  been  written  into  the  forms 
of  law.  It  is  not  even  uniform.  It  is  full  of  faults  and 
difficulties;  clumsy,  and  in  its  final  development  it  is  not 
democratic.  The  present  Russian  Government  is  the 
most  autocratic  government  I  have  ever  seen.  Lenin, 
head  of  the  Soviet  Government,  is  farther  removed  from 
the  -people  than  the  Czar  was,  or  than  any  actual  ruler  in 
Europe  is. 

The  people  in  a  shop  or  an  industry  are  a  soviet. 
These,  little  informal  Soviets  elect  a  local  soviet;  which 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  39 

elects  delegates  to  the  city  or  country  (community) 
soviet;  which  elects  delegates  to  the  government  (State) 
soviet.  The  government  Soviets  together  elect  delegates 
to  the  All-Russian  Soviet,  which  elects  commissionnaires 
(who  correspond  to  our  Cabinet,  or  to  a  European 
minority).  And  these  commissionnaires  finally  elect 
Lenin.  He  is  thus  five  or  six  removes  from  the  people. 
To  form  an  idea  of  his  stability,  independence,  and  power, 
think  of  the  process  that  would  have  to  be  gone  through 
with  by  the  people  to  remove  him  and  elect  a  successor. 
A  majority  of  all  the  Soviets  in  all  Russia  would  have  to 
be  changed  in  personnel  or  opinion,  recalled,  or  brought 
somehow  to  recognize  and  represent  the  altered  will  of 
the  people.1 

This  is  a  very  moderate  estimate  of  the  govern- 
ment which  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and  their  associates 
have  imposed  upon  Russia  by  the  old  agencies — 
blood  and  iron.  Mr.  StefFens  is  not  quite  accurate 
in  his  statement  that  the  Soviet  form  of  government 
"has  not  yet  been  written  into  the  forms  of  law." 
The  report  from  which  the  above  passage  is  quoted 
bears  the  date  of  April  2,  1919;  at  that  time  there 
was  in  existence,  and  widely  known  even  outside 
of  Russia,  the  Constitution  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federal  Soviet  Republic,  which  purports  to  be  "the 
Soviet  form  of  government  .  .  .  written  into  the 
forms  of  law."  Either  it  is  that  or  it  is  a  mass 
of  meaningless  verbiage.  There  existed,  too,  at 
that  time,  a  very  plethora  of  laws  which  purported 
to  be  the  written  forms  of  Soviet  government,  and 

1  Report  of  Lincoln  StefFens,  laid  before  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  of  the  United  States  Senate,  September,  1919.  Published  in 
The  Bullitt  Missio,,  to  Russia,  pp.   m-112.     Italics  mine. 


40  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

as  such  were  published  by  the  Bolshevist  Govern- 
ment of  Russia.  The  Fundamental  Law  of  So- 
cialization of  the  Land,  which  went  into  effect  in 
September,  1918;  the  law  decreeing  the  Abolition 
of  Classes  and  Ranks,  dated  November  10,  1917; 
the  law  creating  Regional  and  Local  Boards  of 
National  Economy,  dated  December  23,  1917;  the 
law  creating  The  People's  Court,  November  24, 
1917;  the  Marriage  and  Divorce  Laws,  December 
18,  191 7;  the  Eight  Hour  Law,  October  29,  1917, 
and  the  Insurance  Law,  November  29,  1917,  are 
a  few  of  the  bewildering  array  of  laws  and  decrees 
which  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Soviet  form  of 
government  has  "been  written  into  the  forms  of 
law." 

It  is  in  no  hypercritical  spirit  that  attention  is 
called  to  this  rather  remarkable  error  in  the  report 
of  Mr.  Steffens.  It  is  because  the  Soviet  form  of 
government  has  "been  written  into  the  forms  of 
law"  with  so  much  thoroughness  and  detail  that  we 
are  enabled  to  examine  Bolshevism  at  its  best,  as 
its  protagonists  have  conceived  it,  and  not  merely 
as  it  appears  in  practice,  in  its  experimental  stage, 
with  all  its  mistakes,  abuses,  and  failures.  After 
all,  a  written  constitution  is  a  formulation  of  certain 
ideals  to  be  attained  and  certain  principles  to  be 
applied  as  well  as  very  imperfect  human  beings 
can  do  it.  Given  a  worthy  ideal,  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  make  generous  allowance  for  the  deficiencies 
of  practice;  to  believe  that  these  would  be  pro- 
gressively overcome  and  more  or  less  constant  and 
steady  progress  made  in  the  direction  of  the  ideal. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  the  ideal  itself  is  inferior 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  41 

to  the  practice,  when  by  reason  of  the  good  sense 
and  sound  morality  of  the  people  the  actual  po- 
litical life  proves  superior  to  the  written  constitu- 
tion and  laws,  it  is  not  difficult  to  appreciate  the 
fact.  In  such  circumstances  we  are  not  compelled 
to  discredit  the  right  practice  in  order  to  condemn 
the  wrong  theory.  It  is  true  that  as  a  general 
rule  mankind  sets  its  ideals  beyond  its  imme- 
diate reach;  but  it  is  also  true  that  men  some- 
times surpass  their  ideals.  Most  men's  creeds 
are  superior  to  their  deeds,  but  there  are  many 
men  whose  deeds  are  .vastly  better  than  their 
creeds. 

Similarly,  while  the  political  life  of  nations  gen- 
erally falls  below  the  standards  set  in  their  formal 
constitutions  and  laws,  exceptions  to  this  rule  are 
by  no  means  rare.  Constitutions  are  generally 
framed  by  political  theorists  and  idealists  whose 
inveterate  habit  it  is  to  overrate  the  mental  and 
moral  capacity  of  the  great  majority  of  human 
beings  and  to  underrate  the  force  of  selfishness, 
ignorance,  and  other  defects  of  imperfect  humanity. 
On  the  other  hand,  constitutions  have  sometimes 
been  framed  by  selfish  and  ignorant  despots,  in- 
ferior in  character  and  intelligence  to  the  majority 
of  the  human  beings  to  be  governed  by  the  con- 
stitutions so  devised.  Under  the  former  conditions 
political  realities  fail  to  attain  the  high  levels  of  the 
ideals;  under  the  latter  conditions  they  rise  above 
them.  Finally,  people  outgrow  constitutions  as 
they  outgrow  most  other  political  devices  and  so- 
cial arrangements.  In  old  civilizations  it  is  com- 
mon  to    find    political    life    upon    a   higher    level 


42  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

than  the  formal  constitutions,  which,  unrepealed 
and  unamended,  have  in  fact  become  obsolete,  ig- 
nored by  the  people  of  a  wiser  and  more  generous 
age. 

The  writer  of  these  pages  fully  believes  that  the 
political  reality  in  Russia  is  already  better  than  the 
ignoble  ideal  set  by  the  Bolshevist  constitution. 
The  fundamental  virtues  of  the  Russian  people, 
their  innate  tolerance,  their  democracy,  and  their 
shrewd  sense  have  mitigated,  and  tend  to  increas- 
ingly mitigate,  the  rigors  of  the  new  autocracy. 
Once  more  it  is  demonstrated  that  "man  is  more 
than  constitutions";  that  adequate  resources  of 
human  character  can  make  a  tolerable  degree  of 
comfort  possible  under  any  sort  of  constitution, 
just  as  lack  of  those  resources  can  make  life  intoler- 
able under  the  best  constitution  ever  devised. 
Men  have  attained  a  high  degree  of  civilization  and 
comfort  in  spite  of  despotically  conceived  constitu- 
tions, and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  evils  of  Tammany 
Hall  under  a  Tweed  developed  in  spite  of  a  consti- 
tution conceived  in  a  spirit  more  generous  than  any 
modern  nation  had  hitherto  known.  Great  spiritual 
and  moral  forces,  whose  roots  are  deeply  embedded 
in  the  soil  of  historical  development,  are  shaping 
Russia's  life.  Already  there  is  discernible  much 
that  is  better  than  anything  in  the  constitution 
imposed  upon  her. 

A  more  or  less  vague  perception  of  this  fact  has 
led  to  much  muddled  thinking;  because  the  char- 
acter of  the  Russian  people  and  the  political  and 
economic  conditions  prevailing  have  led  to  a  general 
disregard  of  much  of  Bolshevist   theory,   because 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  43 

men  and  women  in  Russia  are  finding  it  possible 
to  set  aside  certain  elements  of  Bolshevism,  and 
thereby  attain  increasingly  tolerable  conditions  of 
life,  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  Bolshevism  is  less 
evil  than  we  feared  it  to  be.  To  call  this  "muddled 
thinking"  is  to  put  a  strain  upon  charity  of  judg- 
ment. The  facts  are  not  capable  of  such  interpreta- 
tion by  minds  disciplined  by  the  processes  of  straight 
and  clear  thinking.  What  they  prove  is  that, 
fortunately  for  mankind,  the  wholesomeness  of  the 
thought  and  character  of  the  average  Russian  has 
proved  too  strong  to  be  overcome  by  the  false 
ideas  and  ideals  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  their  con- 
trivances. The  Russian  people  live,  not  because 
they  have  found  good  in  Bolshevism,  but  because 
they  have  found  means  to  circumvent  Bolshevism 
and  set  it  aside.  What  progress  is  being  made 
in  Russia  to-day  is  not  the  result  of  Bolshevism, 
but  of  the  growing  power  of  those  very  qualities 
of  mind  and  heart  which  Bolshevism  sought  to 
destroy. 

Bolshevism  is  autocratic  and  despotic  in  its  es- 
sence. Whoever  believes — as  the  present  writer 
does— that  the  only  rational  and  coherent  hope  for 
the  progress  of  civilization  lies  in  the  growth  of 
democracy  must  reject  Bolshevism  and  all  its 
works  and  ways.  It  is  well  to  remember  that  what- 
ever there  is  of  freedom  and  good  will  in  Russia, 
of  democratic  growth,  exists  in  fundamental  de- 
fiance and  antagonism  to  Bolshevism  and  would  be 
crushed  if  the  triumph  of  the  latter  became  com- 
plete. It  is  still  necessary,  therefore,  to  judge 
Bolshevism  by  its  ideal  and  the  logical  implications 


44  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  its  ideal;  not  by  what  results  where  it  is  made 
powerless  by  moral  or  economic  forces  which  it  can- 
not overcome,  but  by  what  it  aims  at  doing  and 
will  do  if  possible.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we 
must  subject  the  constitution  of  Bolshevist  Russia 
to  careful  analysis  and  scrutiny.  In  this  document 
the  intellectual  leaders  of  Bolshevism  have  set 
forth  in  the  precise  terms  of  organic  law  the  manner 
in  which  they  would  reconstruct  the  state. 

In  considering  the  political  constitution  of  any 
nation  the  believer  in  democratic  government  seeks 
first  of  all  to  know  the  extent  and  nature  of  the 
franchise  of  its  citizens,  how  it  is  obtained,  what 
power  it  has,  and  how  it  is  exercised.  The  almost 
uniform  experience  of  those  nations  which  have  de- 
veloped free  and  responsible  self-government  has 
led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ultimate  sovereignty 
of  the  citizens  must  be  absolute;  that  suffrage  must 
be  equal,  universal,  direct,  and  free;  that  it  must 
be  exercised  under  conditions  which  do  not  permit 
intimidation,  coercion,  or  fraud,  and  that,  finally, 
the  mandate  of  the  citizens  so  expressed  must  be 
imperative.  The  validity  of  these  conclusions  may 
not  be  absolute;  it  is  at  least  conceivable  that  they 
may  be  revised.  For  that  matter,  a  reversion  to 
aristocracy  is  conceivable,  highly  improbable  though 
it  may  be.  With  these  uniform  results  of  the  ex- 
perience of  many  nations  as  our  criteria,  let  us  ex- 
amine the  fundamental  suffrage  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet 
Republic  and  the  provisions  relating  to  elections. 
These  are  all  set  forth  in  Article  IV,  Chapters  XIII 
to  XV,  inclusive: 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  45 

Chapter  XIII 

Article  IV 

THE    RIGHT   TO    VOTE 

64.  The  right  to  vote  and  to  be  elected  to  the  Soviets 
is  enjoyed  by  the  following  citizens  of  both  sexes,  irre- 
spective of  religion,  nationality,  domicile,  etc.,  of  the 
Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic,  who  shall 
have  completed  their  eighteenth  year  by  the  day  of 
election: 

(a)  All  who  have  acquired  the  means  of  livelihood 
through  labor  that  is  productive  and  useful  to  society, 
and  also  persons  engaged  in  housekeeping  which  enables 
the  former  to  do  productive  work,  i.e.,  laborers  and 
employees  of  all  classes  who  are  employed  in  indus- 
try, trade,  agriculture,  etc.,  and  peasants  and  Cossack 
agricultural  laborers  who  employ  no  help  for  the  purpose 
of  making  profits. 

(b)  Soldiers  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  Soviets. 

(c)  Citizens  of  the  two  preceding  categories  who  have 
in  any  degree  lost  their  capcity  to  work. 

Note  1:  Local  Soviets  may,  upon  approval  of  the 
central  power,  lower  the  age  standard  mentioned  herein. 

Note  2:  Non-citizens  mentioned  in  Section  20  (Article 
II,  Chapter  V)  have  the  right  to  vote. 

65.  The  following  persons  enjoy  neither  the  right  to 
vote  nor  the  right  to  be  voted  for,  even  though  they 
!>•  long  to  one  of  the  categories  enumerated  above, 
namely: 

(a)  Persons  who  employ  hired  labor  in  order  to  obtain 
from  it  an  increase  in  profits. 

(b)  Persons  who  have  an  income  without  doing  any 
4 


46  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

work,  such  as  interest  from  capital,  receipts  from  prop- 
erty, etc. 

(c)  Private  merchants,  trade  and  commercial  brokers. 

(d)  Monks  and  clergy  of  all  denominations. 

(e)  Employees  and  agents  of  the  former  police,  the 
gendarme  corps,  and  the  Okhrana  (Czar's  secret  service), 
also  members  of  the  former  reigning  dynasty. 

(/)  Persons  who  have  in  legal  form  been  declared 
demented  or  mentally  deficient,  and  also  persons  under 
guardianship. 

(g)  Persons  who  have  been  deprived  by  a  Soviet  of 
their  rights  of  citizenship  because  of  selfish  or  dishonor- 
able offenses,  for  the  period  fixed  by  the  sentence. 


Chapter  XIV 

ELECTIONS 

66.  Elections  are  conducted  according  to  custom  on 
days  fixed  by  the  local  Soviets. 

67.  Election  takes  place  in  the  presence  of  an  election 
committee  and  the  representative  of  the  local  Soviet. 

68.  In  case  the  representative  of  the  Soviet  cannot 
for  valid  causes  be  present,  the  chairman  of  the  election 
meeting  replaces  him. 

69.  Minutes  of  the  proceedings  and  results  of  elec- 
tions are  to  be  compiled  and  signed  by  the  members  of 
the  election  committee  and  the  representative  of  the 
Soviet. 

70.  Detailed  instructions  regarding  the  election  pro- 
ceedings and  the  participation  in  them  of  professional 
and  other  workers'  organizations  are  to  be  issued  by 
the  local  Soviets,  according  to  the  instructions  of  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  47 

Chapter  XV 

THE     CHECKING    AND    CANCELATION     OF    ELECTIONS    AND 
RECALL   OF   THE    DEPUTIES 

71.  The  respective  Soviets  receive  all  the  records  of 
the  proceedings  of  the  election. 

72.  The  Soviet  appoints  a  commission  to  verify  the 
election. 

73.  This  commission  reports  the  results  to  the  Soviet. 

74.  The  Soviet  decides  the  question  when  there  is 
doubt  as  to  which  candidate  is  elected. 

75.  The  Soviet  announces  a  new  election  if  the  elec- 
tion of  one  candidate  or  another  cannot  be  determined. 

76.  If  an  election  was  irregularly  carried  on  in  its 
entirety,  it  may  be  declared  void  by  a  higher  Soviet 
authority. 

77.  The  highest  authority  in  relation  to  questions 
of  elections  is  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee. 

78.  Voters  who  have  sent  a  deputy  to  the  Soviet 
have  the  right  to  recall  him,  and  to  have  a  new  election, 
according  to  general  provisions. 

It  is  quite  clear  that  the  suffrage  here  provided 
for  is  not  universal;  that  certain  classes  of  people 
commonly  found  in  modern  civilized  nations  in 
considerable  numbers  are  not  entitled  to  vote. 
There  may  be  some  doubt  as  to  the  precise  meaning 
of  some  of  the  paragraphs  in  Chapter  XIII,  but 
it  is  certain  that,  if  the  language  used  is  to  be  sub- 
ject to  no  esoteric  interpretation,  the  following 
social  groups  are  excluded  from  the  right  to  vote: 
(a)  all  persons  who  employ  hired  labor  for  profit, 
including    farmers    with    a    single    hired    helper; 


48  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

(b)  all  persons  who  draw  incomes  from  interest, 
rent,  or  profit;  (c)  all  persons  engaged  in  private 
trade,  even  to  the  smallest  shopkeeper;  (d)  all 
ministers  of  religion  of  every  kind;  (e)  all  persons 
engaged  in  work  which  is  not  defined  by  the  proper 
authorities  as  "productive  and  useful  to  society"; 
(/)  members  of  the  old  royal  family  and  those 
formerly  employed  in  the  old  police  service. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  very  large  part  of  the  present 
voting  population  of  this  country  would  be  dis- 
franchised if  we  should  adopt  these  restrictions  or 
anything  like  them.  It  may  be  fairly  argued  in 
reply,  however,  that  the  disfranchisement  would  be 
— and  now  is,  in  Russia — a  temporary  condition 
only;  that  the  object  of  the  discriminations,  and 
of  other  political  and  economic  arrangements  com- 
plementary to  them,  is  to  force  people  out  of  such 
categories  as  are  banned  and  penalized  with  dis- 
franchisement— and  that  this  is  being  done  in 
Russia.  In  other  words,  people  are  to  be  forced 
to  cease  hiring  labor  for  profit,  engaging  in  private 
trade,  being  ministers  of  religion,  living  on  incomes 
derived  from  interest,  rent,  or  profits.  They  are 
to  be  forced  into  service  that  is  "productive  and 
useful  to  society,"  and  when  that  is  accomplished 
they  will  become  qualified  to  vote.  Thus  prac- 
tically universal  suffrage  is  possible,  in  theory  at 
any  rate. 

So  much  may  be  argued  with  fair  show  of  reason. 
We  may  dispute  the  assumption  that  there  is  any- 
thing to  be  gained  by  disfranchising  a  man  because 
he  engages  in  trade,  and  thereby  possibly  confers 
a  benefit  upon  those  whom  he  serves.     We  may 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  49 

doubt  or  deny  that  there  is  likely  to  accrue  any 
advantage  to  society  from  the  disfranchisement  of 
all  ministers  of  religion.  We  may  believe  that  to 
suppress  some  of  the  categories  which  are  dis- 
criminated against  would  be  a  disaster,  subversive 
of  the  life  of  society  even.  When  all  this  has  been 
admitted  it  remains  the  fact  that  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  of  a  society  in  which  there  are  no  em- 
ployers, traders,  recipients  of  capitalist  incomes,  or 
ministers  of  religion;  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of 
such  a  society  in  which,  even  under  this  constitu- 
tion, only  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  adult  popu- 
lation would  be  disfranchised.  Of  course,  it  is  so 
highly  improbable  that  it  borders  on  the  fan- 
tastic; but  it  is,  nevertheless,  within  the  bounds 
of  conceivability  that  practically  universal  suff- 
rage might  be  realized  within  the  limits  of  this 
instrument. 

Let  us  examine,  briefly,  the  conditions  under 
which  the  franchise  is  to  be  exercised:  we  do  not 
find  any  provision  for  that  secrecy  of  the  ballot 
which  experience  and  ordinary  good  sense  indicate 
as  the  only  practicable  method  of  eliminating 
coercion,  intimidation,  and  vote-trafficking.  Nor 
do  wc  find  anything  like  a  uniform  method  of  voting. 
The  holding  of  elections  "conducted  according  to 
custom  on  days  fixed  by  the  local  Soviets"— them- 
selves elective  bodies — makes  possible  an  amount 
of  political  manipulation  and  intrigue  which  almost 
staggers  the  imagination.  Not  until  human  beings 
attain  a  far  greater  degree  of  perfection  than  has 
ever  yet  been  attained,  so  far  as  there  is  any  record, 
will  it  be  safe  or  prudent  to  endow  any  set  of  men 


50  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

with  so  much  arbitrary  power  over  the  manner  in 
which  their  fellows  may  exercise  the  electoral 
franchise. 

There  is  one  paragraph  in  the  above-quoted 
portions  of  the  Constitution  of  Soviet  Russia 
which  alone  opens  the  way  to  a  despotism  which  is 
practically  unlimited.  Paragraph  70  of  Chapter 
XIV  provides  that:  "Detailed  instructions  re- 
garding the  election  proceedings  and  the  partici- 
pation in  them  of  professional  and  other  workers' 
organizations  are  to  be  issued  by  the  local  Soviets, 
according  to  the  instructions  of  the  Ail-Russian  Cen- 
tral Executive  Committee."  Within  the  scope  of 
this  general  statement  every  essential  principle  of 
representative  government  can  be  lawfully  abro- 
gated. Elsewhere  it  has  been  shown  that  trades- 
unions  have  been  denied  the  right  to  nominate  or 
vote  for  candidates  unless  "their  declared  relations 
to  the  Soviet  Government  are  approved  by  the 
Soviet  authorities";  that  parties  are  permitted 
to  nominate  only  such  candidates  as  are  acceptable 
to,  and  approved  by,  the  central  authority;  that 
specific  orders  to  elect  certain  favored  candidates 
have  actually  been  issued  by  responsible  officials. 
Within  the  scope  of  Paragraph  70  of  Chapter  XIV, 
all  these  things  are  clearly  permissible.  No  limit 
to  the  "instructions"  which  may  be  given  by  the 
Ail-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  is  pro- 
vided by  the  Constitution  itself.  It  cannot  be 
argued  that  the  danger  of  evil  practices  occurring 
is  an  imaginary  one  merely;  the  concrete  examples 
cited  in  the  previous  chapter  show  that  the  danger 
is  a  very  real  one. 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  51 

In  this  connection  it  is  important  to  note  Para- 
graph 23  of  Chapter  V,  Article  VI,  which  reads  as 
follows : 

Being  guided  by  the  interests  of  the  working-class 
as  a  whole,  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic 
deprives  all  individuals  and  groups  of  rights  which  could 
be  utilized  by  them  to  the  detriment  of  the  Socialist 
Revolution. 

This  means,  apparently,  that  the  Council  of 
People's  Commissars  can  at  any  time  disfranchise 
any  individual  or  group  or  party  which  aims  to 
overthrow  their  rule.  This  power  has  been  used 
with  tremendous  effect  on  many  occasions. 

Was  it  this  power  which  caused  the  Bolsheviki 
to  withhold  the  electoral  franchise  from  all  members 
of  the  teaching  profession  in  Petrograd,  we  wonder? 
According  to  Section  64  of  Chapter  XIII  of  the 
Soviet  Constitution,  the  "right  to  vote  and  to  be 
elected  to  the  Soviets"  belongs,  first,  to  "all  who 
have  acquired  the  means  of  livelihood  through  labor 
that  is  productive  and  useful  to  society."  Teachers 
employed  in  the  public  schools  and  other  educational 
institutions — especially  those  controlled  by  the 
state — would  naturally  be  included  in  this  category, 
without  any  question,  one  would  suppose,  especially 
in  view  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Bolsheviki  have 
paraded  their  great  passion  for  education  and  cult- 
ure. Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  be  a  fact  that,  up 
to  July,  1919,  the  teaching  profession  of  Petrograd 
was  excluded  from  representation  in  the  Soviet. 
The  following  paragraph  from  the  Izvestia  of  the 


52  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Petrograd  Soviet,  dated  July  3,  1919,  can  hardly 
be  otherwise  interpreted: 

Teachers  and  other  cultural-educational  workers  this 
year  for  the  first  time  will  be  able,  in  an  organized  man- 
ner  through  their  union,  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
work  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  of  Deputies.  This  is  the 
first  and  most  difficult  examination  for  the  working  in- 
telligentsia of  the  above-named  categories.  Comrades  and 
citizens,  scholars,  teachers,  and  other  cultural  workers, 
stand  this  test  in  a  worthy  manner! 

Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  those  provisions 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal 
Soviet  Republic  which  concern  the  general  political 
organization  of  the  Soviet  state.  These  are  con- 
tained in  Article  III,  Chapters  VI  to  XII,  inclusive, 
and  are  as  follows: 

Article  III 

Construction  of  the  Soviet  Power 
A.   Organization  of  the  Central  Power 

Chapter  VI 

THE    ALL-RUSSIAN    CONGRESS    OF    SOVIETS    OF    WORKERS', 
PEASANTS',  COSSACKS',  AND    RED   ARMY   DEPUTIES 

24.  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  the  su- 
preme power  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet 
Republic. 

25.  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  composed 
of  representatives  of  urban   Soviets   (one  delegate  for 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  53 

25,000  voters),  and  of  representatives  of  the  provincial 
(Gubernia)  congresses  of  Soviets  (one  delegate  for  125,000 
inhabitants). 

Note  1:  In  case  the  Provincial  Congress  is  not  called 
before  the  All-Russian  Congress  is  convoked,  delegates 
for  the  latter  are  sent  directly  from  the  County  (Oyezd) 
Congress. 

Note  2:  In  case  the  Regional  (Oblast)  Congress  is 
convoked  indirectly,  previous  to  the  convocation  of  the 
All-Russian  Congress,  delegates  for  the  latter  may  be 
sent  by  the  Regional  Congress. 

26.  The  All-Russian  Congress  is  convoked  by  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  at  least  twice 
a  year. 

27.  A  special  All-Russian  Congress  is  convoked  by 
the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  upon 
its  own  initiative,  or  upon  the  request  of  local  Soviets 
having  not  less  than  one-third  of  the  entire  population 
of  the  Republic. 

28.  The  All-Russian  Congress  elects  an  All-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee  of  not  more  than  200 
members. 

29.  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
is  entirely  responsible  to  the  All-Russian  Congress  of 
Soviets. 

30.  In  the  periods  between  the  convocation  of  the 
Congresses,  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee is  the  supreme  power  of  the  Republic. 


Chapter  VII 

THE   ALL-RUSSIAN    CENTRAL    EXECUTIVE    COMMITTEE 

31.     The  All-Russian   Central  Executive  Committee 
is   the   supreme   legislative,   executive,    and   controlling 


54  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

organ  .  of.  the  „  Russian    Socialist  ^  Federal  .  Soviet    Re- 
public. 

32.  >'  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
directs  in  a  general  way  the  activity  of  the  Workers' 
and  Peasants'  Government  and  of  all  organs  of  the  Soviet 
authority  in  the  country,  and  it  co-ordinates  and  regu- 
lates the  operation  of  the  Soviet  Constitution  and  of  the 
resolutions  of  the  All-Russian  Congresses  and  of  the 
central  organs  of  the  Soviet  power. 

33.  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
considers  and  enacts  all  measures  and  proposals  intro- 
duced by  the  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  or  by  the 
various  departments,  and  it  also  issues  its  own  decrees 
and  regulations. 

34.  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
convokes  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets,  at  which 
time  the  Executive  Committee  reports  on  its  activity  and 
on  general  questions. 

35.  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
forms  a  Council  of  People's  Commissars  for  the  pur- 
pose of  general  management  of  the  affairs  of  the  Russian 
Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic,  and  it  also  forms 
departments  (People's  Commissariats)  for  the  purpose  of 
conducting  the  various  branches. 

36.  The  members  of  the  All-Russian  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  work  in  the  various  departments  (Peo- 
ple's Commissariats)  or  execute  special  orders  of  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee. 

Chapter  VIII 
THE  COUNCIL  of  people's  commissars 

37.  The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  is  intrusted 
with  the  general  management  of  the  affairs  of  the  Rus- 
sian Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  55 

38.  For  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  the  Council 
of  People's  Commissars  issues  decrees,  resolutions,  orders, 
and,  in  general,  takes  all  steps  necessary  for  the  proper 
and  rapid  conduct  of  government  affairs. 

39.  The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  notifies  im- 
mediately the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  all  its  orders  and  resolutions. 

40.  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
has  the  right  to  revoke  or  suspend  all  orders  and  reso- 
lucions  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars. 

41.  All  orders  and  resolutions  of  the  Council  of 
People's  Commissars  of  great  political  significance  are 
referred  for  consideration  and  final  approval  to  the  All- 
Russian  Central  Executive  Committee. 

Note:  Measures  requiring  immediate  execution  may 
be  enacted  directly  by  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missars. 

42.  The  members  of  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missars stand  at  the  head  of  the  various  People's  Com- 
missariats. 

43.  There  are  seventeen  People's  Commissars:  (a) 
Foreign  Affairs,  (b)  Army,  (c)  Navy,  (d)  Interior,  (e) 
Justice,  (/)  Labor,  (g)  Social  Welfare,  (A)  Education, 
(i)  Post  and  Telegraph,  (/)  National  Affairs,  (k)  Finances, 
(/)  Ways  of  Communication,  (m)  Agriculture,  (n)  Com- 
merce and  Industry,  (0)  National  Supplies,  (p)  State 
Control,  (q)  Supreme  Soviet  of  National  Economy,  (r) 
Public  Health. 

44.  Every  Commissar  has  a  Collegium  (Committee) 
of  which  he  is  the  President,  and  the  members  of  which 
are  appointed  by  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars. 

45.  A  People's  Commissar  has  the  individual  right 
to  decide  on  all  questions  under  the  jurisdiction  of  his 
Commissariat,  and  he  is  to  report  on  his  decision  to  the 
Collegium.  If  the  Collegium  does  not  agree  with  the 
Commissar  on  some  decisions,  the  former  may,  without 


56  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

stopping  the  execution  of  the  decision,  complain  of  it 
to  the  executive  members  of  the  Council  of  People's 
Commissars  or  to  the  All-Russian  Centra!  Executive 
Committee. 

Individual  members  of  the  Collegium  have  this  right 
also. 

46.  The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  is  entirely 
responsible  to  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  and 
the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committer:. 

47.  The  People's  Commissars  and  the  Collegia  of  the 
People's  Commissariats  are  entirely  responsible  to  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissars  and  the  All-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee. 

48.  The  title  of  People's  Commissar  belongs  only 
to  the  members  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars, 
which  is  in  charge  of  general  affairs  of  the  Russian 
Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic,  and  it  cannot  be 
used  by  any  other  representative  of  the  Soviet  power, 
either  central  or  local. 

Chapter  IX 

AFFAIRS     IN     THF.     JURISDICTION     OF     THE     ALL-RUSSIAN 

(  ONGRESS     AND     THE     ALL-RUSSIAN     CENTRAL 

EXECUTIVE    COMMITJ  I  I 

49.  The  All-Russian  Congress  and  the  All-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee  deal  with  questions  of 
state,  such  as: 

(a)  Ratification  and  amendment  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic. 

(b)  General  direction  of  the  entire  interior  and  foreign 
policy  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic. 

(c)  Establishing  and  changing  boundaries,  also  ced- 
ing territory  belonging  to  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal 
Soviet  Republic. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  57 

(d)  Establishing  boundaries  for  regional  Soviet  unions 
belonging  to  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Re- 
public, also  settling  disputes  among  them. 

(e)  Admission  of  new  members  to  the  Russian  Social- 
ist Federal  Soviet  Republic,  and  recognition  of  the  seces- 
sion of  any  parts  of  it. 

(J)  The  general  administrative  division  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic 
and  the  approval  of  regional  unions. 

(g)  Establishing  and  changing  weights,  measures, 
and  money  denominations  in  the  Russian  Socialist  Fed- 
eral Soviet  Republic. 

(h)  Foreign  relations,  declaration  of  war,  and  ratifica- 
tion of  peace  treaties. 

({)  Making  loans,  signing  commercial  treaties  and 
financial  agreements. 

(/)  Working  out  a  basis  and  a  general  plan  for  the 
national  economy  and  for  its  various  branches  in  the 
Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic. 

(k)  Approval  of  the  budget  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federal  Soviet  Republic. 

(/)  Levying  taxes  and  establishing  the  duties  of  citi- 
zens to  the  state. 

(m)  Establishing  the  bases  for  the  organization  of 
armed  forces. 

(w)  State  legislation,  judicial  organization  and  pro- 
cedure, civil  and  criminal  legislation,  etc. 

(o)  Appointment  and  dismissal  of  the  individual 
People's  Commissars  or  the  entire  Council,  also  approval 
of  the  President  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars. 

(p)  Granting  and  canceling  Russian  citizenship  and 
fixing  rights  of  foreigners. 

(q)  The  right  to  declare  individual  and  general 
amnesty. 

50.  Besides  the  above-mentioned  questions,  the  All- 
Russian  Congress  and  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive 


58  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Committee  have  charge  of  all  other  affairs  which,  ac- 
cording to  their  decision,  require  their  attention. 

51.  The  following  questions  are  solely  under  the  juris- 
diction of  the  All-Russian  Congress: 

(a)  Ratification  and  amendment  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Soviet  Constitution. 

(b)  Ratification  of  peace  treaties. 

52.  The  decision  of  questions  indicated  in  Para- 
graphs (c)  and  (A)  of  Section  49  may  be  made  by  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  only  in  case 
it  is  impossible  to  convoke  the  Congress. 


B.  Organization  of  Local  Soviets 

Chapter  X 

THE   CONGRESSES   OF  THE    SOVIETS 

53.  Congresses  of  Soviets  are  composed  as  follows: 
{a)  Regional:  of  representatives  of  the  urban  and 
county  Soviets,  one  representative  for  25,000  inhabitants 
of  the  county,  and  one  representative  for  5,000  voters 
of  the  cities — but  not  more  than  500  representatives  for 
the  entire  region — or  of  representatives  of  the  provincial 
Congresses,  chosen  on  the  same  basis,  if  such  a  Congress 
meets  before  the  regional  Congress. 

(b)  Provincial  (Gubernia):  of  representatives  of  urban 
and  rural  (Volost)  Soviets,  one  representative  for  10,000 
inhabitants  from  the  rural  districts,  and  one  represent- 
ative for  2,000  voters  in  the  city;  altogether  not  more 
than  300  representatives  for  the  entire  province.  In 
case  the  county  Congress  meets  before  the  provincial, 
election  takes  place  on  the  same  basis,  but  by  the  county 
Congress  instead  of  the  rural. 

(c)  County:    of  representatives  of  rural  Soviets,  one 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  59 

delegate  for  each  1,000  inhabitants,  but  not  more  than 
300  delegates  for  the  entire  county. 

(d)  Rural  {Volost):  of  representatives  of  all  village 
Soviets  in  the  Volost,  one  delegate  for  ten  members  of 
the  Soviet. 

Note  1:  Representatives  of  urban  Soviets  which  have 
a  population  of  not  more  than  10,000  persons  participate 
in  the  county  Congress;  village  Soviets  of  districts  less 
than  1,000  inhabitants  unite  for  the  purpose  of  electing 
delegates  to  the  county  Congress. 

Note  2:  Rural  Soviets  of  less  than  ten  members  send 
one  delegate  to  the  rural  {Volost)  Congress. 

54.  Congresses  of  the  Soviets  are  convoked  by  the 
respective  Executive  Committees  upon  their  own  initi- 
ative, or  upon  request  of  local  Soviets  comprising  not 
less  than  one-third  of  the  entire  population  of  the  given 
district.  In  any  case  they  are  convoked  at  least  twice 
a  year  for  regions,  every  three  months  for  provinces  and 
counties,  and  once  a  month  for  rural  districts. 

55.  Every  Congress  of  Soviets  (regional,  provincial, 
county,  or  rural)  elects  its  Executive  organ — an  Executive 
Committee  the  membership  of  which  shall  not  exceed: 
(a)  for  regions  and  provinces,  twenty-five;  (b)  for  a  county, 
twenty;  (c)  for  a  rural  district,  ten.  The  Executive  Com- 
mittee is  responsible  to  the  Congress  which  elected  it. 

56.  In  the  boundaries  of  the  respective  territories  the 
Congress  is  the  supreme  power;  during  intervals  between 
the  convocations  of  the  Congress,  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee is  the  supreme  power. 

Chapter  XI 

THE    SOVIET   OF   DEPUTIES 

57.  Soviets  of  Deputies  are  formed: 

(a)    In  cities,  one  deputy  for  each  1,000  inhabitants; 


60  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  total  to  be  not  less  than  fifty  and  not  more  than 
1,000  members. 

(b)  All  other  settlements  (towns,  villages,  hamlets, 
etc.)  of  less  than  10,000  inhabitants,  one  deputy  for  each 
100  inhabitants;  the  total  to  be  not  less  than  three  and 
not  more  than  fifty  deputies  for  each  settlement. 

Term  of  the  deputy,  three  months. 

Note:  In  small  rural  sections,  whenever  possible,  all 
questions  shall  be  decided  at  general  meetings  of  voters. 

58.  The  Soviet  of  Deputies  elects  an  Executive  Com- 
mittee to  deal  with  current  affairs;  not  more  than  five 
members  for  rural  districts,  one  for  every  fifty  members 
of  the  Soviets  of  cities,  but  not  more  than  fifteen  and  not 
less  than  three  in  the  aggregate  (Petrograd  and  Moscow 
not  more  than  forty).  The  Executive  Committee  is 
entirely  responsible  to  the  Soviet  which  elected  it. 

59.  The  Soviet  of  Deputies  is  convoked  by  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  upon  its  own  initiative,  or  upon  the  re- 
quest of  not  less  than  one-half  of  the  membership  of  the 
Soviet;  in  any  case  at  least  once  a  week  in  cities,  and  twice 
a  week  in  rural  sections. 

60.  Within  its  jurisdiction  the  Soviet,  and  in  cases 
mentioned  in  Section  57,  Note,  the  meeting  of  the  voters 
is  the  supreme  power  in  the  given  district. 


Chapter  XII 

JURISDICTION  OF  THE    LOCAL  ORGANS  OF  THE  SOVIETS 

61.  Regional,  provincial,  county,  and  rural  organs 
of  the  Soviet  power  and  also  the  Soviets  of  Deputies  have 
to  perform  the  following  duties: 

(a)  Carry  out  all  orders  of  the  respective  higher  organs 
of  the  Soviet  power. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  Gl 

(b)  Take  all  steps  for  raising  the  cultural  and  eco- 
nomic standard  of  the  given  territory. 

(c)  Decide  all  questions  of  local  importance  within 
their  respective  territories. 

(d)  Co-ordinate  all  Soviet  activity  in  their  respective 
territories. 

62.  The  Congresses  of  Soviets  and  their  Executive 
Committees  have  the  right  to  control  the  activity  of  the 
local  Soviets  (i.e.,  the  regional  Congress  controls  all 
Soviets  of  the  respective  region;  the  provincial,  of  the 
respective  province,  with  the  exception  of  the  urban 
Soviets,  etc.);  and  the  regional  and  provincial  Congresses 
and  their  Executive  Committees  have  in  addition  the 
right  to  overrule  the  decisions  of  the  Soviets  of  their 
districts,  giving  notice  in  important  cases  to  the  central 
Soviet  authority. 

63.  For  the  purpose  of  performing  their  duties,  the 
local  Soviets,  rural  and  urban,  and  the  Eexcutive  Com- 
mittees form  sections  respectively. 

It  is  a  significant  and  notable  fact  that  nowhere  in 
the  whole  of  this  remarkable  document  is  there  any 
provision  which  assures  to  the  individual  voter,  or  to 
any  group,  party,  or  other  organization  of  voters^ 
assurance  of  the  right  to  make  nominations  for  any 
office  in  the  whole  system  of  government.  Incredible 
as  it  may  seem,  this  is  literally  and  exactly  true. 
The  urban  Soviet  consists  of  "one  deputy  for  each 
1,000  inhabitants,"  but  there  is  nowhere  a  sentence 
prescribing  how  these  deputies  are  to  be  nominated 
or  by  whom.  The  village  Soviet  consists  of  "one 
deputy  for  each  100  inhabitants,"  but  there  is 
nowhere  a  sentence  to  show  how  these  deputies 
are  to  be  nominated,  or  wherein  the  right  to  make 


62  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

nominations  is  vested.  The  Volost  Congress  is 
composed  of  "representatives  of  all  village  Sovi- 
ets" and  the  County  Congress  {Oyezd)  of  "repre- 
sentatives of  rural  Soviets."  In  both  these  cases 
the  representatives  are  termed  "delegates,"  but 
there  is  no  intimation  of  how  they  are  nominated, 
or  what  their  qualifications  are.  The  Provincial 
Congress  (Giibernia)  is  composed  of  "representa- 
tives of  urban  and  rural  {Volost)  Soviets."  In  this 
case  the  word  "representatives"  is  maintained 
throughout;  the  word  "delegates"  does  not  ap- 
pear. In  this  provision,  as  in  the  others,  there  is 
no  intimation  of  how  they  are  nominated,  or  whether 
they  are  elected  or  designated. 

It  can  hardly  be  gainsaid  that  the  Constitution 
of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic 
is  characterized  by  loose  construction,  vagueness 
where  definiteness  is  essential,  and  a  marked 
deficiency  of  those  safeguards  and  guaranties  which 
ought  to  be  incorporated  into  a  written  constitution. 
There  is,  for  example,  no  provision  for  that  im- 
munity of  parliamentary  representatives  from  ar- 
rest for  libel,  sedition,  and  the  like,  which  is  en- 
joyed in  practically  all  other  countries.  Even  under 
Czar  Nicholas  II  this  principle  of  parliamentary 
immunity  was  always  observed  until  November, 
1916,  when  the  ferment  of  revolution  was  already 
manifesting  itself.  It  requires  no  expert  legal 
knowledge  or  training  to  perceive  that  the  funda- 
mental instrument  of  the  political  and  legal  system 
of  Soviet  Russia  fails  to  provide  adequate  protec- 
tion for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  its  citizens. 

Let  us  consider  now  another  matter  of  cardinal 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  63 

importance,  the  complex  and  tedious  processes 
which  intervene  between  the  citizen-voter  and  the 
"Council  of  People's  Commissars." 

(i)  The  electorate  is  divided  into  two  groups  or 
divisions,  the  urban  and  the  rural.  Those  entitled 
to  vote  in  the  city  form,  in  the  first  instance,  the 
Soviet  of  the  shop,  factory,  trades-union,  or  pro- 
fessional association,  as  the  case  may  be.  Those 
entitled  to  vote  in  the  rural  village  form,  in  the 
first  instance,  the  village  Soviet. 

(2)  The  Soviets  of  the  shops,  factories,  trades- 
unions,  and  professional  associations  choose,  in 
such  manner  as  they  will,  representatives  to  the 
urban  Soviet.  The  urban  Soviets  are  not  all  based 
on  equal  representation,  however.  According  to 
announcements  in  the  official  Bolshevist  press, 
factory  workers  in  Petrograd  are  entitled  to  one 
representative  in  the  Petrograd  Soviet  for  every 
500  electors,  while  the  soldiers  and  sailors  are 
entitled  to  one  representative  for  every  200  mem- 
bers. Thus  two  soldiers'  votes  count  for  exactly 
as  much  as  five  workmen's  votes.  Those  entitled 
to  vote  in  the  village  Soviets  choose  representatives 
to  a  rural  Soviet  (Folost),  and  this  body,  in  turn, 
chooses  representatives  to  the  county  Soviet 
(Oyezd).  This  latter  body  is  equal  in  power  to 
the  urban  Soviet;  both  are  represented  in  the 
Provincial  Soviet  (Gubernia).  The  village  peasant 
is  one  step  farther  removed  from  the  Provincial 
Soviet  than  is  the  city  worker. 

(3)  Both  the  urban  Soviets  of  the  city  workers' 
representatives  and  the  county  Soviets  of  the 
peasants'    representatives    are    represented    in    the 


61  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Provincial  Soviet.  There  appears  at  this  point 
another  great  inequality  in  voting  power.  The 
basis  of  representation  is  one  member  for  2,000 
city  voters  and  one  for  10,000  inhabitants  of  rural 
villages.  At  first  this  seems  to  mean — and  has 
been  generally  understood  to  mean — that  each  city 
worker's  vote  is  equal  to  the  votes  of  five  peasants. 
Apparently  this  is  an  error.  The  difference  is 
more  nearly  three  to  one  than  five  to  one.  Repre- 
sentation is  based  on  the  number  of  city  voters  and 
the  number  of  village  inhabitants. 

(4)  The  Provincial  Congress  (Gubernia)  sends 
representatives  to  the  Regional  Congress.  Here 
again  the  voting  power  is  unequal:  the  basis  of 
representation  is  one  representative  for  5,000  city 
voters  and  one  for  "25,000  inhabitants  of  the 
county."  The  discrimination  here  is  markedly 
greater  than  in  the  case  of  the  Provincial  Con- 
gresses for  the  following  reason:  The  members 
of  these  Regional  Congresses  are  chosen  by  the 
Gubernias,  which  include  representatives  of  city 
workers  as  well  as  representatives  of  peasants,  the 
former  being  given  three  times  proportionate  repre- 
sentation of  the  latter.  Obviously,  to  again  apply 
the  same  principle  and  choose  representatives  of  the 
Gubernias  to  the  Regional  Congresses  on  the  same 
basis  of  three  to  one  has  a  cumulative  disadvantage 
to  the  peasant. 

(5)  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  com- 
posed of  delegates  chosen  by  the  Provincial  Con- 
gresses, which  represent  city  workers  and  peasants, 
as  already  shown,  and  of  representatives  sent  direct 
from  the  urban  Soviets. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY5 


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66  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

It  will  be  seen  that  at  every  step,  from  the 
county  Soviet  to  the  All-Russian  Congress  of 
Soviets,  elaborate  care  has  been  taken  to  make 
certain  that  the  representatives  of  the  city  workers 
are  not  outnumbered  by  peasants'  representatives. 
The  peasants,  who  make  up  85  per  cent,  of  the  pop- 
ulation, are  systematically  discriminated  against. 

(6)  We  are  not  yet  at  the  end  of  the  intricate 
Soviet  system  of  government.  While  the  All- 
Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  nominally  the  su- 
preme power  in  the  state,  it  is  too  unwieldy  a  body 
to  do  more  than  discuss  general  policies.  It  meets 
twice  a  year  for  this  purpose.  From  its  member- 
ship of  1,500  is  chosen  the  Ail-Russian  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  "not  more  than  200 
members."  This  likewise  is  too  unwieldy  a  body 
to  function  either  quickly  or  well. 

(7)  The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee selects  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars 
of  seventeen  members,  each  Commissar  being  at 
the  head  of  a  department  of  the  government. 

A  brief  study  of  the  diagram  on  the  preceding 
page  will  show  how  much  less  directly  responsive 
to  the  electorate  than  our  own  United  States  Gov- 
ernment is  this  complicated,  bureaucratic  govern- 
ment of  Soviet  Russia. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  67 


THE    PEASANTS   AND   THE    LAND 

AT  the  time  of  the  Revolution  the  peasantry 
L  comprised  85  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
The  industrial  wage-earning  class — the  proletariat — 
comprised,  according  to  the  most  generous  estimate, 
not  more  than  3  to  4  per  cent.  That  part  of  the 
proletariat  which  was  actively  interested  in  the 
revolutionary  social  change  was  represented  by  the 
Social  Democratic  Party,  which  was  split  into 
factions  as  follows:  on  the  right  the  moderate 
"defensist"  Mensheviki;  on  the  left  the  radical 
"defeatist"  Bolsheviki;  with  a  large  center  faction 
which  held  a  middle  course,  sometimes  giving  its 
support  to  the  right  wing  and  sometimes  to  the  left. 
Each  of  these  factions  contained  in  it  men  and 
women  of  varying  shades  of  opinion  and  diverse 
temperaments.  Thus  among  the  Mensheviki  were 
some  who  were  so  radical  that  they  were  very  close 
to  the  Bolsheviki,  while  among  the  latter  were  some 
individuals  who  were  so  moderate  that  they  were 
very  close  to  the  Mensheviki. 

That  part  of  the  peasantry  which  was  actively 
interested  in  revolutionary  social  change  was 
represented  by  the  peasant   Socialist  parties,  the 


6S  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists,  and  the  Popu- 
lists, or  People's  Socialists.  The  former  alone 
possessed  any  great  numerical  strength  or  political 
significance.  In  this  party,  as  in  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party,  there  was  a  moderate  right  wing  and  a 
radical  left  wing  with  a  strong  centrist  element.  In 
this  party  also  were  found  in  each  of  the  wings  men 
and  women  whose  views  seemed  barely  distinguish- 
able from  those  generally  characteristic  of  the 
other.  In  a  general  way,  the  relations  of  the 
Socialists-Revolutionists  and  the  Social  Democrats 
were  characterized  by  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the 
Socialists-Revolutionists  of  the  Right  to  make 
common  cause  with  the  Mcnshevist  Social  Demo- 
crats and  a  like  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  Social- 
ists-Revolutionists of  the  Left  to  make  common 
cause  with  the  Bolshevist  Social  Democrats. 

This  merging  of  the  two  parties  applied  only  to 
the  general  program  of  revolutionary  action;  in 
particular  to  the  struggle  to  overthrow  czarism. 
Upon  the  supreme  basic  economic  issue  confronting 
Russia  they  were  separated  by  a  deep  and  wide  gulf. 
The  psychology  of  the  peasants  was  utterly  unlike 
that  of  the  urban  proletariat.  The  latter  were  con- 
cerned with  the  organization  of  the  state,  with 
factory  legislation,  with  those  issues  which  are 
universally  raised  in  the  conflict  of  capitalists  and 
wage-earners.  The  consciousness  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  was  proletarian.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  peasants  cared  very  little  about  the  or- 
ganization of  the  state  or  any  of  the  matters  which 
the  city  workers  regarded  as  being  of  cardinal 
importance.      They    were    "land    hungry";    they 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  69 

wanted  a  distribution  of  the  land  which  would 
increase  their  individual  holdings.  The  passion 
for  private  possession  of  land  is  strong  in  the 
peasant  of  every  land,  the  Russian  peasant  being 
no  exception  to  the  rule.  Yet  there  is  perhaps  one 
respect  in  which  the  psychology  of  the  Russian 
peasant  differs  from  that  of  the  French  peasant,  for 
example.  The  Russian  peasant  is  quite  as  deeply 
interested  in  becoming  an  individual  landholder; 
he  is  much  less  interested  in  the  idea  of  absolute 
ownership.  Undisturbed  possession  of  an  adequate 
acreage,  even  though  unaccompanied  by  the  title 
of  absolute  ownership,  satisfies  the  Russian. 

The  moderate  Social  Democrats,  the  Menshe- 
viki,  and  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  stood  for 
substantially  the  same  solution  of  the  land  problem 
prior  to  the  Revolution.  They  wanted  to  confis- 
cate the  lands  of  great  estates,  the  Church  and  the 
Crown,  and  to  turn  them  over  to  democratically 
elected  and  governed  local  bodies.  The  Bolshe- 
viki,  on  the  other  hand,  wanted  all  land  to  be 
nationalized  r.nd  in  place  of  millions  of  small 
owners  they  wanted  state  ownership  and  control. 
Large  scale  agriculture  on  government-owned  lands 
by  government  employees  and  more  or  less  rapid 
extinction  of  private  ownership  and  operation  was 
their    ideal.  The    Socialists-Revolutionists    de- 

nounced this  program  of  nationalization,  saying 
that  it  would  make  the  peasants  "mere  wage-slaves 
of  the  state."  They  wanted  " socialization"  of  all 
land,  including  that  of  the  small  peasant  owners. 
By  socialization  they  meant  taking  all  lands  "out 
of  private  ownership   of  persons   into  the  public 


70  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ownership,  and  their  management  by  democratically 
organized  leagues  of  communities  with  the  purpose  of 
an  equitable  utilization" 

The  Russian  peasant  looked  upon  the  Revolu- 
tion as,  above  everything  else,  the  certain  fulfil- 
ment of  his  desire  for  redistribution  of  the  laud. 
There  were,  in  fact,  two  issues  which  far  outweighed 
all  others — the  land  problem  and  peace.  All 
classes  in  Russia,  even  a  majority  of  the  great  land- 
owners themselves,  realized  that  the  distribution 
of  land  among  the  peasants  was  now  inevitable. 
Thus,  interrogated  by  peasants,  Rodzianko,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Fourth  Duma,  a  large  landowner,  said: 

"Yes,  we  admit  that  the  fundamental  problem 
of  the  Constituent  Assembly  is  not  merely  to  con- 
struct a  political  system  for  Russia,  but  likewise  to 
give  back  to  the  peasantry  the  land  which  is  at  present 
in  our  hands" 

The  Provisional  Government,  under  Lvov,  domi- 
nated as  it  then  was  by  landowners  and  bourgeoisie, 
never  for  a  moment  sought  to  evade  this  question. 
On  March  15,  1917,  the  very  day  of  its  formation, 
the  Provisional  Government  by  a  decree  trans- 
ferred all  the  Crown  lands — approximately  12,- 
000,000  acres — to  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  as 
state  property.  Two  weeks  later  the  Provisional 
Government  conferred  upon  the  newly  created 
Food  Commissions  the  right  to  take  possession  of 
all  vacant  and  uncultivated  land,  to  cultivate  it  or 
to  rent  it  to  peasants  who  were  ready  to  undertake 
the  cultivation.  This  order  compelled  many  land- 
owners to  turn  their  idle  lands  over  to  peasants  who 
were  willing  and  ready  to  proceed  with  cultivation. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  71 

On  April  21,  1917,  the  Provisional  Government 
by  a  decree  created  Land  Commissions  throughout 
the  whole  of  Russia.  These  Land  Commissions 
were  created  in  every  township  (Folost),  county 
(Oyezd),  and  province  (Gubernia).  They  were  to 
collect  all  information  concerning  landownership 
and  local  administrative  agencies  and  make  their 
reports  to  a  superior  national  body,  the  All-Russian 
Land  Commission,  which,  in  turn,  would  prepare 
a  comprehensive  scheme  for  submission  to  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly.  On  May  18,  1917,  the  Pro- 
visional Government  announced  that  the  question 
of  the  transfer  of  the  land  to  the  peasants  was  to 
be  left  wholly  to  the  Constituent  Assembly. 

These  local  Land  Commissions,  as  well  as  the  su- 
perior national  commission,  were  democratically 
chosen  bodies,  thoroughly  representative  of  the 
peasantry.  As  might  be  expected,  they  were  to  a 
very  large  extent  guided  by  the  representatives  of 
the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists.  There 
was  never  any  doubt  concerning  their  attitude 
toward  the  peasants'  demand  for  distribution  of  the 
land.  On  the  All-Russian  Land  Commission  were 
the  best-known  Russian  authorities  on  the  land 
question  and  the  agrarian  problem.  Professor  Pos- 
nikov,  the  chairman;  Victor  Chernov,  leader  of 
the  Socialists-Revolutionists;  Pieshekhonov;  Rakit- 
nikov;  the  two  Moslovs;  Oganovsky;  Vikhliaev; 
Cherenekov;  Veselovsky,  and  many  other  eminent 
authorities  were  on  this  important  body.  To  the 
ordinary  non-Russian  these  names  will  mean  little, 
perhaps,  but  to  all  who  are  familiar  with  modern 
Russia  this  brief  list  will  be  a  sufficient  assurance 


72  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

that  the  commission  was  governed  by  liberal 
idealism  united  to  scientific  knowledge  and  practical 
experience. 

The  Land  Commissions  were  not  created  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  collating  data  upon  the  subject 
of  landownership  and  cultivation.  That  was,  in- 
deed, their  avowed  and  ostensible  object;  but  be- 
hind that  there  was  another  and  much  more  urgent 
purpose.  In  the  first  place,  as  soon  as  the  revolu- 
tionary disturbances  began,  peasants  in  many  vil- 
lages took  matters  into  their  own  hands  and 
appropriated  whatever  lands  they  could  seize.  Agi- 
tators had  gone  among  the  peasantry — agitators  of 
the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists  not  less  than 
of  the  Bolsheviki — and  preached  the  doctrine  of 
"the  expropriation  of  the  expropriators."  They 
told  the  peasants  to  seize  the  land  and  so  execute 
the  will  of  the  people.  So  long  as  czarism  remained 
the  peasants  held  back;  once  it  was  destroyed,  they 
threw  off"  their  restraint  and  began  to  seize  the  land 
for  themselves.  The  Revolution  was  here.  Was  it 
not  always  understood  that  when  the  Revolution 
came  they  were  to  take  the  land? 

Numerous  estates  were  seized  and  in  some  cases 
the  landowners  were  brutally  murdered  by  the  fren- 
zied peasants.  On  some  of  the  large  estates  the 
mansions  of  the  owners,  the  laborers'  cottages, 
stables,  cattle-sheds,  and  corn-stacks  were  burned 
and  the  valuable  agricultural  machinery  destroyed. 
Whenever  this  happened  it  was  a  great  calamity, 
for  on  the  large  estates  were  the  model  farms,  the 
agricultural  experiment  stations  of  Russia.  And 
while  this  wanton  and  foolish  destruction  was  going 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  73 

on  there  was  a  great  dearth  of  food  for  the  army  at 
the  front.  Millions  of  men  had  to  be  fed  and  it  was 
necessary  to  make  proper  provision  for  the  con- 
servation of  existing  food  crops  and  for  increased 
production.  Nor  was  it  only  the  big  estates  which 
were  thus  attacked  and  despoiled;  in  numerous  in- 
stances the  farms  of  the  "middle  peasants" — corre- 
sponding to  our  moderately  well-to-do  farmers — ■ 
were  seized  and  their  rightful  owners  driven  away. 
In  some  cases  very  small  farms  were  likewise  seized. 
Something  had  to  be  done  to  save  Russia  from  this 
anarchy,  which  threatened  the  very  life  of  the 
nation.  The  Land  Commissions  were  made  ad- 
ministrative organs  to  deal  with  the  land  problems 
as  they  arose,  to  act  until  the  new  Zemstvos  could 
be  elected  and  begin  to  function,  when  the  adminis- 
trative work  of  the  commissions  would  be  assumed 
by  the  Land  Offices  of  the  Zemstvos. 

There  was  another  very  serious  matter  which 
made  it  important  to  have  the  Land  Commissions 
function  as  administrative  bodies.  Numerous  land- 
owners had  begun  to  divide  their  estates,  selling 
the  land  off  in  parcels,  thus  introducing  greater 
complexity  into  the  problem,  a  more  numerous 
class  of  owners  to  be  dealt  with.  In  many  cases, 
moreover,  the  "sales"  and  "transfers"  were  fic- 
titious and  deceptive,  the  new  "owners"  being  mere 
dummies.  In  this  manner  the  landowners  sought 
to  trick  and  cheat  the  peasants.  It  was  to  meet 
this  menace  that  the  Provisional  Government,  on 
July  12,  1917,  by  special  decree  put  a  stop  to  all 
land  speculation  and  forbade  the  transfer  of  title 
to  any  land,  outside  of  the  cities,  except  by  consent 


74  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  the  local  Land  Commission  approved  by  the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture. 

Chernov,  who  under  Kerensky  became  Minister 
of  Agriculture,  was  the  creator  of  the  Land  Com- 
missions and  the  principal  author  of  the  agrarian 
program  of  the  Provisional  Government  as  this 
was  developed  from  March  to  October.  How  com- 
pletely his  policy  was  justified  may  be  judged  from 
the  fact  that  while  most  of  the  landlords  fled  to  the 
cities  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  March, 
fearing  murderous  riotings  such  as  took  place  in 
1906,  in  June  they  had  nearly  all  returned  to  their 
estates.  The  Land  Commissions  had  checked  the 
peasant  uprisings;  they  had  given  the  peasants 
something  to  do  toward  a  constructive  solution, 
and  had  created  in  their  minds  confidence  that 
they  were  going  to  be  honestly  dealt  with;  that  the 
land  would  be  distributed  among  them  before  long. 
In  other  words,  the  peasants  were  patiently  waiting 
for  freedom  and  land  to  be  assured  by  legal  and 
peaceful  means. 

Then  the  Bolshevik!  began  to  rouse  the  peasants 
once  more  and  to  play  upon  their  suspicions  and 
fears.  Simultaneously  their  propagandists  in  the 
cities  and  in  the  villages  began  their  attacks  upon 
the  Provisional  Government.  To  the  peasants 
they  gave  the  same  old  advice:  "Seize  the  land 
for  yourselves!  Expropriate  the  landlords!"  Once 
more  the  peasants  began  to  seize  estates,  to  sack 
and  burn  manor  houses,  and  even  to  kill  landowners. 
The  middle  of  July  saw  the  beginning  of  a  revival  of 
the  "Jacqueries,"  and  in  a  few  weeks  they  had  be- 
come alarmingly  common.     The  propagandists  of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  75 

the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists  did  their  best 
to  put  an  end  to  the  outrages,  but  the  peasants  were 
not  so  easily  placated  as  they  had  been  in  March 
and  April.  Mope  long  deferred  had  brought  about 
a  state  of  despair  and  desperation.  The  poor,  be- 
wildered peasants  could  not  understand  why  such 
a  simple  matter  as  the  distribution  of  the  land— 
for  so  it  seemed  to  them — should  require  months  of 
preparation.  They  were  ready  to  believe  the 
Bolshevist  propagandists  who  told  them  that  the 
delay  was  intended  to  enable  the  bourgeoisie  to 
betray  the  toilers,  and  that  if  they  wanted  the 
land  they  must  take  it  for  themselves.  "You 
know  how  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  always 
talked  to  you  aforetime,"  said  these  skilful  dema- 
gogues; "they  told  you  then  to  seize  the  land,  but 
now  they  only  tell  you  to  wait,  just  as  the  land- 
lords tell  you.  They  have  been  corrupted;  they 
are  no  longer  true  representatives  of  your  interest. 
We  tell  you,  what  you  have  long  known,  that  if  you 
want  the  land  you  must  seize  it  for  yourselves!" 

Anarchy  among  the  peasants  grew  apace.  Some 
of  the  wisest  of  the  leaders  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionary movement  urged  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment to  hurry,  to  revise  its  plan,  and,  instead  of 
waiting  for  the  Constituent  Assembly  to  act  upon 
the  land  program,  to  put  it  into  effect  at  once.  The 
All-Russian  Land  Commission  hastened  its  work 
and  completed  the  formulation  of  a  land  program. 
The  Provisional  Government  stuck  to  its  original 
declaration  that  the  program  must  be  considered 
and  approved  or  rejected  by  the  Constituent 
Assembly.     In  October,   at  the   Democratic  Con- 


76  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ference  in  Petrograd,  the  so-called  Pre-Parliament, 
Prokopovich,  the  well-known  Marxian  economist, 
who  had  become  Minister  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
uttered  a  solemn  warning  that  "the  disorderly 
seizing  of  land  was  ruining  agriculture  and  threat- 
ening the  towns  and  the  northern  provinces  with 
famine." 

It  is  one  of  the  numerous  tragedies  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  that  at  the  very  time  this  warning  was 
issued  Kerensky  had  in  his  possession  two  plans, 
either  of  which  might  have  averted  the  catastrophe 
that  followed.  One  of  them  was  the  completed 
program  of  the  All-Russian  Land  Commission, 
'largely  Chernov's  work.  It  had  already  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Provisional  Government.  It  was 
proposed  that  Kerensky  should  make  a  fight  to 
have  the  Cabinet  proclaim  this  program  to  be  law, 
without  waiting  for  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
The  other  plan  was  very  simple  and  crude.  It  was 
that  all  the  large  estates  be  seized  at  once,  as  a 
measure  of  military  necessity,  and  that  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  land  thus  taken  peasant  soldiers 
with  honorable  discharges  be  given  preference. 
In  either  case,  Kerensky  would  have  split  his 
Cabinet. 

When  we  consider  the  conditions  which  prevailed 
at  that  time,  the  extreme  military  and  political 
weakness,  and  the  vast  stakes  at  issue,  it  is  easy  to 
understand  why  Kerensky  decided  to  wait  for  the 
Constituent  Assembly.  It  is  easy  enough  to  say 
now,  after  the  event,  that  Kerensky's  decision  was 
wrong;  that  his  only  chance  to  hold  the  confidence 
of  the  peasants  was  to  do  one  of  two  things,  declare 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  77 

immediate  peace  or  introduce  sweeping  land  re- 
forms. Certainly,  that  seems  fairly  plain  now.  At 
that  time,  however,  Kerensky  faced  the  hard  fact 
that  to  do  either  of  these  things  meant  a  serious 
break  in  the  Cabinet,  another  crisis,  the  outcome 
of  which  none  could  foretell. 

Moreover,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  Kerensky 
himself  and  those  with  whom  he  was  working  were 
inspired  by  a  very  genuine  and  sincere  passion  for 
democracy.  They  believed  in  the  Constituent 
Assembly.  They  had  idealized  it.  To  them  it 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  betrayal  of  the  Revolution 
that  a  matter  of  such  fundamental  importance 
should  be  disposed  of  by  a  small  handful  of  men, 
rather  than  by  the  representatives  of  the  people 
duly  elected,  upon  a  democratic  basis,  for  that  pur- 
pose. The  Provisional  Government  was  pledged 
to  leave  the  Constituent  Assembly  free  and  untram- 
eled  to  deal  with  the  land  problem:  how  could  it 
violate  its  pledge  and  usurp  the  functions  of  the 
Assembly?  If  Kerensky's  course  was  a  mistaken 
one,  it  was  so  only  because  conscientious  loyalty  to 
principle  is  not  invariably  expedient  in  politics; 
because  the  guile  and  dishonesty  of  his  opponents 
triumphed  over  his  simple  honesty  and  truthfulness. 

On-October  20,  1917,  the  Provisional  Government 
enacted  a  law  which  marked  a  further  step  in  the 
preparation  of  the  way  for  the  new  system  of  land 
tenure.  The  new  law  extended  the  control  of  the 
Land  Offices  of  the  Zemstvos — where  these  existed, 
and  of  the  Land  Commissions,  where  the  Zemstvos 
with  their  Land  Offices  did  not  yet  exist — over  all 
cultivated  land.     It  was  thus   made  possible  for 


78  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  provisions  of  a  comprehensive  land  law  to  be 
applied  quickly,  with  a  minimum  amount  of  either 
disturbance  or  delay. 

From  the  foregoing  it  will  be  readily  seen  that 
the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat  interfered  with  the  con- 
summation of  a  most  painstaking,  scientific  effort 
to  solve  the  greatest  of  all  Russian  problems.  Their 
apologists  are  fond  of  claiming  that  the  Bolsheviki 
can  at  least  be  credited  with  having  solved  the  land 
problem  by  giving  the  land  to  the  peasants.  The 
answer  to  that  preposterous  claim  is  contained  in  the 
foregoing  plain  and  unadorned  chronological  record, 
the  accuracy  of  which  can  easily  be  attested  by  any 
person  having  access  to  a  reasonably  good  library. 
In  so  far  as  the  Bolsheviki  put  forward  any  land 
program  at  all,  they  adopted,  for  reasons  of  political 
expediency,  the  program  which  had  been  worked 
out  by  the  Land  Commissions  under  the  Provisional 
Government— the  so-called  Chernov  program.  With 
that  program  they  did  nothing  of  any  practical 
value,  however.  Where  the  land  was  distributed 
under  their  regime  it  was  done  by  the  peasants 
themselves.  In  many  cases  it  was  done  in  the 
primitive,  violent,  destructive,  and  anarchical  ways 
of  the  "Jacqueries"  already  described,  adding 
enormously  to  Russia's  suffering  and  well-nigh  en- 
compassing her  destruction.  By  nothing  else  is  the 
malefic  character  and  influence  of  Bolshevism  more 
clearly  shown  than  by  the  state  in  which  it  placed 
the  land  problem,  just  when  it  was  about  to  be 
scientifically  and  democratically  solved. 

When  the  Constituent  Assembly  met  on  January 
5,  191 8,  the  proposed  land  law  was  at  once  taken 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  79 

up.  The  first  ten  paragraphs  had  been  adopted 
when  the  Assembly  was  dispersed  by  Trotsky's 
Red  Guards.  The  entire  bill  was  thus  not  acted 
upon.  The  ten  paragraphs  which  were  passed 
give  a  very  good  idea  of  the  general  character  and 
scope  of  the  measure: 

In  the  name  of  the  peoples  of  the  Russian  State,  com- 
posing the  All-Russian  Constituent  Assembly,  be  it  or- 
dained that: 

i.  Right  of  ownership  to  land  within  the  limits  of 
the  Russian  Republic  is  henceforth  and  forever  abolished. 

2.  All  lands  contained  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
Russian   Republic  with   all   their  underground   wealth,  | 
forests,  and  waters  become  the  property  of  the  people. 

3.  The  control  of  all  lands,  the  surface  and  under  the 
surface,  and  all  forests  and  waters  belongs  to  the  Re- 
public, as  expressed  in  the  forms  of  its  central  adminis- 
trative organs  and  organs  of  local  self-government  on 
the  principles  enacted  by  this  law. 

4.  Those  territories  of  the  Russian  Republic  which 
are  autonomous  in  a  juridico-governmental  conception, 
are  to  realize  their  agrarian  plans  on  the  basis  of  this 
law  and  in  accord  with  the  Federal  Constitution. 

5.  The  aims  of  the  government  forces  and  the  organs 
of  local  self-government  in  the  sphere  of  the  control  of 
lands,  underground  riches,  forests,  and  waters  constitute: 
(a)  The  creation  of  conditions  most  favorable  to  the 
greater  exploitation  of  the  natural  wealth  of  the  land 
and  the  highest  development  of  productive  forces;  (b) 
The  equitable  distribution  of  all  natural  wealth  among 
the  population. 

6.  The  right  of  any  person  or  institution  to  land, 
underground  resources,  forests,  and  waters  is  limited 
only  to  the  utilization  thereof. 


80  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

7.  All  citizens  of  the  Russian  Republic,  and  also 
unions  of  such  citizens  and  states  and  social  institutions, 
may  become  users  of  land,  underground  resources,  for- 
ests, and  waters,  without  regard  to  nationality  or  religion. 

8.  The  land  rights  of  such  users  are  to  be  obtained, 
become  effective,  and  cease  under  the  terms  laid  down 
by  this  law. 

9.  Land  rights  belonging  at  present  to  private  per- 
sons, groups,  and  institutions,  in  so  far  as  they  conflict 
with  this  law,  are  herewith  abrogated. 

10.  The  transformation  of  all  lands,  underground 
strata,  forests,  and  waters,  belonging  at  present  to  private 
persons,  groups,  or  institutions,  into  popular  property 
is  to  be  made  without  recompense  to  such  owners. 

After  they  had  dispersed  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly the  Bolsheviki  published  their  famous 
"Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  the  Laboring  and 
Exploited  People,"  containing  their  program  for 
"socialization  of  the  land,"  taken  bodily  from 
the  Socialists-Revolutionists.  This  declaration  had 
been  first  presented  to  the  Constituent  Assembly 
when  the  Bolsheviki  demanded  its  adoption  by  that 
body.  The  paragraphs  relating  to  the  socialization 
of  the  land  read: 

1.  To  effect  the  socialization  of  the  land,  private 
ownership  of  land  is  abolished,  and  the  whole  land  fund 
is  declared  common  national  property  and  transferred 
to  the  laborers  without  compensation,  on  the  basis  of 
equalized  use  of  the  soil. 

All  forests,  minerals,  and  waters  of  state-wide  im- 
portance, as  well  as  the  whole  inventory  of  animate  and 
inanimate  objects,  all  estates  and  agricultural  enter- 
prises, are  declared  national  property. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  81 

This  meant  literally  nothing  from  the  standpoint 
of  practical  politics.  Its  principal  interest  lies  in 
the  fact  that  it  shows  that  the  Bolsheviki  accepted 
in  theory  the  essence  of  the  land  program  of  the 
elements  comprised  in  the  Provisional  Government 
and  in  the  Constituent  Assembly,  both  of  which 
they  had  overthrown.  Practically  the  declaration 
could  have  no  effect  upon  the  peasants.  Millions 
of  them  had  been  goaded  by  the  Bolsheviki  into 
resorting  to  anarchistic,  violent  seizing  of  lands  on 
the  principle  of  "each  for  himself  and  the  devil 
take  the  hindmost."  These  would  now  be  ready 
to  fight  any  attempt  made  by  the  Soviet  authorities 
to  "socialize  "  the  land  they  held.  Millions  of  other 
peasants  were  still  under  the  direction  of  the  local 
Land  Commissions,  most  of  which  continued  to 
function,  more  or  less  sub  rosa,  for  some  time.  And 
even  when  and  where  the  local  Land  Commis- 
sions themselves  did  not  exist,  the  plans  they 
had  prepared  were,  in  quite  a  large  measure, 
put  into  practice  when  local  land  divisions  took 
place. 

The  Bolsheviki  were  powerless  to  make  a  single 
constructive  contribution  to  the  solution  of  the 
basic  economic  problem  of  Russia.  Their  "so- 
cialization decree"  was  a  poor  substitute  for  the 
program  whence  it  had  been  derived;  they  pos- 
sessed no  machinery  and  no  moral  agencies  to  give 
it  reality.  It  remained  a  pious  wish,  at  best; 
perhaps  a  far  harsher  description  would  be  that 
much  more  nearly  true.  Later  on,  when  they 
went  into  the  villages  and  sought  to  "socialize" 
them,  the    Bolsheviki   found   that   they   had    not 


82  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

solved  the  land  problem,  but  had  made  it  worse 
than  it  had  been  before. 

We  have  heard  much  concerning  the  nationaliza- 
tion of  agriculture  in  Soviet  Russia,  and  of  the  mar- 
velous success  attending  it.     The  facts,  as  they  are 
to  be  found  in  the  official  publications  of  the  Soviet 
Government   and   the   Communist   Party,   do   not 
sustain  the  roseate  accounts  which  have  been  pub- 
lished   by    our    pro-Bolshevist    friends.     By    July, 
191 8,  the  month  in  which  the  previously  decreed 
nationalization  of  industry  was  enforced,  some  ten- 
tative steps  toward  the  nationalization  of  agricult- 
ure had   already  been  taken.     Maria  Spiridonova, 
a  leader  of  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  Socialists- 
Revolutionists,  who  had  co-operated  with  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  bitterly  assailed  the  Council  of  the  People's 
Commissaries  for  having  resorted  to  nationalization 
of  the  great  estates,  especially  in  the  western  gov- 
ernment.    In  a  speech  delivered  in  Petrograd,  on 
July    16th,   Spiridonova  charged  that  "the   great 
estates  were  being  taken  over  by  government  de- 
partments and  were  being  managed  by  officials,  on 
the  ground  that  state  control  would  yield  better  re- 
sults than  communal  ownership.     Under  this  sys- 
tem the  peasants  were  being  reduced  to  the  state 
of  slaves  paid  wages  by  the  state.     Yet  the   law 
provided    that    these    estates    should    be    divided 
among  the  peasant  communes  to  be  tilled  by  the 
peasants    on    a    co-operative    basis."     It    appears 
that  this  policy  was  adopted  in  a  number  of  in- 
stances   where    the    hostility    to    the    Bolsheviki 
manifested  by  the  peasants  made  the  division  of  the 
land  among  them  "undesirable."     Nationalization 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  83 

upon  any  large  scale  was  not  resorted  to  until  some 
months  later.  Nationalization  of  the  agriculture 
of  the  country  as  a  whole  has  never  been  attempted, 
of  course.  There  could  not  be  such  a  nationaliza- 
tion of  agriculture  without  first  nationalizing  the 
land,  and  that,  popular  opinion  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  has  never  been  done  in  Russia  as 
yet.  The  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  229)  de- 
clared, in  November,  1919,  that  "in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  decree  announcing  the  nationalization 
of  the  land  is  now  two  years  old,  this  nationalization 
has  not  yet  been  carried  out." 

It  was  not  until  March,  1919,  according  to  a 
report  by  N.  Bogdanov  in  Economicheskaya  Zhizn, 
November  7,  1919,  that  nationalized  agriculture 
really  began  on  a  large  scale.  From  this  report  we 
learn  something  of  the  havoc  which  had  been 
wrought  upon  the  agricultural  industry  of  Russia 
from  March,  1917  to  1919: 

A  considerable  portion  of  the  estates  taken  over  by 
the  People's  Commissariat  of  Agriculture  could  not  be 
utilized,  due  to  the  lack  of  various  accessories,  such  as 
harness,  horseshoes,  rope,  small  instruments,  etc. 

The  workers  were  very  fluctuating,  entirely  unor- 
ganized, politically  inert — all  this  due  to  the  shortage 
of  provisions  and  organization.  The  technical  forces 
could  not  get  used  to  the  village;  besides,  we  did  not 
have  sufficient  numbers  of  agronomists  (agricultural 
experts)  familiar  with  the  practical  organization  of  large 
estates.  The  regulations  governing  the  social  manage- 
ment of  land  charged  the  representatives  of  the  industrial 
proletariat  with  a  leading  part  in  the  work  of  the  Soviet 
estates.     But,  torn  between  meeting  the  various  require- 


84  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ments  of  the  Republic,  of  prime  importance,  the  prole- 
tariat could  not  with  sufficient  speed  furnish  the  num- 
ber of  organizers  necessary  for  agricultural  management. 

The  idea  of  centralized  management  on  the  Soviet 
estates  has  not  been  properly  understood  by  the  local 
authorities,  and  the  work  of  organization  from  the  very 
beginning  had  to  progress  amid  bitter  fighting  between 
the  provincial  Soviet  estates  and  the  provincial  offices 
of  the  Department  of  Agriculture.  This  struggle  has 
not  as  yet  ceased. 

Thus,  the  work  of  nationalizing  the  country's  agri- 
culture began  in  the  spring — i.e.,  a  half-year  later  than 
it  should  have,  and  without  any  definite  territory  (every 
inch  of  it  had  to  be  taken  after  a  long  and  strenuous 
siege  on  the  part  of  the  surrounding  population);  with 
insufficient  and  semi-ruined  equipment;  without  pro- 
visions; without  an  apparatus  for  organization  and  with- 
out the  necessary  experience  for  such  work;  with  the 
agricultural  workers  engaged  in  the  Soviet  estates  lack- 
ing any  organization  whatever. 

Naturally,  the  results  of  this  work  are  not  impressive. 

•  ••*••• 

Within  the  limits  of  the  Soviet  estates  the  labor-union 
of  agricultural  proletariat  has  developed  into  a  large 
organization. 

In  a  number  of  provinces  the  leading  part  in  the  work 
of  the  Soviet  estates  has  been  practically  assumed  by 
the  industrial  proletariat,  which  has  furnished  a  number 
of  organizers,  whose  reputation  has  been  sufficiently 
established. 

Estimating  the  results  of  the  work  accomplished,  we 
must  admit  that  we  have  not  yet  any  fully  nationalized 
rural  economy.  But  during  the  eight  months  of  work  in 
this  direction  all  the  elements  for  its  organization  have 
been  accumulated. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  85 

A  preliminary  familiarity  with  individual  estates  and 
with  agricultural  regions  makes  it  possible  to  begin  the 
preparation  of  a  national  plan  for  production  on  the 
Soviet  estates  and  for  a  systematic  attempt  to  meet  the 
manifold  demands  made  on  the  nationalized  estates  by 
the  agricultural  industries:  sugar,  distilling,  chemical, 
etc.,  as  well  as  by  the  country's  need  for  stock-breeding, 
seeds,  planting,  and  other  raw  materials. 

The  greatest  difficulties  arise  in  the  creation  of  the 
machinery  of  organization.  The  shortage  of  agricultural 
experts  is  being  replenished  with  great  difficulty,  for 
the  position  of  the  technical  personnel  of  the  Soviet 
estates,  due  to  their  weak  political  organization,  is  ex- 
tremely unstable.  The  mobilization  of  the  proletarian 
forces  for  the  work  in  the  Soviet  estates  gives  us  ground 
to  believe  that  in  this  respect  the  spring  of  1920  will  find 
us  sufficiently  prepared. 

The  ranks  of  proletarian  workers  in  the  Soviet  estates 
are  drawing  together.  True,  the  level  of  their  enlight- 
enment is  by  no  means  high,  but  "in  union  there  is 
strength,"  and  this  force  if  properly  utilized  will  rapidly 
yield  positive  results. 

The  sole  purpose  of  these  quotations  is  to  show 
that  at  best  the  "nationalization  of  agriculture"  in 
Russia,  concerning  which  we  have  heard  so  much, 
is  only  an  experiment  that  has  just  been  begun; 
that  it  bears  no  very  important  relation  to  the 
industry  as  a  wThole.  It  would  be  just  as  true  to 
say,  on  the  basis  of  the  agricultural  experiment  sta- 
tions of  our  national  and  state  governments,  that 
we  have  "nationalized  agriculture"  as  to  make 
that  claim  for  Russia.  The  records  show  that  the 
"  nationalized"  farms  did  not  produce  enough  food  to 
maintain  the  workers  employed  on  them. 


86  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Apart  from  the  nationalization  of  a  number  of 
large  estates  upon  the  basis  of  wage  labor  under  a 
centralized  authority,  the  Committee  for  the  Com- 
munization  of  Agricultural  Economy  was  formed 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  agricultural  com- 
munes. At  the  same  time — February,  1919 — the 
Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets  called 
on  the  Provincial  Soviets  to  take  up  this  work  of 
creating  agricultural  communes.  Millions  of  rubles 
were  spent  for  this  purpose,  but  the  results  were  very 
small.  In  March,  1919,  Pravda  declared  that 
"15,000  communes  were  registered,  but  we  have 
no  proofs  as  to  their  existence  anywhere  except  on 
paper."  The  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee, May,  1919,  complained  that  "the  number 
of  newly  organized  communes  is  growing  smaller 
from  month  to  month;  the  existing  communes  are 
becoming  disintegrated,  twenty  of  them  having 
been  disbanded  during  March."  City-bred  workers 
found  themselves  helpless  on  the  land  and  in  conflict 
with  the  peasants.  On  the  other  hand,  the  peasants 
would  not  accept  the  communes,  accompanied  as 
these  were  with  Soviet  control.  In  the  same  num- 
ber of  the  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee, Nikolaiev,  a  well-known  Bolshevik,  declared: 

The  communes  are  absolutely  contradictory  to  the 
mode  of  living  of  our  toiling  peasant  masses,  as  these 
communes  demand  not  only  the  abolition  of  property 
rights,  to  implements  and  means  of  production,  but  the 
division  of  products  according  to  program. 

At  the  Congress  of  Trades-unions,  which  met  in 
Moscow  in  May,  1919,  the  possibility  of  using  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  87 

communes  as  means  of  relieving  the  wide-spread 
unemployment  and  distress  among  the  city  workers 
was  discussed  by  Platonov,  Rozanov,  and  other 
noted  Bolsheviki.  The  closing  down  of  numerous 
factories  and  the  resulting  unemployment  of  large 
masses  of  workmen  had  brought  about  an  appalling 
amount  of  hunger.  It  was  proposed,  therefore, 
that  communes  be  formed  in  the  villages  under  the 
auspices  of  the  trades-unions,  and  as  branches  of 
the  unions,  parcels  of  land  being  given  to  the 
unions.  In  this  way,  it  was  argued,  employment 
would  be  found  for  the  members  of  the  unions  and 
the  food-supply  of  the  cities  would  be  materially 
increased.  While  approving  the  formation  of  com- 
munes, the  Congress  voted  down  the  proposal. 

On    June    8,    1919,    there    was    established    the 
Administration  of  Industrial  Allotments.     The  ob- 
ject of  this  new  piece  of  bureaucratic  machinery 
was  the  increase  of  agricultural  production  through 
land  allotments  attached  to,  or  assigned  to,  indus- 
trial establishments,  and  their  cultivation  by  the 
workers.     This    scheme,  which  had   been  promul- 
gated as  early  as  February,  1919,  was  a  pathetic 
anticlimax  to  the  ambitious  program  with  which 
the    Bolshevist   Utopia-builders    set    out.     It   was 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  "allotment  gardens" 
scheme  so  long  familiar  in  British  cities.     Such  al- 
lotment gardens  were  common  enough  in  the  in- 
dustrial centers  of  the  United   States   during  the 
war.     As    an    emergency    measure    for    providing 
vegetables  they  were  useful  and  even   admirable; 
as  a  contribution  to  the  solution  of  the  agricult- 
ural problem  in  its  largest  sense  their  value  was 


88  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

insignificant.  Yet  we  find  the  Economicheskaya 
Zhizn,  in  November,  191 9,  indulging  in  the  old 
intoxicating  visions  of  Utopia,  and  seeing  in  these 
allotments  the  means  whereby  the  cities  could  be 
relieved  of  their  dependence  upon  the  rural  villages 
for  food: 

Out  of  the  hitherto  frenzied  rush  of  workmen  into  vil- 
lages, brought  about  by  hunger,  a  healthy  proletariat 
movement  was  born,  aiming  at  the  creation  of  their  own 
agriculture  by  means  of  allotments  attached  to  the  works. 
This  movement  resulted,  on  February  15,  1919,  in  a 
decree  which  granted  to  factory  and  other  proletariat 
groups  the  right  to  organize  their  own  rural  economy. 
.  .  .  The  enthusiasm  of  the  workmen  is  impressive.  .  .  . 
The  complete  emancipation  of  the  towns  from  the  villages  in 
the  matter  of  food-supply  appears  to  be  quite  within  the 
realms  of  possibility  in  the  near  future,  without  the  un- 
wieldy, expensive,  and  inefficient  machinery  of  the  People' 's 
Commissariat  of  Food  Supply,  and  without  undue  irrita- 
tion of  the  villages.  This  will,  besides,  relieve  enormously 
the  strain  on  the  crippled  railways.  And,  what  is  even 
more  important,  it  points  out  a  new  and  the  only  right 
way  to  the  nationalization  of  the  land  and  to  the  sociali- 
zation of  agriculture.  And,  indeed,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  decree  announcing  the  nationalization  of  the 
land  is  now  two  years  old,  this  nationalization  has  not 
yet  been  carried  out.  The  attitude  of  the  peasant  to  the 
land,  psychologically  as  well  as  economically,  is  still 
that  of  the  small  landowner.  He  still  considers  the  land 
his  property,  for,  as  before,  it  is  he,  and  not  the  state, 
that  draws  both  the  absolute  and  the  differential  rent, 
and  he  is  fighting  for  it,  with  the  food  detachments,  with 
all  his  power.  If  there  is  any  difference  at  all  it  is  that  the 
rent  which  formerly  used  to  find  its  way  into  the  wide 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  89 

pockets  of  the  landowners  now  goes  into  the  slender 
purse  of  the  peasant.  The  difference,  however,  in  the 
size  of  the  respective  pockets  is  becoming  more  and  more 
insignificant.  .  .  .  In  order  to  make  the  approach  to 
socialization  of  the  land  possible,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
Soviet  authorities  should,  besides  promulgating  decrees, 
actually  take  possession  of  the  land,  and  the  authorities 
can  only  do  this  with  the  help  of  the  industrial  prole- 
tariat, whose  dictatorship  it  represents. 

How  extremely  childish  all  this  is!  How  little 
the  knowledge  of  the  real  problem  it  displays!  If 
the  official  organ  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council 
and  the  People's  Commissaries  of  Finance,  Com- 
merce and  Trade  and  Food  knew  no  better  than  this 
after  two  such  years  as  Russia  had  passed  through, 
how  can  there  be  any  hope  for  Russia  until  the 
reckless,  ignorant,  bungling  experimenters  are  over- 
thrown? Pills  of  Podophyllum  for  earthquakes 
would  be  less  grotesque  than  their  prescription  for 
Russia's  ailment. 


90  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


i 


VI 


THE    BOLSHEVIK1    AND    THE    PEASANTS 

IN    the    fierce    fratricidal    conflict    between    the 
Bolsheviki   and   the   democratic  anti-Bolshevist 
elements  so  much  bitterness  has  been  engendered 
that  anything  approaching  calm,  dispassionate  dis- 
cussion   and    judgment    has    been    impossible    for 
Russians,  whether  as  residents  in  Russia,  engaged 
in  the  struggle,  or  as  emigres,  impotent  to  do  more 
than  indulge  in  the  expression  of  their  emotions, 
practically   all   Russians   everywhere   have  been — 
and  still  are — too  intensely  partizan  to  be  just  or 
fair-minded.     And  non-Russians  have  been  subject 
to  the   same  distorting  passions,  only  to  a  lesser 
degree.     Even  here  in  the  United  States,  while  an 
incredibly  large  part  of  the  population  has  remained 
utterly  indifferent,  wholly  uninterested  in  the  strug- 
gle or  the  issues  at  stake,  it  has  been  practically 
impossible    to    find    anywhere    intelligent    interest 
dissociated  from  fierce  partizanship. 

The  detachment  and  impartiality  essential  to  the 
formation  of  sound  and  unbiased  judgment  have 
been  almost  non-existent.  The  issues  at  stake  have 
been  too  vast  and  too  fundamental,  too  vitally  con- 
cerned with  the  primal  things  of  civilization,  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  91 

sources  of  some  of  our  profoundest  emotions,  to 
permit  cool  deliberation.  Moreover,  little  groups 
of  men  and  women  with  strident  cries  have  hurled 
the  challenge  of  Bolshevism  into  the  arena  of  our 
national  life,  and  that  at  a  time  of  abnormal  ex- 
citation, at  the  very  moment  when  our  lives  were 
pulsing  with  a  fiercely  emotional  patriotism.  As 
a  result  of  these  conditions  there  has  been  little 
discriminating  discernment  in  the  tremendous  riot 
of  discussion  of  Russian  Bolshevism  which  has 
raged  in  all  parts  of  the  land.  It  has  been  a 
frenzied  battle  of  epithet  and  insult,  calumny  and 
accusation. 

It  is  not  at  all  strange  or  remarkable  that  their 
opponents,  in  Russia  and  outside  of  it,  have  been 
ready  to  charge  against  the  Bolsheviki  every  evil 
condition  in  Russia,  including  those  which  have  long 
existed  under  czarism  and  those  which  developed 
during  and  as  a  result  of  the  war.  The  transporta- 
tion system  had  been  reduced  to  something  nearly 
approaching  chaos  before  the  Revolution  of  March, 
1917,  as  all  reasonably  well-informed  people  know. 
Yet,  notwithstanding  these  things,  it  is  a  common 
practice  to  charge  the  Bolsheviki  with  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  transportation  system  and  all  the  evil 
results  following  from  it.  Industrial  production 
declined  greatly  in  the  latter  part  of  1916  and  the 
early  weeks  of  1917.  The  March  Revolution,  by 
lessening  discipline  in  the  factories,  had  the  effect 
of  lessening  production  still  further.  The  demoral- 
ization of  industry  was  one  of  the  gravest  problems 
with  which  Kerensky  had  to  deal.  Yet  it  is  rare 
to  find   any  allowance  made  for  these  important 


■*,-* 


N 
V, 

92  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

facts  in  anti-Bolshevist  polemics.  The  Bolsheviki 
are  charged  with  having  wrought  all  the  havoc  and 
harm;  there  is  no  discrimination,  no  intellectual 
balance. 

Similarly,  many  of  their  opponents  have  charged 
against  the  Russian  Bolsheviki  much  brutality  and 
crime  which  in  fairness  should  be  attributed  rather 
to  inherent  defects  of  the  peasant  character,  them- 
selves the  product  of  centuries  of  oppression  and 
misrule.  There  is  much  that  is  admirable  in  the 
i  character  of  the  Russian  peasant,  and  many  west- 
ern writers  have  found  the  temptation  to  idealize  it 
irresistible.  Yet  it  is  well  to  remember  that  it  is 
'%  not  yet  sixty  years  since  serfdom  was  abolished; 
that  under  a  very  thin  veneer  there  remain  ignorant 
selfishness,  superstition,  and  the  capacity  for  savage 
brutality  which  all  primitive  peoples  have.  Noth- 
ing is  gained,  nobody  is  helped  to  an  understanding 
of  the  Russian  problem,  if  emphasis  is  laid  upon 
the  riotous  seizures  of  land  by  the  peasants  in  the 
early  stages  of  the  Bolshevist  regime  and  no  at- 
tention paid  to  the  fact  that  similar  riotings  and 
land  seizures  were  numerous  and  common  in  1906, 
and  that  as  soon  as  the  Revolution  broke  out  in 
March,  1917,  the  peasant  uprisings  began.  Un- 
doubtedly the  Bolsheviki  must  be  held  responsible 
for  the  fact  that  they  deliberately  destroyed  the 
discipline  and  restraint  which  the  Land  Commis- 
sions exercised  over  the  peasants;  that  they  in- 
stigated them  to  riot  and  anarchy  at  the  very  time 
when  a  peaceful  and  orderly  solution  of  the  land 
problem  was  made  certain.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
minimize  their  crime  against  Russian  civilization: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  93 

only  it  is  neither  true  nor  wise  to  attribute  the 
brutal  character  of  the  peasant  to  Bolshevism. 

The  abolition  of  the  courts  of  justice  and  the 
forms  of  judicial  procedure  threw  upon  the  so- 
called  "People's  Tribunals"  the  task  of  administer- 
ing justice — a  task  which  the  peasants  of  whom  the 
village  tribunals  were  composed,  many  of  them 
wholly  illiterate  and  wholly  unfit  to  exercise  au- 
thority, could  not  be  expected  to  discharge  other 
than  as  they  did,  with  savage  brutality.  Here  is  a 
list  of  cases  taken  from  a  single  issue  (April  26, 
191 8)  of  the  Dyelo  Naroda  {People's  Affair),  organ 
of  the  Socialists-Revolutionists: 

In  Kirensk  County  the  People's  Tribunal  ordered  a 
woman,  found  guilty  of  extracting  brandy,  to  be  in- 
closed in  a  bag  and  repeatedly  knocked  against  the 
ground  until  dead. 

In  the  Province  of  Tver  the  People's  Tribunal  has  sen- 
tenced a  young  fellow  "to  freeze  to  death"  for  theft. 
In  a  rigid  frost  he  was  led  out,  clad  only  in  a  shirt,  and 
water  was  poured  on  him  until  he  turned  into  a  piece  of 
ice.  Out  of  pity  somebody  cut  his  tortures  short  by 
shooting  him. 

In  Sarapulsk  County  a  peasant  woman,  helped  by  her 
lover,  killed  her  husband.  For  this  crime  the  People's 
Tribunal  sentenced  the  woman  to  be  buried  alive  and  her 
lover  to  die.  A  grave  was  dug,  into  which  first  the  body 
of  the  killed  lover  was  lowered,  and  then  the  woman, 
hands  and  feet  bound,  put  on  top.  She  had  been  covered 
by  almost  fifteen  feet  of  earth  when  she  still  kept  on 
yelling  "Help!"  and  "Have  pity,  dear  people!"  The 
peasants,  who  witnessed  the  scene,  later  said,  "But  the 
life  of  a  woman  is  as  lasting  as  that  of  a  cat." 

In   the  village  of  Bolshaya   Sosnovka   a  shoemaker 
7 


94  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

killed  a  soldier  who  tried  to  break  in  during  the  night. 
The  victim's  comrades,  also  soldiers,  created  a  ''Revo- 
lutionary Tribunal,"  which  convicted  the  shoemaker  to 
"be  beheaded  at  the  hands  of  one  of  his  comrades  to 
whose  lot  it  should  fall  to  perform  the  task."  The  shoe- 
maker was  put  to  death  in  the  presence  of  a  crowd  of 
thousands  of  people. 

In  the  village  of  Bootsenki  five  men  and  three  women 
were  accused  of  misconduct.  The  local  peasant  com- 
mittee undertook  to  try  them.  After  a  long  trial  the 
committee  reached  the  verdict  to  punish  them  by  flog- 
ging, giving  each  one  publicly  thirty-five  strokes  with  the 
rod.  One  of  the  women  was  pregnant  and  it  was  de- 
cided to  postpone  the  execution  in  her  case  until  she 
had  been  delivered.  The  rest  were  severely  flogged. 
In  connection  with  this  affair  an  interesting  episode  oc- 
curred. One  of  the  convicted  received  only  sixteen 
strokes  instead  of  thirty-five.  At  first  no  attention  was 
paid  to  it.  The  next  day,  however,  rumors  spread  that 
the  president  of  the  committee  had  been  bribed,  and  had 
thus  mitigated  the  punishment. 

Then  the  committee  decreed  to  flog  the  piesident 
himself,  administering  to  him  fifty  strokes  with  the 
rod. 

In  the  village  of  Riepyrky,  in  Korotoyansk  County, 
the  peasants  caught  a  soldier  robbing  and  decided  to 
drown  him.  The  verdict  was  carried  out  by  the  members 
of  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  in  the  presence  of  all  the 
people  of  the  village. 

In  the  village  of  Vradievka,  in  Ananyensky  County, 
eleven  thieves,  sentenced  by  the  people,  were  shot. 

In  the  district  of  Kubanetz,  in  the  Province  of  Petro- 
grad,  carrying  out  the  verdict  of  the  people,  peasants 
shot  twelve  men  of  the  fighting  militia  who  had  been 
caught  accepting  bribes. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  95 

These  sentences  speak  for  themselves.  They 
were  not  expressions  of  Bolshevist  savagery,  for  in 
the  village  tribunals  there  were  very  few  Bolsheviki. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  same  people  who  meted  out 
these  barbarous  sentences  treated  the  agents  of  the 
Soviet  Government  with  equally  savage  brutality. 
The  Bolsheviki  had  unleashed  the  furious  passion 
of  these  primitive  folk,  destroyed  their  faith  in 
liberty  within  the  law,  and  replaced  it  by  license  and 
tyranny.  Thus  had  they  recklessly  sown  dragons' 
teeth. 

As  early  as  December,  1917,  the  Bolshevist  press 
was  discussing  the  serious  conditions  which  ob- 
tained among  the  peasants  in  the  villages.  It  was 
recognized  that  no  good  had  resulted  from  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  land  by  the  anarchical  methods 
which  had  been  adopted.  The  evils  which  the 
leaders  of  the  Mensheviki  and  the  Socialists- 
Revolutionists  had  warned  against  were  seen  to  be 
very  stern  realities.  As  was  inevitable,  the  land 
went,  in  many  cases,  not  to  the  most  needy,  but  to 
the  most  powerful  and  least  scrupulous.  In  these 
cases  there  was  no  order,  no  wisdom,  no  justice, 
no  law  save  might.     It  was  the  old,  old  story  of 

Let  him  take  who  has  the  power; 
And  let  him  keep  who  can. 

All  that  there  was  of  justice  and  order  came  from 
the  organizations  set  up  by  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, the  organizations  the  Bolsheviki  sought  to 
destroy.  Before  they  had  been  in  power  very  long 
the  new  rulers  were  compelled  to  recognize  the 


96  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

seriousness    of  the    situation.     On    December    26, 
1 91 7,  Pravda  said: 

Thus  far  not  everybody  realizes  to  what  an  extent  the 
war  has  affected  the  economic  condition  of  the  villages. 
The  increase  in  the  cost  of  bread  has  been  a  gain  only 
for  those  selling  it.  The  demolition  of  the  estates  of  the 
landowners  has  enriched  only  those  who  arrived  at  the 
place  of  plunder  in  carriages  driven  by  five  horses. 
By  the  distribution  of  the  landowners'  cattle  and  the 
rest  of  their  property,  those  gained  most  who  were  in 
charge  of  the  distribution.  In  charge  of  the  distribution 
were  committees,  which,  as  everybody  was  complaining, 
consisted  mainly  of  wealthy  peasants. 

One  of  the  most  terrible  consequences  of  the  law- 
less anarchy  that  had  been  induced  by  the  Bolshe- 
viki  was  the  internecine  strife  between  villages, 
which  speedily  assumed  the  dimensions  of  civil  war. 
It  was  common  for  the  peasants  in  one  village  to 
arm  themselves  and  fight  the  armed  peasants  of  a 
neighboring  village  for  the  possession  of  the  lands 
of  an  estate.  At  the  instigation  of  the  Bolsheviki 
and  of  German  agents,  many  thousands  of  peasants 
had  deserted  from  the  army,  taking  with  them 
their  weapons  and  as  much  ammunition  as  they 
could.  "Go  back  to  your  homes  and  take  your 
guns  with  you.  Seize  the  land  for  yourselves  and 
defend  it!"  was  the  substance  of  this  propaganda. 
The  peasant  soldiers  deserted  in  masses,  frequently 
terrorizing  the  people  of  the  villages  and  towns 
through  which  they  passed.  Several  times  the 
Kerensky  Government  attempted  to  disarm  these 
masses  of  deserters,  but  their  number  was  so  great 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  97 

that  this  was  not  possible,  every  attempt  to  disarm 
a  body  of  them  resolving  itself  into  a  pitched  battle. 
In  this  way  the  villages  became  filled  with  armed 
men  who  were  ready  to  use  their  weapons  in  the 
war  for  booty,  a  sort  of  savage  tribal  war,  the  vil- 
lage populations  being  the  tribes.  In  his  paper, 
Novaya  Zhizn,  Gorky  wrote,  in  June,  1918: 

All  those  who  have  studied  the  Russian  villages  of 
our  day  clearly  perceive  that  the  process  of  demoraliza- 
tion and  decay  is  going  on  there  with  remarkable  speed. 
The  peasants  have  taken  the  land  away  from  its 
owners,  divided  it  among  themselves,  and  destroyed 
the  agricultural  implements.  And  they  are  getting  ready 
to  engage  in  a  bloody  internecine  struggle  for  the  division 
of  the  booty.  In  certain  districts  the  population  has 
consumed  the  entire  grain-supply,  including  the  seed. 
In  other  districts  the  peasants  are  hiding  their  grain 
underground,  for  fear  of  being  forced  to  share  it  with 
starving  neighbors.  This  situation  cannot  fail  to  lead 
to  chaos,  destruction,  and  murder.1 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  "bloody  internecine 
struggle"  had  been  going  on  for  some  time.  Even 
before  the  overthrow  of  Kerensky  there  had  been 
many  of  these  village  wars.  The  Bolshevist  Gov- 
ernment did  not  make  any  very  serious  attempt  to 
interfere  with  the  peasant  movements  for  the  dis- 
tribution of  land  for  some  time  after  the  coup  d'etat. 
It  was  too  busy  trying  to  consolidate  its  position  in 
the  cities,  and  especially  to  organize  production  in 
the  factories.  There  was  not  much  to  be  done  with 
the  farms  at  that  season  of  the  year.     Early  in  the 

1  Italics  mine. — J.  S. 


98  "THE  GREATEST   FAILURE 

spring  of  191 8  agents  of  the  Soviet  Government 
began  to  appear  in  the  villages.  Their  purpose  was 
to  supervise  and  regulate  the  distribution  of  the 
land.  Since  a  great  deal  of  the  land  had  already 
been  seized  and  distributed  by  the  peasants,  this 
involved  some  interference  on  the  part  of  the  cen- 
tral Soviet  power  in  matters  which  the  peasants 
regarded  themselves  as  rightfully  entitled  to  settle 
in  their  own  way. 

This  gave  rise  to  a  bitter  conflict  between  the 
peasants  and  the  central  Soviet  authorities.  If  the 
peasants  had  confiscated  and  partitioned  the  land, 
however  inequitably,  they  regarded  their  deed  as 
conclusive  and  final.  The  attempt  of  the  Soviet 
agents  to  "revise"  their  actions  they  regarded  as 
robbery.  The  central  Soviet  authorities  had  against 
them  all  the  village  population  with  the  exception 
of  the  disgruntled  few.  If  the  peasants  had  not 
yet  partitioned  the  land  they  were  suspicious  of  out- 
siders coming  to  do  it.  The  land  was  their  own; 
the  city  men  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  In  hun- 
dreds of  villages  the  commissions  sent  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  land 
program  were  mobbed  and  brutally  beaten,  and  in 
many  cases  were  murdered.  The  issue  of  Vlast 
Naroda  {Power  of  the  People)  for  May,  191 8,  con- 
tained the  following: 

In  Bielo  all  members  of  the  Soviets  have  been  mur- 
dered. 

In  Soligalich  two  of  the  most  prominent  members  of 
the  Soviets  have  literally  been  torn  to  pieces.  Two 
others  have  been  beaten  half  dead. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  99 

In  Atkarsk  several  members  of  the  Soviets  have  been 
killed.  In  an  encounter  between  the  Red  Guards  and 
the  masses,  many  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  Red 
Guards  fled. 

In  Kleen  a  crowd  entered  by  force  the  building  oc- 
cupied by  the  Soviets,  with  the  intention  of  bringing  the 
deputies  before  their  own  court  of  justice.  The  latter 
fled.  The  Financial  Commissary  committed  suicide  by 
shooting  himself,  in  order  to  escape  the  infuriated  crowd. 

In  Oriekhovo-Zooyevo  the  deputies  work  in  their 
offices  guarded  by  a  most  vigilant  military  force.  Even 
on  the  streets  they  are  accompanied  by  guards  armed 
with  rifles  and  bayonets. 

In  Penza  an  attempt  has  been  made  on  the  lives  of 
the  Soviet  members.  One  of  the  presiding  officers  has 
been  wounded.  The  Soviet  building  is  now  surrounded 
with  cannon  and  machine-guns. 

In  Svicherka,  where  the  Bolsheviki  had  ordered  a 
St.  Bartholomew  night,  the  deputies  are  hunted  like  wild 
animals. 

In  the  district  of  Kaliasinsk  the  peasantry  has  decid- 
edly refused  to  obey  orders  of  the  Soviets  to  organize 
an  army  by  compulsion.  Some  of  the  recruiting  officers 
and  agitators  have  been  killed. 

Similar  acts  become  more  numerous  as  time  goes  on. 
The  movement  against  the  Soviets  spreads  far  and  wide, 
affecting  wider  and  wider  circles  of  the  people. 

The  warfare  between  villages  over  confiscated 
land  was  a  very  serious  matter.  Not  only  did  the 
peasants  confiscate  and  divide  among  themselves 
the  great  estates,  but  they  took  the  "excess"  lands 
of  the  moderately  well-to-do  peasants  in  many 
instances — that  is,  all  over  and  above  the  average 
allotment  for  the  village.     Those  residing  in  a  vil- 


100  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

lage  immediately  adjoining  an  estate  thus  confis- 
cated had,  all  other  things  being  equal,  a  better 
chance  to  get  the  lands  than  villagers  a  little  farther 
distant,  though  the  latter  might  be  in  greater  need 
of  the  land,  owing  to  the  fact  that  their  holdings 
were  smaller.  Again,  the  village  containing  many 
armed  men  stood  a  better  chance  than  the  village 
containing  few.  Village  made  war  against  village, 
raising  armed  forces  for  the  purpose.  We  get  a 
vivid  picture  of  this  terrible  anarchy  from  the 
following  account  in  the  Vlast  Naroda: 

The  village  has  taken  away  the  land  from  the  landlords, 
farmers,  wealthy  peasants,  and  monasteries.  It  cannot, 
however,  divide  it  peacefully,  as  was  to  be  expected. 

The  more  land  there  is  the  greater  the  appetite  for  it; 
hence  more  quarrels,  misunderstandings,  and  fights. 

In  Oboyansk  County  many  villages  refused  to  supply 
soldiers  when  the  Soviet  authorities  were  mobilizing  an 
army.  In  their  refusal  they  stated  that  "in  the  spring 
soldiers  will  be  needed  at  home  in  the  villages,"  not  to 
cultivate  the  land,  but  to  protect  it  with  arms  against 
neighboring  peasants. 

In  the  Provinces  of  Kaluga,  Kursk,  and  Voronezh 
peasant  meetings  adopted  the  following  resolutions: 

"All  grown  members  of  the  peasant  community  have 
to  be  home  in  the  spring.  Whoever  will  then  not  return 
to  the  village  or  voluntarily  stay  away  will  be  forever 
expelled  from  the  community. 

"These  provisions  are  made  for  the  purpose  of  having 
as  great  a  force  as  possible  in  the  spring  when  it  comes 
to  dividing  the  land." 

The  peasantry  is  rapidly  preparing  to  arm  and  is 
partly  armed  already.  The  villages  have  a  number  of 
rifles,  cartridges,  hand-grenades,  and  bombs. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  101 

Some  villages  in  the  Nieshnov  district  in  the  Province 
of  Mohilev  have  supplied  themselves  with  machine- 
guns.  The  village  of  Little  Nieshnov,  for  instance,  has 
decided  to  order  fifteen  machine-guns  and  has  organized 
a  Red  Army  in  order  to  be  able  better  to  defend  a  piece 
of  land  taken  away  from  the  landlords,  and,  as  they  say, 
that  "the  neighboring  peasants  should  not  come  to  cut 
our  hay  right  in  front  of  our  windows,  like  last  year." 
When  the  neighboring  peasants  "heard  of  the  decision" 
they  also  procured  machine-guns.  They  have  formed 
an  army  and  intend  to  go  to  Little  Nieshnov  to  cut  the 
hay  on  the  meadows  "under  the  windows"  of  the  dis- 
puted owners. 

In  the  Counties  of  Schigrovsk,  Oboyansk,  and  Ruilsk, 
in  the  Province  of  Kursk,  almost  every  small  and  large 
village  has  organized  a  Red  Guard  and  is  making  prep- 
arations for  the  coming  spring  war.  In  these  places 
the  peasants  have  taken  rich  booty.  They  took  and 
devastated  160  estates,  14  breweries,  and  26  sugar  re- 
fineries. Some  villages  have  even  marked  the  spot  where 
the  machine-guns  will  have  to  be  placed  in  the  spring. 
In  Volsk  County  in  the  Province  of  Saratov  five  large 
villages — Kluchi,  Pletnevka,  Ruibni,  Shakhan,  and 
Cherna'vka — expect  to  have  war  when  the  time  comes  to 
divide  the  148,500  acres  of  Count  Orlov-Denisov's 
estate.  Stubborn  fights  for  meadows  and  forests  are 
already  going  on.  They  often  result  in  skirmishes  and 
murder.  There  are  similar  happenings  in  other  counties 
of  the  province;  for  instance,  in  Petrov,  Balashov,  and 
Arkhar. 

In  the  Province  of  Simbirsk  there  is  war  between  the 
community  peasants  and  shopkeepers.  The  former  have 
decided  to  do  away  with  "Stolypin  heirs,"  as  they  call 
the  shopkeepers.  The  latter,  however,  have  organized 
and  are  ready  for  a  stubborn  resistance.  Combats  have 
already   taken    place.      The    peasants    demolish    farms, 


LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BA^ 


102  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

and  the  farmers  set  fire  to  towns,  villages,  threshing- 
floors,  etc. 

We  have  received  from  the  village  of  Khanino,  in  the 
Province  of  Kaluga,  the  following  letter: 

"The  division  of  the  land  leads  to  war.  One  village 
fights  against  the  other.  The  wealthy  and  strong  peas- 
ants have  decided  not  to  let  the  poor  share  the  land 
taken  away  from  the  landlords.  In  their  turn,  the  poor 
peasants  say,  'We  will  take  away  from  you  bourgeois 
peasants  not  only  the  lands  of  the  landlords,  but  also 
your  own.  We,  the  toilers,  are  now  the  government.' 
This  leads  to  constant  quarrels  and  fights.  The  popu- 
lation of  the  neighboring  village  consists  of  so-called 
natives  and  of  peasants  brought  by  landlords  from 
the  Province  of  Orlov.  The  natives  now  say  to  those 
from  Orlov:  'Get  away  from  our  land  and  return  to 
your  Province  of  Orlov.  Anyhow,  we  shall  drive  you 
away  from  here.'  The  peasants  from  Orlov,  however, 
threaten  'to  kill  all  the  natives.'  Thus  there  are  daily 
encounters." 

In  another  village  the  peasants  have  about  5,400  acres 
of  land,  which  they  bought.  For  some  reason  or  other 
they  failed  to  cultivate  it  last  year.  Therefore  the  peas- 
ants of  a  neighboring  village  decided  to  take  it  away 
from  them  as  "superfluous  property  which  is  against 
the  labor  status."    The  owners,  however,  declared: 

"First  kill  us  and  then  you  will  be  able  to  take  away 
our  land." 

In  some  places  the  first  battles  for  land  have  already 
taken  place. 

In  the  Province  of  Tambov,  near  the  village  of  Ischeina, 
a  serious  encounter  has  taken  place  between  the  peasants 
of  the  village  of  Shleyevka  and  Brianchevka.  Fortu- 
nately, among  the  peasants  of  Brianchevka  was  a  wise 
man,  "the  village  Solomon,"  who  first  persuaded  his 
neighbors  to  put  out  for  the  peasants  of  Shleyevka  five 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  103 

buckets  of  brandy.    The  latter  actually  took  the  ransom 
and  went  away,  thus  leaving  the  land  to  the  owners. 

In  some  instances  the  Bolsheviki  instigated  the 
peasants  to  massacre  hundreds  of  innocent  people 
in  adjacent  villages  and  towns.  They  did  not  stop, 
or  even  protest  against,  the  most  savage  anti- 
Jewish  pogroms.  Charles  Dumas,  the  well-known 
French  Socialist,  a  Deputy  in  Parliament,  after 
spending  fifteen  months  in  Russia,  published  his 
experiences  and  solemnly  warned  the  Socialists  of 
France  against  Bolshevism.  His  book  l  is  a  ter- 
rible chronicle  of  terrorism,  oppression,  and  an- 
archy, all  the  more  impressive  because  of  its  re- 
straint and  careful  documentation.  He  cites  the 
following  cases: 


*t> 


On  March  18,  1918,  the  peasants  of  an  adjoining  vil- 
lage organized,  in  collusion  with  the  Bolsheviki,  a  veri- 
table St.  Bartholomew  night  in  the  city  of  Kuklovo. 
About  five  hundred  bodies  of  the  victims  were  found 
afterward,  most  of  them  "Intellectuals."  All  residences 
and  stores  were  plundered  and  destroyed,  the  Jews  being 
among  the  worst  sufferers.  Entire  families  were  wiped 
out,  and  for  three  days  the  Bolsheviki  would  not  permit 
the  burial  of  the  dead. 

In  May,  1918,  the  city  of  Korocha  was  the  scene  of  a 
horrible  massacre.  Thirty  officers,  four  priests,  and  three 
hundred  citizens  were  killed. 

In  May,  1918,  the  relations  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment to  the  peasantry  were  described  by  Gorky 
as  the  war  of  the  city  against  the  country.  They 
were,  in  fact,  very  similar  to  the  relations  of  con- 

1  La  Virile  sur  les  Bolsheviki,  par  Charles  Dumas. 


104  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

quering  armies  to  the  subjugated  but  rebellious 
and  resentful  populations  of  conquered  territories. 
On  May  14th  a  decree  was  issued  regarding  the 
control  of  grain,  the  famous  compulsory  grain 
registration  order.  This  decree  occupies  so  im- 
portant a  place  in  the  history  of  the  struggle,  and 
contains  so  many  striking  features,  that  a  fairly 
full  summary  is  necessary:1 

/  While  the  people  in  the  consuming  districts  are 
starving,  there  are  large  reserves  of  unthreshed 
grain  in  the  producing  districts.  This  grain  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  village  bourgeoisie — "tight-fisted 
village  dealers  and  profiteers" — who  remain  "deaf 
and  indifferent  to  the  wailings  of  starving  workmen 
and  peasant  poverty"  and  hold  their  grain  in  the 
hope  of  forcing  the  government  to  raise  the  price 
of  grain,  selling  only  to  the  speculators  at  fabulous 
prices.  "An  end  must  be  put  to  this  obstinacy 
of  the  greedy  village  grain-profiteers."  To  abolish 
the  grain  monopoly  and  the  system  of  fixed  prices, 
while  it  would  lessen  the  profits  of  one  group  of 
capitalists,  would  also  "make  bread  completely  in- 
accessible to  our  many  millions  of  workmen  and 
would  subject  them  to  inevitable  death  from 
starvation."  Only  food  grains  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  feeding  their  families,  on  a  rationed  basis, 
and  for  seed  purposes  should  be  permitted  to  be 
held  by  the  peasants.  "  The  answer  to  the  violence 
of  grain-growers  toward  the  starving  poor  must  be 
violence  toward  the  bourgeoisie." 

Continuing  its  policy  of  price-fixing  and  monopo- 

1  The  entire  text  is  given  as  an  appendix  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  105 

lization  of  the  grain-supply,  the  government  de- 
creed "a  merciless  struggle  with  grain  speculators," 
compulsion  of  "each  grain-owner  to  declare  the 
surplus  above  what  is  needed  to  sow  the  fields  and 
for  personal  use,  according  to  established  normal 
quantities,  until  the  new  harvest,  and  to  surrender 
the  same  within  a  week  after  the  publication  of  this 
decision  in  each  village."  The  workmen  and  poor  j 
peasants  were  called  upon  "to  unite  at  once  for  a 
merciless  struggle  with  grain-hoarders."  All  per- 
sons having  a  surplus  of  grain  and  failing  to  bring 
it  to  the  collecting-points,  and  those  wasting  grain 
on  illicit  distillation  of  alcohol,  were  to  be  regarded 
as  "enemies  of  the  people."  They  were  to  be 
turned  over  to  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal,  which 
would  "imprison  them  for  ten  years,  confiscate; 
their  entire  property,  and  drive  them  out  forever 
from  the  communes";  while  the  distillers  must,  in 
addition,  "be  condemned  to  compulsory  communal 
work." 

To  carry  out  this  rigorous  policy  it  was  pro- 
vided that  any  person  who  revealed  an  unde- 
clared surplus  of  grains  should  receive  one-half  the 
value  of  the  surplus  when  it  was  seized  and  con- 
fiscated, the  other  half  going  to  the  village  commune. 
"For  the  more  successful  struggle  with  the  food 
crisis"  extraordinary  powers  were  conferred  upon 
the  People's  Food  Commissioner,  appointed  by  the 
Soviet  Government.  This  official  was  empowered 
to  (i)  publish  at  his  discretion  obligatory  regula- 
tions regarding  the  food  situation,  "exceeding  the 
usual  limits  of  the  People's  Food  Commissioner's 
competence";    (2)  to  abrogate  the  orders  of  local 


106  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

food  bodies  and  other  organizations  contravening 
his  own  plans  and  orders;  (3)  to  demand  from  all 
institutions  and  organizations  the  immediate  carry- 
ing out  of  his  regulations;  (4)  "to  use  armed  forces 
in  case  resistance  is  shown  to  the  removal  of  grains 
or  other  food  products;  (5)  to  dissolve  or  reorganize 
the  food  agencies  where  they  might  resist  his  orders; 
(6)  to  discharge,  transfer,  commit  to  the  Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal,  or  subject  to  arrest  officers  and 
employees  of  all  departments  and  public  organiza- 
tions in  case  of  interference  with  his  orders;  (7)  to 
transfer  the  powers  of  such  officials,  departments, 
and  institutions,"  with  the  approval  of  the  Council 
of  People's  Commissaries. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  discuss  the  merits  of 
these  regulations,  even  if  we  possessed  the  complete 
data  without  which  the  merit  of  the  regulations 
cannot  be  determined.  For  our  present  purpose  it 
is  sufficient  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  peasants 
regarded  the  regulations  as  oppressive  and  vigor- 
ously resisted  their  enforcement.  They  claimed 
that  the  amount  of  grain — and  also  of  potatoes — ■ 
they  were  permitted  to  keep  was  insufficient;  that 
it  meant  semi-starvation  to  them.  The  peasant 
Soviets,  where  such  still  existed,  jealous  of  their 
rights,  refused  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the 
People's  Food  Commissaries.  No  material  increase 
in  the  supply  of  "surplus  grain"  was  observed. 
The  receiving-stations  were  as  neglected  as  before. 
The  poor  wretches  who,  inspired  by  the  rich  reward 
of  half  the  value  of  the  illegal  reserves  reported, 
acted  as  informers  were  beaten  and  tortured,  and 
the  Food  Commissaries,  who  were  frequently  arm- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  107 

gant  and  brutal  in  their  ways,  were  attacked  and 
in  some  cases  killed. 

The  Soviet  Government  had  resort  to  armed 
force  against  the  peasants.  On  May  30,  1918,  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissaries  met  and  decided 
that  the  workmen  of  Petrograd  and  Moscow  must 
form  "food-requisitioning  detachments"  and  "ad- 
vance in  a  crusade  against  the  village  bourgeoisie, 
calling  to  their  assistance  the  village  poor."  From 
a  manifesto  issued  by  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missaries this  passage  is  quoted: 

The  Central  Executive  Committee  has  ordered  the 
Soviets  of  Moscow  and  Petrograd  to  mobilize  10,000 
workers,  to  arm  them  and  to  equip  them  for  a  campaign 
for  the  conquest  of  wheat  from  the  rapacious  and  the 
monopolists.  This  order  must  be  put  into  operation 
within  a  week.  Every  worker  called  upon  to  take  up 
arms  must  perform  his  duty  without  a  murmur. 

This  was,  of  course,  a  mobilization  for  war  of  the 
city  proletariat  against  the  peasantry.  In  an 
article  entitled,  "The  Policy  of  Despair,"  published 
in  his  paper,  the  Novaya  Zhizn,  Gorky  vigorously 
denounced  this  policy: 

The  war  is  declared,  the  city  against  the  country,  a 
war  that  allows  an  infamous  propaganda  to  say  that  the 
worker  is  to  snatch  his  last  morsel  of  bread  from  the 
half-starved  peasant  and  to  give  him  in  return  nothing 
but  Communist  bullets  and  monetary  emblems  without 
value.  Cruel  war  is  declared,  and  what  is  the  more 
terrible,  a  war  without  an  aim.  The  granaries  of  Russia 
are  outside  of  the  Communistic  Paradise,  but  rural 
Russia  suffers  as  much  from  famine  as  urban  Russia. 


108  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

We  are  profoundly  persuaded — and  Lenin  and  many 
of  the  intelligent  Bolsheviks  know  this  very  well — that 
to  collect  wheat  through  these  methods  that  recall  in 
a  manner  so  striking  those  employed  by  General  Eichorn 
(a  Prussian  general  of  enduring  memory  for  cruelty)  in 
Ukrainia,  will  never  solve  the  food  crisis.  They  know 
that  the  return  to  democracy  and  the  work  of  the  local 
autonomies  will  give  the  best  results,  and  meantime 
they  have  taken  this  decisive  step  on  the  road  to  folly. 

How  completely  the  Bolshevist  methods  failed 
is  shown  by  the  official  Soviet  journel,  Finances  and 
National  Economy  (No.  38),  November,  1918.  The 
following  figures  refer  to  a  period  of  three  months  in 
the  first  half  of  1918,  and  show  the  number  of  wagon- 
loads  demanded  and  the  number  actually  secured: 

Wagon-  Wagon-  Percentage 

IQ18  loads  loads  of  Demand 

Demanded  Secured  Realized 

April 20,967  1,462  6.97 

May 19,780  1,684  7.02 

June I7>370  786  4.52 

In  explanation  of  these  figures  the  apologists  of 
Bolshevist  rule  have  said  that  the  failure  was  due 
in  large  part  to  the  control  of  important  grain- 
growing  provinces  by  anti-Bolshevist  forces.  This 
is  typical  of  the  half-truths  which  make  up  so  much 
of  the  Bolshevist  propaganda.  Of  course,  impor- 
tant grain  districts  were  in  the  control  of  the  anti- 
Bolshevist  forces,  but  the  fact  was  known  to  the 
Bolsheviki  and  was  taken  into  account  in  making 
their  demands.  Otherwise,  their  demands  would 
certainly  have  been  much  greater.     Let  us,  how- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


109 


ever,  look  at  the  matter  from  a  slightly  different 
angle  and  consider  how  the  scheme  worked  in  those 
provinces  which  were  wholly  controlled  by  the 
Bolsheviki,  and  where  there  were  no  "enemy 
forces."  The  following  figures,  taken  from  the 
same  Soviet  journal,  refer  to  the  month  of  June, 
1918: 


Wagon- 

Wagon- 

Percentage 

Province 

loads 

loads 

of  Demand 

Demanded 

Secured 

Realized 

Voronezh 

1,000 

2 

0.20 

Viatka. .  . 

1,300 

H 

I.07 

Kazan. . . 

400 

2 

O.50 

Kursk.  . . 

500 

7 

I.40 

Orel 

300 

8 

2.67 

Tambov . 

675 

98 

14-51 

On  June  II,  1918,  a  decree  was  issued  establish- 
ing the  so-called  Pauper  Committees,  or  Committees 
of  the  Poor.  The  decree  makes  it  quite  clear  that 
the  object  was  to  replace  the  village  Soviets  by 
these  committees,  which  were  composed  in  part  of 
militant  Bolsheviki  from  the  cities  and  in  part  of 
the  poorest  peasants  in  the  villages,  including 
among  these  the  most  thriftless,  idle,  and  dissolute. 
Clause  2  of  the  decree  of  June  nth  provided  that 
"both  local  residents  and  chance  visitors"  might  be 
elected.  Those  not  admitted  were  those  known 
to  be  exploiters  and  "tight-fists,"  those  owning 
commercial  or  industrial  concerns,  and  those  hiring 
labor.  An  explanatory  note  was  added  which 
stated  that  those  using  hired  labor  for  cultivating 
land  up  to  a  certain  area  might  be  considered  eligi- 
ble.    An  official  description  of  these  Committees  of 


110  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  Poor  was  published  in  Pravda,  in  February, 
1919.  Of  course,  the  committees  had  been  estab- 
lished and  working  for  something  over  six  months 
when  Pravda  published  this  account: 

A  Committee  of  the  Poor  is  a  close  organization  formed 
in  all  villages  of  the  very  poorest  peasants  to  fight 
against  the  usurers,  rich  peasants,  and  clergy,  who  have 
been  exploiting  the  poorest  peasants  and  squeezing  out 
their  life-blood  for  centuries  under  the  protection  of 
emperors.  Only  such  of  the  very  poorest  -peasants  as  sup- 
port the  Soviet  authority  are  elected  members  of  these  com- 
mittees. These  latter  register  all  grain  and  available 
foodstuffs  in  their  villages,  as  well  as  all  cattle,  agricult- 
ural implements,  carts,  etc.  It  is  likewise  their  duty  to 
introduce  the  new  land  laws  issued  by  order  of  the 
Soviets  of  the  Workers',  Soldiers',  Peasants',  and  Cos- 
sacks' Deputies. 

The  fields  are  cultivated  with  the  implements  thus 
registered,  and  the  harvest  is  divided  among  those 
who  have  worked  in  accordance  with  the  law.  The 
surplus  is  supplied  to  the  starving  cities  in  return  for 
goods  of  all  kinds  that  the  villagers  need.  The  motto 
of  the  Communist-Bolshevist  Party  is  impressed  upon  all 
members  of  these  committees — namely,  "Help  the  poor; 
do  not  injure  the  peasant  of  average  means,  but  treat 
usurers,  clergy,,  and  all  members  of  the  White  Army  with- 
out mercy." 

Even  this  account  of  these  committees  of  the 
poor  indicates  a  terrible  condition  of  strife  in  the 
villages.  These  committees  were  formed  to  take  the 
place  of  the  Soviets,  which  the  Food  Commissars, 
in  accordance  with  the  wide  powers  conferred  upon 
them,  could  order  suppressed  whenever  they  chose. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  111 

Where  the  solidarity  of  the  local  peasantry  could 
not  be  broken  up  "chance  visitors,"  poor  wretches 
imported  for  the  purpose,  constituted  the  entire 
membership  of  such  committees.  In  other  cases, 
a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  committees  were 
chosen  from  among  the  local  residents.  There  was 
no  appeal  from  the  decision  of  these  committees. 
Any  member  of  such  a  committee  having  a  grudge 
against  a  neighbor  could  satisfy  it  by  declaring 
him  to  be  a  hoarder,  could  arrest  him,  seize  his 
property  and  have  him  flogged  or,  as  sometimes 
happened,  shot.  The  military  detachments  formed 
to  secure  grain  and  other  foodstuffs  had  to  work 
with  these  committees  where  they  already  existed, 
and  to  form  them  where  none  yet  existed. 

The  Severnaya  Oblast,  July  4,  191 8,  published  de- 
tailed instructions  of  how  the  food-requisitioning 
detachments  were  to  proceed  in  villages  where 
committees  of  the  poor  had  not  yet  been  formed. 
They  were  to  first  call  a  meeting,  not  of  all  the 
peasants  in  a  village,  but  only  of  the  very  poorest 
peasants  and  such  other  residents  as  were  well 
known  to  be  loyal  supporters  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. From  the  number  thus  assembled  five  or 
seven  must  be  selected  as  a  committee.  When 
formed  this  committee  must  demand,  as  a  first 
step,  the  surrendering  of  all  arms  by  the  rest  of  the 
population.  This  disarming  of  the  people  must  be 
very  vigorously  and  thoroughly  carried  out;  re- 
fusal to  surrender  arms  to  the  committee,  or  con- 
cealing arms  from  the  committee,  involved  severe 
punishment.  Persons  guilty  of  either  offense  might 
be  ordered  shot  by  the  Committee  of  the  Poor,  the 


112 


a 


THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


Food  Commissar  or  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal. 
After  the  disarmament  had  been  proclaimed,  three 
days'  notice  was  to  be  served  upon  the  peasants  to 
deliver  their  "surplus"  grain — that  is,  all  over  and 
above  the  amount  designated  by  the  committee — 
at  the  receiving  station.  Failure  to  do  this  entailed 
severe  penalties;  destroying  or  concealing  grain 
was  treason  and  punishable  by  death  at  the  hands 
of  a  firing-squad. 

The  war  between  the  peasantry,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  Bolshevist  officials,  the  food-requisitioning 
detachments  and  the  pauper  committees,  on  the 
other,  went  on  throughout  the  summer  of  1918. 
The  first  armed  detachments  reached  the  villages 
toward  the  end  of  June.  From  that  time  to  the 
end  of  December  the  sanguinary  struggle  was  main- 
tained. According  to  Izvestia  of  the  Food  Com- 
missariat, December,  191 8,  the  Food  Army  con- 
sisted of  3,000  men  in  June  and  36,500  in  December. 
In  the  course  of  the  struggle  this  force  had  lost 
7,309  men,  killed,  wounded,  and  sick.  In  other 
words,  the  casualties  amounted  to  30  per  cent,  of 
the  highest  number  ever  engaged.  These  figures 
of  themselves  bear  eloquent  witness  to  the  fierce 
resistance  of  the  peasantry.  It  was  a  common 
occurrence  for  a  food-requisitioning  detachment  to 
enter  a  village  and  begin  to  search  for  concealed 
weapons  and  grain  and  to  be  at  once  met  with 
machine-gun  and  rifle-fire,  the  peasants  treating 
them  as  robbers  and  enemies.  Sometimes  the  vil- 
lagers were  victorious  and  the  Bolshevist  forces 
were  driven  away.  In  almost  every  such  case 
strong  reinforcements  were  sent,  principally  Let- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  113 

tish  or  Chinese  troops,  to  subdue  the  rebel  village 
and  wipe  out  the  "counter-revolutionaries"  and 
"bourgeoisie" — that  is  to  say,  nine-tenths  of  the 
peasants  in  the  village. 

Under  these  conditions  things  went  from  bad  to 
worse.  Naturally,  there  was  some  increase  in  the 
amount  of  grain  turned  in  at  the  receiving  stations, 
but  the  increase  was  not  commensurate  with  the 
effort  and  cost  of  obtaining  it.  In  particular,  it 
did  not  sustain  the  host  of  officials,  committees, 
inspectors,  and  armed  forces  employed  in  intimidat- 
ing the  peasants.  One  of  the  most  serious  results 
was  the  alarming  decline  of  cultivation.  The  in- 
centive to  labor  had  been  taken  away  from  the 
hard-working,  thrifty  peasants.  Their  toil  was 
penalized,  in  fact.  A  large  part  of  the  land  or- 
dinarily tilled  was  not  planted  that  autumn  and  for 
spring  sowing  there  was  even  less  cultivation.  The 
peasants  saw  that  the  industrious  and  careful 
producers  had  most  of  the  fruits  of  their  labors 
taken  from  them  and  were  left  with  meager  ra- 
tions, which  meant  semi-starvation,  while  the  idle, 
thriftless,  and  shiftless  "poorest  peasants"  fared 
much  better,  taking  from  the  industrious  and  com- 
petent. Through  the  peasantry  ran  the  fatal  cry: 
'Why  should  we  toil  and  starve?  Let  us  all  be 
idle  and  live  well  as  'poor  peasants'!" 

Thus  far,  we  have  followed  the  development  of 
the  agrarian  policy  of  the  Bolsheviki  through  two 
stages:  First  of  all,  peasant  Soviets  were  recognized 
and  regarded  as  the  basis  of  the  whole  system  of 
agricultural  production.  It  was  found  that  these 
did  not  give  satisfactory  results;    that  each  Soviet 


114  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

cared  only  ior  its  own  village  prosperity;  that  the 
peasants  held  their  grain  for  high  prices  while 
famine  raged  in  the  cities.  Then,  secondly,  all  the 
village  Soviets  were  shorn  of  their  power  and  all 
those  which  were  intractable — a  majority  of  them 
— suppressed,  their  functions  being  taken  over  by 
state-appointed  officials,  the  Food  Commissars  and 
the  Committees  of  the  Poor  acting  under  the  direc- 
tion of  these.  As  we  shall  see  in  subsequent 
chapters,  these  stages  corresponded  in  a  very 
striking  way  to  the  first  two  stages  of  industrial 
organization  under  Bolshevist  rule. 

The  chairman  of  the  Perm  Committee  of  the 
Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists,  M.  C.  Eroshkin, 
visited  the  United  States  in  the  winter  of  1918-19. 
It  was  the  good  fortune  of  the  present  writer  to 
become  acquainted  with  this  brilliant  Russian 
Socialist  leader  and  to  obtain  much  information 
from  him.  Few  men  possess  a  more  thorough 
understanding  of  the  Russian  agrarian  problem 
than  Mr.  Eroshkin,  who  during  the  regime  of  the 
Provisional  Government  was  the  representative  for 
the  Perm  District  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
and  later  became  a  member  of  the  Provisional 
Government  of  Ural.     In  March,  1919,  he  said: 

The  Russian  peasant  could,  in  all  fairness,  scarcely 
be  suspected  of  being  a  capitalist,  and  even  according 
to  the  Soviet  constitution,  no  matter  how  twisted,  he 
could  not  be  denied  a  vote.  But  fully  aware  that  the 
peasants  constitute  a  majority  and  are,  as  a  whole,  op- 
posed to  the  Bolsheviki,  the  latter  have  destroyed  the 
Soviets  in  the  villages  and  instead  of  these  they  have 
created  so-called  "Committees  of  the  Poor" — i.e.,  ag- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  115 

gregations  of  inebriates,  propertyless,  worthless,  and 
work-hating  peasants.  For,  whoever  wishes  to  work  can 
find  work  in  the  Russian  village  which  is  always  short 
of  agricultural  help.  These  "Committees  of  the  Poor" 
have  been  delegated  to  represent  the  peasantry  of 
Russia. 

Small  wonder  that  the  peasants  are  opposed  to  this 
scheme  which  has  robbed  them  of  self-government. 
Small  wonder  that  their  hatred  for  these  "organiza- 
tions" reaches  such  a  stage  that  entire  settlements  are 
rising  against  these  Soviets  and  their  pretorians,  the 
Red  Guardsmen,  and  in  their  fury  are  not  only  murdering 
these  Soviet  officials,  but  are  practising  fearful  cruelties 
upon  them,  as  happened  in  December,  1918,  in  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Pskov,  Kaluga,  and  Tver. 

By  removing  and  arresting  all  those  delegates  who  are 
undesirable  to  them,  the  Bolsheviki  have  converted 
these  Soviets  into  organizations  loyal  to  themselves,  and, 
of  course,  fear  to  think  of  a  true  general  election,  for  that 
will  seal  their  doom  at  once. 

Mr.  Eroshkin,  like  practically  every  other  leader 
of  the  Russian  peasants'  movement,  is  an  anti- 
Bolshevik  and  his  testimony  may  be  regarded  as 
biased.  Let  us,  therefore,  consider  what  Bolshevist 
writers  have  said  in  their  own  press. 

Izvestia  of  the  Provincial  Soviets,  January  18, 
1919,  published  the  following: 

The  Commissaries  were  going  through  the  Tzaritzin 
County  in  sumptuous  carriages,  driven  by  three,  and  often 
by  six,  horses.  A  great  array  of  adjutants  and  a  large 
suite  accompanied  these  Commissaries  and  an  imposing 
number  of  trunks  followed  along.  They  made  exorbitant 
demands    upon    the    toiling    population,    coupled    with 


116  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

assaults  and  brutality.  Their  way  of  squandering  money 
right  and  left  is  particularly  characteristic.  In  some 
houses  the  Commissaries  gambled  away  and  spent  on 
intoxicants  large  sums.  The  hard-working  population 
looked  upon  these  orgies  as  upon  complete  demoraliza- 
tion and  failure  of  duty  to  the  world  revolution. 

In  the  same  official  journal,  four  days  later, 
January  22,  1919,  Kerzhentzev,  the  well-known 
Bolshevik,  wrote: 

The  facts  describing  the  village  Soviet  of  the  Uren 
borough  present  a  shocking  picture  which  is  no  doubt 
typical  of  all  other  corners  of  our  provincial  Soviet  life. 
The  chairman  of  this  village  Soviet,  Rekhalev,  and  his 
nearest  co-workers  have  done  all  in  their  power  to  antag- 
onize the  population  against  the  Soviet  rule.  Rekhalev 
himself  has  often  been  found  in  an  intoxicated  con- 
dition and  he  has  frequently  assaulted  the  local  inhabi- 
tants. The  beating-up  of  visitors  to  the  Soviet  office  was 
an  ordinary  occurrence.  In  the  village  of  Bierezovka 
the  peasants  have  been  thrashed  not  only  with  fists,  but 
have  often  been  assaulted  with  sticks,  robbed  of  their  foot- 
wear, and  cast  into  damp  cellars  on  bare  earthen  floors. 
The  members  of  the  Varnavinsk  Ispolkom  (Executive 
Committee),  Glakhov,  Morev,  Makhov,  and  others,  have 
gone  even  farther.  They  have  organized  "requisition 
parties"  which  were  nothing  else  but  organized  pil- 
lagings,  in  the  course  of  which  they  have  used  wire-wrapped 
sticks  on  the  recalcitrants.  The  abundant  testimony, 
verified  by  the  Soviet  Commission,  portrays  a  very 
striking  picture  of  violence.  When  these  members  of 
the  Executive  Committee  arrived  at  the  township  of 
Sadomovo  they  commenced  to  assault  the  population 
and  to  rob  them  of  their  household  belongings,  such  as 
quilts,  clothing,  harness,  etc.     No  receipts  for  the  requi- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  117 

sitioned  goods  were  given  and  no  money  paid.  They 
even  resold  to  others  on  the  spot  some  of  the  breadstuffs 
which  they  had  requisitioned. 

In  the  same  paper  (No.  98),  March  9,  1919,  an- 
other Bolshevist  writer,  Sosnovsky,  reported  on 
conditions  in  the  villages  of  Tver  Province  as 
follows : 

The  local  Communist  Soviet  workers  behave  them- 
selves, with  rare  exception,  in  a  disgusting  manner.  Mis- 
use of  power  is  going  on  constantly. 

Izvestia  published,  January  5,  1919,  the  signed 
report  of  a  Bolshevist  official,  Latzis,  complaining 
that  "in  the  Velizsh  county  of  the  Province  of 
Vitebsk  they  are  flogging  the  peasants  by  the  author- 
ity of  the  local  Soviet  Committee!'  On  May  14,  191 9, 
the  same  journal  published  the  following  article 
concerning  conditions  in  this  province: 

Of  late  there  has  been  going  on  in  the  village  a  really 
scandalous  orgy.  It  is  necessary  to  call  attention  to  the 
destructive  work  of  the  scoundrels  who  worked  them- 
selves into  responsible  positions.  Evidently  all  the  good 
and  unselfish  beginnings  of  the  workmen's  and  peasants' 
authority  were  either  purposely  or  unintentionally  per- 
verted by  these  adventurers  in  order  to  undermine  the 
confidence  of  the  peasants  in  the  existing  government 
in  order  to  provoke  dissatisfaction  and  rebellion.  It 
is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  no  open  counter-revolu- 
tionaty  or  enemy  of  the  proletariat  has  done  as  much 
harm  to  the  Socialist  republic  as  the  charlatans  of  this 
sort.  Take,  as  an  instance,  the  third  district  of  the 
government  of  Vitebsk,  the  county  of  Veliashkov.    Here 


118  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  taxes  imposed  upon  the  peasants  were  as  follows: 
P.  Stoukov,  owning  17  dessiatines,  was  compelled  to  pay 
a  tax  of  5,000  rubles,  while  U.  Voprit,  owning  24  dessi- 
atines, paid  only  500  rubles.  S.  Grigoriev  paid  2,000  on 
29  dessiatines,  while  Ivan  Tselov  paid  8,000  on  23 
dessiatines."  (Quoting  some  more  instances,  the  writer 
adds  that  the  soil  was  alike  in  all  cases.  He  then  brings 
some  examples  of  the  wrongs  committed  by  the  requi- 
sitioning squads.) 

The  same  issue  of  this  Soviet  organ  contained  the 
report  of  an  official  Bolshevist  investigation  of  the 
numerous  peasant  uprisings.  This  report  stated 
that  "The  local  communists  behave,  with  rare 
exceptions,  abominably,  and  it  was  only  with  the 
greatest  difficulty  that  we  were  able  to  explain  to 
the  peasants  that  we  were  also  communists." 

Izvestia  also  published  an  appeal  from  one  Vo- 
patin  against  the  intolerable  conditions  prevailing 
in  his  village  in  the  Province  of  Tambov: 

Help!  we  are  perishing!  At  the  time  when  we  are 
starving  do  you  know  what  is  going  on  in  the  villages? 
Take,  for  instance,  our  village,  Olkhi.  Speculation  is 
rife  there,  especially  with  salt,  which  sells  at  40  rubles 
a  pound.  What  does  the  militia  do?  What  do  the 
Soviets  do?  When  it  is  reported  to  them  they  wave 
their  hands  and  say,  "This  is  a  normal  phenomenon." 
Not  only  this,  but  the  militiamen,  beginning  with  the 
chief  and  including  some  communists,  are  all  engaged 
in  brewing  their  own  alcohol,  which  sells  for  70  rubles  a 
bottle.  Nobody  who  is  in  close  touch  with  the  militia 
is  afraid  to  engage  in  this  work.  Hunger  is  ahead  of  us, 
but  neither  the  citizens  nor  the  "authorities"  recognize 
it.    The  people's  judge  also  drinks,  and  if  one  wishes  to 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  119 

win  a  case  one  only  needs  to  treat  him  to  a  drink.  We 
live  in  a  terrible  filth.  There  is  no  soap.  People  and 
horses  all  suffer  from  skin  diseases.  Epidemics  are  in- 
evitable in  the  summer.  If  Moscow  will  pay  no  atten- 
tion to  us,  then  we  shall  perish.  We  had  elections  for  the 
village  and  county  Soviets,  but  the  voting  occurred  in  vio- 
lation of  the  Constitution  of  the  Soviet  Government. 

As  a  result  of  this  a  number  of  village  capitalists,  who, 
under  the  guise  of  communists,  entered  the  -party  in  ordtr 
to  avoid  the  requisitions  and  contributions,  zvere  elected. 
The  laboring  peasantry  is  thus  being  turned  against  the 
government,  and  this  at  a  time  when  the  hosts  of 
Kolchak  are  advancing  from  the  east. 

Lenin,  in  his  report  to  the  Eighth  Congress  of  the 
Communist  Party  last  April,  published  in  Pravda, 
April  9,  1919,  faced  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 
indicated  by  these  reports.     He  said: 

All  class-conscious  workmen,  of  Petrograd,  Ivano- 
Voznesensk,  and  Moscow,  who  have  been  in  the  vil- 
lages, tell  us  of  instances  of  many  misunderstandings, 
of  misunderstandings  that  could  not  be  solved,  it  seemed, 
and  of  conflicts  of  the  most  serious  nature,  all  of  which 
were,  however,  solved  by  sensible  workmen  who  did  not 
speak  according  to  the  book,  but  in  language  which  the 
people  could  understand,  and  not  like  an  officer  allowing 
himself  to  issue  orders,  though  unacquainted  with  village 
life,  but  like  a  comrade  explaining  the  situation  and  ap- 
pealing to  their  feelings  as  toilers.  And  by  such  explana- 
tion one  attained  what  could  not  be  attained  by  thou- 
sands who  conducted  themselves  like  commanders  or 
superiors. 

In    the    Scvernaya    Communa,    May    10,    1919, 
another  Bolshevist  official,  Krivoshayev,  reported: 


120  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

The  Soviet  workers  are  taking  from  the  peasants 
chicken,  geese,  bread,  and  butter  without  paying  for  it. 
In  some  households  of  these  poverty-stricken  folk  they 
are  confiscating  even  the  pillows  and  the  samovars  and 
everything  they  can  lay  their  hands  on.  The  peasants 
naturally  feel  very  bitterly  toward  the  Soviet  rule. 


Here,  then,  is  a  mass  of  Bolshevist  testimony, 
published  in  the  official  press  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment and  the  Communist  Party.  It  cannot  be  set 
aside  as  "capitalist  misrepresentation,"  or  as  "lying 
propaganda  of  the  Socialists-Revolutionists."  These 
and  other  like  phrases  which  have  been  so  much  on 
the  lips  of  our  pro-Bolshevist  Liberals  and  Socialists 
are  outworn;  they  cannot  avail  against  the  evi- 
dence supplied  by  the  Bolsheviki  themselves.  If 
we  wanted  to  draw  upon  the  mass  of  similar  evi- 
dence published  by  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  and 
other  Socialist  groups  opposed  to  the  Bolsheviki,  it 
would  be  easy  to  fill  hundreds  of  pages.  The 
apologists  of  Bolshevism  have  repeatedly  assured  us 
that  the  one  great  achievement  of  the  Bolsheviki, 
concerning  which  there  can  be  no  dispute,  is  the 
permanent  solution  of  the  land  problem,  and  that 
as  a  result  the  Bolsheviki  are  supported  by  the 
great  mass  of  the  peasantry.  Against  that  silly 
fable  let  one  single  fact  stand  as  a  sufficient  refuta- 
tion: According  to  the  Severnaya  Communa,  Sep- 
tember 4,  1919,  the  Military  Supply  Bureau  of 
Petrograd  alone  had  sent,  up  to  April  1,  1919, 
225  armed  military  requisitioning  detachments  to 
various  villages.  Does  not  that  fact  alone  indicate 
the  true  attitude  of  the  peasants? 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  121 

Armed  force  did  not  bring  much  food,  however. 
The  peasants  concealed  and  hoarded  their  supplies. 
They  resisted  the  soldiers,  in  many  instances. 
When  they  were  overcome  they  became  sullen  and 
refused  to  plant  more  than  they  needed  for  their 
own  use.  Extensive  curtailment  of  production  was 
their  principal  means  of  self-defense  against  what 
they  felt  to  be  a  great  injustice.  According  to 
Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  54),  1919,  this  was  the 
principal  reason  for  the  enormous  decline  of  acreage 
under  cultivation — a  decline  of  13,500,000  acres  in 
twenty-eight  provinces — and  the  main  cause  of  the 
serious  shortage  of  food  grains.  Instead  of  exporting 
a  large  surplus  of  grain,  Tambov  Province  was 
stricken  with  famine,  and  the  plight  of  other 
provinces  was  almost  as  bad. 

In  the  Province  of  Tambov  the  peasants  rose  and 
drove  away  the  Red  Guards.  In  the  Bejetsh  dis- 
trict, Tver  Province,  17,000  peasants  rose  in  revolt 
against  the  Soviet  authorities,  according  to  Gregor 
Alexinsky.  A  punitive  detachment  sent  there  by 
Trotsky  suppressed  this  rising  with  great  brutality, 
robbing  the  peasants,  flogging  many  of  them,  and 
killing  many  others.  In  Briansk,  Province  of  Orol, 
the  peasants  and  workmen  rose  against  the  Soviet 
authorities  in  November,  1919,  being  led  by  a 
former  officer  of  the  Fourth  Soviet  Army  named 
Sapozhnikov.  Lettish  troops  suppressed  this  up- 
rising in  a  sanguinary  manner.  In  the  villages  of 
Kharkov  Province  no  less  than  forty-nine  armed 
detachments  appeared,  seeking  to  wrest  grain  from 
the  peasants,  who  met  the  soldiers  with  rifles  and 
machine-guns.     This  caused  Trotsky  to  send  large 


122  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

punitive  expeditions,  consisting  principally  of  Let- 
tish troops,  and  many  lives  were  sacrificed.  Yet, 
despite  the  bloodshed,  only  a  small  percentage  of 
the  grain  expected  was  ever  obtained.  There  were 
serious  peasant  revolts  against  Soviet  rule  in  many 
other  places. 

The  District  Extraordinary  Commissions  and  the 
revolutionary  tribunals  were  kept  busy  dealing  with 
cases  of  food-hoarding  and  speculation.  A  typical 
report  is  the  following  taken  from  the  Bolshevist 
Derevenskaia  Communa  (No.  222),  October  2,  1919. 
This  paper  complained  that  the  peasants  were 
concealing  and  hoarding  grain  for  the  purpose  of 
selling  it  to  speculators  at  fabulous  prices: 

Every  day  the  post  brings  information  concerning 
concealment  of  grain  and  other  foodstuffs,  and  the  diffi- 
culties encountered  by  the  registration  commissions  in 
their  work  in  the  villages.  All  this  shows  the  want  of 
consciousness  among  the  masses,  who  do  not  realize 
what  chaos  such  tactics  introduce  into  the  general  life 
of  the  country. 

No  one  can  eat  more  than  the  human  organism  can 
absorb;  the  ration — and  that  not  at  all  a  "famine"  one 
— is  fixed.  Every  one  is  provided  for,  and  yet — conceal- 
ment, concealment  everywhere,  in  the  hope  of  selling 
grain  to  town  speculators  at  fabulous  prices. 

How  much  is  being  concealed,  and  what  fortunes  are 
made  by  profiteering,  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
example:  The  Goretsky  Extraordinary  Commission  has 
fined  Irina  Ivashkevich,  a  citizeness  of  Lapinsky  village, 
for  burying  25,000  rubles'  worth  of  grain  in  a  hole  in  her 
back  yard. 

Citizeness  Irina  Ivashkevich  has  much  money,  but 
little  understanding  of  what  she  is  doing. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  123 

Neither  force  nor  threats  could  overcome  the  re- 
sistance of  the  peasants.  In  the  latter  part  of 
November,  1919,  sixteen  food-requisitioning  detach- 
ments of  twenty-five  men  each  were  sent  from 
Petrograd  to  the  Simbirsk  Province,  according  to 
the  Izvestia  of  Petrograd.  They  were  able  to 
secure  only  215  tons  of  grain  at  a  very  extraordinary 
price.  Speculation  had  raised  the  price  of  grain  to 
600  rubles  per  pood  of  36  pounds.  The  paper  Trud 
reported  at  the  same  time  that  the  delegates  of 
forty-five  labor  organizations  in  Petrograd  and 
Moscow,  who  left  for  the  food-producing  provinces 
to  seek  for  non-rationed  products,  returned  after 
two  months  wholly  unsuccessful,  having  spent  an 
enormous  amount  of  money  in  their  search.  Their 
failure  was  due  in  part  to  a  genuine  shortage,  but 
it  was  due  in  part  also  to  systematic  concealment 
and  hoarding  for  speculation  on  the  part  of  the 
peasants.  Much  of  this  illicit  speculation  and 
trading  was  carried  on  with  the  very  Soviet  officials 
who  were  charged  with  its  suppression!1 

How  utterly  the  attempt  to  wrest  the  food  from 
the  peasants  by  armed  force  failed  is  evidenced  by 
figures  published  in  the  Soviet  journal,  Finances 
and  National  Economy  (No.  310).  The  figures  show 
the  amounts  of  food-supplies  received  in  Petrograd 
in  the  first  nine  months  of  191 8  as  compared  with 
the   corresponding    period    of  the    previous    year. 

1  The  Bulletin  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets 
(No.  25),  February  24,  1919,  reports  such  a  case.  Many  other  similar 
references  might  be  quoted.  Pravda,  July  4,  1919,  said  that  many 
of  those  sent  to  requisition  grain  from  the  peasants  were  themselves 
"gross  speculators." 


J  an. -Mar. 

Apr-June 

July-Sept. 

Tons 

Tons 

Tons 

In  1913.. 

24,626 

24,165 

20,438 

In  1918. .  . 

I2,OOI 

5,388 

2,241 

124  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

The  totals  include  flour,  rye,  wheat,  barley,  oats, 
and  peas: 

Total  for 

Nine  Mos. 

Tons 

69,229 
I9>639 


If  we  take  barley  and  oats,  which  were  drawn 
mainly  from  the  northern  and  central  provinces  and 
from  the  middle  Volga — territories  occupied  by  the 
Bolsheviki  and  free  from  "enemy  forces" — we  find 
that  the  same  story  is  told:  in  the  three  months 
July-September,  191 8,  105  tons  of  barley  were 
received,  as  against  1,245  tons  in  the  corresponding 
period  of  the  previous  year.  Of  oats  the  amount 
received  in  the  three  months  of  July-September, 
1918,  was  175  tons  as  against  3,105  tons  in  the 
corresponding  period  of  1917. 

Armed  force  failed  as  completely  as  Gorky  had 
predicted  it  would.  References  to  the  French 
Revolution  are  often  upon  the  lips  of  the  leaders 
of  Bolshevism,  and  they  have  slavishly  copied  its 
form  and  even  its  terminology.  It  might  have  been 
expected,  therefore,  that  they  would  have  remem- 
bered the  French  experience  with  the  Law  of 
Maximum  and  its  utter  and  tragic  failure,  and  that 
they  would  have  learned  something  therefrom,  at 
least  enough  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  same 
mistakes  as  were  made  in  1793.  There  is  no  evi- 
dence of  such  learning,  however.  For  that  matter, 
is  there  any  evidence  that  they  have  learned  any- 
I    thing  from  history? 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  123 

Not  only  was  armed  force  used  in  a  vain  attempt 
to  wrest  the  grain  from  the  peasants,  but  similar 
methods  were  relied  upon  to  force  the  peasants  into 
the  Red  Army.  On  May  i,  1919,  Pravda,  official 
organ  of  the  Communist  Party,  published  the  fol- 
lowing announcement: 

From  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Russian  Communist 
Party. 

The  Central  Committee  of  the  Russian  Communist 
Party  announces  the  following — 

To  all  -provincial  committees  of  the  Communist  Party,  to 
Provincial  Military  Commissaries. 

The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  of 
Soviets,  at  the  session  of  April  23d,  unanimously  adopted 
the  decree  to  bring  the  middle  and  poor  peasants  into 
the  struggle  against  the  counter-revolution.  According 
to  this  decree,  every  canton  must  send  10  to  20  strong, 
capable  soldiers,  who  can  act  as  nuclei  for  Red  Army  units 
in  those  places  to  which  they  will  be  sent. 

Just  as  they  had  resisted  all  efforts  to  wrest  away 
their  grain  and  other  foodstuffs  by  force,  so  the 
peasants  resisted  the  attempts  at  forcible  mobiliza- 
tion. Conscripted  peasants  who  had  been  mobil- 
ized refused  to  go  to  the  front  and  attempted  mass 
desertions  in  many  places,  notably,  however,  in 
Astrakhan.  These  struggles  went  on  throughout 
the  early  summer  of  1919,  but  in  the  end  force 
triumphed.  On  August  12,  1919,  Trotsky  wrote 
in  Pravda: 

The  mobilization  of  the  19-year-old  and  part  of  the  18- 
year-old  men,  the  inrush  of  the  peasants  who  before  re- 
9 


126  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

fused  to  appear  in  answer  to  the  mobilization  decree,  all  of 
this  is  creating  a  powerful,  almost  inexhaustible,  source 
from  which  to  build  up  our  army.  .  .  .  From  now  on  any 
resistance  to  local  authorities,  any  attempt  to  retain 
and  protect  any  valuable  and  experienced  military 
worker  is  deliberate  sabotage.  .  .  .  No  one  should  dare 
to  forget  that  all  Soviet  Russia  is  an  armed  camp.  .  .  . 
All  Soviet  institutions  are  obliged,  immediately,  within 
the  next  months,  not  only  to  furnish  officers'  schools 
with  the  best  quarters,  but,  in  general,  they  must  furnish 
these  schools  with  such  material  and  special  aids  as  will 
make  it  possible  for  the  students  to  work  in  the  most 
intensive  manner.  .  .  . 

Bitter  as  the  conflict  was  during  this  period  and 
throughout  1919,  it  was,  nevertheless,  considerably 
less  violent  than  during  the  previous  year.  This 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Bolsheviki  had  modified 
their  policy  in  dealing  with  the  peasants  in  some 
very  important  respects.  Precisely  as  they  had 
manifested  particular  hatred  toward  the  bourgeoisie 
in  the  cities,  and  made  their  appeal  to  the  prole- 
tariat, so  they  had,  from  the  very  first,  manifested 
a  special  hatred  toward  the  great  body  of  peasants 
of  the  "middle  class" — that  is  to  say,  the  fairly 
well-to-do  and  successful  peasant — and  made  their 
appeal  to  the  very  poorest  and  least  successful. 
The  peasants  who  owned  their  own  farms,  possessed 
decent  stock,  and  perhaps  employed  some  assist- 
ance, were  regarded  as  the  "rural  bourgeoisie" 
whom  it  was  necessary  to  expropriate.  The  whole 
appeal  of  the  Bolsheviki,  so  far  as  the  peasant  was 
concerned,  was  to  the  element  corresponding  to  the 
proletariat,  owning  nothing.     The  leaders  of  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  127 

Bolsheviki  believed  that  only  the  poorest  section 
of  the  peasantry  could  make  common  cause  with 
the  proletariat;  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
peasantry  belonged  with  the  bourgeoisie.  They 
relied  upon  the  union  of  the  urban  proletariat  and 
the  poorest  part  of  the  peasantry,  led  by  the  former, 
to  furnish  the  sinews  of  the  Revolution.  Over  and 
over  again  Lenin's  speeches  and  writings  prior  to 
April,  1919,  refer  to  "the  proletariat  and  the  poorest 
peasants";  over  and  over  again  he  emphasizes  this 
union,  always  with  the  more  or  less  definite  state- 
ment that  "the  proletariat"  must  lead  and  "the 
poorest  peasants"  follow. 

In  April,  1919,  at  the  Congress  of  the  Russian 
Communist  Party,  Lenin  read  a  report  on  the  atti- 
tude of  the  proletariat  and  the  Soviet  power  to  the 
peasantry  which  marked  a  complete  change  of 
attitude,  despite  the  fact  that  Lenin  intimated  that 
neither  he  nor  the  party  had  ever  believed  anything 
else.  "No  sensible  Socialist  ever  thought  that 
we  might  apply  violence  to  the  middle  peasantry," 
he  said.  He  even  disclaimed  any  intention  to  ex- 
propriate the  rich  peasants,  if  they  would  refrain 
from  counter-revolutionary  tendencies!  Of  course, 
in  thus  affirming  his  orthodoxy  while  throwing 
over  an  important  article  of  his  creed,  Lenin  was 
simply  conforming  to  an  old  and  familiar  practice. 
When  we  remember  how  he  berated  the  Menshevist 
Social  Democrats  and  declared  them  not  to  be 
Socialists  because  their  party  represented  "fairly 
prosperous  peasants,"  x  and  the  fact  that  the  Soviet 

1  The  New  International,  April,  1918. 


128  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Constitution  itself  sets  forth  that  the  dictatorship 
to  be  set  up  is  "of  the  urban  and  rural  proletariat 
and  the  poorest  peasantry,1"  Lenin's  attempt  to 
make  it  appear  that  he  had  always  regarded  the 
middle  and  rich  peasantry  with  such  benign  tolera- 
tion can  only  move  us  to  laughter. 

To  present  Lenin's  change  of  front  fairly  it  is 
necessary  to  quote  at  considerable  length  from  his 
two  speeches  at  the  Congress  as  reported  in  Pravda, 
April  5  and  9,  1919: 

During  the  long  period  of  the  bourgeois  rule  the 
peasant  has  always  supported  the  bourgeois  authority 
and  was  on  the  side  of  the  bourgeoisie.  This  is  under- 
standable if  one  takes  into  account  the  economic  strength 
of  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  political  methods  of  its  rule. 
We  cannot  expect  the  middle  peasant  to  come  over  to 
our  side  immediately.  But  if  we  direct  our  policy  cor- 
rectly, then  after  a  certain  period  hesitation  will  cease 
and  the  peasant  may  come  over  to  our  side.  En- 
gels,  who,  together  with  Marx,  laid  the  foundations  of 
scientific  Marxism — that  is,  of  the  doctrine  which  our 
party  follows  constantly  and  particularly  in  time  of 
revolution — Engels  already  established  the  fact  that  the 
peasantry  is  differentiated  with  respect  to  their  land 
holdings  into  small,  middle,  and  large;  and  this  dif- 
ferentiation for  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Euro- 
pean countries  exists  to-day.  Engels  said,  "Perhaps  it 
will  not  be  necessary  to  suppress  by  force  even  the  large 
peasantry  in  all  places."  And  no  sensible  Socialist  ever 
thought  that  we  might  ever  apply  violence  to  the  middle 
peasantry  (the  smaller  peasantry  is  our  friend).  This 
is  what  Engels  said  in  1894,  a  vear  before  his  death,  when 

1  Article  II,  chap,  v,  paragraph  9, 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  129 

the  agrarian  question  was  the  burning  question  of  the 
day.  This  point  of  view  shows  us  that  truth  which  is 
sometimes  forgotten,  though  with  which  we  have  always 
theoretically  been  in  accord.  With  respect  to  landlords 
and  capitalists  our  task  is  complete  expropriation.  But 
we  do  not  permit  any  violence  with  respect  to  the  middle 
peasant.  Even  with  respect  to  the  rich  peasant,  we  do 
not  speak  with  the  same  determination  as  with  regard 
to  the  bourgeoisie,  "Absolute  expropriation  of  the  rich 
peasantry."  In  our  program  this  difference  is  empha- 
sized. We  say,  "The  suppression  of  the  resistance  of 
the  peasantry,  the  suppression  of  its  counter-revolu- 
tionary tendencies."  This  is  not  complete  expropriation. 
The  fundamental  difference  in  our  attitude  toward  the 
bourgeoisie  and  toward  the  middle  peasantry  is  complete 
expropriation  of  the  bourgeoisie,  but  union  with  the 
middle  peasantry  that  does  not  exploit  others.  This 
fundamental  line  in  theory  is  recognized  by  all.  In  -practice 
this  line  is  not  always  observed  strictly,  and  local  workers 
have  not  learned  to  observe  it  at  all.  When  the  proletariat 
overthrew  the  bourgeois  authority  and  established  its 
own  and  set  about  to  create  a  new  society,  the  question 
of  the  middle  peasantry  came  into  the  foreground. 
Not  a  single  Socialist  in  the  world  has  denied  the  fact 
that  the  establishment  of  communism  will  proceed  dif- 
ferently in  those  countries  where  there  is  large  land 
tenure.  This  is  the  most  elementary  of  truths  and  from 
this  truth  it  follows  that  as  we  approach  the  tasks  of 
construction  our  main  attention  should  be  concentrated 
to  a  certain  extent  precisely  on  the  middle  peasantry. 
Much  will  depend  on  how  we  have  defined  our  attitude 
toward  the  middle  peasantry.  Theoretically,  this  ques- 
tion has  been  decided,  but  we  know  from  our  own  ex- 
perience the  difference  between  the  theoretical  decision  of 
a  question  and  the  practical  carrying  out  of  the  decision. 


130  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

.  .  .  All  remember  with  what  difficulty,  and  after  how 
many  months,  we  passed  from  workmen's  control  to 
workmen's  administration  of  industry,  and  that  was 
development  within  our  class,  within  the  proletarian 
class,  with  which  we  had  always  had  relations.  But  now 
we  must  define  our  attitude  toward  a  new  class,  toward 
a  class  which  the  city  workmen  do  not  know.  We  must 
define  our  attitude  toward  a  class  which  does  not  have 
a  definite  steadfast  position.  The  proletariat  as  a  mass 
is  for  Socialism;  the  bourgeoisie  is  against  Socialism; 
it  is  easy  to  define  the  relations  between  two  such  classes. 
But  when  we  come  to  such  a  group  as  the  middle  peas- 
antry, then  it  appears  that  this  is  such  a  kind  of  class 
that  it  hesitates.  The  middle  peasant  is  part  property- 
owner  and  part  toiler.  He  does  not  exploit  other  repre- 
sentatives of  the  toilers.  For  decades  he  has  had  to 
struggle  hard  to  maintain  his  position  and  he  has  felt 
the  exploitation  of  the  landlord-capitalists.  But  at  the 
same  time  he  is  a  property-owner. 

Therefore  our  attitude  toward  this  class  presents 
enormous  difficulties.  On  the  basis  of  our  experience 
of  more  than  a  year,  and  of  proletariat  work  in  the  village 
for  more  than  a  year,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  there 
has  already  taken  place  a  class  differentiation  in  the 
village,  we  must  be  most  careful  not  to  be  hasty,  not  to 
theorize  without  understanding,  not  to  consider  ready 
what  has  not  been  worked  out.  In  the  resolution  which 
the  committee  proposes  to  you,  prepared  by  the  agrarian 
section,  which  one  of  the  next  speakers  will  read  to  you, 
you  will  find  many  warnings  on  this  point.  From  the 
economic  point  of  view  it  is  clear  that  we  must  go  to  the 
assistance  of  the  middle  peasant.  On  this  point  theo- 
retically there  is  no  doubt.  But  with  our  level  of  culture, 
with  our  lack  of  cultural  and  technical  forces  which  we 
could  offer  to  the  village,  and  with  that  helplessness 
with  which  we  often  go  to  the  villages,  comrades  often 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  131 

apply  compulsion,  which  spoils  the  whole  cause.     Only 
yesterday  one  comrade  gave  me  a  small  pamphlet  en- 
titled, Instructions  for  Party  Activity  in  the  Province  of 
Nizhninovgorod,   a   publication   of  the    Nizhninovgorod 
Committee  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  (Bolshe- 
viki),  and  in  this  pamphlet  I  read,  for  example,  on  page 
41,   "The    decree    on    the   extraordinary   revolutionary 
tax  should  fall  with  its  whole  weight  on  the  shoulders 
of  the  village  rich  peasant  speculators,  and  in  general 
on  the  middle  elements  of  the  peasantry."     Now  here 
one  may  see  that  people  have  indeed  "understood,"  or 
is  this  a  misprint?    But  it  is  not  admissible  for  such  mis- 
prints to  appear.    Or  is  this  the  result  of  hurried,  hasty 
work,  which  shows  how  dangerous  haste  is  in  a  matter 
like  this?     Or  have  we  here  simply  a  failure  to  under- 
stand, though  this  is  the  very  worst  supposition  which 
I   really  do  not  wish  to   make  with   reference   to   our 
comrades  at  Nizhninovgorod?    It  is  quite  possible  that 
this  is  simply   an  oversight.     Such  instances  occur  in 
practice,  as  one  of  the  comrades  in  the  commission  has 
related.    The  peasants  surrounded  him  and  each  peasant 
asked:     "Please  define,  am  I  a  middle  peasant  or  not? 
I  have  two  horses  and  one  cow.     I  have  two  cows  and 
one  horse,"  etc.    And  so  this  agitator  who  was  traveling 
over  entire  districts  had  to  use  a  kind  of  thermometer 
in  order  to  take  each  peasant  and  tell  him  whether  he 
was  a  middle  peasant  or  not.     But  to  do  this  he  had  to 
know  the  whole  history  and  economic  life  of  this  par- 
ticular peasant  and  his  relations  to  lower  and  higher 
groups,  and  of  course  we  cannot  know  this  with  exactness. 
Here  one  must  have  practical  experience  and  knowl- 
edge of  local  conditions,  and  we  have  not  these  things 
as  yet.     We  are  not  at  all  ashamed  to  admit  this;  we 
must  admit  this  openly.     We  have  never  been  Utopists 
and  have  never  imagined  that  we  could  build  up  the 
communistic  society  with  the  pure  hands  of  pure  com- 


132  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

munists  who  would  be  born  and  educated  in  a  pure 
communistic  society.  Such  would  be  children's  fables. 
We  must  build  communism  on  the  ruins  of  capitalism, 
and  only  that  class  which  has  been  tempered  in  the 
struggle  against  capitalism  can  do  this.  You  know  very 
well  that  the  proletariat  is  not  without  the  faults  and 
weaknesses  of  the  capitalistic  society.  It  struggles  for 
Socialism,  and  at  the  same  time  against  its  own  defects. 
The  best  and  most  progressive  portion  of  the  prole- 
tariat which  has  been  carrying  on  a  desperate  struggle 
in  the  cities  for  decades  was  able  to  imitate  in  the  course 
of  this  struggle  all  the  culture  of  city  life,  and  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  did  acquire  it.  You  know  that  the  village 
even  in  the  most  progressive  countries  was  condemned 
to  ignorance.  Of  course,  the  cultural  level  of  the  village 
will  be  raised  by  us,  but  that  is  a  matter  of  years  and 
years.  This  is  what  our  comrades  everywhere  forget, 
and  this  is  what  every  word  that  comes  to  us  from  the 
village  portrays  with  particular  clearness,  when  the  word 
comes  not  from  local  intellectuals  and  local  officials,  but 
from  people  who  are  watching  the  work  in  the  village 
from  a  practical  point  of  view. 

•  •••••• 

When  we  speak  of  the  tasks  in  connection  with  work 
in  the  villages,  in  spite  of  all  difficulties,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  our  knowledge  has  been  directed  to  the  im- 
mediate suppression  of  exploiters,  we  must  nevertheless 
remember  and  not  forget  that  in  the  villages  with  rela- 
tion to  the  middle  peasantry  the  task  is  of  a  different 
nature.  All  conscious  workmen,  of  Petrograd,  Ivanovo- 
Vosnesensk,  and  Moscow,  who  have  been  in  the  villages, 
tell  us  of  instances  of  many  misunderstandings,  of  mis- 
understandings that  could  not  be  solved,  it  seemed,  and 
of  conflicts  of  the  most  serious  nature,  all  of  which  were, 
however,  solved  by  sensible  workmen  who  did  not  speak 
according  to  the  book,  but  in  language  which  the  people 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  133 

could  understand,  and  not  like  an  officer  allowing  him- 
self to  issue  orders  though  unacquainted  with  village 
life,  but  like  a  comrade  explaining  the  situation  and  ap- 
pealing to  their  feelings  as  toilers.  And  by  such  explana- 
tion one  attained  what  could  not  be  attained  by  thou- 
sands who  conducted  themselves  like  commanders  or 
superiors. 

The  resolution  which  we  now  present  for  your  atten- 
tion is  drawn  up  in  this  spirit.  I  have  tried  in  this  report 
to  emphasize  the  main  principles  behind  this  resolution, 
and  its  general  political  significance.  I  have  tried  to 
show,  and  I  trust  I  have  succeeded,  that  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  interests  of  the  revolution  as  a  whole  we 
have  not  made  any  changes.  We  have  not  altered  our 
line  of  action.  The  White-Guardists  and  their  assistants 
shout  and  will  continue  to  shout  that  we  have  changed. 
Let  them  shout.  That  does  not  disturb  us.  We  are 
developing  our  aims  in  an  absolutely  logical  manner. 
From  the  task  of  suppressing  the  bourgeoisie  we  must 
now  transfer  our  attention  to  the  task  of  building  up 
the  life  of  the  middle  peasantry.  We  must  live  with  the 
middle  peasantry  in  peace.  The  middle  peasantry  in  a 
communistic  society  will  be  on  our  side  only  if  we  lighten 
and  improve  its  economic  conditions.  If  we  to-morrow 
could  furnish  a  hundred  thousand  first-class  tractors 
supplied  with  gasolene  and  machinists  (you  know,  of 
course,  that  for  the  moment  this  is  dreaming),  then  the 
middle  peasant  would  say,  "I  am  for  the  Commune." 
But  in  order  to  do  this  we  must  first  defeat  the  interna- 
tional bourgeoisie;  we  must  force  them  to  give  us  these 
tractors,  or  we  must  increase  our  own  production  so 
that  we  can  ourselves  produce  them.  Only  thus  is  the 
question  stated  correctly. 

The  peasant  needs  the  industries  of  the  cities  and  can- 
not live  without  them  and  the  industries  are  in  our  hands. 
If  we  approach  the  situation  correctly,  then  the  peasant 


134  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

will  thank  us  because  we  will  bring  him  the  products 
from  the  cities — implements  and  culture.  It  will  not  be 
exploiters  who  will  bring  him  these  things,  not  land- 
lords, but  his  own  comrades,  workers  whom  he  values 
very  deeply.  The  middle  peasant  is  very  practical  and 
values  only  actual  assistance,  quite  carelessly  thrusting 
aside  all  commands  and  instructions  from  above. 

First  help  him  and  then  you  will  secure  his  confidence. 
If  this  matter  is  handled  correctly,  if  each  step  taken 
by  our  group  in  the  village,  in  the  canton,  in  the  food- 
supply  detachment,  or  in  any  organization,  is  carefully 
made,  is  carefully  verified  from  this  point  of  view,  then 
we  shall  win  the  confidence  of  the  peasant,  and  only  then 
shall  we  be  able  to  move  forward.  Now  we  must  give  him 
assistance.  We  must  give  him  advice,  and  this  must 
not  be  the  order  of  a  commanding  officer,  but  the  advice 
of  a  comrade.    The  peasant  then  will  be  absolutely  for  us. 

•  •••••• 

.  .  .  We  learned  how  to  overthrow  the  bourgeoisie  and 
suppress  it  and  we  are  very  proud  of  what  we  have  done. 
We  have  not  yet  learned  how  to  regulate  our  relations 
with  the  millions  of  middle  peasants  and  how  to  win 
their  confidence.  We  must  say  this  frankly;  but  we 
have  understood  the  task  and  we  have  undertaken  it 
and  we  say  to  ourselves  with  full  hope,  complete  knowl- 
edge, and  entire  decision:  We  shall  solve  this  task,  and 
then  Socialism  will  be  absolute,  invincible. 

At  the  same  time,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Moscow 
Soviet,  Kalinin,  a  peasant  and  a  Bolshevik,  was 
elected  president  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee. His  speech,  reported  in  Severnaya  Com- 
muna,  April  10,  1919,  sounded  the  same  note  as 
the  speeches  of  Lenin — conciliation  of  the  middle 
peasantry: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  135 

My  election  is  the  symbol  of  the  union  of  the 
proletariat  and  the  peasantry.  At  the  present  mo- 
ment when  all  counter-revolutionary  forces  are  press- 
ing in  on  us,  such  a  union  is  particularly  valuable.  The 
peasantry  was  always  our  natural  ally,  but  in  recent 
times  one  has  heard  notes  of  doubt  among  the  peasants; 
parties  hostile  to  us  are  trying  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
us  and  the  peasantry.  We  must  convince  the  middle  peas- 
ants that  the  working-class,  having  in  its  hands  the  factories, 
has  not  attacked,  and  will  not  attack,  the  small,  individual 
farms  of  the  -peasant.  This  can  be  done  all  the  more 
easily  because  neither  the  old  nor  the  new  program  of 
communists  says  that  we  will  forcibly  centralize  the 
peasant  lands  and  drive  them  into  communes,  etc. 
Quite  to  the  contrary,  we  say  definitely  that  we  will 
make  every  effort  to  readjust  and  raise  the  level  of  the 
peasant  economic  enterprises,  helping  both  technically 
and  in  other  ways,  and  I  shall  adhere  to  this  policy  in 
my  new  post.     Here  is  the  policy  we  shall  follow: 

We  shall  point  out  to  province,  district,  and  other 
executive  committees  that  they  should  make  every 
effort  in  the  course  of  the  collecting  of  the  revolutionary 
tax,  to  the  end  that  it  should  not  be  a  heavy  burden  on  the 
middle  peasant;  that  they  should  make  self-administra- 
tion less  costly  and  reduce  bureaucratic  routine.  We 
shall  make  every  effort  so  that  the  local  executive  com- 
mittees shall  not  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  exchange 
of  articles  of  agriculture  and  of  home  consumption  be- 
tween cantons  and  peasants — that  is,  the  purchase  of 
farm  and  household  utensils  that  are  sold  at  fairs.  We 
shall  try  to  eliminate  all  friction  and  misunderstandings 
between  provinces  and  cantons.  We  shall  appeal  to  the 
local  executive  committees  not  only  not  to  interfere 
with,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  support,  separate 
peasant  economic  enterprises  which,  because  of  their 
special  character,  have  a  special  value.    The  mole  of  his- 


136 


THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


tory  is  working  well  for  us;  the  hour  of  world  revolution 
is  near,  though  we  must  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  fact 
that  at  the  present  moment  it  is  all  the  more  difficult 
for  us  to  struggle  with  counter-revolution  because  of 
the  disorganization  of  our  economic  life.  Frequently 
they  prophesied  our  failure,  but  we  still  hold  on  and  we 
shall  find  new  sources  of  strength  and  support.  Further, 
each  of  us  must  answer  the  question  as  to  how  to  adjust 
production,  carry  out  our  enormous  tasks,  and  use  our 
great  natural  resources.  In  this  field  the  unions  of  Peters- 
burg and  Moscow  are  doing  very  much,  because  they 
are  the  organizing  centers  from  whose  examples  the 
provinces  will  learn.  Much  has  been  done  in  preparing 
products,  but  much  still  has  to  be  done.  We  in  Peters- 
burg fed  ourselves  for  three  months,  from  the  end  of 
June  to  the  beginning  of  September,  on  products  from 
our  Petersburg  gardens. 


The  new  attitude  toward  the  peasantry  revealed 
in  the  speeches  of  Lenin  and  Kalinin  was  already 
manifesting  itself  in  the  practical  policy  of  the 
Soviet  power.  Greatly  alarmed  by  the  spread  of 
famine  in  the  cities,  and  by  the  stout  resistance  of 
the  peasants  to  the  armed  requisitioning  detach- 
ments, which  amounted  to  civil  war  upon  a  large 
scale,  they  had  established  in  many  county  towns 
in  the  grain-producing  provinces  central  exchanges 
to  which  the  peasants  were  urged  to  bring  their 
grain  to  be  exchanged  for  the  manufactured  goods 
so  sorely  needed  by  them.  The  attitude  toward 
the  peasants  was  more  tolerant  and  friendly;  the 
brutal  strife  practically  disappeared.  This  did  not 
bring  grain  to  the  cities,  however,  in  any  con- 
siderable quantity.     The  peasants  found  that  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  137 

price  offered  for  their  grain  was  too  low,  and  the 
prices  demanded  for  the  manufactured  goods  too 
high.  According  to  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee,  No.  443,  the  fixed  price  of  grain 
was  only  70  per  cent,  higher  than  in  the  month 
preceding  the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat,  whereas  the 
prices  on  manufactured  goods  needed  by  the 
peasants,  including  shoes,  clothing,  household  uten- 
sils, and  small  tools,  average  more  than  2,800  per 
cent,  higher.  The  peasant  saw  himself  once  more 
as  a  victim  of  the  frightful  parasitism  of  the  cities 
and  refused  to  part  with  his  grain.  The  same  issue 
of  Izvestia  explained  that  the  exchange  stations 
"have  functioned  but  feebly  and  have  brought  very 
little  relief  to  the  villages";  that  the  stations  soon 
became  storehouses  for  "bread  taken  av/ay  from 
the  peasants  by  force  at  the  fixed  prices."  When 
cajoling  failed  to  move  the  peasants  the  old  agencies 
of  force  were  resorted  to.  The  grain  was  forcibly 
taken  and  the  peasants  were  paid  in  paper  currency 
so  depreciated  as  to  be  almost  worthless.  Thus 
the  villages  were  robbed  of  grain  and,  at  the  same 
time,  left  destitute  of  manufactured  goods. 

At  the  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party,  follow- 
ing the  speeches  of  Lenin,  from  which  we  have 
quoted,  it  was  decided  that  the  work  of  securing 
grain  and  other  foodstuffs  should  be  turned  over 
to  the  co-operatives.  A  few  days  earlier,  according 
to  Pravda,  March  15,  191 9,  a  decree  was  issued  per- 
mitting, in  a  number  of  provinces,  "free  sales  of 
products,  including  foodstuffs."  This  meant  that 
the  peasants  were  free  to  bring  their  supplies  of 
grain  out  in  the  open  and  to  sell  them  at  the  best 


138  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

prices  they  could  get.  The  situation  was  thus  some- 
what improved,  but  not  everywhere  nor  for  long. 
Many  of  the  local  Soviets  refused  to  adopt  the  new 
policy  and,  as  pointed  out  by  the  Izvestia  <yf  the 
Petrograd  Soviet,  March  24,  1919,  continued  to 
make  forced  requisitions.  There  was,  however, 
some  limitation  upon  the  arrogant  and  brutal  rule 
of  the  local  Soviets;  some  restrictions  were  imposed 
upon  the  dictatorship  of  the  Committees  of  the 
Poor. 

From  an  article  in  Izvestia,  November  3,  1919, 
we  get  some  further  information  concerning  the  atti- 
tude of  the  peasants  toward  the  Soviet  power,  and 
its  bearing  upon  the  food  question.  Only  a  sum- 
mary of  the  article  is  possible  here:  "The  food  con- 
ditions are  hard,  not  because  Russia,  by  being  cut 
off  from  the  principal  bread-producing  districts, 
does  not  have  sufficient  quantities  of  grain,  but 
principally  owing  to  the  class  war,  which  has  be- 
come permanent  and  continuous.  This  class  war 
hinders  the  work  of  factories  and  shops"  and,  by 
lessening  the  production  of  manufactured  goods, 
"naturally  renders  the  exchange  of  goods  between 
towns  and  country  difficult,  because  the  peasants  con- 
sider money  of  no  value,  not  being  able  to  buy  anything 
with  it"  The  peasants  are  not  yet  "sufficiently 
far-sighted  to  be  quite  convinced  of  the  stability  of 
the  Soviet  power  and  the  inevitability  of  Socialism." 
The  peasants  of  the  producing  provinces  "do  not 
willingly  enough  give  the  grain  to  the  towns,  and 
this  greatly  drags  on  the  class  war,  which  of  course 
ruins  them"  The  food  conditions  in  the  towns 
promote  "counter-revolution,"  creating  the   hope 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  139 

that  the  famine-stricken  people  in  the  towns  will 
cease  to  support  the  Soviet  power.  "Thus  the 
peasants  by  concealing  their  bread  .  .  .  render  con- 
ditions harder,  not  only  for  the  workmen,  but  also 
for  themselves."  A  statistical  table  shows  that 
from  August,  1918,  to  September,  1919,  in  the 
twelve  principal  provinces,  "99,980,000  poods  of 
bread  and  fodder  grains  were  delivered  to  the 
state,  which  constitutes  38.1  per  cent,  of  the  quan- 
tity which  was  to  be  received  according  to  the  state 
allocation  by  provinces.  The  delivery  of  bread 
grain  equaled  42.5  per  cent.  Thus  these  provinces 
gave  less  than  one-half  of  what  they  could  and 
should  have  given  to  the  state." 

Such  is  the  self-confessed  record  of  Bolshevism 
in  rural  Russia.  It  is  a  record  of  stupid,  blundering, 
oppressive  bureaucracy  at  its  best,  and  at  its  worst 
of  unspeakable  brutality.  In  dealing  with  the 
peasantry,  who  make  up  more  than  85  per  cent,  of 
the  population  of  Russia,  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and 
their  followers  have  shown  no  greater  wisdom  of 
statesmanship,  no  stronger  love  of  justice,  no 
greater  humanity,  than  the  old  bureaucracy  of 
czarism.  They  have  not  elevated  the  life  of  the 
peasants,  but,  on  the  contrary,  have  checked  the 
healthy  development  that  was  already  in  progress 
and  that  promised  so  well.  They  have  further 
brutalized  the  life  of  the  peasants,  deepened  their 
old  distrust  of  government,  fostered  anarchy,  and 
restored  the  most  primitive  methods  of  living  and 
working.  All  this  they  have  done  in  the  name  of 
Socialism  and  Progress! 


140  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


VII 

THE    RED   TERROR 

IT  is  frequently  asserted  in  defense  of  the  Bolshe- 
viki  that  they  resorted  to  the  methods  of  ter- 
rorism only  after  the  bourgeoisie  had  done  so;  that, 
in  particular,  the  attempts  to  assassinate  Lenin  and 
other  prominent  Bolshevist  leaders  induced  ter- 
roristic reprisals.  Thus  the  Red  Terror  is  made  to 
appear  as  the  response  of  the  proletariat  to  the 
White  Terror  of  the  bourgeoisie.  This  is  not  true, 
unless,  indeed,  we  are  to  take  seriously  the  alleged 
"attack"  on  Lenin  on  January  16,  1918.  A  shot 
was  fired,  it  was  said,  at  Lenin  while  he  was  riding 
in  his  motor-car.  No  one  was  arrested  and  no 
attempt  was  made  to  discover  the  person  who  fired 
the  shot.  The  general  impression  in  Petrograd  was 
that  it  was  a  trick,  designed  to  afford  an  excuse 
for  the  introduction  of  the  Terror.  The  assassina- 
tion *of  Uritzky  and  the  attempted  assassination  of 
Lenin,  in  the  summer  of  191 8,  were  undoubtedly 
followed  by  an  increase  in  the  extent  and  savagery 
of  the  Red  Terror,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  long 
before  that  time  men  and  women  who  had  given 
their  lives  to  the  revolutionary  struggle  against 
czarism,  and  who  had  approved  of  the  terroristic 
acts  against  individual  officials,  were  staggered  by 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  141 

the  new  mass  terrorism  which  began  soon  after  the 
Bolsheviki  seized  the  reins  of  power. 

On  January  16th,  following  the  alleged  "attack" 
upon  Lenin  above  referred  to,  Zinoviev,  Bouch- 
Bruyevich,  and  other  leaders  of  the  Bolsheviki 
raised  a  loud  demand  for  the  Terror.  On  the  18th, 
the  date  set  for  the  opening  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  the  brutal  suppression  of  the  demonstra- 
tion was  to  be  held,  but  on  the  16th  the  self-con- 
stituted Commissaries  of  the  People  adopted  a 
resolution  to  the  effect  that  any  attempt  "to  hold  a 
demonstration  in  honor  of  the  Constituent  Assem- 
bly" would  be  "put  down  most  ruthlessly."  This 
resolution  was  adopted,  it  is  said,  at  the  instigation 
of  Bouch-Bruyevich,  who  under  czarism  had  been 
a  noted  defender  of  religious  liberty. 

The  upholders  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  pro- 
ceeded to  hold  their  demonstration.  What  hap- 
pened is  best  told  in  the  report  of  the  event  made  to 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  International 
Socialist  Bureau  by  Inna  Rakitnikov: 

From  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  corteges,  com- 
posed principally  of  working-men  bearing  red  flags  and 
placards  with  inscriptions  such  as  "Proletarians  of  All 
Countries,  Unite!"  "Land  and  Liberty!"  "Long  Live 
the  Constituent  Assembly!"  etc.,  set  out  from  different 
parts  of  the  city.  The  members  of  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Soviet  of  Peasants'  Delegates  had  agreed 
to  meet  at  the  Field  of  Mars,  where  a  procession  coming 
from  the  Petrogradsky  quarter  was  due  to  arrive.  It 
was  soon  learned  that  a  part  of  the  participants,  coming 
from  the  Viborg  quarter,  had  been  assailed  at  the 
Liteiny  bridge  by  gun-fire  from  the   Red  Guards  and 

10 


t 


142  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

were  obliged  to  turn  back.  But  that  did  not  check  the 
other  parades.  The  peasant  participants,  united  with 
the  workers  from  Petrogradsky  quarter,  came  to  the 
Field  of  Mars;  after  having  lowered  their  flags  before 
the  tombs  of  the  Revolution  of  February  and  sung  a 
funeral  hymn  to  their  memory,  they  installed  themselves 
on  Liteinaia  Street.  New  manifestants  came  to  join 
them  and  the  street  was  crowded  with  people.  At  the 
corner  of  Fourstatskaia  Street  (one  of  the  streets  leading 
to  the  Taurida  Palace)  they  found  themselves  all  at 
once  assailed  by  shots  from  the  Red  Guards. 

The  Red  Guard  fired  without  warning,  something  that 
never  before  happened,  even  in  the  time  of  czarism. 
The  police  always  began  by  inviting  the  participators 
to  disperse.  Among  the  first  victims  was  a  member  of 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  of  Peasants' 
Delegates,  the  Siberian  peasant,  Logvinov.  An  explo- 
sive bullet  shot  away  half  of  his  head  (a  photograph  of  his 
body  was  taken;  it  was  added  to  the  documents  which 
were  transferred  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry).  Sev- 
eral workmen  and  students  and  one  militant  of  the 
Revolutionary  Socialist  Party,  Gorbatchevskaia,  were 
killed  at  the  same  time.  Other  processions  of  partici- 
pants on  their  way  to  the  Taurida  Palace  were  fired  into 
at  the  same  time.  On  all  the  streets  leading  to  the 
palace,  groups  of  Red  Guards  had  been  established; 
they  received  the  order,  "Not  to  spare  the  cartridges." 
On  that  day  at  Petrograd  there  were  one  hundred 
killed  and  wounded.1 

1  How  the  Russian  Peasants  Fought  for  a  Constituent  Assembly. 
A  report  to  the  International  Socialist  Bureau  by  Inna  Rakitnikov, 
vice-president  of  the  executive  committee  of  the  Soviet  of  Delegates, 
placing  themselves  upon  the  grounds  of  the  defense  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly.  With  a  letter-preface  by  the  citizen,  E.  Roubanovitch, 
member  of  the  International  Socialist  Bureau.  May  30,  1918.  Note: 
This  report  is  printed  in  full  as  Appendix  II  to  Bolshevism,  by  John 
Spargo,  pp.  331-384' 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  143 

What  of  the  brutal  murder  of  the  two  members 
of  the  Provisional  Government,  F.  F.  Kokoshkin 
and  A.  I.  Shingarev?  Seized  in  the  middle  of 
December,  they  were  cast  into  dark,  damp,  and  cold 
cells  in  the  Peter  and  Paul  Fortress,  in  the  notorious 
"Trubetskoy  Bastion."  On  the  evening  of  January 
1 8th  they  were  taken  to  the  Marie  Hospital.  That 
night  Red  Guards  and  sailors  forced  their  way  into 
the  hospital  and  brutally  murdered  them  both. 
It  is  true  that  Izvestia  condemned  the  crime,  saying: 
"Apart  from  everything  else  it  is  bad  from  a 
political  point  of  view.  This  is  a  fearful  blow  aimed 
at  the  Revolution,  at  the  Soviet  authorities."  It 
is  true,  also,  that  Dybenko,  Naval  Commissary, 
published  a  remarkable  order,  saying:  "The  honor 
of  the  Revolutionary  Fleet  must  not  bear  the  stain 
of  an  accusation  of  revolutionary  sailors  having 
murdered  their  helpless  enemies,  rendered  harmless 
by  imprisonment.  /  call  upon  all  who  took  part 
in  the  murder  .  .  .  to  appear  of  their  own  accord 
before  the  Revolutionary   Tribunal." 

In  the  absence  of  definite  proof  to  the  contrary  it 
is  perhaps  best  to  regard  this  outrage  as  due  to  the 
brutal  savagery  of  individuals,  rather  than  as  part 
of  a  deliberate  officially  sanctioned  policy  of  ter- 
rorism. Yet  there  is  the  fact  that  the  sailors  and 
Red  Guards,  who  were  armed,  had  gone  straight 
to  the  hospital  from  the  office  of  the  Commis- 
ion  for  Combating  Counter-Revolution,  Sabotage, 
and  Profiteering.  That  this  body,  which  from  the 
first  enlisted  the  services  of  many  of  the  spies  and 
secret  agents  of  the  old  regime,  had  some  connec- 
tion with  the  murders  was  generally  believed. 


144  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

At  the  end  of  December,  1917,  and  in  January, 
191 8,  there  were  wholesale  massacres  in  Sebastopol, 
Simferopol,  Eupatoria,  and  other  places.  The 
well-known  radical  Russian  journalist,  Dioneo- 
Shklovsky,  quotes  Gorky's  paper,  the  Novaya 
Zhizn  {New  Life),  as  follows: 

The  garrison  of  the  Revolutionary  Army  at  Sebastopol 
has  already  begun  its  final  struggle  against  the  bour- 
geoisie. Without  much  ado  they  decided  simply  to 
massacre  all  the  bourgeoisie.  At  first  they  massacred 
the  inhabitants  of  the  two  most  bourgeois  streets  in 
Sebastopol,  then  the  same  operation  was  extended  to 
Simferopol,  and  then  it  was  the  turn  of  Eupatoria. 

In  Sebastopol  not  less  than  five  hundred  citizens 
disappeared  during  this  St.  Bartholomew  massacre, 
according  to  this  report,  while  at  Simferopol 
between  two  and  three  hundred  officers  were  shot 
in  the  prisons  and  in  the  streets.  At  Yalta  many 
persons — between  eighty  and  one  hundred — were 
thrown  into  the  bay.  At  Eupatoria  the  sailors 
placed  the  local  "bourgeoisie  in  a  barge  and 
sank  it.'* 

Of  course  Gorky's  paper  was  at  that  time  very 
bitter  in  its  criticisms  of  the  brutal  methods  of  the 
Bolsheviki,  and  that  fact  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  considering  its  testimony.  Gorky  had 
been  very  friendly  to  the  Bolsheviki  up  to  the 
coup  d'etat,  but  revolted  against  their  brutality  in 
the  early  part  of  their  regime.  Subsequently,  as 
is  well  known,  he  became  reconciled  to  the  regime 
sufficiently  to  take  office  under  it.  The  foregoing 
accounts,  as  well  as  those  in  the  following  para- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  145 

graph,  agree  in  all  essential  particulars  with  reports 
published  in  the  Constitutional-Democratic  paper, 
Nast  Viek.  This  paper,  for  some  inexplicable  rea- 
son, notwithstanding  its  vigorous  opposition  to  the 
Bolsheviki,  was  permitted  to  appear,  even  when 
all  other  non-Bolshevist  papers  were  suppressed. 

According  to  the  Novaya  Zhizn,  No.  5,  the  Soviets 
in  many  Russian  towns  made  haste  to  follow  the 
example  of  the  revolutionary  forces  at  Sebastopol 
and  Simferopol.  In  the  town  of  Etaritsa  the  local 
Red  Guard  wired  to  the  authorities  at  the  Smolny 
Institute,  Petrograd,  for  permission  to  have  "a 
St.  Bartholomew's  night"  (Yeremeievskaia  Notch). 
In  Tropetz,  according  to  the  same  issue  of  Gorky's 
paper,  the  commandant  presented  this  report  to 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  local  Soviet: 
''The  Red  Army  is  quite  ready  for  action.  Am 
waiting  for  orders  to  begin  a  St.  Bartholomew's 
massacre."  During  the  latter  part  of  February 
and  the  first  week  of  March,  1918,  there  were 
wholesale  massacres  of  officers  and  other  bour- 
geoisie in  Kiev,  Rostov-on-Don  and  Novotcher- 
kassk,  among  other  places.  The  local  Socialists- 
Revolutionists  paper,  Izvestia,  of  Novotcherkassk,in 
its  issue  of  March  6,  191 8,  gave  an  account  of  the 
killing  of  a  number  of  officers. 

In  the  beginning  of  March,  1918,  mass  execu- 
tions were  held  in  Rostov-on-Don.  Many  children 
were  executed  by  way  of  reprisal.  The  Russkiya 
Viedomosti  {Russian  News),  in  its  issue  of  March  23, 
1918,  reported  that  the  president  of  the  Municipal 
Council  of  Rostov,  B.  C.  Vasiliev,  a  prominent 
member  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party;  the  mayor 


7 


< 


146  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  the  city;  the  former  chairman  of  the  Rostov- 
Nakhichevan  Council  of  Working-men's  and  Sol- 
diers' Delegates,  P.  Melnikov;  and  M.  Smirnov, 
who  was  chairman  of  this  Soviet  at  the  time — had 
handed  in  a  petition  to  the  Bolshevist  War-Revolu- 
tionary Council,  asking  that  they  themselves  be 
shot  "instead  of  the  innocent  children  who  are 
executed  without  law  and  justice." 

A  group  of  mothers  submitted  to  the  same  Bol- 
shevist tribunal  the  following  heartrending  petition: 

If,  according  to  you,  there  is  need  of  sacrifices  in  blood 
and  life  in  order  to  establish  a  socialistic  state  and  to 
create  new  ways  of  life,  take  our  lives,  kill  us,  grown 
mothers  and  fathers,  but  let  our  children  live.  They 
have  not  yet  had  a  chance  to  live;  they  are  only  growing 
and  developing.  Do  not  destroy  young  lives.  Take  our 
lives  and  our  blood  as  ransom. 

Our  voices  are  calling  to  you,  laborers.  You  have  not 
stained  the  banner  of  the  Revolution  even  with  the 
blood  of  traitors,  such  as  Shceglovitov  and  Protopopov. 
Why  do  you  now  witness  indifferently  the  bloodshed  of 
our  children?  Raise  your  voices  in  protest.  Children 
do  not  understand  about  party  strife.  Their  adherence 
to  one  or  another  party  is  directed  by  their  eagerness 
for  new  impressions,  novelty,  and  the  suggestions  of 
elders. 

We,  mothers,  have  served  the  country  by  giving  our 
sons,  husbands,  and  brothers.  Pray,  take  our  last  pos- 
sessions, our  lives,  but  spare  our  children.  Call  us  one 
after  the  other  for  execution,  when  our  children  are  to 
be  shot!  Every  one  of  us  would  gladly  die  in  order  to 
save  the  life  of  her  children  or  that  of  other  children. 

Citizens,  members  of  the  War-Revolutionary  Council, 
listen  to  the  cries  of  the  mothers.    We  cannot  keep  silent! 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  147 

A.  Lockerman  is  a  Socialist  whose  work  against 
czarism  brought  prison  and  exile.  He  was  engaged 
in  Socialist  work  in  Rostov-on-Don  when  the  Bol- 
sheviki  seized  rhe  city  in  1918,  and  during  the  sev- 
enty days  they  remained  its  masters.     He  says: 

The  callousness  with  which  the  Red  soldiers  carried 
out  executions  was  amazing.  Without  wasting  words, 
without  questions,  even  without  any  irritation,  the  Red 
Army  men  took  those  who  were  brought  to  them  from 
the  street,  stripped  them  naked,  put  them  to  the  wall 
and  shot  them.  Then  the  bodies  were  thrown  out  on 
the  embankment  and  stable  manure  thrown  over  the 
pools  of  blood.1 

Such  barbarity  and  terrorism  went  on  wherever 
the  Bolsheviki  held  control,  long  before  the  intro- 
duction of  a  system  of  organized  terror  directed  by 
the  central  Soviet  Government.  Not  only  did  the 
Bolshevist  leaders  make  no  attempt  to  check  the 
brutal  savagery,  the  murders,  lynchings,  floggings, 
and  other  outrages,  but  they  loudly  complained 
that  the  local  revolutionary  authorities  were  not 
severe  enough.  Zinoviev  bewailed  the  too  great 
leniency  displayed  toward  the  "counter-revolution- 
aries and  bourgeoisie.'*  Even  Lenin,  popularly  be- 
lieved to  be  less  inclined  to  severity  than  any  of  his 
colleagues,  complained,  in  April,  1918,  that  "our  rule 
is  too  mild,  quite  frequently  resembling  jam  rather 
than  iron."     Trotsky  with  greater  savagery  said: 

You  are  perturbed  by  the  mild  terror  we  are  applying 
against  our  class  enemies,  but  know  that  a  month  hence 

XA.  Lockerman;  Les  Bolsheviks  a  I'ceuvre,  preface  par  V.  Zenzinov, 
Paris,  1920. 


148  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

this  terror  will  take  a  more  terrible  form  on  the  model 
of  the  terror  of  the  great  revolutionaries  of  France. 
Not  a  fortress,  but  the  guillotine,  will  be  for  our  enemies! 

Numerous  reports  similar  to  the  foregoing  could 
be  cited  to  disprove  the  claim  of  the  apologists  of 
the  Bolsheviki  that  the  Red  Terror  was  introduced 
in  consequence  of  the  assassination  of  Uritzky  and 
the  attempt  to  assassinate  Lenin.  The  truth  is 
that  the  tyrannicide,  the  so-called  White  Terror, 
was  the  result  of  the  Red  Terror,  not  its  cause.  It 
is  true,  of  course,  that  the  terrorism  was  not  all  on 
the  one  side.  There  were  many  uprisings  of  the 
people,  both  city  workers  and  peasants,  against  the 
Bolshevist  usurpers.  Defenders  of  the  Bolsheviki 
cite  these  uprisings  and  the  brutal  savagery  with 
which  the  Soviet  officials  were  attacked  to  justify 
the  terroristic  policy  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The  in- 
troduction of  such  a  defense  surely  knocks  the 
bottom  out  of  the  claim  that  the  Bolsheviki  really 
represented  the  great  mass  of  the  working-people, 
and  that  only  the  aristocracy,  the  bourgeoisie,  and 
the  rich  peasants  were  opposed  to  them.  The 
uprisings  were  too  numerous,  too  wide-spread, 
and  too  formidable  to  admit  of  such  an  interpre- 
tation. 

M.  C.  Eroshkin,  who  was  chairman  of  the  Perm 
Committee  of  the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists, 
and  represented  the  Minister  of  Agriculture  in  the 
Perm  district  under  the  Provisional  Government, 
during  his  visit  to  the  United  States  in  1919  told 
the  present  writer  some  harrowing  stories  of  up- 
risings against  the  Soviets  which  took  on  a  character 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  149 

of  bestial  brutality.  One  of  these  stories  was  of  an 
uprising  in  the  Polevsky  Works,  in  Ekaterinburg 
County,  where  a  mob  of  peasants,  armed  with 
axes,  scythes,  and  sticks,  fell  upon  the  members  of 
the  Soviet  like  so  many  wild  animals,  tearing  fifty 
of  them  literally  into  pieces! 

That  the  government  of  Russia  under  the  Bol- 
sheviki  was  to  be  tyrannical  and  despotic  in  the 
extreme  was  made  evident  from  the  very  beginning. 
By  the  decree  of  November  24,  191 7,  all  existing 
courts  of  justice  were  abolished  and  in  their  places 
set  up  a  system  of  local  courts  based  upon  the 
elective  principle.  The  first  judges  were  to  be 
elected  by  the  Soviets,  but  henceforth  "on  the  basis 
of  direct  democratic  vote."  It  was  provided  that 
the  judges  were  to  be  "guided  in  their  rulings  and 
verdicts  by  the  laws  of  the  governments  which  had 
been  overthrown  only  in  so  far  as  those  laws  are 
not  annulled  by  the  Revolution,  and  do  not  contra- 
dict the  revolutionary  conscience  and  the  revolu- 
tionary conception  of  right."  An  interpretative 
note  was  appended  to  this  clause  explaining  that  all 
laws  which  were  in  contradiction  to  the  decrees  of 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet 
Government,  or  the  minimum  programs  of  the 
Social  Democratic  or  Socialists-Revolutionists  par- 
ties, must  be  regarded  as  canceled. 

This  new  "democratic  judicial  system"  was 
widely  hailed  as  an  earnest  of  the  democracy  of  the 
new  regime  and  as  a  constructive  experiment  of  the 
highest  importance.  That  the  decree  seemed  to 
manifest  a  democratic  intention  is  not  to  be  gain- 
said:   the  question  of  its  sincerity  cannot   be  so 


150  'THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

easily  determined.  Of  course,  there  is  much  in 
the  decree  and  in  the  scheme  outlined  that  is  ex- 
tremely crude,  while  the  explanatory  note  referred 
to  practically  had  the  effect  of  enacting  the  plat- 
forms of  political  parties,  which  had  never  been 
formulated  in  the  precise  terms  of  laws,  being  rather 
general  propositions  concerning  the  exact  meaning, 
of  which  there  was  much  uncertainty.  Crude  and 
clumsy  though  the  scheme  might  be,  however,  it 
had  the  merit  of  appearing  to  be  democratic.  A 
careful  reading  of  the  decree  reveals  the  fact  that 
several  most  important  classes  of  offenses  were 
exempted  from  the  jurisdiction  of  these  courts, 
among  them  all  "political  offenses."  Special  revo- 
lutionary tribunals  were  to  be  charged  with  "the 
defense  of  the  Revolution": 

For  the  struggle  against  the  counter-revolutionary 
forces  by  means  of  measures  for  the  defense  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  its  accomplishments,  and  also  for  the  trial 
of  proceedings  against  profiteering,  speculation,  sabotage, 
and  other  misdeeds  of  merchants,  manufacturers,  offi- 
cials, and  other  persons,  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Revo- 
lutionary Tribunals  are  established,  consisting  of  a  chair- 
man and  six  members,  serving  in  turn,  elected  by  the 
provincial  or  city  Soviets  of  Workmen's,  Soldiers',  and 
Peasants'  Deputies. 

Perhaps  only  those  who  are  familiar  with  the 
methods  of  czarism  can  appreciate  fully  the  sig- 
nificance of  thus  associating  political  offenses,  such 
as  counter-revolutionary  agitation,  with  such  of- 
fenses as  illegal  speculation  and  profiteering.  Pro- 
ceedings  against   profiteers   and   speculators   could 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  151 

be  relied  upon  to  bring  sufficient  popularity  to  these 
tribunals  to  enable  them  to  punish  political  offenders 
severely,  and  with  a  greater  degree  of  impunity 
than  would  otherwise  be  possible.  On  December 
19,  1917,  I.  Z.  Steinberg,  People's  Commissar  of 
Justice,  issued  a  decree  called  "Instructions  to  the 
Revolutionary  Tribunal,"  which  caused  Shcheglovi- 
tov,  the  most  reactionary  Minister  of  Justice  the 
Czar  ever  had,  to  cry  out:  "The  Cadets  repeatedly 
charged  me  in  the  Duma  with  turning  the  tribunal 
into  a  weapon  of  political  struggle.  How  far  the 
Bolsheviki  have  left  me  behind!"  The  following 
paragraphs  from  this  remarkable  document  show 
how  admirably  the  institution  of  the  Revolutionary 
Tribunal  was  designed  for  political  oppression: 

I.  The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  has  jurisdiction  in 
cases  of  persons  (a)  who  organize  uprisings  against  the 
authority  of  the  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government, 
actively  oppose  the  latter  or  do  not  obey  it,  or  call  upon 
other  persons  to  oppose  or  disobey  it;  (b)  who  utilize 
their  positions  in  the  state  or  public  service  to  disturb 
or  hamper  the  regular  progress  of  work  in  the  institution 
or  enterprise  in  which  they  are  or  have  been  serving 
(sabotage,  concealing  or  destroying  documents  or  prop- 
erty, etc.);  (c)  who  stop  or  reduce  production  of  articles 
of  general  use  without  actual  necessity  for  so  doing; 
(d)  who  violate  the  decrees,  orders,  binding  ordinances, 
and  other  published  acts  of  the  organs  of  the  Workmen's 
and  Peasants'  Government,  if  such  acts  stipulate  a  trial 
by  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  for  their  violation;  (e) 
who,  taking  advantage  of  their  social  or  administrative 
position,  misuse  the  authority  given  them  by  the  revo- 
lutionary people.    Crimes  against  the  people  committed 


152  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

by  means  of  the  press  are  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a 
specially  instituted  Revolutionary  Tribunal. 

2.  The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  for  offenses  indicated 
in  Article  I  imposes  upon  the  guilty  the  following  pen- 
alties: (i)  fine;  (2)  deprivation  of  freedom;  (3)  exile 
from  the  capitals,  from  particular  localities,  or  from  the 
territory  of  the  Russian  Republic;  (4)  public  censure; 
(5)  declaring  the  offender  a  public  enemy;  (6)  depriva- 
tion of  all  or  some  political  rights;  (7)  sequestration  or 
confiscation,  partial  or  general,  of  property;  (8)  sentence 
to  compulsory  public  work. 

The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  fixes  the  penalty,  being 
guided  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  dictates 
of  the  revolutionary  conscience. 

II.  The  verdicts  of  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  are 
final.  In  case  of  violation  of  the  form  of  procedure 
established  by  these  instructions,  or  the  discovery  of 
indications  of  obvious  injustice  in  the  verdict,  the  Peo- 
ple's Commissar  of  Justice  has  the  right  to  address  to 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets  of 
Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Deputies  a  request 
to  order  a  second  and  last  trial  of  the  case. 

Refusal  to  obey  the  Soviet  Government,  active 
opposition  to  it,  and  calling  upon  other  persons  "to 
oppose  or  disobey  it"  are  thus  made  punishable 
offenses.  In  view  of  the  uproar  of  protest  raised 
in  this  country  against  the  deportation  of  alien 
agitators  and  conspirators,  especially  by  the  de- 
fenders and  upholders  of  the  Bolsheviki  who  have 
assured  us  of  the  beneficent  liberality  of  the  Soviet 
Utopia,  it  may  be  well  to  direct  particular  attention 
to  the  fact  that  these  "instructions"  make  special 
and  precise  provisions  for  the  deportation  of  politi- 


\ 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  153 

cal  undesirables.  It  is  set  forth  that  the  Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal  may  inflict,  among  other  penal- 
ties, "exile  from  the  capitals,  from  particular 
localities,  or  from  the  territory  of  the  Russian  Re- 
public," that  is,  deportation.  These  penalties, 
moreover,  apply  to  Russian  citizens,  not,  as  in  the 
case  of  our  deportations,  to  aliens.  The  various 
forms  of  exile  thus  provided  for  were  common 
penalties  under  the  old  regime.1 

It  is  interesting  to  observe,  further,  that  there  is 
no  right  of  appeal  from  the  verdicts  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary Tribunal,  except  that  "the  People's 
Commissar  of  Justice  has  the  right  to  address  to 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets 
of  Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Deputies  a 
request  to  order  a  second  and  last  trial"  of  any 
case  in  which  he  is  sufficiently  interested  to  do  so. 
Unless  this  official  can  be  convinced  that  there 
has  been  some  "violation  of  the  form  of  procedure" 
or  that  there  is  "obvious  injustice  in  the  verdict," 
and  unless  he  can  be  induced  to  make  such  a 
"request"  to  the  central  Soviet  authority,  the 
verdict  of  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  is  final  and 
absolute.     What  a  travesty  upon  justice  and  upon 

1  To  avoid  misunderstanding  (though  I  cannot  hope  to  avert  mis- 
representation) let  me  say  that  this  paragraph  is  not  intended  to  be 
a  defense  or  a  justification  of  the  policy  of  deporting  alien  agitators. 
While  admitting  the  right  of  our  government  to  deport  undesirable 
aliens,  as  a  corollary  to  the  undoubted  right  to  deny  their  admission 
in  the  first  place,  I  do  not  believe  in  deportation  as  a  method  of  dealing 
with  revolutionary  propaganda.  On  the  other  hand,  I  deny  the  right 
of  the  Bolsheviki  or  their  supporters  to  oppose  as  reactionary  and 
illiberal  a  method  of  dealing  with  political  undesirables  which  is  in 
full  force  in  Bolshevist  Russia,  which  they  acclaim  so  loudly. 


4*   A  A 


) 


154  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

democracy!  What  an  admirable  instrument  for 
tyrants  to  rely  upon! 

Even  this  terrible  weapon  of  despotism  and 
oppression  did  not  satisfy  the  Bolsheviki,  however. 
For  one  thing,  the  decree  constituting  the  Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal  provided  that  its  session  must  be 
held  in  the  open;  for  another,  its  members  must 
be  elected.  Consequently,  a  new  type  of  tribunal 
was  added  to  the  system,  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission for  Combating  Counter-Revolution — the 
infamous  Chresvychaika.  Not  since  the  Inquisi- 
tions of  the  Middle  Ages  has  any  civilized  nation 
maintained  tribunals  clothed  with  anything  like 
the  arbitrary  and  unlimited  authority  possessed 
by  the  central  and  local  Extraordinary  Commis- 
sions for  Combating  Counter-Revolution.  They 
have  written  upon  the  pages  of  Russia's  history  a 
record  of  tyranny  and  oppression  which  makes  the 
worst  record  of  czarism  seem  gentle  and  beneficent. 

It  is  not  without  sinister  significance  that  in  all 
the  collections  of  documents  which  the  Bolsheviki 
and  their  sympathizers  have  published  to  illustrate 
the  workings  of  the  Soviet  system,  in  this  country 
and  in  Europe,  there  is  not  one  explaining  the  or- 
ganization, functions,  methods,  and  personnel  of 
its  most  characteristic  institution — more  charac- 
teristic even  than  the  Soviet.  Neither  in  the  several 
collections  published  by  The  Nation,  the  American 
Association  for  International  Conciliation,  the  Rus- 
sian Soviet  Government  Bureau,  nor  in  the  books 
of  writers  like  John  Reed,  Louise  Bryant,  William 
C.  Bullitt,  Raymond  Robins,  William  T.  Goode, 
Arthur  Ransome,  Isaac  Don  Levine,  Colonel  Ma- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  155 

lone,  M.P.,  Lincoln  Eyre,  Etienne  Antonelli,  nor 
any  other  volume  of  the  kind,  can  such  information 
be  found.     This  silence  is  profoundly  eloquent. 

This  much  we  know  about  the  Chresvychaikas: 
The  Soviet  Government  created  the  All-Russian 
Extraordinary  Commission  for  Combating  Coun- 
ter-Revolution,  Sabotage,  and  Profiteering,  and 
established  it  at  the  headquarters  of  the  former 
Prefecture  of  Petrograd,  2,  Gorokhovaia  Street. 
Its  full  personnel  has  never  been  made  known,  but 
it  is  well  known  that  many  of  the  spies  and  con- 
fidential agents  of  the  former  secret  police  service 
entered  its  employ.  Until  February,  igig,  it  pos- 
sessed absolutely  unlimited  powers  of  arrest,  except 
for  the  immunity  enjoyed  by  members  of  the  govern- 
ment; its  hearings  were  held  in  secret;  it  was  not 
obliged  to  report  even  the  names  of  persons  sentenced 
by  it;  mass  arrests  and  mass  sentences  were  common 
under  its  direction;  it  was  not  confined  to  deali?ig 
with  definite  crimes,  violations  of  definite  laws,  but 
could  punish  at  will,  in  any  manner  it  deemed  fit, 
any  conduct  which  it  pleased  to  declare  to  be  "counter- 
revolutionary." 

Those  apologists  who  say  that  the  Bolsheviki 
resorted  to  terrorism  only  after  the  assassination  of 
Uritzky,  and  those  others  who  say  that  terrorism 
was  the  answer  to  the  intervention  of  the  Allies, 
are  best  answered  by  the  citation  of  official  docu- 
mentary evidence  furnished  by  the  Bolsheviki 
themselves.  In  the  face  of  such  evidence  argument 
is  puerile  and  vain.  In  February,  1918,  months 
before  either  the  assassination  of  Uritzky  or  the 
intervention  of  the  Allies  took  place,  the  All-Rus- 


156  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

sian  Extraordinary  Commission  issued  the  following 
proclamation,  which  was  published  in  the  Krasnaya 
Gazcta,  official  organ  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet,  on 
February  23,  1918: 

The  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission  to  Combat 
Counter-Revolution,  Sabotage,  and  Speculation,  of  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissaries,  brings  to  the  notice 
of  all  citizens  that  up  to  the  present  time  it  has  been 
lenient  in  the  struggle  against  the  enemies  of  the  people. 

But  at  the  present  moment,  when  the  counter-revolu- 
tion is  becoming  more  impudent  every  day,  inspired  by 
the  treacherous  attacks  of  German  counter-revolution- 
ists; when  the  bourgeoisie  of  the  whole  world  is  trying  to 
suppress  the  advance-guard  of  the  revolutionary  Inter- 
national, the  Russian  proletariat,  the  All-Russian  Ex- 
traordinary Commission,  acting  in  conformity  with  the 
ordinances  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries, 
sees  no  other  way  to  combat  counter-revolutionists,  specu- 
lators, marauders,  hooligans,  obstructionists,  and  other 
parasites,  except  by  pitiless  destruction  at  the  place  of 
crime. 

Therefore  the  Commission  announces  that  all  enemy 
agents,  and  countei -revolutionary  agitators,  speculators, 
organizers  of  uprisings  or  participants  in  preparations  for 
uprisings  to  overthrow  the  Soviet  authority,  all  fugitives 
to  the  Don  to  join  the  counter-revolutionary  armies  of 
Kaledin  and  Kornilov  and  the  Polish  counter-revolutionary 
Legions,  sellers  or  purchasers  of  arms  to  be  sent  to  the 
Finnish  White  Guard,  the  troops  of  Kaledin,  Kornilov, 
and  Dovbor  Musnitsky,  or  to  arm  the  counter-revolu- 
tionary bourgeoisie  of  Petrograd,  will  be  mercilessly  shot 
by  detachments  of  the  Commission  at  the  place  of  the  crime. 

Petrograd,  February  22,  iqi8. 

All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  157 

In  connection  with  this  ferocious  document  and 
its  announcement  that  "counter-revolutionists" 
would  be  subject  to  "pitiless  destruction,"  that 
"counter-revolutionary  agitators"  would  be  "merci- 
lessly shot,"  it  is  important  to  remember  that 
during  the  summer  of  1917,  when  Kerensky  was 
struggling  against  "German  counter-revolution- 
ists" and  plots  to  overthrow  the  Revolution,  the 
Bolsheviki  had  demanded  the  abolition  of  the 
death  penalty.  Lenin,  Trotsky,  Kamenev,  Zin- 
oviev,  and  others  denounced  Kerensky  as  a  "hang- 
man" and  "murderer."  Where  is  the  moral  in- 
tegrity of  these  men  ?  Like  scorpion  stings  are  the 
bitter  words  of  the  protest  of  L.  Martov,  leader 
of  the  radical  left  wing  of  the  Menshevist  Social 
Democrats: 

In  1910  the  International  Socialist  Congress  at  Copen- 
hagen passed  a  resolution  in  favor  of  starting  a  campaign 
in  all  countries  for  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty. 

All  the  present  leaders  of  the  Bolshevist  Party — 
Lenin,  Zinoviev,  Trotsky,  Kamenev,  Radek,  Rakovsky, 
Lunarcharsky — voted  for  this  resolution.  I  saw  them 
all  there  raising  their  hands  in  favor  of  the  resolution 
declaring  war  on  capital  punishment. 

Then  I  saw  them  in  Petrograd  in  July,  1917,  protest- 
ing against  punishing  by  death  even  those  who  had 
turned  traitors  to  their  country  during  the  war. 

I  see  them  now  condemning  to  death  and  executing 
people,  bourgeoisie  and  workmen,  peasants  and  officers 
alike.  I  see  them  now  demanding  from  their  subordi- 
nates that  they  should  not  count  the  victims,  that  they 
should  put  to  death  as  many  opponents  of  the  Bolshevist 
regime  as  possible. 

11 


158  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

And  I  say  to  these  Bolshevist  "judges":  You  are 
malignant  liars  and  perjurers!  You  have  deceived  the 
workmen's  International  by  signing  its  demand  for  the 
universal  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  and  by  its  resto- 
ration when  you  came  to  power. 

No  idle  threat  was  the  proclamation  of  February: 
the  performance  was  fully  as  brutal  as  the  text. 
Hundreds  of  people  were  shot.  The  death  penalty 
had  been  "abolished,"  and  on  the  strength  of  that 
fact  the  Bolsheviki  had  been  lauded  to  the  skies  for 
their  humanity  by  myopic  and  perverse  admirers  in 
this  country  and  elsewhere  outside  of  Russia. 
But  the  shooting  of  people  by  the  armed  detach- 
ments of  the  Extraordinary  Commission  went  on. 
No  court  ever  examined  the  cases;  no  competent 
jurists  heard  or  reviewed  the  evidence,  or  even 
examined  the  charges.  A  simple  entry,  such  as 
"Ivan  Kouzmitch — Robbery — Shot,"  might  cover 
the  murder  of  a  devoted  Socialist  whose  only  crime 
was  a  simple  speech  to  his  fellow-workmen  in  favor 
of  the  immediate  convocation  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  or  calling  upon  them  to  unite  against  the 
Bolsheviki.  And  where  counter-revolutionary  agi- 
tation was  given  as  the  crime  for  which  men  were 
shot  there  was  nothing  to  show,  in  many  cases, 
whether  the  victim  had  taken  up  arms  against  the 
Soviet  power  or  merely  expressed  opinions  unfavor- 
able to  the  regime. 

Originally  under  the  direction  of  Uritzky,  who 
met  a  well-deserved  fate  at  the  hands  of  an  assassin  * 

1  Uritzky  is  thus  described  by  Maurice  Verstraete: 
"He  is  a  refined  sadist,  who  does  his  grim  work  for  the  love  of  it.  .  .  . 
Uritzky  is  a  hunchback  and  seems  to  be  revenging  himself  on  all  man- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  159 

in  July,  191 8,  the  Ail-Russian  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission in  turn  set  up  Provincial  and  District 
Extraordinary  Commissions,  all  of  which  enjoyed 
the  same  practically  unlimited  powers.  Before 
February,  1919,  these  bodies  were  not  even  limited 
in  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  inflict  the  death  pen- 
alty, except  for  the  immunity  enjoyed  by  members 
of  the  government.  Any  Extraordinary  Commis- 
sion could  arrest,  arraign,  condemn,  and  execute  any 
person  in  secret,  the  only  requirement  being  that 
afterward,  if  called  upon  to  do  so,  it  must  report  the 
case  to  the  local  Soviet!  A  well-known  Bolshevist 
writer,  Alminsky,  wrote  in  Pravda,  October  8,  191 8: 

The  absence  of  the  necessary  restraint  makes  one 
feel  appalled  at  the  "instruction"  issued  by  the  All- 
Russian  Extraordinary  Commission  to  "All  Provincial 
Extraordinary  Commissions,"  which  says:  "The  All- 
Russian  Extraordinary  Commission  is  perfectly  inde- 
pendent in  its  work,  carrying  out  house-searches,  ar- 
rests, executions,  of  which  it  afterward  reports  to  the 
Council  of  the  People's  Commissaries  and  to  the  Cen- 
tral Executive  Council."     Further,  the  Provincial  and 

kind  for  his  deformity.  His  heart  is  full  of  hatred,  his  nerves  are 
shattered,  and  his  mind  depraved.  He  is  the  personification  of  a 
civilized  brute — that  is  to  say,  the  most  cruel  of  all.  Yesterday  he 
was  laughing  at  his  own  joke.  He  had  ordered  twenty  men  to  be 
executed.  Among  the  condemned  was  a  lover  of  the  girl  who  was 
waiting  to  be  examined.  Uritzky  himself  told  her  of  the  death  of  her 
lover.  .  .  .  The  only  emotion  of  which  Uritzky  is  capable  is  fear.  The 
only  person  Uritzky  obeys  is  the  Swiss  ambassador,  as  he  hopes,  in 
return,  that  the  latter  will  enable  him  to  procure  a  passport  to  Switzer- 
land, in  case  he  is  forced  to  escape  when  the  Bolsheviks  are  over- 
thrown. .  .  .  Trotsky  and  Zinoviev  are  in  many  ways  like  Uritzky. 
They  are  also  cruel,  hysterical,  and  ready  to  overwhelm  the  wor/d 
with  blood." — Verstraete,  Mes  Cahiers  Russes,  p.  350. 


•»<"'. 


1G0  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

District  Extraordinary  Commissions  "are  independent 
in  their  activities,  and  when  called  upon  by  the  local 
Executive  Council  present  a  report  of  their  work." 
In  so  far  as  house-searches  and  arrests  are  concerned, 
a  report  made  afterward  may  result  in  putting  right 
irregularities  committed  owing  to  lack  of  restraint.  The 
same  cannot  be  said  of  executions.  ...  It  can  also  be 
seen  from  the  "instruction"  that  personal  safety  is  to 
a  certain  extent  guaranteed  only  to  members  of  the  gov- 
ernment, of  the  Central  Council,  and  of  the  local  Execu- 
tive Committees.  With  the  exception  of  these  few 
persons  all  members  of  the  local  committees  of  the 
(Bolshevik)  Party,  of  the  Control  Committees,  and  of 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  party  may  be  shot  at 
any  time  by  the  decision  of  any  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission of  a  small  district  town  if  they  happen  to  be  on 
its  territory,  and  a  report  of  that  made  afterward. 

After  the  assassination  of  Uritzky,  and  the  at- 
tempted assassination  of  Lenin,  there  was  instituted 
a  mad  orgy  of  murderous  terror  without  parallel. 
It  was  a  veritable  saturnalia  of  brutal  repression. 
Against  the  vain  protestation  of  the  defenders  of 
the  Bolsheviki  that  the  Red  Terror  has  been  grossly 
exaggerated,  it  is  quite  sufficient  to  set  down  the 
exultations  and  admissions  of  the  Bolsheviki  them- 
selves, the  records  made  and  published  in  their  own 
official  reports  and  newspapers.  The  evidence 
which  is  given  in  the  next  few  pages  is  only  a  small 
part  of  the  immense  volume  of  such  evidence  that 
is  available,  every  word  of  it  taken  from  Bolshevist 
sources. 

Under  czarism  revolutionary  terrorism  directed 
against  government  officials  was  almost  invariably 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  161 

followed  by  increased  repression;  terror  made 
answer  to  terror.  We  shall  search  the  records  of 
czarism  in  vain,  however,  for  evidence  of  such 
brutal  and  blood-lusting  rage  as  the  Bolsheviki 
manifested  when  their  terror  was  answered  by 
terror.  When  a  young  Jew  named  Kannegiesser 
assassinated  Uritzky  the  Krasnaya  Gazeta  declared : 

The  whole  bourgeoisie  must  answer  for  this  act  of 
terror.  .  .  .  Thousands  of  our  enemies  must  pay  for 
Uritzky's  death.  .  .  .  We  must  teach  the  bourgeoisie  a 
bloody  lesson.-  .  .  .  Death  to  the  bourgeoisie! 

This  same  Bolshevist  organ,  after  the  attempt  to 
assassinate  Lenin,  said: 

We  will  turn  our  hearts  into  steel,  which  we  will 
temper  in  the  fire  of  suffering  and  the  blood  of  fighters 
for  freedom.  We  will  make  our  hearts  cruel,  hard,  and 
immovable,  so  that  no  mercy  will  enter  them,  and  so 
that  they  will  not  quiver  at  the  sight  of  a  sea  of  enemy 
blood.  We  will  let  loose  the  flood-gates  of  that  sea. 
Without  mercy,  without  sparing,  we  will  kill  our  en- 
emies in  scores  of  hundreds.  Let  them  be  thousands; 
let  them  drown  themselves  in  their  own  blood.  For  the 
blood  of  Lenin  and  Uritzky,  Zinoviev,  and  Volodarsky, 
let  there  be  floods  of  the  blood  of  the  bourgeoisie — more 
blood,  as  much  as  possible. 

In  the  same  spirit  the  Izvestia  declared,  "The 
proletariat  will  reply  to  the  attempt  on  Lenin  in  a 
manner  that  will  make  the  whole  bourgeoisie 
shudder  with  horror."  Peters,  successor  to  Uritzky 
as  head  of  the  Extraordinary  Commission,  said,  in 


162  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

an  official  proclamation,  "This  crime  will  be 
answered  by  a  mass  terror."  On  September  2d, 
Petrovsky,  Commissar  for  the  Interior,  issued  this 
call  to  mass  terror: 

Murder  of  Volodarsky  and  Uritzky,  attempt  on  Lenin, 
and  shooting  of  masses  of  our  comrades  in  Finland, 
Ukrainia,  the  Don  and  Czechoslovakia,  continual  dis- 
covery of  conspiracies  in  our  rear,  open  acknowledgment 
of  Right  Social  Revolutionary  Party  and  other  counter- 
revolutionary rascals  of  their  part  in  these  conspira- 
cies, together  with  the  insignificant  extent  of  serious 
repressions  and  mass  shooting  of  White  Guards  and 
bourgeoisie  on  the  part  of  the  Soviets,  all  these  things 
show  that  notwithstanding  frequent  pronouncements 
urging  mass  terror  against  the  Socialists-Revolution- 
aries, White  Guards,  and  bourgeoisie  no  real  terror 
exists. 

Such  a  situation  should  decidedly  be  stopped.  End 
should  be  put  to  weakness  and  softness.  All  Right 
Socialists-Revolutionaries  known  to  local  Soviets  should 
be  arrested  immediately.  Numerous  hostages  should  be 
taken  from  the  bourgeoisie  and  officer  classes.  At  the 
slightest  attempt  to  resist  or  the  slightest  movement 
among  the  White  Guards,  mass  shooting  should  be  ap- 
plied at  once.  Initiative  in  this  matter  rests  especially 
with  the  local  executive  committees. 

Through  the  militia  and  extraordinary  commissions, 
all  branches  of  government  must  take  measures  to  seek 
out  and  arrest  persons  hiding  under  false  names  and 
shoot  without  fail  anybody  connected  with  the  work  of 
the  White  Guards. 

All  above  measures  should  be  put  immediately  into 
execution. 

Indecisive  action  on  the  part  of  local  Soviets  must  be 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  163 

immediately  reported  to  People's  Commissary  for  Home 
Affairs. 

The  rear  of  our  armies  must  be  finally  guaranteed 
and  completely  cleared  of  all  kinds  of  White-Guardists, 
and  all  despicable  conspirators  against  the  authority 
of  the  working-class  and  of  the  poorest  peasantry. 
Not  the  slightest  hesitation  or  the  slightest  indecisiveness 
in  applying  mass  terror. 

Acknowledge  the  receipt  of  this  telegram. 

Transmit  to  district  Soviets. 

[Signed]     Petrovsky.1 

On  September  3,  1918,  the  Izvestia  published  this 
news  item: 

In  connection  with  the  murder  of  Uritzky  five  hundred 
persons  have  been  shot  by  order  of  the  Petrograd  Ex-  , 
traordinary  Commission  to  Combat  Counter-Revolution. 
The  names  of  the  persons  shot,  and  those  of  candidates 
for  future  shooting,  in  case  of  a  new  attempt  on  the 
lives  of  the  Soviet  leaders,  will  be  published  later.2 

1  The  text  is  taken  from  the  Weekly  of  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary 
Commission  (No.  i),  Moscow,  September  21,  1918.  The  translation 
used  is  that  published  by  the  U.  S.  Department  of  State.  It  has 
been  verified. 

2  Desiring  to  confine  the  evidence  here  strictly  to  Bolshevist  sources, 
I  have  passed  over  much  testimony  by  well-known  Socialists-Revolu- 
tionists, Social  Democrats,  and  others.  Because  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  have  the  item  referring  to  the  retaliatory  massacre  in 
Petrograd  satisfactorily  verified,  I  introduce  here,  by  way  of  corrobo- 
ration, a  statement  by  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  leader,  Eugene 
Trupp,  published  in  the  organ  of  the  Socialists-Revolutionists,  Zemlia  i 
Folia,  October  3,  1918: 

"After   the   murder  of  Uritzky  in   Petrograd    1,500   people  were 
arrested;     512,    including    10    Socialists-Revolutionists,    were    shot. 
At  the  same  time  800  people  were  arrested  in  Moscow.     It  is  unknown, 
however,  how  many  of  these  were  shot.     In  Nizhni-Novgorod, 
were  shot;  in  Jaroslavl,  13;  in  Astrakhan,  12  Socialists-Revolutionists 


41 

ts;      /    ^ 


104  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Two  days  later,  September  5,  191 8,  a  single 
column  of  lzvestia  contained  the  following  para- 
graphs, headed  "Latest  News": 

Arrest  of  Right  Socialists-Revolutionaries 

At  the  present  moment  the  ward  extraordinary  com- 
missioners are  making  mass  arrests  of  Right  Socialists- 
Revolutionaries,  since  it  has  become  clear  that  this 
party  is  responsible  for  the  recent  acts  of  terrorism 
(attempt  on  life  of  Comrade  Lenin  and  the  murder  of 
Uritzky),  which  were  carried  out  according  to  a  definitely 
elaborated  program. 

Arrest  of  a  Priest 

For  an  anti-Soviet  sermon  preached  from  the  church 
pulpit,  the  Priest  Molot  has  been  arrested  and  turned 
over  to  the  counter-revolutionary  section  of  the  AH- 
Russian  Extraordinary  Commission. 

Struggle  Against  Counter-Revolutionaries 

We  have  received  the  following  telegram  from  the 
president  of  the  Front  Extraordinary  Commission, 
Comrade  Latsis:  "The  Extraordinary  Commission  of 
the  Front  had  shot  in  the  district  of  Ardatov,  for  anti- 
Soviet  agitation,  4  peasants,  and  sent  to  a  concentration 
camp  32  officers. 

"At  Arzamas  were  shot  three  champions  of  the 
Tsarist  regime,  and  one  peasant-exploiter,  and  14  officers 
were  sent  to  the  concentration  camp  for  anti-Soviet 
agitation. " 

in  Sarapool,  a  member  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  party  of 
Socialists-Revolutionists,  I.  I.  Teterin;    in  Penza,  about  40  officers." 
See  also  the  corroboration  of  this  incident  quoted  from  the  Weekly 
Journal  of  the  Extraordinary  Commission,  on  p.  171. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  165 

House  Committee  Fined 

For  failure  to  execute  the  orders  of  the  dwelling  section 
of  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission,  the  house 
committee  at  42,  Pokrovka,  has  been  fined  20,000  rubles. 

This  fine  is  a  punishment  for  failure  to  remove  from 
the  house  register  the  name  of  the  well-known  Cadet 
Astrov,  who  disappeared  three  months  ago. 

All  the  movable  property  of  Astrov  has  been  con- 
fiscated. 

The  Arrest  of  Speculators 

On  September  3d  members  of  the  Section  to  Combat 
Speculation  of  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commis- 
sion arrested  Citizen  Pitkevich,  who  was  trying  to  buy 
125  food-cards  at  20  rubles  each.  A  search  was  made  in 
the  apartment  of  Pitkevich,  which  revealed  a  store  of 
such  cards  bearing  official  stamps. 

This  section  also  arrested  a  certain  Bosh,  who  was 
speculating  in  cocaine  brought  from  Pskov. 

On  September  5,  191S,  the  Council  of  the  People's 
Commissaries  ordered  that  the  names  of  persons 
shot  by  order  of  the  Extraordinary  Commission 
should  be  published,  with  full  particulars  of  their 
cases,  a  decision  which  was  flouted  by  the  Extraor- 
dinary Commission,  as  we  shall  see.  The  resolu- 
tion of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries  was 
published  in  the  Severnaya  Communa,  evening  edi- 
tion, November  9,  1918,  and  reads  as  follows: 

The  Council  of  the  People's  Commissaries,  having 
considered  the  report  of  the  chairman  of  the  Extraor- 
dinary Commission,  finds  that  under  the  existing  con- 
ditions it  is  most  necessary  to  secure  the  safety  of  the 


166  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

rear  by  means  of  terror.  All  persons  belonging  to  the 
White  Guard  organizations  or  involved  in  conspiracies 
and  rebellion  are  to  be  shot.  Their  names  and  the  par- 
ticulars of  their  cases  are  to  be  published. 

On  September  10,  191 8,  the  Severnaya  Communa 
published  in  its  news  columns  the  two  following 
despatches: 

Jaroslayl,  September  gih. — In  the  whole  of  the 
Jaroslavl  Government  a  strict  registration  of  the  bour- 
geoisie and  its  partizans  has  been  organized.  Mani- 
festly anti-Soviet  elements  are  being  shot;  suspected 
persons  are  being  interned  in  concentration  camps; 
non-working  sections  of  the  population  are  being  sub- 
jected to  compulsory  labor. 

TyeRj,  September  gth. — The  Extraordinary  Commission 
has  arrested  and  sent  to  concentration  camps  over  130 
hostages  from  among  the  bourgeoisie.  The  prisoners 
include  members  of  the  Cadet  Party,  Socialists-Revo- 
lutionists of  the  Right,  former  officers,  well-known 
members  of  the  propertied  class,  and  policemen. 

Two  days  later,  September  12th,  the  same  journal 
contained  the  following: 

Atkarsk,  September,  nth. — Yesterday  martial  law 
was  proclaimed  in  the  town.  Eight  counter-revolution- 
aries were  shot. 

On  September  18,  191 8,  the  Severnaya  Communa 
published  the  following  evidences  of  the  wide-spread 
character  of  the  terrorism  which  the  Bolsheviki 
were  practising: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  167 

In  Sebesh  a  priest  named  Kikevitch  was  shot  for 
counter-revolutionary  propaganda  and  for  saying  masses 
for  the  late  Nicholas  Romanov. 

In  Astrakhan  the  Extraordinary  Commission  has  shot 

ten  Socialists-Revolutionists  of  the  Right  involved  in  a 
plot  against  the  Soviet  power.  In  Karamyshev  a  priest 
named  LubinofF  and  a  deacon  named  Kvintil  have  been 
shot  for  revolutionary  agitation  against  the  decree  separating 
the  Church  from  the  State  and  for  an  appeal  to  overthrow 
the  Soviet  Government.  In  Perm,  in  retaliation  for  the 
assassination  of  Uritzky  and  for  the  attempt  on  Lenin, 
fifty  hostages  from  among  the  bourgeois  classes  and  the 
White  Guards  were  shot. 

The  shooting  of  innocent  hostages  is  a  peculiarly 
brutal  form  of  terrorism.  When  it  was  practised 
by  the  Germans  during  the  war  the  world  rever- 
berated with  denunciation.  That  the  Bolsheviki 
ever  were  guilty  of  this  crime,  so  much  more  odious 
than  anything  which  can  be  charged  against 
czarism,  has  been  many  times  denied,  but  the 
foregoing  statement  from  one  of  their  most  in- 
fluential official  journals  is  a  complete  refutation 
of  all  such  denials.  Perm  is  more  than  a  thousand 
miles  from  Petrograd,  where  the  assassination  of 
Uritzky  occurred,  and  no  attempt  was  ever  made 
to  show  that  the  fifty  hostages  who  were  shot,  or 
any  of  them,  were  guilty  of  any  complicity  in  the  as- 
sassination. It  was  a  brutal,  malignant  retaliation 
upon  innocent  people  for  a  crime  of  which  they  knew 
nothing.  The  famous  "Decree  No.  903,"  signed  by 
Trotsky,  which  called  for  the  taking  of  hostages  as  a 
means  of  checking  desertions  from  the  Red  Army, 
was  published  in  Izvestia,  September  18,  1918: 


1G8 


THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


? 


Decree  No.  903:  Seeing  the  increasing  number  of 
deserters,  especially  among  the  commanders,  orders  are 
issued  to  arrest  as  hostages  all  the  members  of  the 
family  one  can  lay  hands  on:  father,  mother,  brother, 
sister,  wife,  and  children. 

The  evening  edition  of  Severnaya  Communa, 
September  18,  191 8,  reported  a  meeting  of  the 
Soviet  of  the  first  district  of  Petrograd,  stating  that 
the  following  resolution  had  been  passed: 

The  meeting  welcomes  the  fact  that  mass  terror  is 
being  used  against  the  White  Guards  and  higher  bour- 
geois classes,  and  declares  that  every  attempt  on  the 
life  of  any  of  our  leaders  will  be  answered  by  the  pro- 
letariat by  the  shooting  down  not  only  of  hundreds, 
as  the  case  is  now,  but  of  thousands  of  White  Guards, 
bankers,  manufacturers,  Cadets,  and  Socialists-Revo- 
lutionists of  the  Right. 

On  the  following  day,  September  19th,  the  same 
journal  quoted  Znjp^j^as  saying: 


To  overcome  our  enemies  we  must  have  our  own 
Socialist  Militarism.  We  must  win  over  to  our  side  90 
millions  out  of  the  100  millions  of  population  of  Russia 
under  the  Soviets.     As  for  the  rest,  we  have  nothing  to 

say  to  them;  they  must  be  annihilated. 

* 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  fact 
that  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commissaries 
ordered  that  the  Extraordinary  Commission  pub- 
lish the  names  of  all  persons  sentenced  to  be  shot, 
with   particulars   of  their  cases,   and   the   further 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  109 

fact  that  the  instruction  was  ignored.  It  is  well 
known  that  great  friction  developed  between  the 
Extraordinary  Commissions  and  the  Soviet  power. 
In  many  places  the  Extraordinary  Commissions 
not  only  defied  the  local  Soviets,  but  actually  sup- 
pressed them.  Naturally,  there  was  friction  between 
the  Soviet  power  and  its  creature.  There  were  loud 
protests  on  the  part  of  influential  Bolsheviki,  who 
demanded  that  the  Chresvy  chalk  as  be  curbed  and 
restrained  and  that  the  power  to  inflict  the  death 
penalty  be  taken  from  them.  That  is  why  the 
resolution  of  September  5th,  already  quoted,  was 
passed.  Nevertheless,  in  practice  secrecy  was  very 
generally  observed.  Trials  took  place  in  secret  and 
there  was  no  publication,  in  many  instances,  of 
results.  Reporting  a  meeting  of  the  Executive. 
Committee  of  the  Moscow  Soviet,  which  took  place 
on  October  16,  1918,  Izvestia,  the  official  Bolshevist 
organ,  contained  the  following  in  its  issue  of  the 
next  day: 

The  report  of  the  work  of  the  All-Russian  Extraor- 
dinary Commission  was  read  at  a  secret  session  of  the 
Executive  Committee.  But  the  report  and  the  discussion 
of  it  were  held  behind  closed  doors  and  will  not  be  pub- 
lished. After  a  debate  the  doors  of  the  Session  Hall 
were  thrown  open. 

From  an  article  in  the  Severnaya  Communa, 
October  17,  19 18,  we  learn  that  the  Extraordinary 
Commission  "has  registered  2,559  counter-revolu- 
tionary affairs  and  5,000  arrests  have  been  made"; 
that  "at  Kronstadt  there  have  been  1,130  hostages. 
Only  183  people  are  left;    500  have  been  shot." 


170  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Under  the  heading,  "The  Conference  of  the  Ex- 
traordinary Commission,"  Izvestia  of  October  19, 
191 8,  printed  the  following  paragraph: 

Petrograd,  October  17th. — At  to-day's  meeting  of  the 
Conference  of  the  Extraordinary  Investigating  Com- 
mission, Comrades  Moros  and  Baky  read  reports  giving 
an  account  of  the  activities  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission in  Petrograd  and  Moscow.  Comrade  Baky 
threw  light  on  the  work  of  the  district  commission  of 
Petrograd  after  the  departure  of  the  All-Russian  Ex- 
traordinary Commission  for  Moscow.  The  total  number 
of  people  arrested  by  the  Extraordinary  Commission 
amounted  to  6,220.    Eight  hundred  -people  werd  shot. 

On  November  5,  191 8,  Izvestia  said: 

A  riot  occurred  in  the  Kirsanoff  district.  The  rioters 
shouted,  "Down  with  the  Soviets."  They  dissolved  the 
Soviet  and  Committee  of  the  Village  Poor.  The  riot 
was  suppressed  by  a  detachment  of  Soviet  troops.  Six 
ringleaders  were  shot.    The  case  is  under  examination. 

The  Weekly  Journal  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
missions to  Combat  Counter-Revolution  is,  as  the 
name  implies,  the  official  organ  in  which  the  proc- 
lamations and  reports  of  these  Extraordinary  Com- 
missions are  published.  It  is  popularly  nicknamed 
"The  Hangmen's  Journal."  The  issue  of  October 
6,  1918  (No.  3),  contains  the  following: 

We  decided  to  make  it  a  real,  not  a  paper  terror. 
In  many  cities  there  took  place,  accordingly,  mass  shoot- 
ings of  hostages,  and  it  is  well  that  they  did.  In  such 
business  half-measures  are  worse  than  none. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  171 

Another  issue  (No.  5),  dated  October  20,  1918, 
says: 

Upon  the  decision  of  the  Petrograd  Extraordinary 
Commission,  500  hostages  were  shot. 

These  are  typical  extracts:  it  would  be  possible  to 
quote  from  this  journal  whole  pages  quite  similar 
to  them. 

How  closely  the  Extraordinary  Commissions 
copied  the  methods  of  the  Czar's  secret  police 
system  can  be  judged  from  a  paragraph  that  ap- 
peared in  the  Severnaya  Communa,  October  17,  191 8 : 

The  Extraordinary  Commission  has  organized  the 
placing  of  police  agents  in  every  part  of  Petrograd. 
The  Commission  has  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  work- 
men exhorting  them  to  inform  the  police  of  all  they 
know.  The  bandits,  both  in  word  and  action,  must  be 
forced  to  recognize  that  the  revolutionary  proletariat 
is  watching  them  strictly. 

Here,  then,  is  a  formidable  array  of  evidence 
from  Bolshevist  sources  of  the  very  highest  author- 
ity. It  is  only  a  part  of  the  whole  volume  of  such 
evidence  that  is  available;  nevertheless,  it  is  suffi- 
cient, overwhelming,  and  conclusive.  If  we  were 
to  draw  upon  the  official  documentary  testimony  of 
the  Socialist  parties  and  groups  opposed  to  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  hundreds  of  pages  of  records  of  Schreck- 
lichkeit,  even  more  brutal  than  anything  here 
quoted,  could  be  easily  compiled.  Much  of  this 
testimony  is  as  reliable  and  entitled  to  as  much 
weight  as  any  of  the  foregoing.     Take,  for  example, 


172  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  statement  of  the  Foreign  Representatives  of  the 
Russian  Social  Democratic  Party  upon  the  shooting 
of  six  young  students  arrested  in  Petrograd:  In 
the  New  York  World,  March  22,  1920,  Mr.  Lincoln 
Eyre  quotes  "Red  Executioner  Peters"  as  saying: 
"We  have  never  yet  passed  the  sentence  of  death 
on  a  foreigner,  although  some  of  them  richly  de- 
served it.  The  few  foreigners  who  have  lost  their 
lives  in  the  Revolution  have  been  killed  in  the 
course  of  a  fight  or  in  some  such  manner."  Shall 
we  not  set  against  that  statement  the  signed  testi- 
mony of  responsible  and  honored  spokesmen  of  the 
Russian  Social  Democratic  Party? 

Three  brothers,  named  Genzelli,  French  citizens, 
were  arrested  and  shot  without  the  formality  of  a 
trial.  They  had  been  officers  in  the  Czar's  army, 
and,  with  three  young  fellow-officers,  Russians, 
were  discovered  at  a  private  gathering,  wearing  the 
shoulder-straps  indicative  of  their  former  military 
rank.  This  was  their  offense.  According  to  a 
statement  issued  by  the  Foreign  Representatives  of 
the  Russian  Social  Democratic  Party,  Lenin  was 
asked  at  Smolny,  "What  is  to  be  done  with  the 
students?"  and  replied,  "Do  with  them  what  you 
like."  The  whole  six  were  shot,  but  it  has  never 
been  possible  to  ascertain  who  issued  the  order  for 
the  execution. 

Another  example:  The  famous  Schastny  case 
throws  a  strong  light  upon  one  very  important 
phase  of  the  Bolshevist  terror.  Shall  we  decline  to 
give  credence  to  Socialists  of  honorable  distinction, 
simply  because  they  are  opposed  to  Bolshevism? 
Here    are   two   well-known    Socialist   writers,   one 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  173 

French  and  the  other  Russian,  long  and  honorably 
identified  with  the  international  Socialist  move- 
ment. Charles  Dumas,  the  French  Socialist,  from 
whose  book1  quotation  has  already  been  made, 
gives  an  account  of  the  Schastny  case  which  vividly 
illustrates  the  brutality  of  the  Bolsheviki: 

The  Schastny  case  is  the  most  detestable  episode  in 
Bolshevist  history.  Its  most  repulsive  feature  is  the 
parody  of  legality  which  the  Bolsheviki  attempt  to 
attach  to  a  case  of  wanton  murder.  Admiral  Schastny 
was  the  commander  of  the  Baltic  Fleet  and  was  put  in 
command  by  the  Bolsheviki  themselves.  Thanks  to 
his  efforts,  the  Russian  war-ships  were  brought  out 
of  Helsingfors  harbor  in  time  to  escape  capture  by  the 
Germans  on  the  eve  of  their  invasion  of  Finland.  In 
general,  it  was  he  who  contributed  largely  to  the  saving 
of  whatever  there  was  left  of  the  Russian  fleet.  His 
political  views  were  so  radical  that  even  the  Bolsheviki 
tolerated  him  in  their  service.  Notwithstanding  all 
this,  he  was  accused  of  complicity  in  a  counter-revo- 
lutionary plot  and  haled  before  a  tribunal.  In  vain  did 
the  judge  search  for  a  shred  of  proof  of  his  guilt.  Only 
one  witness  appeared  against  him — Trotsky — who  de- 
livered an  impassioned  harangue  full  of  venom  and 
malice.  Admiral  Schastny  implored  the  court  to  allow 
witnesses  for  the  defense  to  testify,  but  the  judges  de- 
creed that  his  request  was  sheer  treason.  Thereupon 
the  witnesses  who  were  prevented  from  appearing  in 
court  forwarded  their  testimony  in  writing,  but  the 
court  decided  not  to  read  their  communication.  After 
a  simulated  consultation,  Schastny  was  condemned  to 
die — a  verdict  which  later  stirred  even  Krylenko,  one 

1  La   Virile  sur  les  Bolsheviki,  par  Charles  Dumas,   Paris,   IQIQ. 
12 


174  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  his  accusers,  to  say:  "That  was  not  a  death  sentence 
— that  was  a  summary  shooting!" 

The  verdict  was  to  be  carried  out  in  twenty-four  hours. 
This  aroused  the  ire  of  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  of  the 
Left,  who  at  that  time  were  represented  in  the  People's 
Commissariat,  and  they  immediately  forwarded,  in  the 
name  of  their  party,  a  sharp  protest  against  the  official 
confirmation  of  the  death  sentence.  The  Commissaries, 
in  reply,  ordered  the  immediate  shooting  of  Schastny. 

Apparently  Schastny  was  subjected  to  torture  before 
his  death.  He  was  killed  without  witnesses,  without  a 
priest,  and  even  his  lawyer  was  not  notified  of  the  hour 
of  his  execution.  When  his  family  demanded  the  sur- 
render of  his  body  to  them,  it  was  denied.  What,  if 
otherwise,  did  the  Bolsheviki  fear,  and  why  did  they 
so  assiduously  conceal  the  body  of  the  dead  admiral? 
The  same  occurred  after  the  execution  of  Fanny  Royd, 
who  shot  at  Lenin.  There  is  also  indisputable  evidence 
that  the  Bolsheviki  are  resorting  to  torture  at  inquests. 
The  assassin  of  Commissary  Uritzky  (whose  family, 
by  the  way,  was  entirely  wiped  out  by  the  Bolsheviki 
as  a  matter  of  principle,  without  even  the  claim  that 
they  knew  anything  about  the  planned  attempt)  was 
tortured  by  his  executioners  in  the  Fortress  of  St.  Peter 
and  Paul. 

In  the  modern  revolutionary  movement  of  Rus- 
sia few  men  have  served  with  greater  distinction 
than  L.  Martov,  and  none  with  greater  disinter- 
estedness. His  account  of  the  Schastny  trial  is 
vibrant  with  the  passionate  hatred  of  tyranny  and 
oppression  characteristic  of  his  whole  career: 

He  was  accused  of  conspiring  against  the  Soviet  power. 
Captain   Schastny  denied   it.     He   asked   the  tribunal 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  175 

to  hear  witnesses,  including  Bolshevist  commissaries, 
who  had  been  appointed  to  watch  him.  Who  was  better 
qualified  to  state  whether  he  had  really  conspired  against 
the  Soviet  power? 

The  tribunal  refused  to  hear  witnesses.  Refused  what 
every  court  in  the  world,  except  Stolypin's  field  court 
martials,  recognized  the  worst  criminal  entitled  to. 

A  man's  life  was  at  stake,  the  life  of  a  man  who  had 
won  the  love  and  confidence  of  his  subordinates,  the 
sailors  of  the  Baltic  Fleet,  who  protested  against  the 
captain's  arrest.  The  life  of  a  man  who  had  performed 
a  marvelous  feat!  He  had  somehow  managed  to  take 
out  of  Helsingfors  harbor  all  the  ships  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet,  and  had  thus  saved  them  from  capture  by  the 
Finnish  Whites. 

It  was  not  the  enraged  Finnish  Whites,  nor  the  German 
Imperialists,  who  shot  this  man.  He  was  put  to  death 
by  men  who  call  themselves  Russian  Communists — by 
Messrs.  MedvedefF,  Bruno,  Karelin,  Veselovski,  Peter- 
son, members  of  the  Supreme  Revolutionary  Tribunal. 

Captain  Schastny  was  refused  the  exercise  of  the  right 
to  which  every  thief  or  murderer  is  entitled — i.  e.,  to 
call  in  witnesses  for  the  defense.  But  the  witness  for 
the  prosecution  was  heard.  This  witness  was  Trotsky, 
Trotsky,  who,  as  Commissary  for  War  and  Naval  Affairs, 
had  arrested  Captain  Schastny. 

At  the  hearing  of  the  case  by  the  tribunal,  Trotsky 
acted,  not  as  a  witness,  but  as  a  prosecutor.  As  a  prose- 
cutor he  declared,  "This  man  is  guilty;  you  must  con- 
demn him!"  And  Trotsky  did  it  after  having  gagged  the 
prisoner  by  refusing  to  call  in  witnesses  who  might  refute 
the  accusations  brought  against  him. 

Not  much  valor  is  required  to  fight  a  man  who  has 
been  gagged  and  whose  hands  are  tied,  nor  much  hon- 
esty or  loftiness  of  character. 

It  was  not  a  trial;  it  was  a  farce.    There  was  no  jury. 


176  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

The  judges  were  officials  dependent  upon  the  authorities, 
receiving  their  salaries  from  the  hands  of  Trotsky  and 
other  People's  Commissaries.  And  this  mockery  of  a 
court  passed  the  death  sentence,  which  was  hurriedly 
carried  out  before  the  people,  who  were  profoundly 
shaken  by  this  order  to  kill  an  innocent  man,  could  do 
anything  to  save  him. 

Under  Nicholas  Romanov  one  could  sometimes  stop 
the  carrying  out  of  a  monstrously  cruel  sentence  and 
thus  pull  the  victim  out  of  the  executioner's  hands. 

Under  Vladimir  Ulianov  this  is  impossible.  The 
Bolshevist  leaders  slept  peacefully  when,  under  the  cover 
of  night,  the  first  victim  of  their  tribunal  was  stealthily 
being  killed. 

No  one  knew  who  murdered  Schastny  or  how  he  was 
murdered.  As  under  the  Czars,  the  executioners'  names 
are  concealed  from  the  people.  No  one  knows  whether 
Trotsky  himself  came  to  the  place  of  the  execution  to 
watch  and  direct  it. 

Perhaps  he,  too,  slept  peacefully  and  saw  in  his  dreams 
the  proletariat  of  the  whole  world  hailing  him  as  the 
liberator  of  mankind,  as  the  leader  of  the  universal 
revolution. 

In  the  name  of  Socialism,  in  thy  name,  O  proletariat, 
blind  madmen  and  vainglorious  fools  staged  this  ap- 
palling farce  of  cold-blooded  murder. 

The  evidence  we  have  cited  from  Bolshevist 
sources  proves  conclusively  that  the  Red  Terror  was 
far  from  being  the  unimportant  episode  it  is 
frequently  represented  to  have  been  by  pro- 
Bolshevist  writers.  It  effectually  disposes  of  the 
assiduously  circulated  myth  that  the  Extraordinary 
Commissions  were  for  the  most  part  concerned  with 
the  suppression  of  robbery,  crimes  of  violence,  and 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  177 

illegal  speculation,  and  that  only  in  a  few  excep- 
tional instances  did  they  use  their  powers  to  sup- 
press anti-Bolshevist  propaganda.  The  evidence 
makes  it  quite  clear  that  from  the  early  days  of  the 
Bolshevist  regime  until  November,  191 8,  at  least, 
an  extraordinary  degree  of  terrorism  prevailed 
throughout  Soviet  Russia.  According  to  a  report 
published  by  the  Ail-Russian  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission in  February  of  the  present  year,  not  less 
than  6,185  persons  were  executed  in  1918  and 
3,456  in  1919,  a  total  of  9,641  in  Moscow  and 
Petrograd  alone.  Of  the  total  number  for  the  two 
years,  7,068  persons  were  shot  for  counter-revolu- 
tionary activities,  63 1  for  crimes  in  office — embezzle- 
ment, corruption,  and  so  on — 217  for  speculation 
and  profiteering,  and  1,204  f°r  a^  other  classes  of 
crime. 

That  these  figures  understate  the  extent  of  the 
Red  Terror  is  certain.  In  the  first  place,  the  report 
covers  only  the  work  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
missions of  Moscow  and  Petrograd.  The  numerous 
District  Extraordinary  Commissions  are  not  re- 
ported on.  In  the  next  place,  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  many  of  the  reports  of  the  Extraordi- 
nary Commissions  were  falsified  in  order  not  to 
create  too  bad  an  impression.  Quite  frequently,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  number  of  victims  reported  by 
the  Chresvychaikas  was  less  than  the  number  act- 
ually known  to  have  been  killed.  Moreover,  the 
figures  given  refer  only  to  the  victims  of  the 
Extraordinary  Commissions,  and  do  not  include 
those  sentenced  to  death  by  the  other  revolutionary 
tribunals.     The  9,641    executions — even  if  we  ac- 


178  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

cept  the  figures  as  full  and  complete — refer  only 
to  the  victims  of  the  Moscow  and  Petrograd 
Chresvychaikas,  men  and  women  put  to  death  with- 
out anything  like  a  trial.1  When  to  these  figures 
there  shall  be  added  the  victims  of  all  the  District 
Extraordinary  Commissions  and  of  all  the  other 
revolutionary  tribunals,  the  real  meaning  of  the 
Red  Terror  will  begin  to  appear.  But  even  that 
will  not  give  us  the  real  measure  of  the  Red  Terror, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  the  many  thousands  of 
peasants  and  workmen  who  have  been  slain  in 
the  numerous  uprisings,  frequently  taking  on  the 
character  of  pitched  battles  between  armed  masses 
and  detachments  of  Soviet  troops,  are  not  in- 
cluded. 

The  naive  and  impressionable  Mr.  Goode  says 
of  the  judicial  system  of  Soviet  Russia:  "Its  chief 
quality  would  seem  to  be  a  certain  simplicity.  By 
a  stroke  of  irony  the  people's  courts  aim  not  only 
at  punishment  of  evil,  but  also  at  reformation  of  the 
wrongdoer!  A  first  offender  is  set  free  on  condition 
that  he  must  not  fall  again.  Should  he  do  so,  he 
pays  the  penalty  of  his  second  offense  together  with 
that  to  which  his  first  crime  rendered  him  liable."  2 
That  Mr.  Goode  should  be  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
such  humane  measures  were  not  unknown  or  un- 
common in  the  administration  of  justice  by  the 
ordinary  criminal  courts  under  czarism  is  perhaps 
not  surprising.  It  is  somewhat  surprising,  how- 
ever, that  he  should  write  as  though  the  Soviet 


1  The  figures  are  taken  from  Russkoe  Delo  (Prague),  March  4,  1920. 

2  Bolshevism  at  Work,  by  William  T.  Goode,  pp.  96-97. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  179 

courts  have  made  a  distinct  advance  in  penology. 
Has  he  never  heard  of  the  First  Offenders  Act  in 
his  own  country,  or  of  our  extensive  system  of 
suspended  sentences,  parole,  probation,  and  so  on? 
It  is  not  necessary  to  deny  Mr.  Goode's  statement, 
or  even  to  question  it.  As  a  commentary  upon  it, 
the  following  article  from  Severnaya  Communa,  De- 
cember 4,  1918,  is  sufficient: 

It  is  impossible  to  continue  silent.  It  has  constantly 
been  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Viborg  Soviet 
(Petrograd)  of  the  terrible  state  of  affairs  existing  in  the 
city  prisons.  That  people  all  the  time  are  dying  there 
of  hunger;  that  people  are  detained  six  and  eight  months 
without  examination,  and  that  in  many  cases  it  is  impossible 
to  learn  why  they  have  been  arrested,  owing  to  officials  being 
changed,  departments  closed,  and  documents  lost.  In  order 
to  confirm,  or  otherwise,  these  rumors,  the  Soviet  de- 
cided to  send  on  the  3d  November  a  commission  con- 
sisting of  the  president  of  the  Soviet,  the  district  medical 
officer,  and  district  military  commissar,  to  visit  and 
report  on  the  "Kresti"  prison.  Comrades!  What  they 
saw  and  what  they  heard  from  the  imprisoned  is  im- 
possible to  describe.  Not  only  were  all  rumors  con- 
firmed, but  conditions  were  actually  found  much  worse 
than  had  been  stated.  I  was  pained  and  ashamed. 
I  myself  was  imprisoned  under  czardom  in  that  same 
prison.  Then  all  was  clean,  and  prisoners  had  clean 
linen  twice  a  month.  Now,  not  only  are  prisoners  left 
without  clean  linen,  but  many  are  even  without  blankets, 
and,  as  in  the  past,  for  a  trifling  offense  they  are  placed 
in  solitary  confinement  in  cold,  dark  cells.  But  the  most 
terrible  sights  we  saw  were  in  the  sick-bays.  Comrades, 
there  we  saw  living  dead  who  hardly  had  strength  enough 
to  whisper  their  complaints  that  they  were  dying  of 


ISO  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

hunger.  In  one  ward,  among  the  sick  a  corpse  had 
lain  for  several  hours,  whose  neighbors  managed  to 
murmur,  "Of  hunger  he  died,  and  soon  of  hunger  we 
shall  all  die."  Comrades,  among  them  are  many  who 
are  quite  young,  who  wish  to  live  and  see  the  sunshine. 
If  we  really  possess  a  workmen's  government  such 
things  should  not  be. 

Following  the  example  of  Mr.  Arthur  Ransome, 
many  pro-Bolshevist  writers  have  assured  us  that 
after  1918  the  Red  Terror  practically  ceased  to 
exist.  Mr.  Ransome  makes  a  great  deal  of  the 
fact  that  in  February,  191 9,  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  the  People's  Commissaries  "definitely 
limited  the  powers  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission." x  Although  he  seems  to  have  attended 
the  meeting  at  which  this  was  done,  and  talks  of 
"the  bitter  struggle  within  the  party  for  and 
against  the  almost  dictatorial  powers  of  the  Ex- 
traordinary Committee,"  he  appears  not  to  have 
understood  what  was  done.  Perhaps  it  ought  not 
to  be  expected  that  this  writer  of  fairy-stories  who 
so  naively  confesses  his  ignorance  of  "economics" 
should  comprehend  the  revolutionary  struggle  in 
Russia.  Be  that  how  it  may,  he  does  not  state 
accurately  what  happened.  He  says:  "Therefore 
the  right  of  sentencing  was  removed  from  the  Ex- 
traordinary Commission;  but  if,  through  unfore- 
seen circumstances,  the  old  conditions  should 
return,  they  intended  that  the  dictatorial  powers 
of  the  Commission  should  be  returned  to  it  until 
those  conditions  had  ceased."  Actually  the  de- 
cision was  that  the  power  to  inflict  the  death  penalty 

1  Russia  in  1919,  by  Arthur  Ransome,  pp.   108-114. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  181 

should  be  taken  from  the  Extraordinary  Commis- 
sions, except  where  and  when  martial  law  existed. 
When  Krylenko,  Diakonov,  and  others  protested 
against  the  outrage  of  permitting  the  Extraordinary 
Commissions  to  execute  people  without  proof  of 
their  guilt,  Izvestia  answered  in  words  which  clearly 
reveal  the  desperate  and  brutal  spirit  of  Bolshe- 
vism :  "  //  among  one  hundred  executed  one  was  guilty, 
this  would  be  satisfactory  and  would  sanction  the 
action  of  the  Commission." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  resolution  which,  accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Ransome,  "definitely  limited  the  powers 
of  the  Extraordinary  Commission,"  was  an  evasion 
of  the  issue.  Not  only  was  martial  law  in  existence 
in  the  principal  cities,  and  not  only  was  it  easy  to 
declare  martial  law  anywhere  in  Soviet  Russia,  but 
it  was  a  very  easy  matter  for  accused  persons  to  be 
brought  to  Moscow  or  Petrograd  and  there  sen- 
tenced by  the  Extraordinary  Commission.  This 
zuas  actually  done  in  many  cases  after  the  February 
decision.  Mr.  Ransome  quotes  Dzerzhinsky  to  the 
effect  that  criminality  had  been  greatly  decreased 
by  the  Extraordinary  Commissions — in  Moscow  by 
80  per  cent.! — and  that  there  was  now,  February, 
1919,  no  longer  danger  of  "large  scale  revolts." 
What  a  pity  that  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary 
Commission  did  not  consult  Mr.  Ransome  before 
publishing  its  report  in  February  of  this  year! 
That  report  shows,  first,  that  in  1919  the  activi- 
ties of  the  Extraordinary  Commission  were  much 
greater  than  in  1918;  second,  that  the  number  of 
arrests  made  in  1919  was  80,662  as  against  46,348 
in  1918;  third,  that  in  1919  the  arrests  of  "ordinary 


182  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

criminals"  nearly  equaled  the  total  number  of  ar- 
rests made  in  1918/or  all  causes,  including  counter- 
revolutionary activity,  speculation,  crimes  in  office, 
and  general  crime.  The  figures  given  in  the  report 
are:  arrests  for  ordinary  crimes  only  in  1919,  39,957; 
arrests  for  all  causes  in  191 8,  47,348.  When  it  is 
remembered  that  all  the  other  revolutionary  tri- 
bunals were  active  throughout  this  period,  how  shall 
we  reconcile  this  record  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission with  Mr.  Ransome's  account?  The  fact  is 
that  crime  steadily  increased  throughout  1919,  and 
that  at  the  very  time  Mr.  Ransome  was  in  Moscow 
conditions  there  were  exceedingly  bad,  as  the  report  of 
arrests  and  convictions  shows. 

Terrorism  continued  in  Russia  throughout  1919, 
the  rose-colored  reports  of  specially  coached  corre- 
spondents to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  There 
was,  indeed,  a  period  in  the  early  summer  when 
the  rigors  of  the  Red  Terror  were  somewhat  re- 
laxed. This  seems  to  have  been  connected  with  the 
return  of  the  bourgeois  specialists  to  the  factories 
and  the  officers  of  the  Czar's  army  to  positions  of 
importance  in  the  Red  Army.  This  could  not  fail 
to  lessen  the  persecution  of  the  bourgeoisie,  at 
least  for  a  time.  In  July  the  number  of  arrests 
made  by  the  Extraordinary  Commission  was  small, 
only  4,301;  in  November  it  reached  the  high  level 
of  14,673.  To  those  who  claim  that  terrorism 
did  not  exist  in  Russia  during  1919,  the  best  answer 
is — this  very  illuminating  official  Bolshevist  report. 

On  January  10,  1919,  Iwestia  published  an  article 
by  Trotsky  in  which  the  leader  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  Soviet  Republic  dealt  with  the  subject 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  183 

of  terrorism.  This  was,  of  course,  in  advance  of 
the  meeting  which  Mr.  Ransome  so  completely 
misunderstood.     Trotsky  said: 

By  its  terror  against  saboteurs  the  proletariat  does  not 
at  all  say,  "I  shall  wipe  out  all  of  you  and  get  along 
without  specialists."  Such  a  program  would  be  a  pro- 
gram of  hopelessness  and  ruin.  While  dispersing,  ar- 
resting, and  shooting  saboteurs  and  conspirators,  the  pro- 
letariat says,  "/  shall  break  your  will,  because  my  will 
is  stronger  than  yours,  and  I  shall  force  you  to  serve  me" 
Terror  as  the  demonstration  of  the  will  and  strength 
of  the  working-class  is  historically  justified,  precisely 
because  the  proletariat  was  able  thereby  to  break  the 
will  of  the  Intelligentsia,  pacify  the  professional  men  of 
various  categories  and  work,  and  gradually  subordinate 
them  to  its  own  aims  within  the  fields  of  their  specialties. 

On  April  2,  1919,  Izvestia  published  a  proclama- 
tion by  Dzerzhinsky,  president  of  the  All-Russian 
Extraordinary  Commission,  warning  that  "demon- 
strations and  appeals  of  any  kind  will  be  suppressed 
without  pity": 

In  view  of  the  discovery  of  a  conspiracy  which  aimed 
to  organize  an  armed  demonstration  against  the  Soviet 
authority  by  means  of  explosions,  destruction  of  railways, 
and  fires,  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission 
warns  that  demonstrations  and  appeals  of  any  kind 
will  be  suppressed  without  pity.  In  order  to  save  Petro- 
grad  and  Moscow  from  famine,  in  order  to  save  hundreds 
and  thousands  of  innocent  victims,  the  All-Russian 
Extraordinary  Commission  will  be  obliged  to  take  the 
most  severe  measures  of  punishment  against  all  who  will 


184  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

appeal  for  White  Guard  demonstration  or  for  attempts 
at  armed  uprising. 

[Signed]     F.  Dzerzhinsky, 
President  of  the  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission. 

The  Severnaya  Communa  of  April  2,  1919,  con- 
tains an  official  report  of  the  shooting  by  the 
Petrograd  Extraordinary  Commission  of  a  printer 
named  Michael  Ivanovsky  "for  the  printing  of 
proclamations  issued  by  the  Socialists-Revolutionists 
of  the  Left."  Later  several  Socialists-Revolution- 
ists, among  them  Soronov,  were  shot  "for  having 
proclamations  and  appeals  in  their  possession." 

On  May  1,  1919,  the  Izvestia  of  Odessa,  official 
organ  of  the  Soviet  in  that  city,  published  the  follow- 
ing account  of  the  infliction  of  the  death  penalty 
for  belonging  to  an  organization.     It  said: 

The  Special  Branch  of  the  Staff  of  the  Third  Army 
has  uncovered  the  existence  of  an  organization,  the 
Union  of  the  Russian  People,  now  calling  itself  "the 
Russian  Union  for  the  People  and  the  State."  The 
entire  committee  was  arrested. 

After  giving  the  names  of  those  arrested  the  ac- 
count continued: 

The  case  of  those  arrested  was  transferred  to  the 
Military  Tribunal  of  the  Soviet  of  the  Third  Army. 
Owing  to  the  obvious  activity  of  the  members  of  the 
Union  directed  against  the  peaceful  population  and  the 
conquests  of  the  Revolution,  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal 
decided  to  sentence  the  above-mentioned  persons  to 
death.     The  verdict  was  carried  out  on  the  same  night. 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  185 

On  May  6,  1919,  Severnaya  Communa  published 
the  following  order  from  the  Defense  Committee : 

Order  No.  8  of  the  Defense  Committee.  The  Ex- 
traordinary Commission  for  Combating  Counter-Revo- 
lution  is  to  take  measures  to  suppress  all  forms  of  official 
crime,  and  not  to  hesitate  at  shooting  the  guilty.  The 
Extraordinary  Committee  is  bound  to  indict  not  only 
those  who  are  guilty  of  active  crime,  but  also  those  who 
are  guilty  of  inaction  of  authority  or  condonement  of 
crime,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  punishment  must  be 
increased  in  proportion  to  the  responsibility  attached 
to  the  post  filled  by  the  guilty  official. 

On  May  14,  1919,  Izvestia  published  an  article  by 
a  Bolshevist  official  describing  what  happened  in 
the  Volga  district  as  the  Bolsheviki  advanced. 
This  article  is  important  because  it  calls  attention 
to  a  form  of  terrorism  not  heretofore  mentioned: 
it  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  latter  part  of  191 8 
the  Bolsheviki  introduced  the  system  of  rationing 
out  food  upon  class  lines,  giving  to  the  Red  Army 
three  times  as  much  food  per  capita  as  to  the 
average  of  the  civil  population,  and  dividing  the 
latter  into  categories.  The  article  under  considera- 
tion shows  very  clearly  how  this  system  was  made 
an  instrument  of  terrorism: 

Instructions  were  received  from  Moscow  to  forbid 
free  trade,  and  to  introduce  the  class  system  of  feeding. 
After  much  confusion,  this  made  the  population  starve 
in  a  short  time,  and  rebel  against  the  food  dictatorship. 
.  .  .  "Was  it  necessary  to  introduce  the  class  system 
of  feeding    into    the   Volga    district    so    haphazardly?" 


186  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

asks  the  writer.  "Oh  no.  There  was  enough  bread  ready 
for  shipment  in  that  region,  and  in  many  places  it  was 
rotting,,  because  of  the  lack  of  railroad  facilities.  The 
class-feeding  system  did  not  increase  the  amount  of 
bread.  ...  It  did  create,  together  with  the  inefficient 
policy,  and  the  lack  of  a  distribution  system,  a  state  of 
starvation,  which  provoked  dissatisfaction." 

Throughout  1919  the  official  Bolshevist  press 
continued  to  publish  accounts  of  the  arrest  of 
hostages.  Thus  Izvestia  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet 
of  Workmen's  and  Red  Army  Deputies  (No.  185), 
August  16,  1919,  published  an  official  order  by  the 
acting  Commandant  of  the  fortified  district  of 
Petrograd,  a  Bolshevist  official  named  Kozlovsky. 
The  two  closing  paragraphs  of  this  order  follow: 

I  declare  that  all  guilty  of  arson,  also  all  those  who 
have  knowledge  of  the  same  and  fail  to  report  the  cul- 
prits to  the  authorities,  will  be  shot  forthwith. 

I  warn  all  that  in  the  event  of  repeated  cases  of  arson 
I  will  not  hesitate  to  adopt  extreme  measures,  including 
the  shooting  of  the  bourgeoisie's  hostages,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  all  the  White  Guards'  plots  directed  against 
the  proletarian  state  must  be  regarded  not  as  the  crime 
of  individuals,  but  as  the  offense  of  the  entire  enemy  class. 

That  hostages  were  actually  shot,  and  not  merely 
held  under  arrest,  is  clearly  stated  in  the  Severnaya 
Communa,  March  11,  1919: 

By  order  of  the  Military  Revolutionary  Committee 
of  Petrograd  several  officers  were  shot  for  spreading  un- 
true rumors  that  the  Soviet  authority  had  lost  the  confidence 
of  the  people. 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  187 

All  relatives  of  the  officers  of  the  86th  Infantry  Regiment 
{which  deserted  to  the  Whites)  were  shot. 

The  same  journal  published,  September  2,  1919, 
the  following  decree  of  the  War  Council  of  the 
Petrograd  Fortified  District: 

It  has  been  ascertained  that  on  the  17th  of  August 
there  was  maliciously  cut  down  in  the  territory  of  the 
Ovtzenskaya  Colony  about  200  sazhensks  of  telegraph 
and  telephone  wire.  In  consequence  of  the  above- 
mentioned  criminal  offense,  the  War  Council  of  the 
Petrograd  Fortified  District  has  ordered — 

(1)  To  impose  on  the  Ovtzenskaya  Colony  a  fine  of 
500,000  rubles;  (2)  the  guarding  of  the  intactness  of  the 
lines  to  be  made  incumbent  upon  the  population  under 
reciprocal  responsibility;  and  (3)  hostages  to  be  taken. 

Note:  The  decree  of  the  War  Council  was  carried 
out  on  the  30th  of  August.  The  following  hostages  have 
been  taken:  Languinen,  P.  M.;  Languinen,  Ya.  P.; 
Finck,  F.  Kh.;  Ikert,  E.  S.;  LunefF,  F.  L.;  Dalinguer, 
P.  M.;  Dalinguer,  P.  Ya.;  Raw,  Ya.  I.;  Shtraw,  V.  M.; 
Afanassieff,  L.  K. 

This  drastic  order  was  issued  and  carried  out 
nearly  a  month  before  the  district  was  declared  to 
be  in  a  state  of  siege. 

The  Krasnaya  Gazetay  November  4,  191 9,  pub- 
lished a  significant  list  of  Red  Army  officers  who 
had  deserted  to  the  Whites  and  of  the  retaliatory 
arrests  of  innocent  members  of  their  families. 
Mothers,  brothers,  sisters,  and  wives  were  arrested 
and  punished  for  the  acts  of  their  relatives  in  de- 
serting the  Red  Army.     The  list  follows: 


1SS  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

1.  Khomutov,  D.  C. —  brother  and  mother 
arrested. 

2.  Piatnitzky,  D.  A. — mother,  sister,  and  brother 
arrested. 

3.  Postnov — mother  and  sister  arrested. 

4.  Agalakov,  A.  M. — wife,  father,  and  mother 
arrested. 

5.  Haratkviech,  B. — wife  and  sister  arrested. 

6.  Kostylev,  V.  I. — wife  and  brother  arrested. 

7.  Smyrnov,  A.  A. — mother,  sister,  and  father 
arrested. 

8.  Chebykin — wife  arrested. 

In  September,  1919,  practically  all  the  Bolshevist 
papers  published  the  following  order,  signed  by 
Trotsky : 

I  have  ordered  several  times  that  officers  with  in- 
definite political  convictions  should  not  be  appointed 
to  military  posts,  especially  when  the  families  of  such 
officers  live  on  the  territory  controlled  by  enemies  of 
the  Soviet  Power.  My  orders  are  not  being  carried 
out.  In  one  of  our  armies  an  officer  whose  family  lives 
on  the  territory  controlled  by  Kolchak  was  appointed 
as  a  commander  of  a  division.  Consequently,  this  com- 
mander betrayed  his  division  and  went  over,  together 
with  his  staff,  to  the  enemy.  Once  more  I  order  the 
Military  Commissaries  to  make  a  thorough  cleansing  of 
all  Commanding  Staffs.  In  case  an  officer  goes  over  to 
the  enemy,  his  family  should  be  made  to  feel  the  conse- 
quences of  his  betrayal. 

Early  in  November,  1919,  the  Petrograd  Extraor- 
dinary Commission  announced  that  by  its  orders 
forty-two  persons  had  been  shot.    A  number  of  these 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  189 

were  ordinary  criminals;  several  others  had  been 
guilty  of  selling  cocaine.  Among  the  other  victims 
we  find  one  Maximovich,  "for  organizing  a  mass  de- 
sertion of  Red  Army  soldiers  to  the  Whites";  one 
Shramchenko,  "for  participating  in  a  counter-revo- 
lutionary conspiracy" ;  E.  K.  Kaulbars,  "for  spying"; 
PloozhnikofF  and  Demeshchenke,  "/or  exciting  the 
politically  unconscious  masses  and  hounding  them  on 
against  the  Soviet  Power." 

In  considering  this  terribly  impressive  accumu- 
lation of  evidence  from  the  Bolshevist  press  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  it  represents  not  the  criticism  of 
a  free  press,  but  only  that  measure  of  truth  which 
managed  to  find  its  way  through  the  most  drastic 
censorship  ever  known  in  any  country  at  any  time. 
Not  only  were  the  organs  of  the  anti-Bolshevist 
Socialists  suppressed,  but  even  the  Soviet  press 
was  not  free  to  publish  the  truth.  Trotsky  himself 
made  vigorous  protest  in  the  Izvestia  of  the  Central 
Executive  Committee  (No.  13)  against  the  censor- 
ship which  "prevented  the  publication  of  the  news 
that  Perm  was  taken  by  the  White  Guards."  A 
congress  of  Soviet  journalists  was  held  at  Moscow, 
in  May,  1919,  and  made  protest  against  the  manner 
in  which  they  were  restrained  from  criticizing  Soviet 
misrule.  The  Izvestia  of  the  Provincial  Executive 
Committee,  May  8,  1919,  quotes  from  this  protest 
as  follows: 

The  picture  of  the  provincial  Soviet  press  is  melancholy 

enough.     We  journalists    are   particularly  "up    against 

it"  when  we  endeavor  to  expose  the  shortcomings  of  the 

local   Soviet   rule   and   the  local   Soviet  officials.     Im- 

13 


190  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

mediately  we  are  met  with  threats  of  arrest  and  banish- 
ment, threats  which  are  often  carried  out.  In  Kaluga  a 
Soviet  editor  was  nearly  shot  for  a  remark  about  a 
drunken  communist. 


Under  such  conditions  as  are  indicated  in  this 
protest  the  evidence  we  have  cited  was  published. 
What  the  record  would  have  been  if  only  there  was 
freedom  for  the  opposition  press  can  only  be 
imagined.  In  the  light  of  such  a  mass  of  authorita- 
tive evidence  furnished  by  the  Bolsheviki  them- 
selves, of  what  use  is  it  for  casual  visitors  to  Russia, 
like  Mr.  Goode  and  Mr.  Lansbury,  for  example,  to 
attempt  to  throw  dust  into  our  eyes  and  make  it 
appear  that  acts  of  terrorism  and  tyranny  are  no 
more  common  in  Russia  than  in  countries  like  Eng- 
land, France,  and  America?  And  how,  in  the  light 
of  such  testimony,  shall  we  explain  the  ecstatic 
praise  of  Bolshevism  and  the  Bolsheviki  by  men 
and  women  who  call  themselves  Socialists  and  Lib- 
erals, and  who  profess  to  love  freedom?  It  is  true 
that  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  has  now 
been  decreed,  the  decree  going  into  effect  on  Janu- 
ary 22,  1920.  Lenin  has  declared  that  this  date 
marks  the  passing  of  the  policy  of  blood,  and  that 
only  a  renewal  of  armed  intervention  by  the  Allies 
can  force  a  return  to  it.  We  shall  see.  This  is 
not  the  first  time  the  death  penalty  has  been 
"  abolished  "  by  decree  during  the  Bolshevist  regime. 
Some  of  us  remember  that  on  November  7,  1918, 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  in  Moscow  de- 
creed the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  and  a 
general  amnesty.     After  that  murder,  by  order  of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  191 

the    Extraordinary   Commissions,  went   on   worse 
than  before.  * 

In  Odessa  an  investigation  was  made  into  the 
workings  of  the  Chresvychaika  and  a  list  of  fifteen 
classes  of  crimes  for  which  the  death  penalty  had 
been  imposed  and  carried  out  was  published.  The 
list  enumerated  various  offenses,  ranging  from 
espionage  and  counter-revolutionary  agitation  to 
"dissoluteness."  The  fifteenth  and  last  class  on 
the  list  read,  "Reasons  unknown."  Perhaps  these 
words  sum  up  the  only  answer  to  our  last  question. 

1  As  proofs  of  these  pages  are  being  revised,  word  comes  that  the 
death  penalty  has  been  revived — Vide  London  Times,  May  26,  1920. 


192  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


F 


VIII 

INDUSTRY  UNDER  SOVIET  CONTROL 

OR  the  student  of  the  evolution  of  Bolshevism 
in  Russia  there  is,  perhaps,  no  task  more 
difficult  than  to  unravel  the  tangled  skein  of  the 
history  of  the  first  few  weeks  after  the  coup  d'etat. 
Whoever  attempts  to  set  forth  the  development  of 
events  during  those  weeks  in  an  ordered  and  con- 
secutive narrative,  and  to  present  an  accurate,  yet 
intelligible,  account  of  the  conditions  that  pre- 
vailed, must  toil  patiently  through  a  bewildering 
snarled  mass  of  conflicting  testimony,  charges  and 
counter-charges,  claims  and  counter-claims.  State- 
ments concerning  apparently  simple  matters  of 
fact,  made  by  witnesses  whose  competence  and 
probity  are  not  to  be  lightly  questioned,  upon 
events  of  which  they  were  witnesses,  are  simply 
irreconcilable.  Moreover,  there  is  a  perfect  wel- 
ter of  sweeping  generalizations  and  an  almost 
complete  lack  of  such  direct  and  definite  informa- 
tion, statistical  and  other,  as  can  readily  be  found 
relating  to  both  the  earlier  and  the  later  stages  of 
the  Revolution. 

Let  us  first  set  down  the  facts  concerning  which 
there  is  substantial  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
partizans  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  the  various  factions 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  193 

opposed  to  them,  ranging  from  the  Constitutional- 
Democrats  to  such  factions  as  the  Socialists- 
Revolutionists  of  the  Left  and  the  "Internation- 
alist" section  of  the  Menshevist  Social  Democrats, 
both  of  which  were  quite  closely  allied  to  the 
Bolsheviki  in  sympathy  and  in  theory.  At  the 
time  when  the  Bolsheviki  raised  the  cry,  "All 
power  to  the  Soviets!"  in  October,  191 7,  arrange- 
ments were  well  under  way  for  the  election,  upon 
the  most  democratic  basis  imaginable,  of  a  great 
representative  constitutional  convention,  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly.  Not  only  had  the  Bolsheviki 
nominated  their  candidates  and  entered  upon  an 
electoral  campaign  in  advocacy  of  their  program; 
not  only  were  they,  in  common  with  all  other 
parties,  pledged  to  the  holding  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly;  much  more  important  is  the  fact  that 
they  professed  to  be,  and  were  by  many  regarded 
as,  the  special  champions  and  defenders  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  solicitous  above  all  else  for 
its  convocation  and  its  integrity.  From  June  on- 
ward Trotsky,  Kamenev,  and  other  Bolshevist 
leaders  had  professed  to  fear  only  that  the  Pro- 
visional Government  would  either  refuse  to  con- 
voke the  Constituent  Assembly  or  in  some  manner 
prevent  its  free  action.  No  small  part  of  the  in- 
fluence possessed  by  the  Bolsheviki  immediately 
prior  to  the  overthrow  of  Kerensky  was  due  to  the 
fact  that,  far  from  being  suspected  of  hostility  to 
the  Constituent  Assembly,  they  were  widely  re- 
garded as  its  most  vigorous  and  determined  up- 
holders. To  confirm  that  belief  the  Council  of  the 
People's  Commissaries  issued  this,  its  first  decree: 


i 


194  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

In  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the  Russian  Re- 
public, chosen  by  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets 
of  Workers'  and  Soldiers'  Deputies  with  participation 
of  peasant  deputies,  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars 
decrees: 

i.  The  elections  for  the  Constituent  Assembly  shall 
take  place  at  the  date  determined  upon — November  12th. 

2.  All  electoral  commissions,  organs  of  local  self- 
government,  Soviets  of  Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants' 
Deputies,  and  soldiers'  organizations  on  the  front  should 
make  every  effort  to  assure  free  and  regular  elections 
at  the  date  determined  upon. 

In  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the  Russian  Re- 
public, 

The  President  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars, 

Vladimir  Ulianov — Lenin. 

That  was  in  November,  191 7 — and  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  has  not  yet  been  convoked.  In 
Pravda,  December  26,  1917,  Lenin  published  a 
series  of  propositions  to  show  that  the  elections, 
which  had  taken  place  since  the  Bolsheviki  as- 
sumed power,  did  not  give  a  clear  indication  of  the 
real  voice  of  the  masses!  The  elections  had  gone 
heavily  against  the  Bolsheviki,  and  that  fact 
doubtless  explains  Lenin's  disingenuous  argument. 
Later  on  Lenin  was  able  to  announce  that  no  as- 
sembly elected  by  the  masses  by  universal  suffrage 
could  be  accepted!  "The  Soviet  Republic  re- 
pudiates the  hypocrisy  of  formal  equality  of  all 
human  beings,"  he  wrote  in  his  Letter  to  American 
Workmen. 

It  is  quite  certain  that  the  political  power  and 
influence  of  the  Soviets  was  never  so  small  at  any 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  195 

time  since  the  birth  of  the  Revolution  in  March 
as  it  was  when  the  Bolsheviki  raised  the  cry,  "All 
power  to  the  Soviets!"  The  reasons  for  this,  if  not 
obvious,  are  easily  intelligible:  the  mere  facts  that 
the  election  of  a  thoroughly  democratic  constitu- 
tional convention  at  an  early  date  was  assured, 
and  that  the  electoral  campaign  had  already  begun, 
were  by  themselves  sufficient  to  cause  many  of 
those  actively  engaged  in  the  revolutionary  struggle 
to  turn  their  interest  from  the  politics  of  the  Soviets 
to  the  greater  political  issues  connected  with  the 
campaign  for  the  Constituent  Assembly  elections. 
There  were  other  factors  at  work  lessening  the 
popular  interest  in  and,  consequently,  the  political 
influence  of,  the  Soviets.  In  the  first  place,  the 
hectic  excitement  of  the  early  stages  of  the  Revo- 
lution had  passed  off,  together  with  its  novelty, 
and  life  had  assumed  a  tempo  nearer  normal;  in 
the  second  place,  city  Dumas  and  the  local  Zems- 
tvos,  which  had  been  elected  during  the  summer, 
upon  a  thoroughly  democratic  basis,  were  function- 
ing, and,  naturally,  absorbing  much  energy  which 
had  hitherto  been  devoted  to  the  Soviets. 

Concerning  these  things  there  is  little  room  for 
dispute.  The  Izvestia  of  the  Soviets  again  and  again 
called  attention  to  the  waning  power  and  influence 
of  the  Soviets,  always  cheerfully  and  with  wise 
appreciation.     On  September  28,  191 7,  it  said: 

At  last  a  truly  democratic  government,  born  of  the 
will  of  all  classes  of  the  Russian  people,  the  first  rough 
form  of  the  future  liberal  parliamentary  regime,  has  been 
formed.    Ahead  of  us  is  the  Constituent  Assembly,  which 


196  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

will  solve  all  questions  of  fundamental  law,  and  whose 
composition  will  be  essentially  democratic.  The  function 
of  the  Soviets  is  at  an  end,  and  the  time  is  approaching 
when  they  must  retire,  with  the  rest  of  the  revolutionary 
machinery,  from  the  stage  of  a  free  and  victorious  people, 
whose  weapons  shall  hereafter  be  the  peaceful  ones  of 
political  action. 

On  October  23,   1917,  Izvestia  published  an  im- 
portant  article  dealing  with  this  subject,  saying: 

We  ourselves  are  being  called  the  "undertakers"  of 
our  own  organization.  In  reality,  we  are  the  hardest 
workers  in  constructing  the  new  Russia.  .  .  .  When  autoc- 
racy and  the  entire  bureaucratic  regime  fell,  we  set  up 
the  Soviets  as  barracks  in  which  all  the  democracy  could 
find  temporary  shelter.  Now,  in  place  of  barracks  we 
are  building  the  permanent  edifice  of  a  new  system,  and 
naturally  the  people  will  gradually  leave  the  barracks 
for  the  more  comfortable  quarters. 

Dealing  with  the  lessening  activity  of  the  local 
Soviets,  scores  of  which  had  ceased  to  exist,  the 
Soviet  organ  said: 

This  is  natural,  for  the  people  are  coming  to  be 
interested  in  the  more  permanent  organs  of  legislation — 
the  municipal  Dumas  and  the  Zemstvos. 

Continuing,  the  article  said: 

In  the  important  centers  of  Petrograd  and  Moscow, 
where  the  Soviets  were  best  organized,  they  did  not  take 
in  all  the  democratic  elements.  .  .  .  The  majority  of  the 
intellectuals  did  not  participate,  and  many  workers  also; 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  197 

some  of  the  workers  because  they  were  politically  back- 
ward, others  because  the  center  of  gravity  for  them  was 
in  their  unions.  .  .  .  We  cannot  deny  that  these  organiza- 
tions are  firmly  united  with  the  masses,  whose  every-day 
needs  are  better  served  by  them.  .  .  . 

That  the  local  democratic  administrations  are  being 
energetically  organized  is  highly  important.  The  city 
Dumas  are  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  and  in  purely 
local  matters  have  more  authority  than  the  Soviets. 
Not  a  single  democrat  will  see  anything  wrong  in  this.  .  .  . 

.  . .  Elections  to  the  municipalities  are  being  conducted 
in  a  better  and  more  democratic  way  than  the  elections 
to  the  Soviets.  ...  All  classes  are  represented  in  the 
municipalities.  .  .  .  And  as  soon  as  the  local  self-govern- 
ments begin  to  organize  life  in  the  municipalities,  the 
role  of  the  local  Soviets  naturally  ends.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  There  are  two  factors  in  the  falling  off  of  interest 
in  the  Soviets.  The  first  we  may  attribute  to  the  lower- 
ing of  political  interest  in  the  masses;  the  second  to  the 
growing  effort  of  provincial  and  local  governing  bodies 
to  organize  the  building  of  new  Russia.  .  .  .  The  more  the 
tendency  lies  in  this  latter  direction  the  sooner  disappears 
the  significance  of  the  Soviets.  .  .  . 

It  seems  to  be  hardly  less  certain,  though  less 
capable  of  complete  demonstration,  perhaps,  that 
the  influence  of  the  Soviets  in  the  factories  was  also 
on  the  wane.  Perhaps  it  would  be  fairer  to  say 
that  there  was  an  increasing  sense  of  responsibility 
and  a  lessening  of  the  dangerous  recklessness  of  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  Revolution.  The  factory 
Soviets  in  the  time  of  the  Provisional  Government 
varied  so  greatly  in  their  character  and  methods 
that  it  is  rather  difficult  to  accurately  represent  them 
in  a  brief  description.     Many  of  them  were  similar, 


198  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

in  practice,  to  the  shop  meetings  of  the  trades- 
unions;  others  more  nearly  resembled  the  Whitley 
Councils  of  England.  There  were  still  others,  how- 
ever, which  asserted  practically  complete  owner- 
ship of  the  factories  and  forced  the  real  owners  out. 
On  March  20,  1917,  Izvestia  said: 

If  any  owner  of  an  undertaking  who  is  dissatisfied 
with  the  demands  made  by  the  workmen  refuses  to 
carry  on  the  business,  then  the  workmen  must  resolutely 
insist  on  the  management  of  the  work  being  given  over 
into  their  hands,  under  the  supervision  of  the  Commis- 
sary of  the  Soviets. 

That  is  precisely  what  happened  in  many  cases. 
We  must  not  forget  that  the  Bolsheviki  did  not 
introduce  Soviet  control  of  industry.  That  they 
did  so  is  a  very  general  belief,  but,  like  so  many 
other  beliefs  concerning  Russia,  it  is  erroneous. 
The  longest  trial  of  the  Soviet  control  of  industry 
took  place  under  the  regime  of  the  Provisional 
Government,  in  the  pre-Bolshevist  period.  Many 
of  the  worst  evils  of  the  system  were  developed 
during  that  period,  though  as  a  result  of  Bolshevist 
propaganda  and  intrigue  to  a  large  degree. 

Industrial  control  by  the  workers,  during  the 
pre-Bolshevist  period  of  the  Revolution,  and  es- 
pecially during  the  spring  and  early  summer,  was 
principally  carried  on  by  means  of  four  distinct 
types  of  organization,  to  all  of  which  the  general 
term  "Soviet"  was  commonly  applied.  Perhaps  a 
brief  description  of  each  of  these  types  will  help 
to  interpret  the  history  of  this  period: 

(1)   Factory  Councils.     These  may  be  called  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  199 

true  factory  Soviets.  They  existed  in  most  fac- 
tories, large  and  small  alike,  their  size  varying  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  workers  employed.  In 
a  small  factory  the  Council  might  consist  of  seven 
or  nine  members;  in  a  large  factory  the  number 
might  be  sixty.  The  latter  figure  seems  rarely  to 
have  been  exceeded.  Most  of  the  Councils  were 
elected  by  the  workers  directly,  upon  a  basis  of 
equal  suffrage,  every  wage-worker,  whether  skilled 
or  unskilled,  male  or  female,  being  entitled  to  vote. 
Boys  and  girls  were  on  the  same  footing  as  their 
elders  in  this  respect.  Generally  the  voting  was 
done  at  mass-meetings,  held  during  working-hours, 
the  ordinary  method  being  a  show  of  hands. 
While  there  were  exceptions  to  this  rule,  it  was  rare 
that  foremen,  technical  supervisors,  or  other  per- 
sons connected  with  the  management  were  per- 
mitted to  vote.  In  some  cases  the  Council  was 
elected  indirectly,  that  is  to  say,  it  was  selected  by 
a  committee,  called  the  Workshop  Committee. 
The  Factory  Council  was  not  elected  for  any  speci- 
fied period  of  time,  as  a  rule,  and  where  a  definite 
period  for  holding  office  was  fixed,  the  right  of  recall 
was  so  easily  invoked,  and  was  so  freely  exercised, 
that  the  result  was  the  same  as  if  there  had  been  no 
such  provision.  As  a  result  of  the  nervous  tension 
of  the  time,  the  inevitable  reaction  against  long- 
continued  repression,  there  was  much  friction  at 
first  and  recalls  and  re-elections  were  common. 
The  present  writer  has  received  several  reports, 
from  sources  of  indubitable  authority,  of  factories 
in  which  two,  and  even  three,  Council  elections  were 
held  in  less  than  one  month!     Of  course,  this  is  an 


200  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

incidental  fact,  ascribable  to  the  environment 
rather  than  to  the  institution.  The  Councils  held 
their  meetings  during  working-hours,  the  members 
receiving  full  pay  for  the  time  thus  spent.  Usually 
the  Council  would  hold  a  daily  meeting,  and  it  was 
not  uncommon  for  the  meetings  to  last  all  day,  and 
even  into  the  evening — overtime  being  paid  for  the 
extra  hours.  Emile  Vandervelde,  the  Belgian  So- 
cialist Minister  of  State — a  most  sympathetic  ob- 
server—  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  in 
one  establishment  in  Petrograd,  employing  8,000 
skilled  workers,  the  Factory  Council,  composed  of 
forty-three  men  who  each  earned  sixteen  rubles  per 
day  of  eight  hours,  sat  regularly  eight  hours  per  day.1 
To  describe  fully  the  functions  of  the  Factory 
Councils  would  require  many  pages,  so  complex 
were  they.  Only  a  brief  synopsis  of  their  most 
important  rights  and  duties  is  possible  here. 
Broadly  speaking,  they  possessed  the  right  of  con- 
trol over  everything,  but  no  responsibility  for  suc- 
cessful management  and  administration.  In  their 
original  form,  and  where  the  owners  still  remained 
at  the  head,  the  Councils  did  not  interfere  in  such 
matters  as  the  securing  of  raw  materials,  for  ex- 
ample. They  did  not  interest  themselves  in  the 
financial  side  of  the  undertaking,  at  least  not  to  see 
that  its  operations  were  profitable.  Their  concern 
was  to  control  the  working  conditions  and  to  "guard 
the  interests  of  the  workers."  They  sometimes 
assumed  the  right  to  refuse  to  do  work  upon  con- 
tracts of  which  they  disapproved.     Jealous  in  their 

1  Three  Aspects  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  by  Emile  Vandervelde, 
p.  71. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  201 

exercise  of  the  right  to  control,  they  would  assume 
no  responsibility  for  direction.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  they  asserted — and  generally  enforced — 
their  right  to  determine  everything  relating  to  the 
engaging  or  dismissal  of  workers,  the  fixing  of 
wages,  hours  of  labor,  rules  of  employment,  and  so 
on,  as  well  as  the  selection  of  foremen,  superintendents, 
technical  experts,  and  even  the  principal  managers  of 
the  establishments.  Professor  Ross  quotes  the  state- 
ment made  by  the  spokesman  of  the  employers  at 
Baku,  adding  that  the  men  did  strike  and  win: 

They  ask  that  we  grant  leave  on  pay  for  a  certain 
period  to  a  sick  employee.  Most  of  us  are  doing  that 
already.  They  stipulate  that  on  dismissal  an  employee 
shall  receive  a  month's  pay  for  every  year  he  has  been 
in  our  service.  Agreed.  They  demand  that  no  workman 
be  dismissed  without  the  consent  of  a  committee  repre- 
senting the  men.  That's  all  right.  They  require  that 
we  take  on  new  men  from  a  list  submitted  by  them. 
That's  reasonable  enough.  They  know  far  better  than 
we  can  whether  or  not  a  fellow  is  safe  to  work  alongside 
of  in  a  dangerous  business  like  ours.  But  when  they 
demand  control  over  the  hiring  and  firing  of  all  our 
employees — foremen,  superintendents,  and  managers  as 
well  as  workmen — we  balk.  We  don't  see  how  we  can 
yield  that  point  without  losing  the  control  essential  to 
discipline  and  efficiency.  Yet  if  we  don't  sign  to-night, 
they  threaten  to  strike.1 

(2)  Workshop  Committees.  This  term  was  some- 
times used  instead  of  "  Factory  Councils,"  particu- 
larly in  the  case  of  smaller  factories,  and  much  con- 

1  Russia  in  Upheaval,  by  E.  A.  Ross,  p.  277. 


Ik 


202  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


fusion  in  the  published  reports  of  the  time  may  be 
attributed  to  this  fact.  Nothing  is  gained  by  an 
arbitrary  division  of  Factory  Councils  on  the  basis 
of  size,  since  there  was  no  material  difference  in 
functions  or  methods.  The  term  "Workshop  Com- 
mittee" was,  however,  applied  to  a  different  or- 
ganization entirely,  which  was  to  be  found  in  prac- 
tically every  large  industrial  establishment,  along 
with,  and  generally  subordinated  to,  the  Factory 
Council.  These  committees  usually  carried  out  the 
policies  formulated  by  the  superior  Factory  Coun- 
cils. They  did  the  greater  part  of  the  work  usually 
performed  by  a  foreman,  and  their  functions  were 
sometimes  summed  up  in  the  term  "collective  fore- 
manship."  They  decided  who  should  be  taken  on 
and  who  employed;  they  decided  when  fines  or 
other  forms  of  punishment  should  be  imposed  for 
poor  work,  sabotage,  and  other  offenses.  The 
foreman  was  immediately  responsible  to  them.  Ap- 
peals from  the  decisions  of  these  committees  might 
be  made  to  the  Councils,  either  by  the  owners  or 
the  workers.  Like  the  Councils,  the  committees 
were  elected  by  universal,  equal  voting  at  open 
meetings;  indeed,  in  some  cases,  only  the  Workshop 
Committee  was  so  elected,  being  charged  with  the 
task  of  selecting  the  Factory  Council. 

(3)  Wages  Committees.  These  committees  ex- 
isted in  the  large  establishments,  as  a  rule,  especially 
those  in  which  the  labor  employed  was  of  many 
kinds  and  varying  degrees  of  skill.  Like  all  other 
factory  organizations,  they  were  elected  by  vote  of  the 
employees.  Responsible  to  the  Factory  Councils, 
though  independently  elected,  the  Wages  Commit- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  203 

tees  classified  all  workers  into  their  respective  wage- 
groups,  fixed  prices  for  piecework,  and  so  on.  They 
could,  and  frequently  did,  decide  these  matters  in- 
dependently, without  consulting  the  management 
at  all. 

(4)  Committees  of  Arbitration  and  Adjustment. 
These  seem  to  have  been  less  common  than  the 
other  committees  already  described.  Elected  solely 
by  the  workers,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  other 
bodies  described,  they  were  charged  with  hearing 
and  settling  disputes  arising,  no  matter  from  what 
cause.  They  dealt  with  the  charges  brought  by 
individual  employees,  whether  against  the  employ- 
ers or  against  fellow-employees;  they  dealt,  also, 
with  complaints  by  the  workers  as  a  whole  against 
conditions,  with  disputes  over  wages,  and  so  on. 
In  all  cases  of  disputes  between  workers  and  employers 
the  decision  was  left  entirely  to  the  elected  representa- 
tives of  the  workers. 

The  foregoing  gives  a  very  fair  idea  of  the  pro- 
letarian machinery  set  up  in  the  factories  under  the 
_ Provisional  Government.  In  one  factory  might  be 
found  operating  these  four  popularly  elected  repre- 
sentative bodies,  all  of  them  holding  meetings  in 
working-hours  and  being  paid  for  the  time  con- 
sumed; all  of  them  involving  more  or  less  frequent 
elections.  No  matter  how  moderate  and  re- 
strained the  description  may  be,  the  impression  can 
hardly  fail  to  be  one  of  appalling  wastefulness  and 
confusion.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  very 
general  agreement  that  in  practice,  after  the  first 
few  weeks,  what  seems  a  grotesque  system  worked 
reasonably  well,  or,   at  least,  far  better  than  its 


204  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

critics  had  believed  possible.  Of  course,  there  was 
much  overlapping  of  functions;  there  was  much 
waste.  On  the  other  hand,  wasteful  strikes  were 
avoided  and  the  productive  processes  were  main- 
tained. Of  course,  the  experiment  was  made  under 
abnormal  conditions.  Not  very  much  in  the  way 
of  certain  conclusion  can  be  adduced  from  it.  Op- 
ponents of  the  Soviet  theory  and  system  will 
always  point  to  the  striking  decline  of  productive 
efficiency  and  say  that  it  was  the  inevitable  result 
of  the  Soviet  control;  believers  in  the  theory  and 
the  system  will  say  that  the  inefficiency  would  have 
been  greater  but  for  the  Soviets. 

That  there  was  an  enormous  decline  in  productive 
efficiency  during  the  early  part  of  the  period  of 
Soviet  control  cannot  be  disputed.  The  evidence 
of  this  is  too  overwhelmingly  conclusive.  As  early 
as  April,  1917,  serious  reports  of  this  decline  began 
to  be  made.  It  was  said  that  in  some  factories  the 
per  capita  daily  production  was  less  than  a  third 
of  what  it  was  a  few  weeks  before.  The  air  was 
filled  with  charges  that  the  workers  were  loafing  and 
malingering.  On  April  nth  Tseretelli  denounced 
these  "foul  slanders"  at  a  meeting  of  the  Petrograd 
Soviet  and  was  wildly  cheered.  Nevertheless,  one 
fact  stood  out — namely,  the  sharp  decline  in  pro- 
ductivity in  almost  every  line.  There  were  not 
a  few  cases  in  which  the  owners  and  highly  trained 
managers  were  forced  out  entirely  and  their  places 
filled  by  wholly  incompetent  men  possessing  no 
technical  training  at  all.  An  extreme  illustration 
is  quoted  by  Ross  •}  In  a  factory  in  southern  Russia 

1  Ross,  op.  cit.y  p.  283. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  205 

the  workers  forced  the  owner  out  and  then  under- 
took to  run  the  plant  themselves.  When  they  had 
used  up  the  small  supply  of  raw  material  they  had 
they  began  to  sell  the  machines  out  of  the  works 
in  order  to  get  money  to  buy  more  raw  material; 
then,  when  they  obtained  the  raw  material,  they 
lacked  the  machinery  for  working  it  up.  Of 
course,  the  incident  is  simply  an  illustration  of 
extreme  folly,  merely.  Men  misuse  safety  razors 
to  commit  suicide  with  in  extreme  cases,  and  the 
misuse  of  Soviet  power  in  isolated  cases  proves 
little  of  value.  On  the  other  hand,  the  case  cited 
by  Ross  is  only  an  extreme  instance  of  a  very 
general  practice.  Many  factories  were  taken  over 
in  the  same  way,  after  the  competent  directors  had 
been  driven  out,  and  were  brought  to  ruin  by  the 
Soviets.  It  was  a  general  practice  or,  at  any  rate, 
a  common  one,  which  drew  from  Skobelev,  Minister 
of  Labor,  this  protest,  which  Izvestia  published  at 
the  beginning  of  May: 

The  seizure  of  factories  makes  workmen  without  any 
experience  in  management,  and  without  working  capital, 
temporarily  masters  of  such  undertakings,  but  soon 
leads  to  their  being  closed  down,  or  to  the  subjugation 
of  the  workmen  to  a  still  harder  taskmaster. 

On  July  ioth  Skobelev  issued  another  stirring 
appeal  to  the  workers,  pointing  out  that  "the  suc- 
cess of  the  struggle  against  economic  devastation 
depends  upon  the  productivity  of  labor,  and  point- 
ing out  the  danger  of  the  growing  anarchy.  The 
appeal  is  too  long  to  quote  in  its  entirety,  but  the 


206  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

following  paragraphs  give  a  good  idea  of  it,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  indicate  how  serious  the  demorali- 
zation of  the  workers  had  become: 

Workmen,  comrades,  I  appeal  to  you  at  a  critical 
period  of  the  Revolution.  Industrial  output  is  rapidly 
declining,  the  quantity  of  necessary  manufactured  arti- 
cles is  diminishing,  the  peasants  are  deprived  of  industrial 
supplies,  we  are  threatened  with  fresh  food  complica- 
tions and  increasing  national  destitution. 

•  •••••• 

The  Revolution  has  swept  away  the  oppression  of  the 
police  regime,  which  stifled  the  labor  movement,  and  the 
liberated  working-class  is  enabled  to  defend  its  economic 
interests  by  the  mere  force  of  its  class  solidarity  and  unity. 
They  possess  the  freedom  of  strikes,  they  have  profes- 
sional unions,  which  can  adapt  the  tactics  of  a  mass 
economic  movement,  according  to  the  conditions  of  the 
present  economic  crisis. 

However,  at  present  purely  elemental  tendencies  are 
gaining  the  upper  hand  over  organized  movement,  and 
without  regard  to  the  limited  resources  of  the  state, 
and  without  any  reckoning  as  to  the  state  of  the  indus- 
try in  which  you  are  employed,  and  to  the  detriment  of 
the  proletarian  class  movement,  you  sometimes  obtain 
an  increase  of  wages  which  disorganizes  the  enterprise 
and  drains  the  exchequer. 

Frequently  the  workmen  refuse  all  negotiations  and 
by  menace  of  violence  force  the  gratification  of  their 
demands.  They  use  violence  against  officials  and  man- 
agers, dismiss  them  of  their  own  accord,  interfere  arbi- 
trarily with  the  technical  management,  and  even  attempt 
to  take  the  whole  enterprise  into  their  own  hands. 

Workmen,  comrades,  our  socialistic  ideals  shall  be 
attained  not  by  the  seizure  of  separate  factories,  but  by  a 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  207 

high  standard  of  economic  organization,  by  the  intelligence 
of  the  masses,  and  the  wide  development  of  the  country's 
productive  forces.  .  .  .  Workmen,  comrades,  remember 
not  only  your  rights,  but  also  your  duties;  think  not  only 
of  your  wishes,  but  of  the  possibilities  of  granting  them, 
not  only  of  your  own  good,  but  of  the  sacrifices  necessary 
for  the  consolidation  of  the  Revolution  and  the  triumph 
of  our  ideals. 

In  July  the  per  capita  output  in  the  munition- 
works  of  Petrograd  was  reported  as  being  only 
25  per  cent,  of  what  it  was  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year.  In  August  Kornilov  told  the  Moscow  Demo- 
cratic Conference  that  the  productivity  of  the 
workers  in  the  great  gun  and  shell  plants  had  de- 
clined 60  per  cent.,  as  compared  with  the  three 
months  immediately  prior  to  the  Revolution;  that 
the  decline  at  the  aeroplane-factories  was  still 
greater,  not  less  than  70  per  cent.  No  denial  of 
this  came  from  the  representatives  of  the  Soviets. 
In  Petrograd,  Nijni-Novgorod,  Saratov,  and  other 
large  centers  there  was  an  estimated  general  decline 
of  production  of  between  60  and  70  per  cent. 

The  representatives  of  the  workers,  the  Soviet 
leaders,  said  that  the  decline,  which  they  admitted, 
was  due  to  causes  over  which  the  Soviets  had  no 
control  to  a  far  greater  degree  than  to  any  conscious 
or  unconscious  sabotage  by  the  workers.  They  ad- 
mitted that  many  of  the  workers  had  not  yet  got 
used  to  freedom;  that  they  interpreted  it  as  mean- 
ing freedom  from  work.  There  was  a  very  natural 
reaction,  they  said,  against  the  tremendous  pace 
which  had  been  maintained  under  the  old  regime. 
They  insisted,  however,  that  this  temporary  failing 


208  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  the  workers  was  a  minor  cause  only,  and  that  far 
greater  causes  were  (i)  deterioration  of  machinery; 

(2)  withdrawal  for  military  reasons  and  purposes 
of  many  of  the  most  capable  and  efficient  workers; 

(3)  shortage  and  poor  quality  of  materials. 
There  is  room  here  for  an  endless  controversy,  and 

the  present  writer  does  not  intend  to  enter  into  it. 
He  is  convinced  that  the  three  causes  named  by  the 
Soviet  defenders  were  responsible  for  a  not  in- 
considerable proportion  of  the  decline  in  produc- 
tivity, but  that  the  Soviets  and  the  impaired  morale 
of  the  workers  were  the  main  causes.  In  the  mining 
of  coal  and  iron,  the  manufacture  of  munitions, 
locomotives,  textiles,  metal  goods,  paper,  and  prac- 
tically everything  else,  the  available  reports  show 
an  enormous  increase  in  production  cost  per  unit, 
accompanied  by  a  very  great  decline  in  average  per 
capita  production.  It  is  true  that  there  were  excep- 
tions to  this  rule,  that  there  were  factories  in  which, 
after  the  first  few  days  of  the  revolutionary  excita- 
tion in  March,  production  per  capita  rose  and  was 
maintained  at  a  high  level  for  a  long  time — until 
the  Bolsheviki  secured  ascendancy  in  those  fac- 
tories, in  fact.  The  writer  has  seen  and  examined 
numerous  reports  indicating  this,  but  prefers  to  con- 
fine himself  to  the  citation  of  such  reports  as  come 
with  the  authority  of  responsible  and  trusted 
witnesses. 

Such  a  report  is  that  of  the  Social  Democrat,  the 
workman  Menshekov,  concerning  the  Ijevski  fac- 
tory with  its  40,000  workmen,  and  of  the  sales 
department  of  which  he  was  made  manager  when 
full  Soviet  control  was  established.     In  that  posi- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  209 

tion  he  had  access  to  the  books  showing  production 
for  the  years  1916,  1917,  and  1918,  and  the  figures 
show  that  under  the  Provisional  Government  pro- 
duction rose,  but  that  it  declined  with  the  rise  of 
Bolshevism  among  the  workers  and  declined  more 
rapidly  when  the  Bolsheviki  gained  control.  Such 
another  witness  is  the  trades-unionist  and  Social 
Democrat,  Oupovalov,  concerning  production  in 
the  great  Sormovo  Works,  in  the  Province  of  Nijni- 
Novgorod,  which  during  the  war  employed  20,000 
persons.  Not  only  was  production  maintained,  but 
there  was  even  a  marked  improvement.  The 
writer  has  been  permitted  to  examine  the  docu- 
mentary evidence  in  the  possession  of  these  men  and 
believes  that  it  fully  confirms  and  justifies  the  claim 
that,  where  there  was  an  earnest  desire  on  the  part 
of  the  workers  to  maintain  and  even  to  improve 
production,  this  proved  possible  under  Soviet 
control. 

The  fact  seems  quite  clear  to  the  writer  (though 
perhaps  impossible  to  prove  by  an  adequate  volume 
of  concrete  evidence)  that  the  impaired  morale  of 
the  workers  which  resulted  in  lessened  production 
was  due  to  two  principal  causes,  namely,  Bolshevist 
propaganda  and  the  lack  of  an  intelligent  under- 
standing on  the  part  of  masses  of  workers  who  were 
not  mentally  or  morally  ready  for  the  freedom  which 
was  suddenly  thrust  upon  them.  The  condition  of 
these  latter  is  readily  understood  and  appreciated. 
The  disciplines  and  self-compulsions  of  freedom  are 
not  learned  in  a  day.  When  we  reflect  upon  the 
conditions  that  obtained  under  czarism,  we  can 
hardly  wonder  that  so  many  of  the  victims  of  those 


210  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

conditions  should  have  mistaken  license  for  liberty, 
or  that  they  should  have  failed  to  see  the  vital  con- 
nection between  their  own  honest  effort  in  the  shop 
and  the  success  of  the  Revolution  they  were 
celebrating. 

All  through  the  summer  the  Bolsheviki  were 
carrying  on  their  propaganda  among  the  workers  in 
the  shops  as  well  as  among  the  troops  at  the  front. 
Just  as  they  preached  desertion  to  the  soldiers,  so 
they  preached  sabotage  and  advocated  obstructive 
strikes  among  the  workers  in  the  factories.  This 
was  a  logical  thing  for  them  to  do;  they  wanted  to 
break  up  the  military  machine  in  order  to  compel 
peace,  and  a  blow  at  that  machine  was  as  effective 
when  struck  in  the  factory  as  anywhere  else.  For 
men  who  were  preaching  mass  desertion  and  mutiny 
at  the  front,  sabotage  in  the  munition-works  at  the 
rear,  or  in  the  transportation  service  on  which  the 
army  depended,  was  a  logical  policy.  It  is  as 
certain  as  anything  can  be  that  the  Bolshevist 
agitation  was  one  of  the  primary  causes  of  the 
alarming  decrease  in  the  production  during  the  re- 
gime of  the  Provisional  Government.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Socialist  leaders  who  supported 
the  Provisional  Government  waged  a  vigorous 
propaganda  among  the  workers,  urging  them  to  in- 
crease production.  Where  they  made  headway,  in 
general  there  production  was  maintained,  or  the 
decline  was  relatively  small.  The  counterpart  of 
that  patriotism  which  Kerensky  preached  among 
the  troops  at  the  front  with  such  magnificent  energy 
was  preached  among  the  factory-workers.  Here  is 
what  Jandarmov  says: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  211 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  output  was  interfered 
with,  for,  to  do  our  working-class  justice,  nowhere  was 
work  delayed  for  more  than  two  days,  and  in  many  fac- 
tories this  epoch-making  development  was  taken  without 
a  pause  in  the  ordinary  routine. 

I  cannot  too  strongly  insist  upon  the  altogether 
unanimous  idealism  of  those  early  days.  There  was  not 
an  ugly  streak  in  that  beautiful  dawn  where  now  the 
skies  are  glowering  and  red  and  frightful.  I  say  that 
output  was  speeded  up.  I,  as  chairman  of  the  first  So- 
viet,1 assure  you  that  we  received  fifty-seven  papers  from 
workmen  containing  proposals  for  increasing  the  efficiency 
of  the  factory;  and  that  spirit  lasted  three  months, 
figures  of  output  went  well  up  and  old  closed-down  fac- 
tories were  reopened.  New  Russia  was  bursting  with 
energy — the  sluice-gates  of  our  character  were  unlocked. 

There  must  have  been  a  great  deal  of  that 
exalted  feeling  among  the  intelligent  working-men 
of  Russia  in  those  stirring  times.  No  one  who  has 
known  anything  of  the  spiritual  passion,  of  sacri- 
ficial quality,  which  has  characterized  the  Russian 
revolutionary  movement  can  doubt  this.  Of  course, 
Jandarmov  is  referring  to  the  early  months  before 
Bolshevism  began  to  spread  in  that  district.  Then 
there  was  a  change.  It  was  the  old,  old  story  of 
rapidly  declining  production: 

But  after  the  first  few  months  the  workers  as  a  whole 
began  to  fall  under  the  spell  of  catchwords  and  stock 
phrases.  Agitation  began  among  the  lower  workers. 
Bolshevism  started  in  the  ranks  of  unskilled  labor. 
They  clamored  for  the  reduction  of  hours  and  down  went 
the  output.     The  defenders  of  the  idea  of  the  shortest 

!That  is,  "first  Soviet"  at  the  Lisvinsk  factory,  about  seventy 
miles  from  Perm. 


212  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

possible  working-day  were  the  same  men  who  afterward 
turned  out  very  fiends  of  Bolshevism  and  every  dis- 
order. I  watched  the  growing  of  their  madness  and  the 
development  of  their  claims,  each  more  impossible  than 
the  last. 

In  the  Kiselovski  mines  the  output  of  2,000,000  poods 
monthly  dropped  to  300,000,  and  the  foundries  of  Upper 
Serginski  produced  1,200  poods  of  iron  instead  of  2,000. 
Why  such  a  fall  ?  The  engineers  wondered  how  workers 
could  reduce  output  to  such  an  extent  if  they  tried,  but 
one  soon  ceased  to  wonder  at  the  disasters  that  followed 
in  quick  succession. 

There  was  anarchy  in  the  factories  and  a  premium 
on  idleness  became  the  order  of  the  day.  It  was  a  posi- 
tive danger  to  work  more  than  the  laziest  unskilled 
laborer,  because  this  was  the  type  of  man  who  always 
seemed  to  get  to  the  top  of  the  Soviet.  "Traitor  to  the 
interests  of  Labor"  you  were  called  if  you  exceeded  the 
time  limit,  which  soon  became  two  hours  a  day.1 

By  September,  1917,  a  healthy  reaction  against 
the  abuses  of  Soviet  industrial  control  was  making 
itself  felt  in  the  factories.  The  workers  were  mak- 
ing less  extravagant  demands  and  accepting  the 
fact  that  they  could  gain  nothing  by  paralyzing 
production;  that  reducing  the  quantity  and  the 
quality  of  production  can  only  result  in  disaster 
to  the  nation,  and,  most  of  all,  to  the  workers  them- 
selves. In  numerous  instances  the  factory  Soviets 
had  called  back  the  owners  they  had  forced  out, 
and  the  managers  and  technical  directors  they  had 
dismissed,  and  restored  the  authority  of  foremen. 
In  other  words,  they  ceased  to  be  controlling  au- 

1  These  extracts  are  from  a  personal  report  by  Jandarmov,  sent  to 
the  present  writer. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  213 

thorities  and  became  simply  consultative  bodies. 
While,  therefore,  they  were  becoming  valuable 
democratic  agencies,  the  economic  power  and  in- 
fluence of  the  Soviets  was  waning. 

On  the  day  of  the  coup  d'etat,  November  7,  191 7, 
the  Bolshevist  Military  Revolutionary  Committee 
issued  a  special  proclamation  which  said,  "The 
goal  for  which  the  people  fought,  the  immediate 
proposal  of  a  democratic  peace,  the  abolition  of 
private  landed  property,  labor  control  of  industry, 
the  establishment  of  a  Soviet  Government — all  this 
is  guaranteed."  Seven  days  later,  November  14th, 
a  decree  was  issued,  giving  an  outline  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  control  of  industry  by  the  Soviets 
was  to  be  organized  and  carried  out.  The  prin- 
cipal features  of  this  outline  plan  are  set  forth  in 
the  following  paragraphs: 

(1)  In  order  to  put  the  economic  life  of  the  country 
on  an  orderly  basis,  control  by  the  workers  is  instituted 
over  all  industrial,  commercial,  and  agricultural  under- 
takings and  societies;  and  those  connected  with  banking 
and  transport,  as  well  as  over  productive  co-operative 
societies  which  employ  labor  or  put  out  work  to  be  done 
at  home  or  in  connection  with  the  production,  purchase, 
and  sale  of  commodities  and  of  raw  materials,  and  with 
conservation  of  such  commodities  as  well  as  regards 
the  financial  aspect  of  such  undertakings. 

(2)  Control  is  exercised  by  all  the  workers  of  a  given 
enterprise  through  the  medium  of  their  elected  organs, 
such  as  factories  and  works  committees,  councils  of 
workmen's  delegates,  etc.,  such  organs  equally  com- 
prising representatives  of  the  employees  and  of  the  tech- 
nical staff. 


2U  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

(3)  In  each  important  industrial  town,  province,  or 
district  is  set  up  a  local  workmen's  organ  of  control, 
which,  being  the  organ  of  the  soldiers',  workmen's,  and 
peasants'  council,  will  comprise  the  representatives  of  the 
labor  unions,  workmen's  committees,  and  of  any  other 
factories,  as  well  as  of  workmen's  co-operative  societies. 

(5)  Side  by  side  with  the  Workmen's  Supreme  Council 
of  the  Labor  Unions,  committees  of  inspection  comprising 
technical  specialists,  accountants,  etc.  These  com- 
mittees, both  on  their  own  initiative  or  at  the  request 
of  local  workmen's  organs  of  control,  proceed  to  a  given 
locality  to  study  the  financial  and  technical  side  of  any 
enterprise. 

(6)  The  Workmen's  Organs  of  Control  have  the  right 
to  supervise  production,  to  fix  a  minimum  wage  in  any 
undertaking,  and  to  take  steps  to  fix  the  prices  at  which 
manufactured  articles  are  to  be  sold. 

(7)  The  Workmen's  Organs  of  Control  have  the  right 
to  control  all  correspondence  passing  in  connection  with 
the  business  of  an  undertaking,  being  held  responsible 
before  a  court  of  justice  for  diverting  their  correspond- 
ence. Commercial  secrets  are  abolished.  The  owners 
are  called  upon  to  produce  to  the  Workmen's  Organs  of 
Control  all  books  and  moneys  in  hand,  both  relating 
to  the  current  year  and  to  any  previous  transactions. 

(8)  The  decisions  of  the  Workmen's  Organs  of  Control 
are  binding  upon  the  owners  of  undertakings,  and  can- 
not be  nullified  save  by  the  decision  of  a  Workmen's 
Superior  Organ  of  Control. 

(9)  Three  days  are  given  to  the  owners,  or  the  admin- 
istrators of  a  business,  to  appeal  to  a  Workmen's  Su- 
perior Court  of  Control  against  the  decisions  filed  by 
any  of  the  lower  organs  of  Workmen's  Control. 

(10)  In  all  undertakings,  the  owners  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  workmen  and  of  employees  delegated  to 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  215 

exercise  control  on  behalf  of  the  workmen,  are  responsible 
to  the  government  for  the  maintenance  of  strict  order 
and  discipline,  and  for  the  conservation  of  property 
(goods).  Those  guilty  of  misappropriating  materials 
and  products,  of  not  keeping  books  properly,  and  of 
similar  offenses,  are  liable  to  prosecution. 


It  was  not  until  December  27,  1917 — seven  weeks 
after  their  arbitrary  seizure  of  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment— that  the  Bolsheviki  published  the  details  of 
their  scheme.  Both  the  original  preliminary  out- 
line and  the  later  carefully  elaborated  scheme  made 
it  quite  evident  that,  no  matter  how  loudly  and 
grandiloquently  Lenin,  Trotsky,  Miliutin,  Smede- 
vich,  and  others  might  talk  about  the  "introduc- 
tion" of  workers'  control,  in  point  of  fact  they  were 
only  thinking  of  giving  a  certain  legal  status  to 
the  Soviet  system  of  control  already  in  operation. 
That  system,  as  we  have  already  seen,  had  been  in 
their  hands  for  some  time.  They  had  used  it  to 
destroy  efficiency,  to  cripple  the  factories  and  assist 
in  paralyzing  the  government  and  the  military 
forces  of  the  nation.  Now  that  they  were  no  longer 
an  opposition  party  trying  to  upset  the  govern- 
ment, but  were  themselves  the  de  facto  government, 
the  Bolsheviki  could  no  longer  afford  to  pursue  the 
policy  of  encouraging  the  factory  Soviets  to  sabo- 
tage. Maximum  production  was  the  first  neces- 
sity of  the  Bolshevist  Government,  quite  as  truly 
as  it  had  been  for  the  Provisional  Government,  and 
as  it  must  have  been  for  any  other  government. 
Sabotage  in  the  factories  had  been  an  important 
means  of  combating  the  Provisional  Government, 


216  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

but  now  it  must  be  quickly  eliminated.  So  long 
as  they  were  in  the  position  of  being  a  party  of 
revolt  the  Bolshevist  leaders  were  ready  to  approve 
the  seizure  of  factories  by  the  workers,  regardless 
of  the  consequences  to  industrial  production  or  to 
the  military  enterprises  dependent  upon  that  pro- 
duction. As  the  governing  power  of  the  nation,  in 
full  possession  of  the  machinery  of  government, 
such  ruinous  action  by  the  workers  could  not  be 
tolerated.  For  the  same  reasons,  the  demoraliza- 
tion of  the  army,  which  they  had  laboriously 
fostered,  must  now  be  arrested. 

In  the  instructions  to  the  All-Russian  Council  of 
Workers'  Control,  published  December  27,  1917, 
we  find  no  important  extension  of  the  existing  Soviet 
control;  we  do,  however,  find  its  le galizatioyi  with 
important  limitations.  These  limitations,  more- 
over, are  merely  legalistic  formulations  of  the 
modifications  already  developed  in  practice  and 
obtaining  in  many  factories.  A  comparison  of  the 
full  text  of  the  instructions  with  the  account  of  the 
system  of  factory  control  under  the  Provisional 
Government  will  demonstrate  this  beyond  doubt.1 
The  control  in  each  enterprise  is  to  be  organized 
"either  by  the  Shop  or  Factory  Committee  or  by 
the  General  Assembly  of  workers  and  employees  of 
the  enterprise,  who  elect  a  Special  Commission  of 
Control"  (Article  I).  In  'Targe-scale  enterprises" 
the  election  of  such  a  Control  Commission  is  com- 
pulsory. To  the  Commission  of  Control  is  given 
sole   authority  to   "enter  into   relations  with  the 

1  This  important  document  is  printed  in  full  at  the  end  of  the  book 
as  an  Appendix. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  217 

management  upon  the  subject  of  control,"  though 
it  may  give  authorization  to  other  workers  to  enter 
into  such  relations  if  it  sees  fit  (Article  III).  The 
Control  Commission  must  make  report  to  the 
general  body  of  workers  and  employees  in  the  en- 
terprise "at  least  twice  a  month"  (Article  IV). 
The  article  (No.  5)  which  deals  with  and  defines  the 
"Duties  and  Privileges  of  the  Control  Commission" 
is  so  elaborate  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  sum- 
marize it  without  injustice.  It  is,  therefore,  well  to 
quote  it  in  full. 

V.  The  Control  Commission  of  each  enterprise  is 
required: 

1.  To  determine  the  stock  of  goods  and  fuel  possessed 
by  the  plant,  and  the  amount  of  these  needed  respectively 
for  the  machinery  of  production,  the  technical  personnel, 
and  the  laborers  by  specialties. 

2.  To  determine  to  what  extent  the  plant  is  provided 
with  everything  that  is  necessary  to  insure  its  normal 
operation. 

3.  To  forecast  whether  there  is  danger  of  the  plant 
closing  down  or  lowering  production,  and  what  the  causes 
are. 

4.  To  determine  the  number  of  workers  by  specialties 
likely  to  be  unemployed,  basing  the  estimate  upon  the 
reserve  supply  and  the  expected  receipts  of  fuel  and 
materials.  . 

5.  To  determine  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  maintain 
discipline  in  work  among  the  workers  and  employees. 

6.  To  superintend  the  execution  of  the  decisions  of 
governmental  agencies  regulating  the  buying  and  selling 
of  goods. 

7.  (a)  To  prevent  the  arbitrary  removal  of  machines, 
materials,  fuel,  etc.,  from  the  plant  without  authorization 


218  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

from  the  agencies  which  regulate  economic  affairs,  and  to 
see  that  inventories  are  not  tampered  with. 

(b)  To  assist  in  explaining  the  causes  of  the  lowering 
of  production  and  to  take  measures  for  raising  it. 

8.  To  assist  in  elucidating  the  possibility  of  a  com- 
plete or  partial  utilization  of  the  plant  for  some  kind  of 
production  (especially  how  to  pass  from  a  war  to  a  peace 
footing,  and  what  kind  of  production  should  be  under- 
taken), to  determine  what  changes  should  be  made  in 
the  equipment  of  the  plant  and  in  the  number  of  its 
personnel,  to  accomplish  this  purpose;  to  determine  in 
what  period  of  time  these  changes  can  be  effected;  to 
determine  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  make  them,  and 
the  probable  amount  of  production  after  the  change  is 
made  to  another  kind  of  manufacture. 

9.  To  aid  in  the  study  of  the  possibility  of  developing 
the  kinds  of  labor  required  by  the  necessities  of  peace- 
times, such  as  the  methods  of  using  three  shifts  of  work- 
men, or  any  other  method,  by  furnishing  information 
on  the  possibilities  of  housing  the  additional  number  of 
laborers  and  their  families. 

10.  To  see  that  the  production  of  the  plant  is  maintained 
at  the  figures  to  be  fixed  by  the  governmental  regulating 
agencies,  and  until  such  time  as  these  figures  shall  have 
been  fixed  to  see  that  the  production  reaches  the  normal 
average  for  the  plant,  judged  by  a  standard  of  conscientious 
labor. 

11.  To  co-operate  in  estimating  costs  of  production 
of  the  plant  upon  the  demand  of  the  higher  agency  of 
workers'  control  or  upon  the  demand  of  the  governmental 
regulating  institutions. 

It  is  expressly  stipulated  that  only  the  owner  has 
"the  right  to  give  orders  to  the  directors  of  the 
plant";  that  the  Control  Commission  "does  not 
participate  in  the  management  of  the  plant  and  has 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  219 

no  responsibility  for  its  development  and  opera- 
tion" (Article  VII).  It  is  also  definitely  stated 
that  the  Control  Commission  has  no  concern  with 
financial  management  of  the  plant  (Article  VIII). 
Finally,  while  it  has  the  right  to  "recommend  for 
the  consideration  of  the  governmental  regulating 
institutions  the  question  of  the  sequestration  of  the 
plant  or  other  measures  of  constraint  upon  the 
plant,"  the  Control  Commission  "has  not  the  right 
to  seize  and  direct  the  enterprise"  (Article  IX). 
These  are  the  principal  clauses  of  this  remarkable 
document  relating  to  the  functions  and  methods 
of  the  Soviet  system  of  control  in  the  factory  itself; 
other  clauses  deal  with  the  relations  of  the  factory 
organizations  to  the  central  governmental  authority 
and  to  the  trades-unions.  They  prescribe  and  de- 
fine a  most  elaborate  system  of  bureaucracy. 

So  much  for  the  imperium  in  imperio  of  the 
Soviet  system  of  industrial  control  conceived  by  the 
Bolsheviki.  In  many  important  respects  it  is  much 
more  conservative  than  the  system  itself  had  been 
under  Kerensky.  It  gives  legal  form  and  force  to 
those  very  modifications  which  had  been  brought 
about,  and  it  specifically  prohibits  the  very  abuses 
the  Bolshevist  agitators  had  fostered  and  the 
elimination  of  which  they  had  everywhere  bitterly 
resisted.  Practically  every  provision  in  the  elab- 
orate decree  of  instructions  limiting  the  authority 
of  the  workers,  defining  the  rights  of  the  managers, 
insisting  upon  the  maintenance  of  production,  and 
the  like,  the  Kerensky  government  had  endeavored 
to  introduce,  being  opposed  and  denounced  therefor 
by  the  Bolsheviki.     It  is  easy  to  imagine  how  bit- 


220  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

terly  that  decree  of  instructions  on  Workers'  Con- 
trol would  have  been  denounced  by  Lenin  and 
Trotsky  had  it  been  issued  by  Kerensky's  Cabinet 
in  July  or  August. 

Let  us  not  make  the  mistake,  however,  of  as- 
suming that  because  the  Bolsheviki  in  power  thus 
sought  to  improve  the  system  of  industrial  control, 
to  purge  it  of  its  weaknesses — its  reckless  lawless- 
ness, sabotage,  tyranny,  dishonesty,  and  incom- 
petence— that  there  was  actually  a  correspond- 
ing improvement  in  the  system  itself.  The  pro- 
Bolshevist  writers  in  this  country  and  in  western 
Europe  have  pointed  to  these  instructions,  and  to 
many  other  decrees  conceived  in  a  similar  spirit 
and  couched  in  a  similar  tone,  as  conclusive  evidence 
of  moderation,  constructive  statesmanship,  and 
wise  intention.  Alas!  in  statesmanship  good  in- 
tention is  of  little  value.  In  politics  and  social 
polity,  as  in  life  generally,  the  road  to  destruction 
is  paved  with  "good  intentions."  The  Lenins  and 
Trotskys,  who  in  opposition  and  revolt  were  filled 
with  the  fury  of  destruction,  might  be  capable  of 
becoming  builders  under  the  influence  of  a  solemn 
recognition  of  the  obligations  of  authority  and 
power.  But  for  the  masses  of  the  people  no  such 
change  was  possible.  Such  miracles  do  not  happen, 
except  in  the  disordered  imaginations  of  those  whose 
minds  are  afflicted  with  moral  Daltonism  and  that 
incapacity  for  sequential  thinking  which  charac- 
terizes such  a  wide  variety  of  subnormal  mentalities. 

By  their  propaganda  the  Bolsheviki  had  fostered 
an  extremely  anti-social  consciousness,  embracing 
sabotage,  lawlessness,  and  narrow  selfishness;    the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  221 

manner  in  which  they  had  seized  the  governmental 
power,  and  brutally  frustrated  the  achievement  of 
that  great  democratic  purpose  which  had  behind 
it  the  greatest  collective  spiritual  impulse  in  the 
history  of  the  nation,  greatly  intensified  that  anti- 
social consciousness.  Now  that  they  were  in  power 
these  madmen  hoped  that  in  the  twinkling  of  an 
eye,  by  the  mere  issuance  of  decrees  and  manifestoes, 
they  could  eradicate  the  evil  thing.  Canute's  com- 
mand to  the  tide  was  not  one  whit  more  vain  than 
their  verbose  decrees  hurled  against  the  relentless 
and  irresistible  sequence  of  cause  and  effect.  Loaf- 
ing, waste,  disorder,  and  sabotage  continued  in  the 
factories,  as  great  a  burden  to  the  Bolshevist 
oligarchs  as  they  had  been  to  the  democrats. 
Workers  continued  to  "seize"  factories  as  before, 
and  production  steadily  declined  to  the  music  of  an 
insatiable  demand  on  the  part  of  the  workers  for 
more  pay.  There  was  no  change  in  the  situation, 
except  in  so  far  as  it  grew  worse.  The  govern- 
mental machine  grew  until  it  became  like  an  im- 
mense swarm  of  devastating  locusts,  devouring 
everything  and  producing  nothing.  History  does 
not  furnish  another  such  record  of  industrial  chaos 
and  ruinous  inefficiency. 

Five  days  after  the  seizure  of  power  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  the  Commissar  of  Labor,  Shliapnikov, 
issued  a  protest  against  sabotage  and  violence. 
Naturally,  he  ascribed  the  excesses  of  the  workers 
to  provocation  by  the  propertied  classes.  That 
"proletarian  consciousness"  upon  which  the  Bol- 
sheviki    based   their   faith    must    have   been   sadly 

lacking  in  the  workers  if,  at  such  a  time,  they  were 
15 


222  "THE   GREATEST   FAILURE 

susceptible  to  the  influence  of  the  "propertied 
classes."  The  fact  is  that  the  destructive  anar- 
chical spirit  they  had  fostered  was  now  a  deadly 
menace  to  the  Bolsheviki  themselves.  Shliapnikov 
wrote : 

The  propertied  classes  are  endeavoring  to  create 
anarchy  and  the  ruin  of  industry  by  provoking  the  work- 
men to  excesses  and  violence  over  the  question  of  fore- 
men, technicians,  and  engineers.  They  hope  thereby 
to  achieve  the  complete  and  final  ruin  of  all  the  mills 
and  factories.  The  revolutionary  Commission  of  Labor 
asks  you,  our  worker-comrades,  to  abstain  from  all 
acts  of  violence  and  excess.  By  a  joint  and  creative 
work  of  the  laboring  masses  and  proletarian  organiza- 
tions, the  Commission  of  Labor  will  know  how  to  sur- 
mount all  obstacles  in  its  way.  The  new  revolutionary 
government  will  apply  the  most  drastic  measures 
against  all  industrials  and  those  who  continue  to  sabotage 
industry,  and  thereby  prevent  the  carrying  out  of  the 
tasks  and  aims  of  the  great  proletarian  and  peasant 
Revolution.  Executions  without  trial  and  other  arbi- 
trary acts  will  only  damage  the  cause  of  the  Revolution. 
The  Commission  of  Labor  calls  on  you  for  self-control 
and  revolutionary  discipline. 

In  January,  1918,  Lenin  read  to  a  gathering  of 
party  workers  a  characteristic  series  of  numbered 
"theses,"  which  Izvestia  published  on  March  8th  of 
that  year.     In  that  document  he  said: 

1.    The  situation  of  the  Russian  Revolution  at  the  pres- 
ent moment  is  such  that  almost  all  workmen   and  the 
overwhelming    majority    of   the    peasants    undoubtedly 
are  on  the  side  of  the  Soviet  authority,  and  of  the  social 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  223 

revolution  started  by  it.     To  that  extent  the  success  of 
the  socialistic  revolution  in  Russia  is  guaranteed. 

2.  At  the  same  time  the  civil  war,  caused  by  the  frantic 
resistance  of  the  propertied  classes  which  understand 
very  well  that  they  are  facing  the  last  and  decisive  strug- 
gle to  preserve  private  property  in  land,  and  in  the  means 
of  production,  has  not  as  yet  reached  its  highest  point. 
The  victory  of  the  Soviet  authority  in  this  war  is  guar- 
anteed, but  inevitably  some  time  yet  must  pass,  in- 
evitably a  considerable  exertion  of  strength  will  be  re- 
quired, a  certain  period  of  acute  disorganization  and 
chaos,  which  always  attend  any  war  and  in  particular 
a  civil  war,  is  inevitable,  before  the  resistance  of  the 
bourgeoisie  will  be  crushed. 

3.  Further,  this  resistance  takes  less  and  less  active 
and  non-military  forms:  sabotage,  bribing  beggars, 
bribing  agents  of  the  bourgeoisie  who  have  pushed  them- 
selves into  the  ranks  of  the  Socialists  in  order  to  ruin 
the  latter's  cause,  etc.  This  resistance  has  proved 
stubborn,  and  capable  of  assuming  so  many  different 
forms,  that  the  struggle  against  it  will  inevitably  drag 
along  for  a  certain  period,  and  will  probably  not  be 
finished  in  its  main  aspects  before  several  months. 
And  without  a  decisive  victory  over  this  passive  and 
concealed  resistance  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  its  cham- 
pions, the  success  of  the  socialistic  revolution  is 
impossible. 

4.  Finally,  the  organizing  tasks  of  the  socialistic 
reorganization  of  Russia  are  so  enormous  and  difficult 
that  a  rather  prolonged  period  of  time  is  also  required 
to  solve  them,  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  petty 
bourgeois  fellow-travelers  of  the  socialistic  proletariat, 
and  of  the  latter's  low  cultural  level. 

5.  All  these  circumstances  taken  together  are  such 
that  from  them  result  the  necessity,  for  the  success  of 
Socialism  in  Russia,  of  a  certain  interval  of  time,  not  less 


224  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

! 
than  a  few  months,  in  the  course  of  which  the  socialistic 

government    must    have   its   hands    absolutely    free,    in 

order  to  triumph  over  the  bourgeoisie,  first  of  all  in  its 

own  country,  and  in  order  to  adopt  broad  and  deep 

organizing  activity. 


The  greatest  significance  of  Lenin's  words  lies  in 
their  recognition  of  the  seriousness  of  the  non- 
military  forms  of  resistance,  sabotage,  and  the  like, 
and  of  the  "low  cultural  level"  of  the  "socialistic 
proletariat."  Reading  the  foregoing  statements 
carefully  and  remembering  Lenin's  other  utter- 
ances, both  before  and  after,  we  are  compelled  to 
wonder  whether  he  is  intellectually  dishonest,  an 
unscrupulous  trickster  playing  upon  the  credulity 
of  his  followers,  or  merely  a  loose  thinker  adrift  and 
helpless  on  the  swift  tides  of  events.  "For  the 
success  of  Socialism  .  .  .  not  less  than  a  few  months" 
we  read  from  the  pen  of  the  man  who,  in  June  of 
the  previous  year,  while  on  his  way  from  Switzer- 
land, had  written  "Socialism  cannot  now  prevail  in 
Russia";  the  same  man  who  in  May,  1918,  was  to 
tell  his  comrades  "it  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that 
the  even  more  developed  coming  generation  will 
accomplish  a  complete  transition  to  Socialism"; 
who  later  told  Raymond  Robins:  "The  Russian 
Revolution  will  probably  fail.  We  have  not  de- 
veloped far  enough  in  the  capitalist  stage,  we  are 
too  primitive  to  realize  the  Socialist  state."  1 

And  yet — "the  success  of  Socialism  .  .  .  not  less 
than  a  few  months"! 

By  the  latter  part  of  February,  191 8,  it  was  quite 

1  Vide  testimony  of  Robins  before  U.  S.  Senate  Committee. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  225 

clear  that  the  Soviet  control  of  industry  was 
"killing  the  goose  that  laid  the  golden  eggs";  that 
it  was  ruining  the  industrial  life  of  the  nation.  The 
official  press  began  to  discuss  in  the  most  serious 
manner  the  alarming  decline  in  production  and  the 
staggering  financial  losses  incurred  in  the  operation 
of  what  formerly  had  been  profitable  enterprises. 
At  the  Extraordinary  Congress  of  Soviets,  in  March, 
191 8,  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  caused  great 
alarm  and  a  desperate  appeal  was  made  to  the 
workers  to  increase  production,  refrain  from  sab- 
otage, and  practise  self-discipline.  The  congress 
urged  "a  merciless  struggle  against  chaos  and  dis- 
organization." Lenin  himself  pointed  out  that  con- 
fiscation of  factories  by  the  workers  was  ruining 
Russia.  The  very  policy  they  had  urged  upon  the 
workers,  the  seizure  of  the  factories,  was  now  seen 
as  a  menace. 

On  April  28,  1918,  Lenin  said:  "If  we  are  to  ex- 
propriate at  this  pace,  we  shall  be  certain  to  suffer 
a  defeat.  The  organization  of  production  under 
proletarian  control  is  notoriously  very  much  behind 
the  expropriation  of  big  masses  of  capital."  *  He 
had  already  come  to  realize  that  the  task  of  trans- 
forming capitalist  society  to  a  Socialist  society  was 
not  the  easy  matter  he  had  believed  shortly  before. 
In  September  he  had  looked  upon  the  task  of  re- 
alizing Socialism  as  a  child  might  have  done.     It 

1  Soviets  at  Work.  I  have  quoted  the  passage  as  it  appears  in  the 
English  edition  of  Kautsky's  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat,  p.  125. 
This  rendering,  which  conforms  to  the  French  translations  of  the 
authorized  text,  is  clearer  and  stronger  than  the  version  given  in  the 
confessedly  "improved"  version  of  Lenin's  speech  by  Doctor  Du- 
brovsky,  published  by  the  Rand  School  of  Social  Science. 


226  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

would  require  a  Freudian  expert  to  explain  the 
silly  childishness  of  this  paragraph  from  The  State 
and  Revolution,  published  in  September,  191 7: 

Capitalist  culture  has  created  industry  on  a  large 
scale  in  the  shape  of  factories,  railways,  posts,  telephones, 
and  so  forth;  and  on  this  basis  the  great  majority  of 
the  functions  of  the  old  state  have  become  enormously 
simplified  and  reduced  in  practice  to  very  simple  .oper- 
ations, such  as  registration,  filing,  and  checking.  Hence 
they  will  be  quite  within  the  reach  of  every  literate 
person,  and  it  will  be  possible  to  perform  them  for  the 
usual  "working-man's  wages."  1 

Thus  it  was  in  September,  before  the  overthrow 
of  the  Provisional  Government.  Then  Lenin  was 
at  the  head  of  a  revolting  faction  and  presented  the 
task  of  reorganizing  the  state  as  very  simple  in- 
deed. In  April  he  was  at  the  head  of  a  govern- 
ment, confronted  by  realities,  and  emphasizing  the 
enormous  difficulty  and  complexity  of  the  task  of 
reorganization.  The  Soviets  at  Work  and  the  later 
booklet,  The  Chief  Tasks  of  Our  Times,  lay  great 
emphasis  upon  the  great  difficulties  to  be  overcome, 
the  need  of  experienced  and  trained  men,  and  the 
folly  of  expecting  anything  like  immediate  suc- 
cess. "We  know  all  about  Socialism,"  he  said, 
"but  we  do  not  know  how  to  organize  on  a  large 
scale,  how  to  manage  distribution,  and  so  on.  The 
old  Bolshevist  leaders  have  not  taught  us  these 
things,  and  this  is  not  to  the  credit  of  our  party 

1  The  State  and  Revolution,  by  N.  Lenin,  p.  12. 

2  The  Chief  Tasks  of  Our  Times,  p.  12. 


>>  0 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  227 

The  same  man  who  had  urged  the  workers  to 
"take  possession  of  the  factories"  now  realized  how 
utterly  unfitted  the  mass  of  the  workers  must  be 
for  undertaking  the  management  of  modern  in- 
dustrial establishments: 

To  every  deputation  of  workers  which  has  come  to 
me  complaining  that  a  factory  was  stopping  work,  I 
have  said,  "If  you  desire  the  confiscation  of  your  factory 
the  decree  forms  are  ready,  and  I  can  sign  a  decree  at 
once.  But  tell  me:  Can  you  take  over  the  management 
of  the  concern?  Have  you  reckoned  what  you  can  pro- 
duce? Do  you  know  the  relations  of  your  work  with 
Russian  and  foreign  markets?"  Then  it  has  appeared 
that  they  are  inexperienced  in  these  matters;  that  there 
is  nothing  about  them  in  the  Bolshevist  literature,  in 
the  Menshevist,  either.1 

Lenin  and  his  associates  had  been  brought  face 
to  face  with  a  condition  which  many  Marxian 
Socialist  writers  had  foreseen  was  likely  to  exist, 
not  only  in  Russia,  but  in  far  more  highly  developed 
industrial  nations,  namely,  a  dangerous  decline  of 
production  and  of  the  average  productivity  of  the 
workers,  instead  of  the  enormous  increase  which 
must  be  attained  before  any  of  the  promises  of 
Socialism  could  be  redeemed.  A  few  figures  from 
official  Bolshevist  sources  will  serve  to  illustrate  the 
seriousness  of  the  decline  in  production.  The  great 
Soromovo  Works  had  produced  fifteen  locomotives 
monthly,  even  during  the  last  months  of  the 
Kerensky  regime.  By  the  end  of  April,  191 8,  it 
was  pointed  out,  the  output  was  barely  two  per 

1  Idem,  p.  12. 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

month.  At  the  Mytishchy  Works  in  Moscow,  the 
production,  as  compared  with  1916,  was  only  40 
per  cent.  At  this  time  the  Donetz  Basin  was  held 
by  the  Bolsheviki.  The  average  monthly  output 
in  the  coal-fields  of  this  important  territory  prior 
to  the  arrival  of  the  Bolsheviki  was  125,000,000 
poods.  The  rule  of  the  Bolsheviki  was  marked  by 
a  serious  and  continuous  decline  in  production, 
dropping  almost  at  once  to  80,000,000  poods  and 
then  steadily  declining,  month  by  month,  until 
in  April-May,  1918,  it  reached  the  low  level  of 
26,000,000  poods.1  When  the  Bolsheviki  were  driven 
away,  the  production  rose  month  by  month,  until, 
in  December,  191 8,  it  had  reached  40,000,000 
poods.  Then  the  Bolsheviki  won  control  once  more 
and  came  back,  and  at  once  production  declined 
with  great  swiftness,  soon  getting  down  to  24,000,- 
000  poods.2  These  figures,  be  it  remembered,  are 
official  Bolshevist  figures. 

So  serious  was  the  decline  of  production  in  every 
department  that  a  commission  was  appointed  to 
investigate  the  matter.  The  commission  reported 
in  January,  1919,  and  from  its  report  the  following 
facts  are  quoted:  in  the  Moscow  railway  work- 
shops the  number  of  workmen  in  1916  was  1,192; 
in  1917  the  number  was  1,179;  m  1918  it  was 
1,772 — an  increase  of  50  per  cent.  The  number  of 
holidays  and  "off  days"  rose  from  6  per  cent,  in 
1916  to  12  per  cent,  in  1917  and  39.5  per  cent,  in 
191 8.  At  the  same  time,  each  car  turned  out  per 
month  represented  the  labor  of  3.35  men  in  191 8 

1  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  May  6,  1919. 

2  Idem. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  229 

as  against  I  in  1917  and  .44  in  1916.  In  the 
Mytishchy  Works,  Moscow,  the  loss  of  production 
was  enormous.  Taking  the  eight-hour  day  as  a 
basis,  and  counting  as  100  the  production  of  1916, 
the  production  in  1917  amounted  to  75,  and  only 
40  in  1918.  In  the  coal-mines  of  the  Moscow  re- 
gion the  fall  of  labor  productivity  was  equally 
marked.  The  normal  production  per  man  is  given 
as  750  poods  per  month.  In  1916  the  production 
was  614  poods;  in  1917  it  was  448  poods,  and  in 
191 8  it  was  only  242  poods.  In  the  textile  in- 
dustries the  decline  in  productivity  was  35  per  cent., 
including  the  flax  industry,  which  does  not  depend 
upon  the  importation  of  raw  materials.1  In  the 
Scherbatchev  factory  the  per-capita  production  of 
calico  was  68  per  cent,  lower  than  in  1917,  accord- 
ing to  the  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  50). 

It  is  not  necessary  to  quote  additional  statistics 
from  the  report  of  the  investigating  commission. 
The  figures  cited  are  entirely  typical.  The  report 
as  a  whole  reveals  that  there  not  only  had  been  no 
arrest  of  the  serious  decline  of  the  year  1917,  but 
an  additional  decline  at  an  accelerated  rate,  and  that 
the  condition  was  general  throughout  all  branches 
of  industry.  The  report  attributes  this  serious  con- 
dition partly  to  loss  of  efficiency  in  the  workers  due 
to  under-nutrition,  but  more  particularly  to  the 
mistaken  conception  of  freedom  held  by  the  workers, 
their  irresponsibility  and  indifference;    to  adminis- 

1  For  most  of  the  statistical  data  in  this  chapter  I  am  indebted 
to  Prof.  V.  I.  Issaiev,  whose  careful  analyses  of  the  statistical  reports 
of  the  Soviet  Government  are  of  very  great  value  to  all  students  of 
the  subject. — Author. 


230  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

trative  chaos  arising  from  inefficiency;  and,  finally, 
the  enormous  amount  of  time  lost  in  holding  meet- 
ings and  elections  and  in  endless  committees.  In 
general  this  report  confirms  the  accounts  furnished 
by  the  agent  of  the  governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  of  America  and  published 
by  them,1  as  well  as  reports  made  by  well-known 
European  Socialists. 

As  early  as  April,  191 8,  Lenin  and  other  Bolshe- 
vist leaders  had  taken  cognizance  of  the  enormous 
loss  of  time  consumed  by  the  innumerable  meetings 
which  Soviet  control  of  industry  involved.  Lenin 
claimed,  with  much  good  reason,  that  much  of  this 
wasteful  talking  was  the  natural  reaction  of  men 
who  had  been  repressed  too  long,  though  his  argu- 
ment is  somewhat  weakened  by  the  fact  that  there 
had  been  eight  months  of  such  talk  before  the 
Bolshevist  regime  began: 

The  habit  of  holding  meetings  is  ridiculed,  and  more 
often  wrathfully  hissed  at  by  the  bourgeoisie,  Men- 
sheviks,  etc.,  who  see  only  chaos,  senseless  bustle,  and 
outbursts  of  petty  bourgeoisie  egoism.  But  without  the 
"holding  of  meetings"  the  oppressed  masses  could  never 
pass  from  the  discipline  forced  by  the  exploiters  to  con- 
scious and  voluntary  discipline.  "Meeting-holding" 
is  the  real  democracy  of  the  toilers,  their  straightening 
out,  their  awakening  to  a  new  life,  their  first  steps  on 
the  field  which  they  themselves  have  cleared  of  reptiles 
(exploiters,  imperialists,  landed  proprietors,  capitalists), 

1  See  the  British  White  Book  and  the  Memorandum  on  Certain  As- 
pects of  the  Bolshevist  Movement  in  Russia,  presented  to  the  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  of  the  U.  S.  Senate  by  Secretary  of  State  Lansing, 
January  5,  1920. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  231 

and  which  they  want  to  learn  to  put  in  order  themselves 
in  their  own  way;  for  themselves,  in  accord  with  the 
principles  of  their,  "Soviet,"  rule,  and  not  the  rule  of 
the  foreigners,  of  the  nobility  and  bourgeoisie.  The 
November  victory  of  the  toilers  against  the  exploiters 
was  necessary;  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  whole  period 
of  elementary  discussion  by  the  toilers  themselves  of 
the  new  conditions  of  life  and  of  the  new  problems  to 
make  possible  a  secure  transition  to  higher  forms  of  labor 
discipline,  to  a  conscious  assimilation  of  the  idea  of  the 
necessity  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  to  absolute 
submission  to  the  personal  orders  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Soviet  rule  during  work.1 

There  is  a  very  characteristic  touch  of  Machiavel- 
lian artistry  in  this  reference  to  "a  secure  transition 
to  higher  forms  of  labor  discipline,"  in  which  there 
is  to  be  "absolute  submission  to  the  personal  orders 
of  the  representatives  of  the  Soviet  rule  dur- 
ing work."  The  eloquent  apologia  for  the  Soviet 
system  of  industrial  control  by  the  workers  carries 
the  announcement  of  the  liquidation  of  that  system. 
It  is  to  be  replaced  by  some  "higher  forms  of  labor 
discipline,"  forms  which  will  not  attempt  the  im- 
possible task  of  conducting  factories  on  debating- 
society  lines."  The  "petty  bourgeois  tendency  to 
turn  the  members  of  the  Soviets  into  'parliamen- 
tarians,' or,  on  the  other  hand,  into  bureaucrats," 
is  to  be  combated.  In  many  places  the  depart- 
ments of  the  Soviets  are  turning  "into  organs  which 
gradually  merge  with  the  commissariats" — in  other 
words,  are  ceasing  to  function  as  governing  bodies 
in  the  factories.     There  is  a  difficult  transition  to 

1  The  Soviets  at  Work,  p.  37. 


232  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

be  made  which  alone  will  make  possible  "the  definite 
realization  of  Socialism,"  and  that  is  to  put  an  end 
to  the  wastefulness  arising  from  the  attempt  to  com- 
bine the  discussion  and  solution  of  political  problems 
with  work  in  the  factories.  There  must  be  a  return 
to  the  system  of  uninterrupted  work  for  so  many 
hours,  with  politics  after  working-hours.  That  is 
what  is  meant  by  the  statement:  "It  is  our  object 
to  obtain  the  free  -performance  of  state  obligations  by 
every  toiler  after  he  is  through  with  his  eight-hour 
session  of  productive  work." 

Admirable  wisdom!  Saul  among  the  prophets  at 
last!  The  romancer  turns  realist!  But  this  pro- 
gram cannot  be  carried  out  without  making  of  the 
elaborate  system  of  workers'  control  a  wreck,  a 
thing  of  shreds  and  patches.  Away  goes  the  Uto- 
pian combination  of  factory  and  forum,  in  which 
the  dynamos  are  stilled  when  there  are  speeches  to 
be  made — pathetic  travesty  of  industry  and  govern- 
ment both.  The  toiler  must  learn  that  his  "state 
obligations"  are  to  be  performed  after  the  day's 
work  is  done,  and  not  in  working-time  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  pay-roll.  More  than  this,  it  is  necessary 
to  place  every  factory  under  the  absolute  dictator- 
ship of  one  person: 


Every  large  machine  industry  requires  an  absolute 
and  strict  unity  of  the  will  which  directs  the  joint  work 
of  hundreds,  thousands,  and  tens  of  thousands  of 
people.  .  .  .  But  how  can  we  secure  a  strict  unity  of 
will?  By  subjecting  the  will  of  thousands  to  the  will 
of  one.1 

1  77*1?  Soviets  at  Work. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  233 

If  the  workers  are  properly  submissive,  if  they 
are  "ideally  conscious  and  disciplined,"  this  dic- 
tatorship may  be  a  very  mild  affair;  otherwise  it 
will  be  stern  and  harsh: 

There  is  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  simple  and 
obvious  fact  that,  if  the  chief  misfortunes  of  Russia  are 
famine  and  unemployment,  these  misfortunes  cannot  be 
overcome  by  any  outbursts  of  enthusiasm,  but  only  by 
thorough  and  universal  organization  of  discipline,  in 
order  to  increase  the  production  of  bread  for  men  and 
fuel  for  industry,  to  transport  it  in  time,  and  to  dis- 
tribute it  in  the  right  way.  That,  therefore,  respon- 
sibility for  the  pangs  of  famine  and  unemployment  falls 
on  every  one  who  violates  the  labor  discipline  in  any', 
enterprise  and  in  any  business.  That  those  who  are 
responsible  should  be  discovered,  tried,  and  punished  : 
without  mercy.1 


-. 


Not  only  must  the  workers  abandon  their  crude 
conception  of  industrial  democracy  as  requiring  the 
abolition  of  individual  authority,  but  they  must  also 
abandon  the  notion  that  in  the  management  of 
industry  one  man  is  as  good  as  another.  They 
must  learn  that  experts  are  necessary:2    "Without 

1  Idem. 

2  A  much  later  statement  of  Lenin's  view  is  contained  in  this 
paragraph  from  a  speech  by  him  on  March  17,  1920.  The  quotation 
is  from  Soviet  Russia,  official  organ  of  the  Russian  Soviet  Government 
Bureau  in  the  Unitec1  States: 

"Every  form  of  administrative  work  requires  specific  qualifications. 
One  may  be  the  best  revolutionist  and  agitator  and  yet  useless  as  an 
administrator.  It  is  important  that  those  who  manage  industries  be 
completely  competent,  and  be  acquainted  with  all  technical  conditions 
within  the  industry.  .We  are  not  opposed  to  the  management  of 
industries  by  the  workers.     But  we  point  out  that  the  solution  of  the 


2U  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  direction  of  specialists  of  different  branches  of 
knowledge,  technique,  and  experience,  the  trans- 
formation toward  Socialism  is  impossible."  Al- 
though it  is  a  defection  from  proletarian  principles, 
a  compromise,  "a  step  backward  by  our  Socialist 
Soviet  state,"  it  is  necessary  to  "make  use  of  the 
old  bourgeois  method  and  agree  to  a  very  high  re- 
muneration for  the  biggest  of  the  bourgeois  special- 
ists." The  proletarian  principles  must  still  further 
be  compromised  and  the  payment  of  time  wages  on 
the  basis  of  equal  remuneration  for  all  workers  must 
give  place  to  payment  according  to  performance; 
piece-work  must  be  adopted.  Finally,  the  Taylor 
system  of  scientific  management  must  be  intro- 
duced: "The  possibility  of  Socialism  will  be 
determined  by  our  success  in  combining  the  Soviet 
rule  and  Soviet  organization  of  management  with 
the  latest  progressive  measures  of  capitalism.  We 
must  introduce  in  Russia  the  study  and  the  teaching 
of  the  Taylor  system,  and  its  systematic  trial  and 
adaptation."1 

In  all  this  there  is  much  that  is  fine  and  admirable, 
but  it  is  in  direct  and  fundamental  opposition  to  the 
whole  conception  of  industrial  control  by  factory 
Soviets.  No  thoughtful  person  can  read  and  com- 
pare the  elaborate  provisions  of  the  Instructions 
on  Workers'  Control,  already  summarized,  and 
Lenin's  Soviets  at  Work  without  reaching  the  con- 

queslion  must  be  subordinate  to  the  interests  of  the  industry.  Therefore 
the  question  of  the  management  of  industry  must  be  regarded  from 
a  business  standpoint.  The  industry  must  be  managed  with  the 
least  possible  waste  of  energy,  and  the  managers  of  the  industry 
must  be  efficient  men,  whether  they  be  specialists  or  workers." 
1  The  Soviets  at  Work. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  235 

elusion  that  the  adoption  of  the  proposals  contained 
in  the  latter  absolutely  destroys  the  former.  The 
end  of  the  Soviet  as  a  proletarian  industry-directing 
instrument  was  already  in  sight. 

Bolshevism  was  about  to  enter  upon  a  new  phase. 
What  the  general  character  of  that  phase  would  be 
was  quite  clear.  It  had  already  been  determined 
and  Lenin's  task  was  to  justify  what  was  in  reality 
a  reversal  of  policy.  The  essential  characteristics 
of  the  Soviet  system  in  industry,  having  proved 
to  be  useless  impedimenta,  were  to  be  discarded, 
and,  in  like  manner,  anti-Statism  was  to  be  ex- 
changed for  an  exaggerated  Statism.  In  February, 
191 8,  the  Bolshevist  rulers  of  Russia  were  con- 
fronted by  a  grave  menace,  an  evil  inherent  in 
Syndicalism  in  all  its  variant  forms,  including 
Bolshevism — namely,  the  assertion  of  exorbitant 
demands  by  workers  employed  in  performing  ser- 
vices of  immediate  and  vital  importance  in  the  so- 
called  "key  industries."  Although  the  railway 
workers  were  only  carrying  the  Bolshevist  theories 
into  practice,  acquiescence  in  their  demands  would 
have  placed  the  whole  industrial  life  of  Russia 
under  their  domination.  Instead  of  a  dictatorship 
of  the  proletariat,  there  would  have  been  dictator- 
ship by  a  single  occupational  group.  Faced  by  this 
danger,  the  Bolshevist  Government  did  not  hesitate 
to  nationalize  the  railways  and  place  them  under  an 
absolute  dictator,  responsible,  not  to  the  railway 
workers,  but  to  the  central  Soviet  authority,  the 
government.  Wages,  hours  of  labor,  and  working 
conditions  were  no  longer  subject  to  the  decision  of 
the  railway  workers'  councils,  but  were  determined 


236  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

by  the  dictators  appointed  by  the  state.  The 
railway  workers'  unions  were  no  longer  recognized, 
and  the  right  to  strike  was  denied  and  strikes  de- 
clared to  be  treason  against  the  state.  The  railway 
workers'  councils  were  not  abolished  at  first,  but 
were  reduced  to  a  nominal  existence  as  "consulta- 
'  tive  bodies,"  which  in  practice  were  not  consulted. 
Here  was  the  apotheosis  of  the  state:  the  new 
policy  could  not  be  restricted  to  railways;  nation- 
alization of  industry,  under  state  direction,  was  to 
take  the  place  of  the  direction  of  industry  by 
autonomous  workers'  councils. 

In  May,  191 8,  Commissar  of  Finances  Gukovsky, 
staggered  by  the  enormous  loss  incurred  upon  every 
hand,  in  his  report  to  the  Congress  of  Soviets  called 
attention  to  the  situation.  He  said  that  the  railway 
system,  the  arterial  system  of  the  industrial  life  of 
the  nation,  was  completely  disorganized  and  de- 
moralized. Freight-tonnage  capacity  had  decreased 
by  70  per  cent.,  while  operating  expenses  had  in- 
creased 150  per  cent.  Whereas  before  the  war 
operating  expenses  were  11,579  rubles  per  verst, 
in  May,  191 8,  wages  alone  amounted  to  80,000 
rubles  per  verst,  the  total  working  expenses  being 
not  less  than  120,000  rubles  per  verst.  A  similar 
state  of  demoralization  obtained,  said  Gukovsky,  in 
the  nationalized  marine  transportation  service.  In 
every  department  of  industry,  according  to  this 
highly  competent  authority,  waste,  inefficiency, 
idleness,  and  extravagance  prevailed.  He  called 
attention  to  the  swollen  salary-list;  the  army  of 
paid  officials.  Already  the  menace  of  what  soon 
developed  into  a  formidable  bureaucracy  was  seen: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  237 

"The  machinery  of  the  old  regime  has  been  pre- 
served, the  ministries  remain,  and  parallel  with 
them  Soviets  have  arisen — provincial,  district, 
volost,  and  so  forth." 

In  June,  191 8,  after  the  railways  had  been  na- 
tionalized for  some  time,  Kobozev,  Bolshevist  Com- 
missar of  Communications,  said:  "The  eight-hour 
workday  and  the  payment  per  hour  have  definitely 
disorganized  the  whole  politically  ignorant  masses, 
who  understand  these  slogans,  not  as  an  appeal  to 
the  most  productive  efficiency  of  a  free  citizen,  but 
as  a  right  to  idleness  unjustified  by  any  technical 
means.  Whole  powerful  railway  workshops  give  a 
daily  disgraceful  exhibition  of  inactivity  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  'Why  should  I  work  when  my  neighbor  is 
paid  by  time  for  doing  no  work  at  all?' 

Although  nationalization  of  industry  had  been 
decided  upon  in  February,  and  a  comprehensive 
plan  for  the  administration  and  regulation  of  na- 
tionalized enterprises  had  been  published  in  March, 
promulgated  as  a  decree,  with  instructions  that  it 
must  be  enforced  by  the  end  of  May,  it  was  not 
until  July  that  the  Soviet  Government  really  de- 
cided upon  its  enforcement.  It  should  be  said, 
however,  that  a  good  many  factories  were  national- 
ized between  April  and  July.  Many  factories  were 
actually  abandoned  by  their  owners  and  directors, 
and  had  to  be  taken  over.  Many  others  were  just 
taken  in  an  "irregular  manner"  by  the  workers, 
who  continued  their  independent  confiscations. 
For  this  there  was  indeed  some  sort  of  authority  in 
the  decree  of  March,   1918.1     Transportation  had 

1(5  1  See  text  of  the  decree — Appendix. 


238  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

broken  down,  and  there  was  a  lack  of  raw  materials. 
It  was  officially  reported  that  in  May  there  were 
more  than  250,000  unemployed  workmen  in  Moscow 
alone.  No  less  than  224  machine-shops,  which  had 
employed  an  aggregate  of  120,000  men,  were  closed. 
Thirty-six  textile  factories,  employing  a  total  of 
136,000  operatives,  were  likewise  idle.  To  avert 
revolt,  it  was  necessary  to  keep  these  unemployed 
workers  upon  the  pay-roll.  Under  czarism  the 
policy  of  subsidizing  industrial  establishments  out 
of  the  government  revenues  had  been  very  exten- 
sively developed.  This  policy  was  continued  by 
the  Provisional  Government  under  Kerensky  and 
by  the  Bolsheviki  in  their  turn.  Naturally,  with 
industry  so  completely  disorganized,  this  led  toward 
bankruptcy  at  a  rapid  rate.  The  following  extract 
from  Gukovsky's  report  to  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  in  May  requires  no  elucidation: 

Our  Budget  has  reached  the  astronomical  figures  of 
from  80  to  100  billions  of  rubles..  No  revenue  can  cover 
such  expenditure.  Our  revenue  for  the  half-year  reaches 
approximately  3,294,000,000  rubles.  It  is  exceedingly 
difficult  to  find  a  way  of  escape  out  of  this  situation. 
The  repudiation  of  state  loans  played  a  very  unfavor- 
able part  in  this  respect,  as  now  it  is  impossible  to  borrow 
money — no  one  will  lend.  Formerly  railways  used  to 
yield  a  revenue,  and  agriculture  likewise.  Now  agri- 
culturists refuse  to  export  their  produce,  they  are  feed- 
ing better  and  hoarding  money.  The  former  apparatus 
— in  the  shape  of  a  Government  Spirit  Monopoly  and 
rural  police  officers — no  longer  exists.  Only  one  thing 
remains  to  be  done — to  issue  paper  money  ad  infinitum. 
But  soon  we  shall  not  be  able  to  do  even  this. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  239 

At  the  Congress  of  the  Soviets  of  People's 
Economy  in  May,  Rykov,  the  president  of  the 
Superior  Council  of  the  National  Board  of  Economy, 
reported,  concerning  the  nationalization  of  indus- 
tries, that  so  far  it  had  been  carried  out  without 
regard  to  industrial  economy  or  efficiency,  but  ex- 
clusively from  the  point  of  view  of  successfully 
struggling  against  the  bourgeoisie.  It  was,  there- 
fore, a  war  measure,  and  must  not  be  judged  by 
ordinary  economic  standards.  Miliutin,  another 
Bolshevist  Commissar,  declared  that  "nationaliza- 
tion bore  a  punitive  character."  It  was  pointed 
out  by  Gostev,  another  Bolshevist  official,  that  it 
had  been  carried  out  against  the  wishes  of  many  of 
the  workers  themselves  quite  as  much  as  against  the 
wishes  of  the  bourgeoisie.  "I  must  laugh  when 
they  speak  of  bourgeois  sabotage,"  he  said.  "We 
have  a  national  people's  and  proletarian  sabotage. 
We  are  met  with  enormous  opposition  from  the  labor 
masses  when  we  start  standardizing."  For  good  or 
ill,  however,  and  despite  all  opposition,  Bolshevism 
had  turned  to  nationalization  and  to  the  erection 
of  a  powerful  and  highly  centralized  state.  What 
the  results  of  that  policy  were  we  shall  see. 


£rCb*? 


240  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


IX 

THE    NATIONALIZATION    OF    INDUSTRY — I 

TO  judge  fairly  and  wisely  the  success  or  failure 
of  an  economic  and  political  policy  so  funda- 
mental and  far-reaching  as  the  nationalization  of 
industry  we  must  discard  theories  altogether  and 
rely  wholly  upon  facts.  Nothing  could  be  easier 
than  to  formulate  theoretical  arguments  of  great 
plausibility  and  force,  either  in  support  of  the  state 
ownership  of  industries  and  their  direction  by  state 
agencies  or  in  opposition  to  such  a  policy.  In- 
teresting such  theorizing  may  be,  but  nothing  can 
be  conclusively  determined  by  it.  When  we  come 
to  deal  with  the  case  of  a  country  where,  as  in 
Russia,  nationalization  of  industry  has  been  tried 
upon  quite  a  large  scale,  there  is  only  one  criterion 
to  apply,  namely,  its  relative  success  as  compared 
with  other  methods  of  industrial  organization  and 
management  in  the  same  or  like  conditions.  If  na- 
tionalization and  state  direction  can  be  shown  to 
have  brought  about  greater  advantage  than  other 
forms  of  industrial  ownership  and  control,  then 
nationalization  is  justified  by  that  result;  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  its  advantages  are  demonstrably  less, 
it  must  be  judged  a  failure. 


1 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  241 


Whether  the  nationalization  of  industry  by  the 
Bolshevist  Government  of  Russia  was  a  sound 
policy,  wisely  conceived  and  carried  out  with  a 
reasonable  degree  of  efficiency,  can  be  determined 
with  a  fair  approach  to  certainty  and  finality. 
Our  opinions  concerning  Karl  Marx's  theory  of  the 
economic  motivation  of  social  evolution,  or  Lenin's 
ability  and  character,  or  the  methods  by  which  the 
Bolsheviki  obtained  power,  are  absolutely  irrelevant 
and  inconsequential.  History  will  base  its  esti- 
mate of  Bolshevism,  not  upon  the  evidence  of  the 
terrorism  which  attended  it,  ample  and  incontest- 
able as  that  evidence  may  be,  but  upon  its  success 
or  failure  in  solving  the  great  economic  problems 
which  it  set  out  to  solve.  Our  judgment  of  the 
nationalization  of  industry  must  not  be  warped  by 
our  resentment  of  those  features  of  Bolshevist  rule 
which  established  its  tyrannical  character.  The 
ample  testimony  furnished  by  the  official  journals 
published  by  the  Bolshevist  Government  and  the 
Communist  Party  enables  us  to  visualize  with 
great  clearness  the  conditions  prevailing  in  Russia 
before  nationalization  of  industry  was  resorted  to. 
We  have  seen  that  there  was  an  alarming  shortage 
of  production,  a  ruinous  excess  of  cost  per  unit  of 
production,  a  great  deal  of  inefficiency  and  waste, 
together  with  a  marked  increase  in  the  number  of 
salaried  administrative  officials.  We  have  seen 
that  during  the  period  of  industrial  organization 
and  direction  by  the  autonomous  organizations  of 
the  workers  in  the  factories  these  evils  grew  to 
menacing  proportions.  It  was  to  remedy  these 
evils    that    nationalization    was    resorted    to.     If, 


242  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

therefore,  we  can  obtain  definite  and  authoritative 
answers  to  certain  questions  which  inevitably  sug- 
gest themselves,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  judge 
the  merits  of  nationalization,  not  as  a  general 
policy,  for  all  times  and  places,  but  as  a  policy  for 
Russia  in  the  circumstances  and  conditions  pre- 
vailing when  it  was  undertaken.  The  questions 
suggest  themselves:  Was  there  any  increase  in  the 
total  volume  of  production?  Was  the  average  per- 
capita  production  raised  or  lowered?  Did  the  new 
methods  result  in  lessening  the  excessive  average 
cost  per  unit  of  production?  Was  there  any  per- 
ceptible marked  increase  in  efficiency?  Finally,  did 
nationalization  lessen  the  number  of  salaried  ad- 
ministrative officials  or  did  it  have  a  contrary 
effect  ? 

We  are  not  concerned  with  opinions  here,  but 
only  with  such  definite  facts  as  are  to  be  had. 
The  replies  to  our  questions  are  to  be  found  in  the 
mass  of  statistical  data  which  the  Bolsheviki  have 
published.  We  are  not  compelled  to  rely  upon  any- 
body's opinions  or  observations;  the  numerous  re- 
ports published  by  the  responsible  officials  of  the 
Bolshevist  Government,  and  by  their  official  press, 
contain  an  abundance  of  statistical  evidence  afford- 
ing adequate  and  reliable  answer  to  each  of  the 
questions  we  have  asked. 

Because  the  railways  were  nationalized  first,  and 
because  of  their  vital  importance  to  the  general 
economic  life  of  the  nation,  let  us  consider  how  the 
nationalization  of  railroad  transportation  worked 
out.  The  following  table  is  taken  from  the  report 
of  the  Commissar  of  Ways  and  Communications: 


IN   ALL  HISTORY" 


213 


Year 

Gross 

Receipts 
(rubles) 

Working 

Expenses 

(rubles) 

Working 

Expenses 

per  Verst 

(rubles) 

Wages  and 
Salaries 
(rubles) 

Profit  and 

Loss 

(rubles) 

1916. . 
1917- • 
1918.  . 

1.350,000,000 
1,400,000,000 
1,500,000,000 

1,210,000,000 
3,300,000,000 
9,500,000,000 

1.700 
46,000 

44.000 

650,000,000 
2,300,000,000 
8.000,000,000 

+  140,000,000 
— 1,900,000,000 
—  8,000,000,000 

These  figures  indicate  that  the  nationalization  of 
railways  during  the  nine  months  of  191 8  was  charac- 
terized by  a  condition  which  no  country  in  the 
world  could  stand  for  a  very  long  time.  This 
official  table  affords  no  scintilla  of  a  suggestion 
that  nationalization  was  succeeding  any  better 
than  the  anarcho-Syndicalist  management  which 
preceded  it.  The  enormous  increase  in  operating 
cost,  the  almost  stationary  receipts,  and  the  result- 
ing colossal  deficit  require  no  comment.  At  least 
on  the  financial  side  the  nationalization  policy  can- 
not be  said  to  have  been  a  success,  a  fact  which  was 
frankly  admitted  by  the  Severnaya  Communa, 
March  26,  1919.  To  see  a  profit  of  140  million 
rubles  transformed  into  a  loss  of  8  billion  rubles  is 
surely  a  serious  matter. 

Let  us,  however,  adopt  another  test  than  that  of 
finance,  namely,  the  service  test,  and  see  whether 
that  presents  us  with  a  more  favorable  result: 
According  to  the  official  report  of  the  Commissar  of 
Ways  and  Communications,  there  were  in  opera- 
tion on  October  1,  1917 — that  is,  shortly  before  the 
Bolshevist  coup  d'etat — 52,597  versts1  of  railroad  line 
in  operation;  on  October  1,  191 8,  there  were  in 
operation  21,800  versts,  a  decrease  of  30,797.  On 
October  1,  191 7,  there  were  in  working  order  15,732 

1  One  verst  equals  .663  mile,  roughly,  about  two-thirds  of  a  mile. 


244  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

locomotives;  on  October  I,  1918,  the  number  had 
dwindled  to  5,037,  a  decrease  of  10,695.  On 
October  1,  1917,  the  number  of  freight  cars  in 
working  condition  was  521,591 ;  on  October  1,  1918, 
the  number  was  227,274,  a  decrease  of  294,317. 

The  picture  presented  by  these  figures  is,  for  one 
who  knows  the  economic  conditions  in  Russia, 
simply  appalling.  At  its  best  the  Russian  railway 
system  was  wholly  inadequate  to  serve  the  economic 
life  of  the  nation.  The  foregoing  official  figures 
indicate  an  utter  collapse  of  the  railways  at  a  time 
when  the  nation  needed  an  efficient  railroad  trans- 
portation system  more  than  at  any  time  in  its  his- 
tory. One  of  the  reasons  for  the  collapse  of  the 
railway  system  was  the  failure  of  the  fuel  supply. 
In  northern  and  central  Russia  wood  is  generally 
used  for  fuel  in  the  factories  and  on  the  railways. 
Difficult  as  it  might  be  for  them  to  maintain  the 
supply  of  coal  under  the  extraordinary  conditions 
prevailing,  it  would  seem  that  with  enormous 
forests  at  their  disposal,  so  near  at  hand,  they  would 
have  found  it  relatively  easy  to  supply  the  railways 
with  wood  for  fuel  purposes.  Yet  nowhere  in  the 
whole  range  of  the  industrial  system  of  Russia  was 
the  failure  more  disastrous  or  more  complete  than 
here.  According  to  an  official  estimate,  the  amount 
of  wood  fuel  required  for  the  railways  from  May  1, 
1918,  to  May  1,  1919,  estimated  upon  the  basis  of 
"famine  rations,"  was  4,954,000  cubic  sazhens,1  of 
which  858,000  cubic  sazhens  was  on  hand,  leaving 
4,096,000  cubic  sazhens  as  the  amount  to  be  pro- 
vided.    A  report  published  in  the  Economicheskaya 

1  One  sazhen  equals  seven  feet. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  245 

Zhizn  (No.  41)  stated  that  not  more  than  18  per 
cent,  of  the  total  amount  of  wood  required  was 
felled,  and  that  not  more  than  one-third  of  that 
amount  was  actually  delivered  to  the  railways.  In 
other  words,  82  per  cent,  of  the  wood  fuel  was  not 
cut  at  all,  at  least  so  far  as  the  particular  economic 
body  whose  business  it  was  to  provide  the  wood 
was  concerned.  Extraordinary  measures  had  to  be 
taken  to  secure  the  fuel.  From  Economicheskaya 
Zhizn,  February  22,  1919,  we  learn  that  the  rail- 
way administration  managed  to  secure  fuel  wood 
amounting  to  70  per  cent,  of  its  requirements,  and 
the  People's  Superior  Economic  Council  another  2 
per  cent.,  a  very  large  part  of  which  had  been  se- 
cured by  private  enterprise.  If  this  last  statement 
seems  astonishing  and  anomalous,  it  must  be  under- 
stood that  as  early  as  January  17,  1919,  Lenin,  as 
President  of  the  Central  Soviet  Government, 
promulgated  a  decree  which  in  a  very  large  measure 
restored  the  right  to  private  enterprise.  Already 
nationalization  was  being  pronounced  a  failure  by 
Lenin.  In  an  address  announcing  this  remarkable 
modification  of  policy  he  said : 

If  each  peasant  would  consent  to  reduce  his  consump- 
tion of  products  to  a  point  a  little  less  than  his  needs 
and  turn  over  the  remainder  to  the  state,  and  if  we  were 
able  to  distribute  that  remainder  regularly,  we  could  go 
on,  assuring  the  population  a  food-supply,  insufficient, 
it  is  true,  but  enough  to  avoid  famine. 

This  last  is,  however,  beyond  our  strength,  due  to 
our  disorganization.  The  people,  exhausted  by  famine, 
show  the  most  extreme  impatience.  Assuredly,  we  have 
our  food  policy,  but  the  essential  of  it  is  that  the  decrees 


210  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

should  be  executed.  Although  they  zvere  promulgated 
long  ago,  the  decrees  relative  to  the  distribution  of  food 
products  by  the  state  never  have  been  executed  because  the 
peasants  will  sell  nothing  for  paper  money. 

It  is  better  to  tell  the  truth.  The  conditions  require 
that  we  should  pitilessly,  relentlessly  force  our  local  or- 
ganizations to  obey  the  central  power.  This,  again,  is 
difficult  because  millions  of  our  inhabitants  are  ac- 
customed to  regard  any  central  power  as  an  organization 
of  exploiters  and  brigands.  They  have  no  confidence 
in  us  and  without  confidence  it  is  impossible  to  institute 
an  economic  regime. 

The  crisis  in  food-supplies,  aggravated  by  the  break- 
down of  transportation,  explains  the  terrible  situation 
that  confronts  us.  At  Petrograd  the  condition  of  the 
transportation  service  is  desperate.  The  rolling-stock 
is  unusable. 

Another  reason  for  the  failure  of  the  railways  un- 
der nationalization  during  the  first  year's  experi- 
mentation with  that  policy  was  the  demoralization 
of  the  labor  force.  The  low  standard  of  efficiency, 
constant  loafing,  and  idleness  were  factors  in  the 
problem.  The  interference  by  the  workers'  councils 
was  even  more  serious.  When  the  railways  were 
nationalized  the  elected  committees  of  workers, 
while  shorn  of  much  of  their  power,  were  retained 
as  consultative  bodies,  as  we  have  already  seen. 
Toward  the  end  of  1918  the  officials  responsible  for 
the  direction  of  the  railroads  found  even  that 
measure  of  authority  which  remained  to  these 
councils  incompatible  with  efficient  organization. 
Consequently,  at  the  end  of  191 8  the  abolition  of 
the  workers'   committees  of  control  was   decreed 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  247 

and  the  dictatorial  powers  of  the  railroad  directors 
made  absolute.  The  system  of  paying  wages  by  the 
day  was  replaced  by  a  piece-work  system,  supple- 
mented by  cash  bonuses  for  special  efficiency. 
Later  on,  as  we  shall  see,  these  changes  were  made 
applicable  to  all  the  nationalized  industries.  Thus, 
the  principal  features  of  the  capitalist  wage  system 
were  brought  back  to  replace  the  communistic 
principles  which  had  failed.  When  Lomov,  presi- 
dent of  the  Chief  Forest  Committee,  declared,  as 
reported  in  Izvestia,  June  4,  1919,  that  "proletarian 
principles  must  be  set  aside  and  the  services  of 
private  capitalistic  apparatus  made  use  of,"  he 
simply  gave  expression  to  what  was  already  a  very  f 
generally  accepted  view. 

The  "return  to  capitalism,"  as  it  was  commonly 
and  justly  described,  had  begun  in  earnest  some 
months  before  Lomov  made  the  declaration  just 
quoted.  The  movement  was  attended  by  a  great 
deal  of  internal  conflict  and  dissension.  In  par- 
ticular the  trades-unions  were  incensed  because  they 
were  practically  suppressed  as  autonomous  organs 
of  the  working-class.  The  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  was  already  assuming  the  character  of 
a  dictatorship  over  the  proletariat  by  a  strongly 
centralized  state.  The  rulers  of  this  state,  setting 
aside  the  written  Constitution,  were  in  fact  not 
responsible  to  any  electorate.  They  ruled  by  fiat 
and  proclamation  and  ruthlessly  suppressed  all  who 
sought  to  oppose  them.  They  held  that,  industry" 
having  become  nationalized,  trades-unions  were  I 
superfluous,  and  that  strikes  could  not  be  tolerated! 
because  they  became,   ipso  facto,   acts  of  treason. 


248  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

against  the  state.     Such  was  the  evolution  of  this 
anti-Statist  movement. 

The  unions  resisted  the  attempts  to  deprive  them 
of  their  character  as  fighting  organizations.  They 
protested  against  the  denial  of  the  right  to  strike, 
the  suppression  of  their  meetings  and  their  press. 
They  resented  the  arbitrary  fixing  of  their  wages  by 
officials  of  the  central  government.  As  a  result, 
there  was  an  epidemic  of  strikes,  most  of  which 
4  were  suppressed  with  great  promptitude  and  brutal- 
\  ity.  At  the  Alexander  Works,  Moscow,  eighty 
I  workers  were  killed  by  machine-gun  fire.  From 
March  6  to  26,  191 9,  the  Krasnaya  Gazeta  pub- 
lished accounts  of  fifteen  strikes  in  Petrograd, 
involving  more  than  half  the  wage-workers  of  the 
city,  some  of  the  strikes  being  attended  with  vio- 
lence which  was  suppressed  by  armed  troops.  At 
the  beginning  of  March  there  was  such  a  strike  at 
the  Tula  Works,  reported  in  Izvestia,  March  2,  191 9. 
On  March  16,  1919,  the  Severnaya  Communa  gave 
an  account  of  the  strike  at  the  famous  Putilov 
Works,  and  of  the  means  taken  to  "clear  out  the 
Social  Revolutionary  blackguards" — meaning  there- 
by the  striking  workmen.  Pravda  published  on 
March  23,  1919,  accounts  of  serious  strikes  at  the 
Putilov  Works,  the  Arthur  Koppel  Works,  the 
government  car-building  shops,  and  elsewhere. 
Despite  a  clearly  defined  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
press  to  ignore  labor  struggles  as  far  as  possible, 
sufficient  was  published  to  show  that  there  was  an 
intense  struggle  by  the  Russian  proletariat  against 
its  self-constituted  masters.  "The  workers  of  Pet- 
rograd are  in  the  throes  of  agitation,  and  strikes 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  249 

are  occurring  in  some  shops.     The  Bolsheviki  have 
been  making  arrests,"  said  Izvestia  on  March  2,  1919. 
Of  course  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  the  strikes 
did  not  of  themselves  indicate  a  condition  of  unrest 
and    dissatisfaction    peculiar   to    Russia.     That    is 
quite  true.     There  were  strikes  in  many  countries 
in  the  early  months  of  191 9.     This  fact  does  not, 
however,  add  anything  to  the  strength  of  the  de- 
fense of  the  Bolshevist  regime.     In  the  capitalist 
countries,  where  the  struggle  between  the  wage- 
earning  and  the  employing  classes  is  a  normal  con- 
dition, strikes  are  very  ordinary  phenomena.    The' 
Bolsheviki,   in   common  with   all  other  Socialists,  | 
pointed  to  these  conflicts  as  evidence  of  the  unfit- 
ness of  capitalism  to  continue,  and  of  the  need  for 
Socialism.     It  was  the  very  essence  of  their  faith 
that  in  the  Socialist  state  strikes  would  be  unknown, 
because  no  conflict  of  class  interests  would  be  pos-  \ 
sible.     Yet  here  in  the  Utopia  of  the  Bolsheviki  the 
proletarian  dictatorship  was  accompanied  by  strikes 
and  lock-outs  precisely  like  those  common  to  the 
capitalist  system  in  all  lands.     Moreover,  while  the 
nations  which  still  retained  the  capitalist  system  had 
their  strikes,  there  was  not  one  of  them  in  which  such 
brutal  methods  of  repression  were  resorted  to.     Russia 
was  at  war,  we  are  told,  and  strikes  were  a  deadly 
menace  to  her  very  existence.     But  this  argument, 
like  the  other,  is  of  no  avail.     England,  France, 
Italy,  and  America  on  the  one  side,  and  Germany 
and  Austria  upon  the  other  side,  all  had  strikes  dur- 
ing the  war,  but  in  no  one  of  them  were  strikers 
shot  down  with   such    savage    recklessness    as    in 
Russia  under  the  Bolsheviki. 


250  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Where  and  when  in  any  of  the  great  capitalist 
nations  during  the  war  was  there  such  a  butchery 
of  striking  workmen  as  that  at  the  Alexander 
Works,  already  referred  to?  Where  and  when  dur- 
ing the  whole  course  of  the  war  did  any  capitalist 
government  suppress  a  strike  of  workmen  with 
anything  like  the  brutality  with  which  the  Bolshe- 
vist masters  of  Russia  suppressed  the  strike  at 
the  Putilov  Works  in  March,  1919?  At  first  the 
marines  in  Petrograd  were  ordered  to  disperse  the 
strikers  and  break  the  strike,  but  they  refused  to 
obey  the  order.  At  a  meeting  these  marines  de- 
cided that,  rather  than  shoot  down  the  striking 
workmen,  they  would  join  forces  with  them.  Then 
the  Bolsheviki  called  out  detachments  of  coast 
guards,  armed  sailors  from  Kronstadt  and  Petrograd 
formerly  belonging  to  the  "disciplinary  battalions," 
chiefly  Letts.  The  strikers  put  up  an  armed  re- 
sistance, being  supported  in  this  by  a  small  body  of 
soldiers.  They  were  soon  overcome,  however,  and 
the  armed  sailors  took  possession  of  the  works  and 
summarily  executed  many  of  the  strikers,  shooting 
them  on  the  spot  without  even  a  drum-head  court 
martial.  The  authorities  issued  a  proclamation — 
published  in  Severnaya  Communa,  March  16,  1919 — 
forbidding  the  holding  of  meetings  and  "inviting" 
the  strikers  back  to  work: 


All  honest  workmen  desirous  of  carrying  out  the  de- 
cision of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  and  ready  to  start  work 
will  be  allowed  to  go  into  the  factory  on  condition  that 
they  forthwith  go  to  their  places  and  take  up  their 
work.     All  those  who  begin  work  will  receive  an  addi- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  251 

tional  ration  of  one-half  pound  of  bread.  The}/  who  do 
not  want  to  resume  work  will  be  at  once  discharged, 
without  receiving  any  concessions.  A  special  commission 
will  be  formed  for  the  reorganization  of  the  works. 
No  meetings  will  be  allowed  to  be  held.  .  .  .  For  the  last 
time  the  Petrograd  Soviet  invites  the  Putilov  workmen 
to  expiate  their  crime  committed  against  the  working- 
class  and  the  peasantry  of  Russia,  and  to  cease  at  once 
their  foolish  strike. 

On  the  following  day  this  "invitation"  was  fol- 
lowed up  by  a  typical  display  of  Bolshevist  force. 
A  detachment  of  armed  sailors  went  to  the  homes  of 
the  striking  workmen  and  at  the  point  of  the  bayo- 
net drove  the  men  back  into  the  works,  about  which 
a  strong  guard  was  placed.  The  men  were  kept 
at  work  by  armed  guards  placed  at  strategic  posi- 
tions in  the  shops.  All  communication  with  the 
outside  w7as  strictly  prohibited.  Numerous  arrests 
were  made.  With  grim  irony  the  Bolshevist  of- 
ficials posted  in  and  around  the  shops  placards 
explaining  that,  unlike  imperialistic  and  capitalistic 
governments,  the  Soviet  authority  had  no  intention 
of  suppressing  strikes  or  insurrections  by  armed 
force.  For  the  good  of  the  Revolution,  however, 
and  to  meet  the  war  needs,  the  government  would 
use  every  means  at  its  command  to  force  the  work- 
men to  remain  at  their  tasks  and  to  prevent  all 
demonstrations. 

A  bitter  struggle  took  place  between  the  trades- 
unions  and  the  Soviet  Government.  It  was  due, 
not  to  strikes  merely,  or  even  mainly,  though  these 
naturally  brought  out  its  bitterest  manifestations. 
The  real  cause  of  the  conflict  was  the  fact  that  the 


252  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

government  had  thrown  communism  to  the  winds 
and  adopted  a  policy  of  state  capitalism.  All  the 
evils  of  capitalism  in  its  relation  to  the  workers  re- 
appeared, intensified  and  exaggerated  as  an  inev- 
itable result  of  being  fundamental  elements  of  the 
polity  of  an  all-powerful  state  wholly  free  from 
democratic  control.  The  abolition  of  the  right  to 
strike;  the  introduction  of  piece-work,  augmented 
by  a  bonus  system  in  place  of  day  wages;  the  ar- 
bitrary fixing  of  wages  and  working  conditions;  the 
withdrawal  of  the  powers  which  the  workers' 
councils,  led  by  the  unions,  had  possessed  since  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution,  and  the  substitution 
for  the  crude  spirit  of  democracy  which  inspired 
the  Soviet  control  of  industry  of  the  despotic  prin- 
ciple of  autocracy,  "absolute  submission  to  the  will 
of  a  single  individual" — these  things  inevitably 
evoked  the  active  hostility  of  the  organized  workers. 
It  was  from  the  proletariat,  and  from  its  most 
"class-conscious"  elements,  that  the  Bolshevist 
regime  received  this  determined  resistance. 

Many  unions  were  suppressed  altogether.  This 
happened  to  the  Teachers'  Union,  which  was  de- 
clared to  be  "counter-revolutionary."1  It  hap- 
pened also  to  the  Printers'  Union.  In  this  case  the 
authorities  simply  declared  that  all  membership 
cards  were  invalid  and  that  the  old  officers  were  dis- 
placed. In  order  to  work  as  a  printer  it  was  neces- 
sary to  get  a  new  card  of  membership,  and  such 
cards  were  only  issued  to  those  who  signed  declara- 
tions of  loyalty  to  the  Bolshevist  authority.2     The 

1  See  Keeling,  op.  cit. 

2  Idem. 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  253 

trades-unions  were  made  to  conform  to  the  decisions 
of  the  Communist  Party  and  subordinated  to  the 
rule  of  the  Commissaries.  Upon  this  point  there 
is  a  good  deal  of  evidence  available,  though  most 
of  it  comes  from  non-Bolshevist  sources.  The 
references  to  this  important  matter  in  the  official 
Bolshevist  press  are  very  meager  and  vague,  and 
the  Ransomes,  Goodes,  Malones,  Coppings,  and 
other  apologists  are  practically  silent  upon  the 
subject. 

The  Socialist  and  trades-union  leader,  Oupovalov, 
from  whom  we  have  previously  quoted,  testifies 
that  "Trades-unions,  as  working-class  organiza- 
tions independent  of  any  political  party,  v/ere 
transformed  by  the  Bolsheviki  into  party  organi- 
zations and  subordinated  to  the  Commissaries." 
Strumillo,  equally  competent  as  a  witness,  says: 
"Another  claim  of  the  Social  Democrats — that 
trades-unions  should  be  independent  of  political 
parties — likewise  came  to  nothing.  They  were  all 
to  be  under  the  control  of  the  Bolsheviki.  Alone 
the  All-Russian  Union  of  Printers  succeeded  in 
keeping  its  independence,  but  eventually  for  that  it 
was  dispersed  by  the  order  of  Lenin,  and  the  members 
of  its  Executive  Committee  arrested."  These  state- 
ments are  borne  out  by  the  testimony  of  the 
English  trades-unionist,  Keeling,  who  says: 

If  a  trades-union  did  not  please  the  higher  Soviet  it 
was  fined  and  suppressed  and  a  new  union  was  formed 
in  its  place  by  the  Bolsheviks  themselves.  Entry  to 
this  new  union  was  only  open  to  members  of  the  old 
union  who  signed  a  form  declaring  themselves  entirely 
17 


254  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

in  agreement  with,  and  prepared  completely  to  support 
in  every  detail,  the  policy  of  the  Soviet  Government. 

Refusal  to  join  on  these  terms  meant  the  loss  of  the 
work  and  the  salary,  together  with  exclusion  from  both 
the  first  and  second  categories.1  It  will  readily  be  under- 
stood how  serious  a  matter  it  was  to  oppose  any  coercive 
measure. 

Every  incentive  was  held  out  to  the  poorer  people  to 
spy  and  report  on  the  others.  A  workman  or  a  girl  who 
gave  information  that  any  member  of  the  trades-union 
was  opposed  in  any  way  to  the  Soviet  system  was 
specially  rewarded.  He  or  she  would  be  given  extra 
food  and  promoted  as  soon  as  possible  to  a  seat  upon 
the  executive  of  the  union  or  a  place  on  the  factory 
committee. 

Soon  after  the  first  Congress  of  the  Railroad 
Workers'  Unions,  in  February,  191 8,  the  unions  of 
railway  workers  were  "merged  with  the  state" — 
that  is,  they  were  forbidden  to  strike  or  to  function 
as  defensive  or  offensive  organizations  of  the 
workers,  and  were  compelled  to  accept  the  direction 
of  the  officials  appointed  by  the  central  government 
and  to  carry  out  their  orders.  At  the  second  Con- 
gress of  the  Railroad  Workers'  Unions,  February, 
1919,  according  to  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  42), 
this  policy  was  "sharply  and  categorically  op- 
posed" by  Platonov,  himself  a  Bolshevik  and  one 
of  the  most  influential  of  the  leaders  of  the  railway 
men's  unions.  At  the  Moscow  Conference  of  Shop 
Committees  and  Trades-Unions,  March,  1919,  it 
was  reported,  according  to  Economicheskaya  Zhizn 

1  I.e.,  the  food  categories  entitling  one  to  the  highest  and  next 
highest  food  rations. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  255 

(No.  51),  the  unions  "having  given  up  their  neutral- 
ity and  independence,  completely  merged  their  lot 
with  that  of  the  Soviet  Government.  .  .  .  Their 
work  came  to  be  closely  interwoven  with  the  state 
activities  of  the  Soviet  Government.  .  .  .  Only 
practical  utilitarian  considerations  prevent  us  from 
completely  merging  the  trades-unions  with  the  ad- 
ministrative apparatus  of  the  state." 

At  the  ninth  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party, 
held  in  Moscow,  Bucharin  proposed  the  adoption  of 
certain  "basic  principles"  governing  the  status  of 
trades-unions  and  these  were  accepted  by  the  Con- 
gress: "In  the  Soviet  state  economic  and  political 
issues  are  indivisible,  therefore  the  economic  organs 
of  the  Labor  movement — the  unions — have  to 
be  completely  merged  with  the  political — the 
Soviets — and  not  to  continue  as  independent  or- 
ganizations as  is  the  case  in  a  capitalistic  state. 
Being  more  limited  in  their  scope,  they  have  to  be 
subordinate  to  the  Soviets,  which  are  more  universal 
institutions.  But  merging  with  the  Soviet  ap- 
paratus the  unions  by  no  means  become  organs  of 
the  state  power;  they  only  take  upon  themselves 
the  economic  functions  of  this  power."  In  his 
speech  Bucharin  contended  that  "such  an  intimate 
connection  of  the  trades-unions  with  the  Soviet 
power  will  present  an  ideal  network  of  economic 
administrative  organization  covering  the  whole  of 
Russia."  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  unions  must 
cease  to  exist  as  fighting  organizations  in  the  Bol- 
shevist state,  and  become  merely  subordinate 
agencies  carrying  out  the  will  of  the  central  power. 
Even   if  this  testimony,   official   and  otherwise, 


256  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

were  lacking,  it  would  be  evident  from  the  numerous 
strikes  of  a  serious  character  among  the  best  or- 
ganized workers,  and  from  their  violence,  that 
Bolshevism  at  this  stage  of  its  development  found 
itself  in  opposition  to  the  trades-unions.  And  if 
the  evidence  upon  that  point  were  not  overwhelm- 
ing and  conclusive,  it  would  only  be  necessary  to 
read  carefully  the  numerous  laws  and  decrees  of 
the  Bolshevist  Government,  and  to  observe  the 
development  of  its  industrial  policy,  in  order  to 
understand  that  trades-unions,  as  independent  and 
militant  working-class  organizations,  fighting  always 
to  advance  the  interests  of  their  class,  could  not 
exist  under  such  a  system. 

The  direct  and  immediate  reason  for  the  policy 
that  was  adopted  toward  the  unions  was,  of  course, 
the  state  of  the  industries,  which  made  it  impossible 
to  meet  the  ever-growing  demands  made  by  the 
unions.  There  was,  however,  a  far  deeper  and 
profounder   reason,   namely,  the   character  of  the 

ions  themselves.  The  Bolsheviki  had  been  forced 
to  recognize  the  fundamental  weakness  of  every 
form  of  Syndicalism,  including  Sovietism.  They 
had  found  that  the  Soviets  were  not  qualified  to 
carry  on  industry  efficiently;  that  narrow  group 
interests  were  permitted  to  dominate,  instead  of 
the  larger  interests  of  society  as  a  whole.  The 
same  thing  was  true  of  the  trades-unions.  By  its 
very  nature  the  trades-union  movement  is  limited 
to  a  critical  purpose  and  attitude;  it  makes  de- 
mands and  evades  responsibilities.  The  trades- 
union  does  not  and  cannot,  as  a  trades-union, 
possess    the    capacity    for    constructive    function- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  257 

ing    that    a    co-operative    society    possesses,    for 
instance. 

This  fact  was  very  clearly  and  frankly  stated  in 
March,  1919,  by  L.  B.  Krassin,  in  a  criticism  which 
was  published  in  the  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No. 
52).  He  pointed  out  that,  apart  from  the  struggle 
for  higher  wages,  "the  labor  control  on  the  part 
of  the  trades-unions  confined  itself  the  whole  time 
to  perfunctory  supervision  of  the  activities  of  the 
plants,  and  completely  ignored  the  general  work  of 
production.  A  scientific  technical  control,  the  only 
kind  that  is  indispensable,  is  altogether  beyond  the 
capacities  of  the  trades-unions."  The  same  issue  of 
this  authoritative  Bolshevist  organ  stated  that  at 
the  Conference  of  Electrical  Workers  it  was  re- 
ported  that  "In  the  course  of  last  year  everybody 
admitted  the  failure  of  workers'  control,"  and  that 
the  conference  had  adopted  a  resolution  "to  replace  J 
the  working-men's  control  by  one  of  inspection — 
i.e.,  by  the  engineers  of  the  Council  of  National 
Economy." 

Instead  of  the  expected  idyllic  peace  and  satisfac- 
tion, there  was  profound  unrest  in  the  Utopia  of  the 
Bolsheviki.  There  was  not  even  the  inspiration  of 
enthusiastic  struggle  and  sacrifice  to  attain  the  goal. 
The  organized  workers  were  disillusioned.  They 
found  that  the  Bolshevist  state,  in  its  relations  to 
them  as  employer,  differed  from  the  capitalist 
employers  they  had  known  mainly  in  the  fact  that 
it  had  all  the  coercive  forces  of  the  state  at  its  com- 
mand, and  a  will  to  use  them  without  any  hesitation 
or  any  mercy.  One  view  of  the  social  and  industrial 
unrest  of  the  period  is  set  forth  in  the  following 


258  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

extract  from  the  Severnaya  Communa,  March  30, 
1919: 

At  the  present  moment  a  tremendous  struggle  is  going 
on  within  the  ranks  of  the  proletariat  between  two 
diametrically  opposed  currents.  Part  of  the  proletariat, 
numerically  in  the  great  majority,  still  tied  to  the  vil- 
lage, both  in  a  material  as  well  as  an  ideological  respect, 
is  in  an  economic  sense  inclined  to  anarchism.  It  is 
not  connected  in  production  and  in  interest  in  its  develop- 
ment. The  other  part  is  the  industrial,  highly  skilled 
mechanics,  who  fight  for  new  methods  of  production. 

By  the  equalization  of  pay,  and  by  the  introduction  oj 
'majority  rule  in  the  management  of  the  factories,  supposed 
to  be  a  policy  of  democracy,  zve  are  only  sawing  off  the  limb 
on  which  we  are  sitting,  for  the  flower  of  our  proletariat, 
the  most  efficient  workers,  prefer  to  go  to  the  villages, 
or  to  engage  in  home  trades,  or  to  do  anything  else  but 
to  remain  within  those  demolished  and  dusty  fortresses 
we  call  factories.  Why,  this  means  in  its  truest  sense 
a  dictatorship  of  unskilled  laborers! 

This  outcry  from  one  of  the  principal  official 
organs  of  the  Bolsheviki  is  interesting  from  several 
points  of  view.  The  struggle  within  the  proletariat 
itself  is  recognized.  This  alone  could  only  mean  the 
complete  abandonment  of  faith  in  the  original 
Bolshevist  ideal,  which  was  based  upon  the  solidar- 
ity of  interest  of  the  working-class  as  a  whole.  The 
denunciation  of  the  equalitarian  principle  of  uni- 
form wages  for  all  workers,  and  of  majority  rule 
in  the  factories,  could  only  come  from  a  conviction 
that  Bolshevism  and  Sovietism  were  alike  unsuited 
to  Russia  and  undesirable.     The  scornful  reference 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  259 

to  a  "dictatorship  of  unskilled  laborers"  might  have 
come  from  any  bourgeois  employer. 

From  the  official  Bolshevist  press  of  this  period 
pages  of  quotations  might  easily  be  given  to  show 
that  the  transformation  to  familiar  capitalist  con- 
ditions was  proceeding  at  a  rapid  rate.  Thus,  the 
Bolshevist  official,  Glebov,  reported  at  the  Con- 
ference of  Factory  Committees,  in  March,  1919: 
'The  fight  against  economic  disintegration  de- 
manded the  reintroduction  of  the  premium  system. 
This  system  has  produced  splendid  results  in  many 
instances,  having  increased  the  productivity  of  labor 
100  to  200  per  cent."  The  Bolshevist  journal,  Novy 
Put,  declared,  "The  most  effective  means  for  raising 
the  efficiency  of  labor  is  the  introduction  of  the 
premium  and  piece-work  system  as  against  daily 
wages."  The  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  46)  de- 
clared, "An  investigation  undertaken  last  month  by 
the  trades-unions  has  shown  that  in  75  per  cent, 
of  the  plants  the  old  system  of  wages  has  been  re- 
introduced and  that  nearly  everywhere  this  has 
been  followed  by  satisfactory  and  even  splendid 
results."  The  same  issue  of  this  important  official 
organ  showed  that  there  had  been  large  increases 
in  production  wherever  the  old  system  of  wages  and 
premiums  had  been  restored.  At  the  Marx  Print- 
ing Works  the  increase  was  20  per  cent.;  at  the 
Nobel  Factory  35  percent.;  at  the  Aviation  Plant 
150  per  cent.;  and  at  Seminov's  Lumber  Mill  243 
per  cent. 

The  Severnaya  Communa  reported  that  "In  the 
Nevski  Works  the  substitution  of  the  premium 
system  for  the  monthly  wage  system  increased  the 


260,  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

productivity  of  the  working-men  three  and  one- 
half  times,  and  the  cost  of  labor  for  one  locomotive 
dropped  from  1,400,000  rubles  to  807,000  rubles — 
i.e.,  to  almost  one-half."  Rykov,  president  of  the 
Superior  Council  of  National  Economy,  one  of  the 
ablest  of  the  Bolshevist  officials,  reported,  according 
to  Izvestia,  that  "in  the  Tula  Munition  Works, 
after  the  old  *  premium'  system  of  wages  had 
been  restored,  the  productivity  of  the  works  and 
of  labor  rose  to  70  per  cent,  of  what  it  was  in 
1916." 

These  are  only  a  few  of  the  many  similar  state- 
ments appearing  in  the  official  Bolshevist  press 
pointing  to  a  reversal  of  policy  and  a  return  to 
capitalist  methods.  On  March  1,  1919,  a  decree  of 
the  People's  Commissaries  was  promulgated  which 
introduced  a  new  wage  scale,  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  extra  pay  for  skill.  The  greater  the  skill  the 
higher  the  rate  of  wages  was  the  new  rule.  As  pub- 
lished in  Severnaya  Communa,  the  scale  provided 
for  twenty-seven  classes  of  workers.  The  lowest, 
unskilled  class  of  laborers,  domestics,  and  so  forth, 
receive  600  rubles  per  month  (1st  class),  660  rubles 
(2d  class),  and  so  on.  Higher  employees,  special- 
ists, are  put  in  classes  20  to  27,  and  receive  from 
1,370  to  2,200  rubles  a  month.  Skilled  mechanics 
in  chemical  plants,  for  example,  receive  1,051- 
1,160  rubles.  Unskilled  laborers,  600  rubles,  and 
chemical  engineers  more  than  2,000  rubles  a 
month. 

Nationalization  of  industry  meant,  and  could 
only  mean,  state  capitalism.  Communism  was  as 
far  away  as  it  was  under  czarism.     And  many  of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  261 

the  old  complaints  so  familiar  in  capitalist  countries 
were  heard.  The  workers  were  discontented  and 
restless;  production,  while  it  was  better  than  under 
Soviet  control,  was  still  far  below  the  normal  level; 
there  was  an  enormous  growth  of  bureaucracy  and 
an  appalling  amount  of  corruption.  Profiteering 
and  speculation  were  rampant  and  inefficiency  was 
the  order  of  the  day.  The  following  extract  from 
an  article  in  Pravda,  March  15,  1919,  is  a  confession 
of  failure  most  abject: 

Last  year  the  people  of  Russia  were  suffering  from 
lack  of  bread.  To-day  they  are  in  distress  because  there 
is  plenty  of  foodstuffs  which  cannot  be  brought  out 
from  the  country  and  which  will,  no  doubt,  decay  to  a 
great  extent  when  hot  weather  arrives. 

The  misery  of  bread  scarcity  is  replaced  by  another 
calamity — the  plentifulness  of  breadstuff's.  That  the 
situation  is  really  such  is  attested  by  these  figures: 

The  Food  Commission  and  its  subsidiary  organs  have 
stored  up  from  August,  1918,  to  February  20,  1919, 
grain  and  forage  products  amounting  to  82,633,582 
poods.  There  remained  on  the  last-mentioned  date  in 
railroad  stations  and  other  collection  centers  not  less 
than  22,245,072  poods  of  grain  and  fodder.  Of  these 
stocks,  according  to  the  incomplete  information  by  the 
Transport  Branch  of  the  Food  Commission,  there  are 
stalled  on  the  Moscow-Kazan  and  Syzran-Viazma  Rail- 
roads alone  not  less  than  2,000,000  poods  of  grain  in 
2,382  cars.  There  are,  moreover,  according  to  the  same 
source,  on  the  Kazanburgsk  and  Samara-Zlatoostovsk 
Line,  at  least  1,300  more  car-loads  of  breadstuff's  that 
cannot  be  moved. 

All  this  grain  is  stalled  because  there  are  no  locomotives 
to  haul  the  rolling-stock.    Thus  the  starving  population 


202  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

does  not  receive  the  bread  which  is  provided  for  it  and 
which  is,  in  part,  even  loaded  up  in  cars. 

•  ■••••• 

In  a  hungry  land  there  must  be  no  misery  while  there 
is  a  surplus  of  bread.  Such  a  misfortune  would  be  truly 
unbearable! 

On  April  15,  1 919,  Izvestia  published  an  article  by 
Zinoviev,  in  which  the  famous  Bolshevist  leader 
confessed  that  the  Soviet  Government  had  not 
materially  benefited  the  average  working-man: 

Has  the  Soviet  Government,  has  our  party  done 
everything  that  can  be  done  for  the  direct  improvement 
of  the  daily  life  of  the  average  working-man  and  his 
family?  Alas!  we  hesitate  to  answer  this  question  in  the 
affirmative. 

Let  us  look  the  truth  in  the  face.  We  have  committed 
quite  a  number  of  blunders  in  this  realm.  We  have  to 
confess  that  zve  are  unable  to  improve  the  nutrition  of  the 
average  worker  to  any  serious  extent.  But  do  the  wages 
correspond  with  the  actually  stupendous  rise  of  prices 
for  unrationed  foodstuffs?  Nobody  will  undertake  to 
answer  this  question  entirely  in  the  affirmative,  while  the 
figures  given  by  Comrade  Strumilin  show  that  in  spite 
of  a  threefold  raise  of  the  wage  scale,  the  real  purchasing 
power  of  these  wages  had  shrunk,  on  the  average,  more 
than  30  per  cent,  by  March  of  the  current  year,  as  com- 
pared with  May  of  last  year. 

The  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  May  6,  1919,  gave 
a  despondent  account  of  the  coal  industry  and  the 
low  production,  accompanied  by  this  alarming 
picture:  "The  starving,  ill-clad  miners  are  running 
away  from  the  pits  in  a  panic,  and  it  is  to  be  feared 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  2G3 

that  in  two  or  three  weeks  not  only  the  whole  pro- 
duction of  coal  will  be  stopped,  but  most  of  the 
mines  will  be  flooded." 

Nationalization  of  industry  was  not  a  new  thing 
in  Russia.  It  was,  indeed,  quite  common  under 
czarism.  The  railways  were  largely  state  owned 
and  operated  by  the  government.  Most  of  the 
factories  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  guns  and 
munitions  were  also  nationalized  under  czarism. 
It  is  interesting,  therefore,  to  compare  the  old 
regime  with  the  new  in  this  connection.  Under 
czarism  nationalization  had  always  led  to  the 
creation  of  an  immense  bureaucracy,  politically 
powerful  by  reason  of  its  numbers,  extravagant, 
inefficient,  and  corrupt.  That  nationalization  un- 
der the  new  regime  was  attended  by  the  same  evils, 
in  an  exaggerated  form,  the  only  difference  being 
that  the  new  bureaucracy  was  drawn  from  a  dif- 
ferent class,  is  written  so  plainly  in  the  records 
that  he  who  runs  may  read.  No  country  in  the 
world,  it  is  safe  to  say,  has  ever  known  such  a 
bureaucracy  as  the  Bolshevist  regime  produced. 

At  the  eighth  All-Russian  Congress  of  the  Com- 
munist Party,  held  in  March,  1919,  Lenin  said: 
"You  imagine  that  you  have  abolished  private 
property,  but  instead  of  the  old  bourgeoisie  that 
has  been  crushed  you  are  faced  by  a  new  one.  The 
places  of  the  former  bourgeoisie  have  already  been 
filled  up  by  the  newly  born  bourgeoisie."  The  back- 
bone of  this  new  bourgeoisie  was  the  vast  army  of 
government  officials  and  employees.  These  and  the 
food  speculators  and  profiteers,  many  of  whom  have 
amassed  great  wealth— real  wealth,  not  worthless 


264  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

paper  rubles — make  up  a  formidable  bourgeoisie. 
Professor  Miliukov  tells  of  a  statistical  department 
in  Moscow  with  twenty-one  thousand  employees; 
and  of  eighteen  offices  having  to  be  visited  to  get 
permission  to  buy  a  pair  of  shoes  from  the  govern- 
ment store.  Alexander  Berkenheim,  vice-chair- 
man of  the  Moscow  Central  Union  of  Russian  Con- 
sumers' Co-operative  Societies,  said:  "The  experi- 
ment in  socialization  has  resulted  in  the  building 
up  of  an  enormous  bureaucratic  machine.  To  buy 
a  pencil  one  has  to  call  at  eighteen  official  places." 
These  men  are  competent  witnesses,  notwithstand- 
ing their  opposition  to  Bolshevism.  Let  us  put  it 
aside,  however,  and  consider  only  a  small  part  of 
the  immense  mass  of  official  Bolshevist  testimony 
to  the  same  general  effect. 

On  February  21,  1919,  the  Bolshevist  official, 
Nemensky,  presented  to  the  Supreme  Council  of 
National  Economy  the  report  of  the  official  inspec- 
tion and  audit  of  the  Centro-Textile,  the  central 
state  organization  having  charge  of  the  produc- 
tion and  distribution  of  textiles.  There  are  some 
sixty  of  these  organizations,  such  as  Centro-Sugar, 
Centro-Tea,  Centro-Coal,  and  so  on,  the  entire 
number  being  federated  into  the  Supreme  Council 
of  National  Economy.  From  the  report  referred  to, 
as  published  in  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  February 
25,  1919,  the  following  paragraphs  are  quoted: 

An  enormous  staff  of  employees  (about  6,000),  for  the 
most  part  loafing  about,  doing  nothing;  it  was  discovered 
that  125  employees  were  actually  not  serving  at  all, 
but  receiving  a  salary  the  same  as  the  others.     There 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  265 

have  been  cases  where  some  have  been  paid  twice  for 
the  same  period  of  time.  The  efficiency  of  the  officials  is 
negligible  to  a  striking  degree.  .  .  . 

The  following  figures  may  partially  serve  as  an  illus- 
tration of  what  was  the  work  of  the  collaborators:  For 
four  months — from  August  25  to  November  21,  19 18 — 
the  number  of  letters  received  amounted  to  59,959 
(making  an  average  of  500  a  day),  and  the  number  of 
letters  sent  was  25,781  (an  average  of  207  per  day). 
Each  secretary  had  to  deal  with  10  letters  received  and 
4  sent,  each  typist  with  2  letters  sent,  and  each  clerk 
with  1  letter  received  and  0.5  sent.  Together  with 
chairs,  tables,  etc.,  the  inventory-book  contained  entries 
of  dinners,  rent,  etc.  When  checking  the  inventory  of 
the  department  it  was  established  that  the  following 
were  missing — 142  tables,  500  chairs,  39  cupboards, 
14  typewriters,  etc.  On  the  whole,  the  entries  in  the 
book  exceeded  by  50  per  cent,  the  number  of  articles 
found  on  the  spot. 

Commenting  upon  this  report  the  Izvestia  l  said: 
"An  enormous  staff  of  employees  in  most  cases 
lounge  about  in  idleness.  An  inquiry  showed  that 
the  staff  of  the  Centro-Textile  included  125  employees 
who  were  practically  not  in  its  service^  though  drawing 
their  pay.  There  were  cases  where  one  and  the  same 
person  drew  his  pay  twice  over  for  one  and  the  same 
period  of  time.  The  working  capacity  of  the  em- 
ployees is  ridiculously  low;  the  average  correspond- 
ence per  typist  was  one  letter  outward  and  one 
inward  per  day;  the  average  per  male  clerk  was 
a  half  a  letter  outward  and  one  inward."  We  do 
not  wonder  at  Nemensky's  own  comment,  "Such 

1  No.  63, 1919. 


2G6  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Soviet  institutions  are  a  beautiful  example  of  dead- 
ening bureaucracy  and  must  be  liquidated." 

The  disclosures  made  in  the  Centro-Textile  were 
repeated  in  other  state  economic  institutions.  Thus 
the  Izvestia  of  the  State  Control,  commenting  upon 
the  Budget  for  1919,  said: 

The  Audit  Department  sees  in  the  increase  of  ex- 
penditure for  the  payment  of  work  a  series  of  negative 
causes.  Among  these  is  that  it  leads  to  a  double  working 
on  parallel  lines — viz.,  the  same  work  is  done  by  two  and 
even  more  sections,  resulting  in  mutual  friction  and 
disorder  and  bringing  the  number  of  employees  beyond 
all  necessary  requirements.  We  noticed  on  more  than 
one  occasion  that  an  institution  with  many  auxiliary 
branches  had  been  opened  before  any  operations  to 
be  carried  on  by  them  were  even  started. 

Furthermore,  the  work  is  mostly  very  slovenly  and  in- 
efficiently conducted.  It  leads  to  an  increase  of  the 
number  of  employees  and  workmen  without  benefit  to 
the  work. 

In  the  Bulletin  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Soviets  (No.  15)  we  find  this  confession:  "We 
have  created  extraordinary  commissaries  and  Ex- 
traordinary Commissions  without  number.  All  of 
these  are,  to  a  lesser  or  greater  degree,  only  mischief- 
makers."  Lunacharsky,  the  Bolshevist  Commis- 
sary of  Education,  is  reported  by  the  Severnaya 
Communa  of  May  23,  1919,  as  saying:  "The  upper 
stratum  of  the  Soviet  rule  is  becoming  detached 
from  the  masses  and  the  blunders  of  the  communist 
workers  are  becoming  more  and  more  frequent. 
These    latter,    according    to    statements    made  by 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  267 

workmen,  treat  the  masses  in  a  high-handed  man- 
ner and  are  very  generous  with  threats  and  repres- 
sions." In  Pravda,  May  14,  1919,  the  Bolshevik, 
Monastyrev,  wrote:  "Such  a  wholesale  loafing  as  is 
taking  place  in  our  Soviet  institutions  and  such  a 
tremendous  number  of  officials  the  history  of  the 
world  has  never  known  and  does  not  know.  All 
the  Soviet  papers  have  written  about  it,  and  we 
have  felt  it  on  our  backs,  too."  Izvestia  of  the 
Central  Executive  Committee  (No.  15),  1919,  said: 
"Besides  Soviets  and  committees,  many  commis- 
saries and  committees  have  been  instituted  here. 
Almost  every  commissariat  has  an  extraordinary 
organ  peculiar  to  its  own  department.  As  a  result 
we  have  numberless  commissaries  of  all  kinds.  All 
of  them  are  more  or  less  highly  arbitrary  in  their 
behavior  and  by  their  actions  undermine  Soviet 
authority." 

These  are  only  a  few  of  the  many  statements  of  a 
like  character  published  in  the  official  Bolshevist 
press.  In  a  country  which  had  long  been  accus- 
tomed to  an  immense  bureaucracy,  the  horde  of 
officials  was  regarded  with  astonishment  and  alarm. 
Like  the  old  bureaucracy,  the  new  bureaucracy  was 
at  once  brutal  and  corrupt.  No  one  can  read  the 
reports  published  by  the  Bolsheviki  themselves  and 
fail  to  be  impressed  by  the  entire  absence  of  ideal- 
ism so  far  as  the  great  majority  of  the  officials  are 
concerned,  a  fact  which  Lenin  himself  has  com- 
mented upon  more  than  once.  That  there  were 
and  are  exceptions  to  the  rule  we  may  well  believe, 
just  as  there  were  such  exceptions  under  the  old 
regime  of  Nicholas  II.     Upon  the  whole,  however, 


JK&tr*  &*aass^\ 


268 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


it  is  difficult  to  see  wherein  the  bureaucracy  of  the 
Bolsheviki  was  less  brutal,  less  coarse,  or  less  cor- 
rupt than  that  of  czarism.  But  again  let  the 
Bolsheviki  speak  through  their  own  recognized 
spokesmen: 

According  to  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee,  November  i,  1918,  a  commission  of 
five  which  had  been  appointed  to  discover  and  dis- 
tribute metal  among  the  factories  in  proportion  to 
their  needs  was  found  to  have  been  bribed  to  dis- 
tribute the  metal,  not  in  proportion  to  the  needs  of 
the  industries,  but  according  to  the  value  of  the 
bribe. 

From  the  Weekly  Report  of  the  Extraordinary 
Commission,  No.  1,  page  28,  we  learn  that  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  combined  Moscow  nationalized 
factories  was  convicted  of  a  whole  series  of  abuses 
and  speculations,  resulting  in  the  embezzlement  of 
many  millions  of  rubles.  It  was  said  that  members 
of  the  administrative  board  and  practically  all  the 
employees  took  part  in  this  graft. 

From  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee, November  3,  191 8,  we  learn  that  the  Soviet 
of  National  Economy  of  Kursk,  connected  with  the 
Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy,  was  found 
guilty  of  speculative  dealings  in  sugar  and  hemp. 

In  the  same  important  official  journal,  January 
22,  1919,  the  well-known  Bolshevik,  Kerzhentzev, 
in  a  terrible  exposure  from  which  we  have  already 
quoted  in  an  earlier  chapter,  says:  "The  abundant 
testimony,  verified  by  the  Soviet  Commission,  por- 
trays a  very  striking  picture  of  violence.  When 
these   members   of  the   Executive   Committee   [he 


^Mfe^ 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  2G9 


names  Glakhov,  Morev,  and  Makhov]  arrived  at 
the  township  of  Sadomovo  they  commenced  to 
assault  the  population  and  to  rob  them  of  food- 
stuffs and  of  their  household  belongings,  such  as 
quilts,  clothing,  harness,  etc.  No  receipts  for  the 
requisitioned  goods  were  given  and  no  money  paid. 
They  even  resold  to  others  on  the  spot  some  of  the 
breadstuffs  which  they  had  requisitioned."  Again, 
the  same  journal  published,  on  March  9,  1919,  a 
report  by  a  prominent  Bolshevik,  Sosnovsky,  on 
conditions  in  the  Tver  Province,  saying:  "The 
local  Communist  Soviet  workers  behave  themselves, 
with  rare  exceptions,  in  a  disgusting  manner.  Mis- 
use of  power  is  going  on  constantly." 

A  cursory  examination  of  the  files  of  the  Bulletin 
of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviets,  for 
the  first  few  months  of  1919,  reveals  a  great  deal  of 
such  evidence  as  the  foregoing.  In  No.  12  we  read: 
"The  toiling  population  see  in  the  squandering  of 
money  right  and  left  by  the  commissaries  and  in 
their  indecent  loudness  and  profanity  during  their 
trips  through  the  district,  the  complete  absence  of 
party  discipline."  In  No.  13  of  the  same  organ 
there  is  an  account  of  the  case  of  Commissary 
Odintzov,  a  member  of  the  peace  delegation  to  the 
Ukraine,  who  was  "found  speculating  in  bread- 
stuffs."  In  No.  20  we  read  that  "members  of  the 
Extraordinary  Commission,  Unger  and  Lebedev, 
were  found  guilty  of  embezzlement."  No.  25  says 
that  "a  case  has  been  started  against  the  commis- 
saries, O.  K.  Bogdanov  and  Zaitzev,  accused  of 
misappropriating  part  of  the  requisitioned  gold  and 

silver  articles." 

18 


270  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Let  us  hear  from  some  of  the  leading  Bolsheviki 
who  participated  in  the  debate  on  the  subject  of  the 
relation  of  the  central  Soviet  authority  to  local 
self-government  at  the  eighth  Congress  of  the 
Communist  Party,  March,  1919.  Nogin,  former 
president  of  the  Moscow  Soviet,  said:  "The  time 
has  come  to  state  openly  before  this  meeting  how 
low  our  party  has  fallen.  We  have  to  confess  that 
the  representatives  both  of  the  central  and  the 
local  authorities  disgrace  the  name  of  the  party  by 
their  conduct.  Their  drunkenness  and  immorality, 
the  robberies  and  other  crimes  committed  by  them,  are 
so  terrible  as  scarcely  to  be  believed."  Commissar 
Volin  said:  "Some  of  the  local  authorities  give 
themselves  over  to  outrageous  abominations.  How 
can  they  be  put  a  stop  to?  The  word  'communist' 
rouses  deep  hatred,  not  only  among  the  bourgeoisie, 
but  even  among  the  poorer  and  the  middle  classes 
which  we  are  ruining.  What  can  we  do  for  our  own 
salvation?"  Pakhomoff  said:  "I  sent  several  com- 
rades to  the  villages.  7  hey  had  barely  reached  their 
destination  when  they  turned  bandits"  Ossinsky 
said,  "The  revolts  now  taking  place  are  not  White 
Guard  risings,  as  formerly,  but  rebellions  caused 
by  famine  and  the  outrageous  behavior  of  our  own 
commissaries." 

Zinoviev  was  equally  emphatic  in  his  declaration: 
"It  cannot  be  concealed  from  this  meeting  that  in 
certain  localities  the  word  'communist'  has  become 
a  term  of  abuse.  The  people  are  beginning  to  hate 
the  'men  in  leather  jackets,'  as  the  commissaries 
were  nicknamed  in  Perm.  The  fact  cannot  be 
denied,  and  we  must  look  the  tiuth  in  the  face. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  271 

Every  one  knows  that  both  in  the  provinces  and  in 
the  large  towns  the  housing  reform  has  been  carried 
out  imperfectly.  True,  the  bourgeoisie  has  been 
driven  out  of  its  houses,  but  the  workmen  have  gained 
nothing  thereby.  The  houses  are  taken  possession  of 
by  Bolshevist  state  employees,  and  sometimes  they 
have  been  occupied,  not  even  by  the  'Soviet  bureau- 
crat,' but  by  his  mother-in-law  or  grandmother." 

Not  only  has  the  bribery  of  officials  grown,  as 
revealed  by  the  reports  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
missions, but  many  of  the  Bolshevist  officials  have 
engaged  in  food  speculation.  That  the  greatest 
buyers  of  the  food  illegally  sold  at  the  Sukharevka 
market  are  the  highly  paid  Soviet  officials  is  a  charge 
frequently  made  in  the  Bolshevist  press.  In  No- 
vember, 1 91 9,  Tsurupa,  People's  Commissary  for 
Supplies,  published  an  article  in  Izvestia  (No.  207), 
exposing  the  speculation  in  foodstuffs  at  the  Suk- 
harevka market,  formerly  the  largest  market  for 
second-hand  goods  in  Moscow,  now  the  center  of 
illicit  speculation.     Tsurupa  said: 


At  the  present  moment  a  number  of  measures  are 
being  drawn  up  to  begin  war  on  "Sukharevka."  The 
struggle  must  be  carried  on  in  two  directions:  first,  the 
strengthening  of  the  organs  of  supply  and  the  control 
over  the  work  of  Soviet  machinery;  secondly,  the  de- 
struction of  speculators.  The  measures  of  the  second 
kind  are,  of  course,  merely  palliative,  and  it  is  impossible 
to  overcome  "Sukharevka"  without  insuring  the  popu- 
lation a  certain  supply  of  the  rationed  foodstuffs. 

Even  among  our  respected  comrades  there  are  some 
who    consider    "Sukharevaka"    as    an    almost    normal 


272  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

thing,  or,  at  any  rate,  as  supplementing  the  gaps  in  food- 
supply. 


Many  defects  in  our  organization  are  directly  con- 
ducive to  speculation.  Thus  many  head  commissariats, 
centers,  factories,  and  works  pay  their  workmen  and 
employees  in  foodstuffs  exceeding  their  personal  re- 
quirements, and,  as  a  rule,  these  articles  find  their  way 
to  "Sukharevka"  for  purposes  of  speculation. 

The  foodstuff's  which  find  their  way  to  "Sukharevka" 
are  sold  at  such  high  prices  that  only  the  upper  circles  of 
Soviet  employees  can  afford  to  buy  them,  the  masses  of 
consumers  being  totally  unable  to  do  so.  These  foodstuffs 
are  at  the  disposal  of  the — so  to  speak — Soviet  bour- 
geoisie, who  can  afford  to  squander  thousands  of  rubles. 
"Sukharevka"  gives  nothing  to  the  masses. 

The  Moscow  Extraordinary  Commission  is  carrying 
on  an  active  campaign  against  "Sukharevka"  specula- 
tion. As  a  result  of  a  fortnight's  work,  437  persons  have 
been  arrested,  and  a  series  of  transactions  have  been  dis- 
covered.    The  most  important  cases  were  as  follows: 

(1)  Sale  of  19  million  rubles'  worth  of  textiles. 

(2)  Sale  of  three  wagon-loads  of  sugar.  (At  the  price 
of  even  200  rubles,  and  not  400  rubles,  a  wagon  of 
36,000  pounds  of  sugar  works  out  at  8,000,000  rubles, 
and  the  whole  deal  amounts  to  24,000,000  rubles.) 

(3)  Seventeen  wagon-loads  of  herrings. 

(4)  15,000,000  rubles'  worth  of  rubber  goods,  etc. 

In  the  course  of  the  campaign  of  the  Moscow 
Extraordinary  Commission  above  referred  to  it 
was  discovered  that  the  state  textile  stores  in 
Moscow  had  been  looted  by  the  "Communists" 
in  charge  of  them.     Millions  of  yards  of  textiles, 


! 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  273 

instead  of  being  placed  on  sale  in  the  nationalized 
stores,  had  been  sold  to  speculators  and  found  their 
way  into  the  Sukharevka.  During  the  summer  of 
1919  the  Bolshevist  official  press  literally  teemed 
with  revelations  of  graft,  spoliation,  and  robbery 
by  officials.  The  report  of  the  Smolensk  Extraor- 
dinary Commission  showed  that  hundreds  of  com- 
plaints had  been  made  and  investigated.  In  general 
the  financial  accounts  were  kept  with  almost  un- 
believable carelessness  and  laxity.  Large  sums  of 
money  were  paid  out  on  the  order  of  single  individ- 
uals without  the  knowledge  of  any  other  officials, 
and  without  check  of  any  sort.  Out  of  a  total 
expenditure  of  three  and  a  half  million  rubles  for 
food  rations  to  soldiers'  families  there  were  no 
vouchers  or  receipts  for  1,161,670  rubles,  according 
to  the  report.  Commenting  upon  the  reign  of 
corruption  in  all  parts  of  Soviet  Russia,  the  Kras- 
naya  Gazeta,  in  an  article  entitled,  "When  Is  This 
to  End?"  said: 

In  the  Commissariat  of  the  Boards  for  the  various 
municipalities  thefts  of  goods  and  money  are  almost  of 
daily  occurrence.     Quite  recently  representatives  of  the  / 
State  Control  found  that  silk  and  other  goods  for  over  \ 
a  million  rubles  had    been  stolen  within  a  short    space  j 
of  time  from  the  goods  listed  as  nationalized.     Further- 
more,   it   has   come   out   during  the   inspection   of  the 
nationalized  houses  that  thefts  and  embezzlements  of  the 
people's  money  have   become  an  ordinary  occurrence. 
It  is  remarkable  how  light-fingered  gentry  who  are  put 
to   manage   the   confiscated   houses   succeed   in   getting 
away  after  pocketing  the  money  belonging  to  the  Soviet, 
and  all  that  with  impunity,  and  yet  the  money  stolen  by 


274  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

them  is  estimated  not  at  hundreds  of  rubles,  but  at  tens 
of  thousands  of  rubles.  Will  there  ever  be  an  end  to 
these  proceedings?  Or  is  complete  liberty  to  be  given 
to  the  thieves  in  Soviet  Russia  to  do  as  they  like? 

Why  does  the  Extraordinary  Commission  not  see  to 
tne  affairs  of  the  Commissariat  of  the  Municipality? 
It  is  high  time  all  these  Augean  stables  were  cleaned 
up.  This  must  stop  at  last.  The  Soviet  authorities 
are  sufficiently  strong  to  have  some  scores  of  these 
thieves  of  the  people's  property  hanged.  To  close 
one's  eyes  to  all  this  is  the  same  as  encouraging  the 
thieves. 

Here,  then,  is  a  part  of  the  evidence  of  the  bru- 
tality and  corruption  of  the  vast  bureaucracy  which 
Bolshevism  has  developed  to  replace  the  old 
bureaucracy  of  the  Czars.  It  is  only  a  small  part 
of  the  total  mass  of  such  evidence.1  Every  word 
of  it  comes  from  Bolshevist  officials  and  journals 
of  standing  and  authority.  It  will  not  do  to  seek 
to  evade  the  issue  by  setting  up  the  plea  that  cor- 
ruption and  brutality  are  found  in  other  lands. 
That  plea  not  only  "begs  the  question,"  but  it 
destroys  the  only  foundation  upon  which  an  honest 
attempt  to  justify  Bolshevism  can  be  made, 
namely,  the  claim  that  it  represents  a  higher  stage 
of  civilization,  of  culture,  and  morality  than  the  old. 
Only  a  profound  belief  in  the  righteousness  of  that 
claim  could  justify  the  recourse  to  such  a  terrible 
method  of  bringing  about  a  change  in  the  social 
organization  of  a  great  nation.  There  is  not  the 
faintest    shadow    of    a    reason    for    believing    that 

1  In  Les  Bolsheviks  a  Vceuvre,  Paris,  1920,  A.  Lockerman  gives  a  list 
of  many  similar  cases  of  looting  and  graft  by  commissars. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  275 

Bolshevism  has  been  one  whit  less  corrupt  than 
the  czarist  bureaucracy. 

What  of  efficiency?  Does  tne  available  evidence 
tend  to  show  that  this  bureaucratic  system  managed 
to  secure  a  degree  of  efficiency  in  production  and 
distribution  commensurate,  in  part,  at  least,  with 
its  enormous  cost?  On  the  contrary,  while  there 
was  a  marked  increase  in  output  after  nationaliza- 
tion was  introduced,  due  to  the  restoration  of  capi- 
talist methods  of  management,  the  enormous  cost 
at  which  the  improvement  was  effected,  for  which 
the  bureaucracy  was  responsible,  left  matters  in  a 
deplorable  condition.  This  can  be  well  understood 
in  view  of  the  fact,  cited  by  Professor  Issaiev,  that 
in  one  of  the  largest  metal  works  in  Moscow  the 
overhead  charges,  cost  of  administration,  account- 
ing, and  so  on,  which  in  1916,  the  last  year  of  the 
old  regime,  amounted  to  15  per  cent,  of  the  total 
cost,  rose  to  over  65  per  cent,  in  191 8-19.  This 
was  not  an  unusual  case,  but  fairly  typical.  Once 
again,  however,  let  us  resist  the  temptation  to  quote 
such  figures,  based  upon  the  calculations  and  re- 
searches of  hostile  critics,  and  confine  ourselves 
strictly  to  Bolshevist  testimony. 

At  the  end  of  December,  191 8,  Rykov,  president 
of  the  Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy,  re- 
ported to  the  Central  Executive  Committee,  ac- 
cording to  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  "Now  almost  all 
the  large  and  medium-sized  establishments  are 
nationalized."  A  few  days  later  an  article  by 
Miliutin,  published  in  the  same  paper,  said:  "A 
year  ago  there  were  about  36  per  cent,  of  national- 
ized establishments  throughout  Soviet  Russia.     At 


276  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  present  time  90  per  cent,  of  industrial  establish- 
ments are  nationalized."     On  January  12,  1919,  the 
same    journal    reported    that    nationalization    had 
become  general  throughout  Russian  industry,  em- 
bracing  the    textile    and    metallurgical    industries, 
glass-making,   printing,   publishing,   practically   all 
commerce,  and  even  barber  shops.     We  are,  there- 
fore, in  a  fair  position  to  judge  the  effects  of  na- 
tionalization upon  the  basis  of  subsequent  reports. 
It  is  not  as  well  known  as  it  ought  to  be  that  the 
Bolsheviki,  even  under  nationalization,  continued 
the  practice,  established  under  czarism  and  main- 
tained by  the  Provisional  Government  under  Keren- 
sky,  of  subsidizing  factories  from  the  central  treas- 
ury of  the  government.     Bad  as  this  practice  was 
under  capitalism,  it  was  immeasurably  worse  when 
applied  to  industry  under  Soviet  control  and  to 
nationalized  industry.     It  was  not  only  conducive 
to    laxity   and    bad    management,    but    it    invited 
these  as  well  as  being  destructive  of  enterprise  and 
energy.     The   sums   spent   for   this   purpose   were 
enormous,  staggering  in  their  total.     A  few  illus- 
trations must  suffice  to  show  this.     According  to 
Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No.  50),  in  the  month  of 
January,    1919,    the    Metal    Department    of   the 
Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy  distributed 
among  the  various  nationalized  metallurgical  works 
i  1,167,295,000  rubles,  and  the  central  organization 
of  the  copper  industry  received  1,193,990,000  rubles. 
According  to  a  report  of  the  Section  of  Polygraphic 
Trades,  published  in  Pravda,  May  17,  1919,  nine- 
teen nationalized  printing-establishments  lost   13,- 
500,000  rubles  during  191 8,  the  deficit  having  to  be 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  277 

made  up  by  subsidies  from  the  central  treasury. 
At  the  Conference  of  Tobacco  Workers,  held  on 
April  25,  1919,  it  was  reported,  according  to 
Severnaya  Communa,  that  the  Petrograd  factories 
alone  were  being  operated  at  a  loss  approaching 
two  million  rubles  a  month.  It  was  further  stated 
that  "the  condition  of  the  tobacco  industry  is  bad. 
The  number  of  plants  has  been  decreased  by  more 
than  half,  and  the  output  is  only  one-third."  In 
the  report  of  Nemensky  on  the  audit  of  the  Centro- 
Textile,  from  which  we  have  already  quoted,  we 
read: 

The  Finance  Credit  Division  of  the  Centrotekstil  re- 
ceived up  to  February  1,  1919,  3,400,000,000  rubles. 
There  was  no  control  of  the  expenditure  of  moneys. 
Money  was  advanced  to  factories  immediately  upon  demand, 
and  there  were  cases  when  money  was  forzvarded  to  fac- 
tories which  did  not  exist.  From  July  1  to  December  31, 
1918,  the  Centrotekstil  advanced  on  account  of  prod- 
ucts to  be  received  1,348,619,000  rubles.  The  value 
of  the  goods  securing  these  advances  received  up  to 
January  I,  1919,  was  only  143,716,000  rubles.  The 
Centrotekstil's  negligent  way  of  doing  business  may  be 
particularly  observed  from  the  way  it  purchased  sup- 
plies of  raw  wool.  Up  to  January  1,  1919,  only  129,803 
poods  of  wool  was  acquired,  whereas  the  annual  re- 
quirement is  figured  at  3,500,000  poods. 

The  value  of  the  goods  actually  received  was, 
according  to  this  authority,  only  10  per  cent,  of 
the  money  advanced.  We  are  told  that  "money 
was  forwarded  to  factories  which  did  not  exist." 
That  this  practice  was  not  confined  to  the  Centro- 


278  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Textile  we  infer  from  the  account  given  in  the 
Izvestia  of  State  Control  (No.  2)  of  a  firm  which 
obtained  a  large  sum  of  money  in  advance  for 
Westinghouse  brakes  to  be  manufactured  and  sup- 
plied by  it,  though  investigation  proved  that  the 
firm  did  not  even  own  a  foundry  and  was  unable  to 
furnish  any  brakes  at  all.  How  much  of  this 
represents  inefficiency,  and  how  much  of  it  graft, 
the  reader  must  judge  for  himself.  The  Bolshevist 
newspaper,  Trud,  organ  of  the  trades-unions,  in  an 
article  dealing  with  the  closing  down  of  nineteen 
textile  factories,  said,  April  28,  1919: 

In  our  textile  crisis  a  prominent  part  is  played  also 
by  the  bad  utilization  of  that  which  we  do  have.  Thus 
the  efficiency  of  labor  has  dropped  to  almost  nothing, 
of  labor  discipline  there  is  not  even  a  trace  left,  the 
machinery,  on  account  of  careless  handling,  has  deteri- 
orated and  its  productive  capacity  has  been  lowered. 

In  Izvestia  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee, 
March  21,  1919,  Bucharin  said:  "Our  position  is 
such  that,  together  with  the  deterioration  of  the 
material  production — machinery,  railways,  and 
other  things — there  is  a  destruction  of  the  funda- 
mental productive  force,  the  labor  class,  as  such.  Here 
in  Russia,  as  in  western  Europe,1  the  working-class 
is  dissolving,  factories  are  closing,  and  the  working- 
class  is  reabsorbed  into  the  villages." 

From  the  report  of  the  Supreme  Council  of 
National  Economy,  March,  1919,  we  learn  that 
in  the  vast  majority  of  the  branches  of  Russia's 

1  Sic! 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  279 

industry  the  labor  required  for  production  had 
increased  from  400  to  500  per  cent.  The  Congress 
of  Salesmen's  Unions,  held  at  the  end  of  April,  1919, 
adopted  a  resolution,  published  in  Izvestia  (No.  97), 
which  said,  "The  nationalization  of  commerce,  ow- 
ing to  the  pell-mell  speed  of  the  methods  employed 
in  carrying  it  out,  has  assumed  with  us  extremely 
ugly  forms,  and  has  only  aggravated  the  bad  state 
of  affairs  in  the  circulation  of  goods  in  the  country, 
which  was  poor  enough  as  it  was." 

These  statements  show  that  in  the  early  part  of 
last  year  the  Bolshevist  regime  was  in  a  very 
critical  condition.  Demands  for  the  "liquidation" 
of  the  system  were  heard  on  every  hand.  Instead 
of  this,  the  resourceful  rulers  of  Soviet  Russia  once 
more  revolutionized  their  methods.  The  period  of 
nationalization  we  have  been  considering  may  be 
described  as  the  first  phase,  the  period  of  the  rule 
of  industry  by  the  professional  politicians  of  the 
Communist  Party.  When,  in  March,  1919,  Leonid 
B.  Krassin 1  undertook  the  reorganization  of  the 
industrial  life  of  the  nation,  Bolshevism  entered 
upon  a  new  phase. 

1  Krassin's  first  name  is  usually  given  as  "Gregory,"  but  this  is  an 
error.  His  full  name  is  Leonid  Borisovitch  Krassin.  He  is  a  Sibe- 
rian of  bourgeois  extraction. 


280  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


X 

THE    NATIONALIZATION   OF   INDUSTRY — II 

THE  second  phase  of  nationalization  may  be 
characterized  as  the  adoption  by  a  political 
state  of  the  purest  capitalist  methods.  Krassin 
was  not  a  Bolshevik  or  a  Socialist  of  any  kind,  so 
far  as  can  be  learned.  He  severed  his  rather 
nominal  connection  with  the  Socialist  movement  in 
1906,  it  is  said,  and,  thoroughly  disillusioned,  de- 
voted himself  to  his  profession  and  to  the  manage- 
ment of  the  Petrograd  establishment  of  the  great 
German  firm  of  Siemens-Schuckart.  He  is  said 
to  have  maintained  very  cordial  relations  with 
Lenin  and  was  asked  by  the  latter  to  accept  three 
portfolios,  namely,  Commerce  and  Industry,  Trans- 
ports, and  War  and  Munitions.  He  agreed  to  take 
the  appointment,  provided  the  Soviet  Government 
would  accept  his  conditions.  He  demanded  (1)  the 
right  to  appoint  specialists  of  his  own  choosing  to 
manage  all  the  departments  under  his  control,  re- 
gardless of  their  political  or  social  views;  (2)  that 
all  remaining  workers'  committees  of  control  be 
abolished  and  that  he  be  given  the  power  to  replace 
them  by  responsible  directors,  with  full  powers; 
(3)  that  piece-work  payments  and  premiums  take 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  281 

the  place  of  day-work  payment,  with  the  right  to 
insist  upon  overtime  regardless  of  any  existing 
rules  or  laws. 

Of  course,  acceptance  of  these  conditions  was 
virtually  an  abandonment  of  every  distinctive 
principle  and  ideal  the  Bolsheviki  had  ever  ad- 
vanced. Krassin  immediately  set  to  work  to  bring 
some  semblance  of  order  out  of  the  chaos.  The 
"iron  discipline"  that  was  introduced  and  the  brutal 
suppression  of  strikes  already  described  were  due 
to  his  powerful  energy.  A  martinet,  with  no  sort 
of  use  for  the  Utopian  visions  of  his  associates, 
Krassin  is  a  typical  industrial  despot.  The  attitude 
of  the  workers  toward  him  was  tersely  stated  by 
the  Proletarskoe  Echo  in  these  words:  "How  Com- 
rade Krassin  has  organized  the  traffic  we  have  all 
seen  and  now  know.  We  do  not  know  whether 
Comrade  Krassin  has  improved  the  traffic,  but  one 
thing  is  certain,  that  his  autocratic  ways  as  a  Com- 
missary greatly  remind  us  of  the  autocratic  policy 
of  a  Czar."1 

Yet  Krassin  failed  to  do  more  or  better  than 
prolong  the  hopeless  struggle  against  utter  ruin  and 
disastrous  failure.  He  was,  after  all,  an  engineer, 
not  a  miracle-worker.  Trades-unions  were  deprived 
of  power  and  made  mere  agencies  for  transmitting 
autocratic  orders;  tens  of  thousands  of  useless 
politicians  were  ousted  from  the  factories  and  the 
railways;  the  workers'  control  was  so  thoroughly 
broken  that  there  were  not  left  in  Soviet  Russia  a 
dozen  workers'  committees  possessing  the  power  of 
the  printers'  "chapel"  in  the  average  large  American 

1  Quoted  by  H.  W.  Lee,  The  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat,  p.  7. 


2S2  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

newspaper  plant,  or  anything  like  the  power  pos- 
sessed by  hundreds,  and  perhaps  thousands,  of  shop 
committees  in  our  industrial  centers.1  But  Krassin 
and  his  stern  capitalist  methods  had  come  too  late. 
The  demoralization  had  gone  too  far. 

Only  a  brief  summary  of  the  most  important 
statistical  data  illustrating  the  results  attained  dur- 
ing the  remainder  of  the  year  1919,  that  is  to  say, 
the  second  phase  of  nationalization,  can  be  given 
here.  To  attempt  anything  like  a  detailed  presen- 
tation of  the  immense  mass  of  available  official 
statistical  data  covering  this  period  would  of  itself 
require  a  large  volume.  If  we  take  the  Economi- 
cheskaya  Zhizn  for  the  months  of  October  and 
November,  1919,  we  shall  be  able  to  get  a  fairly 
good  measure  of  the  results  attained  during  the 
half-year  following  the  reorganization  of  the  system 
by  Krassin.  It  must  always  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  is  the  official  organ 


1  In  view  of  the  denials  of  the  dissolution  of  workers'  control,  cir- 
culated by  Soviet  Russia  and  the  whole  body  of  pro-Bolshevist  propa- 
gandists, it  may  be  well  to  clinch  the  statements  made  on  this  point 
by  quoting  from  an  indisputable  authority.  In  the  issue  of  Econo- 
micheskaya Zhizn,  November  13,  1919,  appears  the  following 
paragraph: 

"SchliapnikofF,  Commissar  of  Labor  in  the  Soviet  Republic,  writes: 
'The  principal  cause  of  the  deplorable  situation  of  the  Russian  in- 
dustry is  a  total  absence  of  order  and  discipline  in  the  factories.  The 
Working  Men's  Councils  and  the  Shop  Committees,  created  with  the 
purpose  of  establishing  order  in  the  factories,  exercised  an  injurious 
influence  on  the  general  course  of  affairs  by  destroying  the  last  traces 
of  discipline  and  by  squandering  away  the  property  of  the  factories. 
All  those  circumstances  put  together  have  compelled  us  to  abolish  the 
(Forking  Men's  Councils  and  to  place  at  the  head  of  the  most  important 
concerns  special  "dictators,"  with  unlimited  powers  and  entitled  to 
dispose  of  the  life  and  death  of  the  workmen.' " 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  283 

of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  and  of  the  Minis- 
tries of  Finance,  Commerce  and  Trade,  and  Food. 
To  avoid  having  to  use  the  name  of  the  journal  in 
almost  every  other  line,  the  statements  of  fact 
made  upon  its  authority  are  followed  by  numbers 
inclosed  in  brackets;  these  numbers  indicate  the 
issues  from  which  the  statements  are  taken.1 

Turning  our  attention  first  to  the  important  sub- 
ject of  transportation,  to  which  Krassin  naturally 
devoted  special  attention,  we  find  that  on  the  entire 
railway  system  of  Soviet  Russia  the  number  of 
freight-cars  and  trucks  in  daily  service  during 
August  and  September  averaged  between  7,000 
and  7,500.  Of  this  number  from  45  to  50  per  cent. — - 
that  is,  from  3,500  to  3,750  cars — were  used  for 
carrying  fuel  for  the  railway  service  itself;  trans- 
portation of  military  supplies  took  25  per  cent., 
from  1,750  to  1,850  cars;  10  per  cent.,  from  700  to 
750  cars,  were  used  for  "evacuation  purposes,"  and 
only  15  to  20  per  cent.,  1,050  to  1,150  cars,  for 
general  transportation  (275).  It  is  worthy  of  note 
that  of  this  absurdly  inadequate  service  for  the 
transportation  of  general  supplies  for  the  civilian 
population,  95  per  cent,  was  used  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  wood  fuel  for  the  cities  and  towns  (220). 
Not  less  than  50  per  cent,  of  all  the  locomotives  in 
the  country  were  out  of  order  at  the  beginning  of 
November,  1919,  and  it  was  stated  that  to  increase 
the  percentage  of  usable  engines  to  the  normal  level 
would  require,  under  the  most  favorable  circum- 
stances,   a    period    of    at    least    five    years    (228). 

1  For  the  mass  of  translations  covering  this  period  the  author  is 
indebted  to  Mr.  Alexander  Kerensky. 


284  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Despite  this  deplorable  condition  there  was  still  a 
great  deal  of  bureaucratic  red  tape  and  waste.  At 
the  meeting  of  the  directors  of  the  Supreme  Council 
of  National  Economy,  in  September,  Markov,  a 
member,  argued  in  favor  of  eliminating  the  red  tape 
and  waste.  He  pointed  out  that  wood  was  being 
transported  to  Moscow  from  the  West  and  at  the 
same  time  to  the  West  from  the  North.  The  Main 
Fuel  Committee  had  rejected  a  proposal  to  ex- 
change the  supplies  of  wood  and  thus  save  trans- 
portation (214).  River  transportation  was  in  just 
as  bad  a  condition,  to  judge  from  the  fact  that  the 
freight  tonnage  on  the  river  Volga  was  only  11  per 
cent,  of  the  pre-war  volume  (228). 

To  prove  the  humanitarian  character  of  the 
Bolshevist  regime  its  apologists  in  this  country  and 
in  England  have  cited  the  fact  that  the  Soviet 
authorities  offered  a  prize  for  the  invention  of  a 
hand-cart  which  would  permit  a  maximum  load  to 
be  pushed  or  drawn  with  a  minimum  expenditure 
of  human  strength.  Quite  another  light  is  thrown 
upon  this  action  by  the  data  concerning  the  break- 
down of  mechanical  transportation  and  the  rapid 
disappearance  of  horses  from  Moscow  and  Petro- 
grad.  The  number  of  horses  in  September,  1919, 
was  only  8  per  cent,  of  the  number  in  November, 
1 91 7 — that  is  to  say,  under  Bolshevism  the  number 
of  horses  had  declined  92  per  cent  (207).  Of  course 
the  decline  was  not  so  enormous  throughout  the 
whole  of  Soviet  Russia,  but  it  was,  nevertheless,  so 
serious  as  to  prohibit  any  hope  of  making  up  the 
loss  of  mechanical  power  by  the  use  of  horses. 
Accordingly,  we  find  arrangements  for  the  organiza- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  285 

tion  of  a  rope  haulage  system  for  the  transportation 
of  coal  and  food.  In  the  Bazulk  and  Aktiubin 
districts  provision  was  made  for  the  use  of  6,000 
carts  to  transport  wood  fuel,  and  10,000  carts  for 
corn  (228).  Similar  arrangements  were  under  way 
in  other  districts.  From  locomotives  and  steamers 
to  transport  food  and  fuel  there  was  a  return  to  the 
most  primitive  of  methods,  such  as  were  used  to 
transport  the  Great  Pyramid  in  Egypt,  as  shown 
by  the  hieroglyphs.  For  this  purpose  the  peasants 
were  mobilized  (228).  The  bodies  of  masses  of 
men  were  substituted  for  horses  and  mechanical 
traction.  Thus  was  reintroduced  into  Russian  life 
in  the  twentieth  century  the  form  of  labor  most  hated 
in  the  old  days  of  serfdom. 

The  fuel  situation  was  exceedingly  bad.  Not 
more  than  55  per  cent,  of  the  fuel  oil  required  could 
be  obtained,  the  deficiency  amounting  to  over  four 
million  poods  of  oil  (221).  Only  33  per  cent,  of  the 
fuel  wood  required  was  obtained  (221).  The  pro- 
duction of  coal  in  the  Moscow  region  was  45  per 
cent,  lower  than  in  191 7  (224).  To  overcome  the 
shortage  of  fuel  in  Petrograd  a  large  number  of 
houses  and  boats  were  ordered  to  be  wrecked  for 
the  sake  of  the  wood  {22  f).  To  save  the  country 
from  perishing  for  lack  of  fuel,  it  was  proposed  that 
the  modest  fir  cones  which  dropped  from  the  trees 
be  collected  and  saved.  It  was  proposed  to  mobilize 
school-children,  disabled  soldiers,  and  old  and  sick 
persons  to  collect  these  fir  cones  (202). 

In  the  nationalized  cotton-factories  there  were 
6,900,962  spindles  and  169,226  looms,  but  only 
300,000  spindles   and   18,182  looms  were  actually 

19 


2S6  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

working  on  September  1st  (207).  On  January  1, 
1919,  there  were  48,490  textile-workers  in  the 
Moscow  District;  six  months  later  there  were 
33,200,  a  reduction  of  15,290 — that  is,  35  percent. 
(220).  In  the  same  period  the  number  of  workers 
engaged  in  preparing  raw  cotton  was  reduced  by 
47.2  percent.  (220).  In  the  metal  works  of  Petro- 
grad  there  were  nominally  employed  a  total  of 
12,141  workers,  of  which  number  only  7,585 — that 
is,  62.4  per  cent. — were  actually  working.  Of  7,500 
workmen  registered  at  the  Putilov  Works  only 
2,800,  or  37.3  per  cent.,  were  actually  working  on 
August  15th.  At  the  Nevsky  Shipbuilding  and 
Engineering  Works  not  less  than  56  per  cent,  of 
the  employees  were  classed  as  absentees  for  the 
first  half  of  July,  70  per  cent,  for  the  second  half, 
and  84  per  cent,  for  the  first  half  of  August.  That 
is  to  say,  of  those  nominally  employed  at  this 
important  works  the  actual  daily  attendance  was 
44  per  cent,  during  the  first  half  of  July,  30  per  cent, 
for  the  second  half,  and  only  16  per  cent,  for  the 
first  half  of  August  (209).  Since  then  the  Nevsky 
Shipbuilding  and  Engineering  Works  have  been 
entirely  closed.  It  must  be  remembered  that  even 
during  the  Kerensky  regime  the  metallurgical  es- 
tablishments in  Petrograd  District,  which  included 
some  of  the  finest  plants  in  the  world,  gave  employ- 
ment to  more  than  100,000  workmen  as  against 
12,141  registered  employees  in  September,  1919. 

In  the  nationalized  leather-factories  of  the  Mos- 
cow District  the  output  of  large  hides  was  43  per 
cent,  less  than  the  output  of  1918,  which  was  itself 
far  below  the  normal  average  {22 7).     In  the  fac- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  287 

tories  which  were  not  nationalized  the  output  of 
large  hides  was  60  per  cent,  less  than  in  191 8. 
The  apparent  superiority  of  the  nationalized  fac- 
tories indicated  by  these  figures  is  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the  Centrokaja,  the  central  administration 
of  the  leather  industry,  gave  preference  to  the 
nationalized  factories  in  the  supply  of  tanning  acids, 
fuel,  and  other  necessities  of  production  {227).  Just 
as  in  the  metallurgical  industry  smaller  undertakings 
had  a  better  chance  of  surviving  than  larger  ones 
(211),  so  in  the  leather  industry  *  (22/).  In  both 
cases  the  establishments  not  nationalized  are  far 
more  successful  than  the  nationalized.  The  output 
of  small  hides  in  nationalized  undertakings  fell  by 
60  per  cent.,  and  in  the  establishments  not  nation- 
alized by  18  per  cent  (227). 

The  four  nationalized  match-factories  in  the 
northern  region  employed  2,000  persons.  The  out- 
put in  October,  1919,  was  50  per  cent,  of  the  normal 
output,  the  explanation  being  given  that  the  falling 
off  was  due  to  the  fact  that  large  numbers  of  work- 
men had  to  be  sent  off  into  the  villages  to  search 
for  bread,  while  others  had  to  be  assigned  to  work 
in  the  fields  and  to  loading  wood  for  fuel  (225).  The 
manufacture  of  electric  lamps  was  practically  at  a 
standstill.  The  Petrograd  factories  were  closed 
down  because  of  a  shortage  of  skilled  workmen  and 
technical  directors;   the  Moscow  factories,  because 

1  Yet  we  find  the  Bolshevik,  Bazhenov,  writing  in  the  Economiches- 
kaya  Zhizn  (No.  50),  in  March,  1919,  the  following  nonsense:  "The 
only  salvation  for  Russia's  industry  lies  in  the  nationalization  of  large 
enterprises  and  the  closing  of  small  and  medium-sized  ones."  Bazhenov 
is  evidently  a  doctrinaire  Marxist  of  the  school  to  whom  one  ounce 
of  theory  is  of  more  worth  than  a  ton  of  facts. 


2SS  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  the  complete  absence  of  gas  (210).     The  sugar 
industry  was  almost  completely  liquidated  {20  f). 

In  the  report  of  the  People's  Commissariat  for 
Finance  we  get  a  graphic  and  impressive  picture  of 
the  manner  in  which  this  ill-working  nationalization 
was,  and  is,  bolstered  up.  For  financing  the  na- 
tionalized industries  appropriations  were  made  as 
follows : 

First  six  months  of  19180 .  .  .         762,895,100  rubles 
Second  six  months  of  1918. .      5,141,073,179 
First  six  months  of  1919 153439,115,828 

The  report  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  whereas 
it  had  been  estimated  that  there  would  be  paid 
into  the  treasury  during  the  first  six  months  of  1919 
for  goods  issued  for  consumption  1,503,516,945 
rubles,  the  sum  actually  received  was  54,564,677 
rubles — that  is,  only  3.5  per  cent. 

Some  idea  of  the  conditions  prevailing  can  be 
gathered  from  the  desperate  attempts  to  produce 
substitutes  for  much-needed  articles.  The  ersatz 
experiments  and  achievements  of  the  Germans  dur- 
ing the  war  may  have  had  something  to  do  with  this. 
At  all  events,  we  find  attempts  made  in  the  cotton- 
factories  to  use  "cottonized"  flax  as  a  substitute 
for  cotton  {20  f).  These  attempts  did  not  afford 
any  satisfactory  or  encouraging  results.  In  con- 
sequence of  the  almost  complete  stoppage  of  the 
sugar  industry  we  find  the  Soviet  authorities  resort- 
ing to  attempts  to  produce  sugar  from  sawdust 
(20 7).  Even  more  pathetic  is  the  manner  in  which 
attempts  were  made  to  supply  salt.     This  necessary' 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  289 

commodity  had,  for  all  practical  purposes,  com- 
pletely disappeared  from  the  market,  though  on 
October  3d,  in  Petrograd,  it  was  quoted  at  140  to 
150  rubles  per  pound  {221).  As  a  result  of  this 
condition,  in  several  districts  old  herring-barrels, 
saturated  with  salt,  were  cut  up  into  small  pieces 
and  used  in  cooking  instead  of  salt  (205).  A  con- 
siderable market  for  these  pieces  of  salted  wood  was 
found. 

We  may  profitably  close  this  summary  of  the 
economic  situation  in  Soviet  Russia  in  October  and 
November,  1919,  by  quoting  from  the  report  of  the 
Chief  Administration  of  Engineering  Works: 

If  we  had  reason  to  fear  last  year  for  the  working  of 
our  transport,  the  complaints  of  its  inefficiency  being 
well  grounded,  matters  have  become  considerably  worse 
during  the  period  under  report.  Water  transport  is 
by  no  means  in  a  better  position,  whilst  of  haulage 
transport  there  is  no  need  to  speak.  .  .  .  The  consuming 
needs  of  the  workmen  have  not  been  even  remotely  satis- 
fied, either  in  the  last  year  or  in  the  current  year,  by  the 
Commissariat  of  Food  Supply,  the  main  source  of  food- 
supply  of  the  workmen  being  speculation  and  free  market. 
But  even  the  latter  source  of  food-supply  of  the  work- 
men in  manufacturing  districts  is  becoming  more  and 
more  inaccessible.  Besides  the  fact  that  prices  have  soared 
up  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  the  controlled  rates  of 
wages,  we  see  the  almost  complete  disappearance  of  food 
articles  from  working-center  markets.  Of  recent  times, 
even  pilgrimage  to  villages  is  of  no  avail.  The  villages  will 
not  part  with  food  for  money  even  at  high  prices.  What 
they  demand  is  articles  of  which  the  workers  are  no 
less  in  need.  Hence  the  workers'  escape  from  the 
factories  (220). 


200  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Unfortunately,  a  good  many  of  the  concerns  enumer- 
ated [in  the  Tula  District]  do  not  work  or  work  only 
with  half  the  output,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  20  of  the 
shafts  working  yield  considerable  quantities  of  coal, 
10  mines  supply  much  raw  material  (15  milliard  poods  of 
minerals  are  estimated  to  be  lying  in  this  district), 
whilst  there  is  also  a  large  number  of  broken  lathes  and 
machinery  which  can,  however,  be  repaired.  Bread  for 
the  workers  could  also  be  found,  if  all  efforts  were 
strained  (the  district  used  to  export  corn  in  peace-time). 
All  these  possibilities  are  not  carried  into  life,  as  there  are 
no  people  who  could  by  their  intense  will  and  sincere 
desire  restore  the  iron  discipline  of  labor.  Our  institu- 
tions are  filled  with  "Sovburs"  and  "Speks,"  who  only 
think  of  their  own  welfare  and  not  of  the  welfare  of  the 
state  and  of  making  use  of  the  revolutionary  possibilities 
of  the  "toilers  in  revolt." 

In  the  light  of  this  terrible  evidence  we  can 
readily  believe  what  Zinoviev  wrote  in  an  article 
contributed  to  the  Severnaya  Communa  in  January 
of  this  year.  In  that  article  he  said :  "  King  Famine 
seems  to  be  putting  out  his  tongue  at  the  proletariat 
of  Petrograd  and  their  families.  ...  Of  late  I  have 
been  receiving,  one  after  another,  starving  delega- 
tions from  working  men  and  women.  They  do 
not  protest,  nor  do  they  make  any  demands;  they 
merely  point  out,  with  silent  reproach,  the  present 
intolerable  state  of  affairs." 

We  are  not  dependent  upon  general  statements 
such  as  Zinoviev's  for  our  information  concerning 
the  state  of  affairs  in  Soviet  Russia  in  January, 
1920.  We  have  an  abundance  of  precise  and  au- 
thoritative data.  In  the  first  place,  Gregor  Alexin- 
sky   has   published,   in    admirable   translation,   the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  291 

text  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  reports 
made  to  the  Joint  Congress  of  the  Councils  of 
National  Economy,  Trades-Unions  and  the  Central 
Soviet  Power.  This  congress  opened  in  Moscow 
on  January  25,  1920,  and  lasted  for  several  days. 
Important  reports  were  made  to  it  by  A.  Rykov, 
president  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  National 
Economy;  M.  Tomsky,  chairman  of  the  Central 
Council  of  Trades-Unions;  Kamenev,  president  of 
the  Moscow  Soviet;  Lenin,  Trotsky,  and  others. 
Alexinsky  was  fortunate  enough  to  secure  copies 
of  the  stenographic  reports  of  the  speeches  made  at 
this  joint  congress.  In  addition  to  this  material 
the  present  writer  has  had  placed  at  his  disposal 
several  issues  of  Izvestia  containing  elaborate  reports 
of  the  congress.  At  the  outset  Rykov  dealt  witl 
the  effects  of  the  World  War  and  the  Civil  War 
upon  the  economic  situation: 

During  the  past  few  years  of  Imperialistic  (World) 
and  Civil  Wars  the  exhaustion  of  the  countries  of  Eu- 
rope, and  in  particular  of  Russia,  has  reached  unheard-of 
proportions.  This  exhaustion  has  affected  the  whole 
territory  of  the  Imperialistic  war,  but  the  Civil  war  has 
been,  as  regards  dissipation  of  the  national  wealth  and 
waste  of  material  and  human  resources,  much  more  detri- 
mental than  the  Imperialistic  war,  for  it  spread  across  the 
greater  part  of  the  territory  of  Soviet  Russia,  involving 
not  only  the  clashing  of  armies,  but  also  devastation, 
fires,  and  destruction  of  objects  of  greatest  value  and  of 
structures. 

•  ••*••• 

The  Civil  War,  having  caused  an  unparalleled  waste 
of  the  human  and  material  resources  of  the  Republic, 


292  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

has  engendered  an  economic  and  productive  crisis.  In 
its  main  features  this  crisis  is  one  of  transportation,  fuel, 
and  human  labor  power. 

Truly  these  are  interesting  admissions — here  is 
"a  very  Daniel  come  to  judgment."  The  civil 
war,  we  are  told,  has  been  "much  more  detrimental 
than  the  Imperialistic  war,"  it  has  "caused  an  un- 
paralleled waste  of  the  human  and  material  re- 
sources of  the  republic."  Is  it  not  pertinent  to 
remind  ourselves  that,  for  bringing  on  the  civil  war 
the  Bolsheviki  were  solely  responsible?  There  was 
no  civil  war  in  Russia  until  they  began  it.  The 
whole  of  the  democratic  forces  of  Russia  were 
unitedly  working  for  the  reconstruction  of  the 
nation  upon  a  sound  basis  of  free  democracy.  They 
began  the  civil  war  in  the  face  of  the  most  solemn 
warnings  and  despite  the  fact  that  every  thought- 
ful person  could  foresee  its  inevitable  disastrous 
results.  By  Rykov's  confession  the  Bolsheviki  are 
condemned  for  having  brought  upon  Russia  evils 
greater  than  those  which  the  World  War  brought 
in  its  train.  Of  the  transportation  problem  Rykov 
has  this  to  say: 

Before  the  war,  the  percentage  of  disabled  locomotives, 
even  in  the  worst  of  times,  never  rose  above  15  per  cent. 
At  the  present  time,  however,  we  have  59.5  per  cent,  of 
disabled  locomotives — -i.e.,  out  of  every  100  locomotives 
in  Soviet  Russia  60  are  disabled,  and  only  40  capable  of 
working.  The  repair  of  disabled  locomotives  also  keeps 
on  declining  with  extraordinary  rapidity;  before  the 
war  we  used  to  repair  up  to  8  per  cent.;  this  percentage, 
after  the  October  revolution,  sometimes  dropped  to  1 
per  cent.;  now  we  have  gone  up,  but  only  1  per  cent., 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  293 

and  we  are  now  repairing  2  per  cent,  of  our  locomotives. 
Under  present  conditions  of  railway  transportation  the 
repairs  do  not  keep  abreast  of  the  deterioration  of  our 
locomotives,  and  every  month  we  have,  in  absolute  figures, 
200  locomotives  less  than  the  preceding  month.  It  is  in- 
dispensable that  we  raise  the  repair  of  locomotives  from 
2  per  cent,  up  to  10  per  cent.,  in  order  to  stop  the  de- 
cline and  further  disintegration  of  railway  transporta- 
tion, in  order  to  maintain  it  at  least  on  the  level  on  which 
it  stands  at  the  present  time.  As  for  the  broad  masses 
of  the  population,  the  workers  and  peasants  of  Soviet 
Russia,  these  figures  simply  mean  that  there  is  no  possi- 
bility of  utilizing  any  one  of  those  grain-producing  regions, 
nor  those  which  have  raw  material  and  fuel,  that  have  been 
added  to  Soviet  Russia  as  a  result  of  the  victory  of  the  Red 
Army. 

According  to  Trotsky,  Rykov's  figures,  depressing 
enough  in  all  conscience,  did  not  disclose  the  full 
gravity  of  the  situation.  The  real  number  of  dis- 
abled locomotives  was  greater  than  the  figures  given, 
he  said,  for  the  reason  that  "we  frequently  call 
'sound'  half-disabled  locomotives  which  threaten 
to  drop  out  completely  on  the  morrow."  Rykov's 
statements  do  more  than  merely  confirm  those  pre- 
viously quoted  from  the  Economic lies k  ay  a  Zhizn: 
they  show  that  from  October  to  January  there  had 
been  a  steady  increase  of  deterioration;  that  condi- 
tions had  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  The  report 
proceeds  to  illustrate  the  seriousness  of  the  situa- 
tion by  concrete  examples  of  the  actual  conditions 
confronting  the  government: 

We  have  a  metallurgical  region  in  the  Ural  mountains; 
but  we  have  had  at  our  disposal  until  now  but  one  single 


294  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

special  train  a  month  to  carry  metals  from  the  Urals  to 
central  Russia.  In  order  to  transport  10  million  poods1 
of  metal  by  one  single  train  per  month  several  decades 
would  be  required,  should  we  be  able  to  utilize  those 
scanty  supplies  of  metal  which  are  ready  in  the  Urals. 

In  order  to  deliver  cotton  from  Turkestan  to  the  tex- 
tile factories  in  Moscow,  we  have  to  carry  more  than 
one-half  million  poods  per  month — up  to  600,000  poods. 
But  at  this  time  we  have  only  about  two  trains  a  month; 
that  is,  scores  of  years  will  be  required  for  transporting 
under  present  conditions  from  Turkestan  those  8  million 
poods  of  cotton  which  we  could  convert,  but  are  unable 
to  deliver  to  the  factories. 

The  disorganized  and  demoralized  state  of  the 
transportation  system  was  only  partly  responsible 
for  the  shortage  of  raw  materials,  however.  It  was 
only  one  of  several  causes:  "On  account  of  the  dis- 
organized state  of  transportation  we  are  unable  to 
obtain  cotton  now,  as  the  railroads  are  unable  to 
carry  it  here.  But  even  as  regards  those  raw  ma- 
terials which  are  produced  in  the  central  parts  of 
Soviet  Russia,  such  as  flax,  wool,  hemp,  hides,  even 
in  these  raw  stuffs  Soviet  Russia  is  experiencing  a 
severe  crisis."  Attention  is  called  to  the  enormous 
decline  in  the  production  of  flax,  the  acreage  de- 
voted to  this  crop  being  only  30  per  cent,  of  that 
formerly  devoted  to  it  and  the  yield  very  much 
poorer.  Rykov  offers  as  an  explanation  of  this 
condition  the  fact  that,  as  the  Soviet  Government 
had  not  been  able  to  deliver  to  the  peasants  in  the 
flax-producing  districts  "any  considerable  quantity 
of   foodstuffs,"    the    peasants  grew  foodstuffs  in- 

xOne  pood  equals  thirty-six  pounds. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  295 

stead  of  flax.  He  adds,  "Another  reason  why  the 
peasants  began  to  cultivate  grains  instead  of  flax 
was  that  the  speculative  prices  of  bread  are  higher 
than  the  fixed  prices  of  flax  at  which  the  state  is 
purchasing  it."  He  pours  the  cold  water  of  realism 
upon  the  silly  talk  of  huge  exports  of  flax  from 
Russia  as  soon  as  trade  with  foreign  nations  is 
opened  up,  and  says,  "But  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
export  large  quantities  of  flax  abroad,  and  the  catas- 
trophic decline  in  flax  production  as  compared  with 
IQIQ  raises  the  question  whether  the  flax  industry 
shall  not  experience  in  IQ20  a  flax  shortage  similar  to 
the  one  experienced  by  the  textile  industry  in  cotton." 
Rykov  calls  attention  to  the  decline  in  the  pro- 
duction of  hides  for  leather  and  of  wool.  During 
the  first  six  months  of  1919  the  hides  collected 
amounted  to  about  one  million  pieces,  but  the  total 
for  the  whole  of  1920  was  not  expected  to  exceed 
650,000  pieces.  "The  number  of  hides  delivered 
to  the  government  decreases  with  every  succeeding 
month."  There  was  also  to  be  observed  "a  decline 
in  the  quantity  of  live  stock,  especially  those  kinds 
which  furnish  wool  for  our  woolen  mills."  But 
perhaps  the  most  impressive  part  of  his  report  is 
that  dealing  with  the  fuel  shortage.  Though  ad- 
jacent to  large  coal-fields,  as  well  as  to  vast  forests, 
Moscow  in  the  winter  of  1919-20  lacked  fuel  "even 
for  heating  the  infirmaries  and  hospitals."  For 
the  winter  of  1919-20  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missaries had  fixed  the  necessary  quantity  of  wood 
for  fuel  to  be  produced  at  12,000,000  to  14,000,000 
cubic  sagenes  (one  cubic  sagene  being  equal  to  two 
cubic  meters).    But  the  Administrations  which  were 


296  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

charged  with  the  work  forwarded  to  the  railroads 
and  to  the  rivers  less  than  2,500,000  sagenes.  It 
must  be  added  that  of  these  same  2,500,000  sagenes 
the  Soviet  Administrations  were  not  able  to  trans- 
port to  the  cities  and  industrial  centers  more  than 
a  very  small  quantity,  and  "even  the  minimum 
program  of  supply  of  fuel  for  the  factories  of  Mos- 
cow could  not  be  carried  out  because  of  the  lack 
of  means  of  transport." 

Bad  as  this  is,  the  coal-supply  is  in  a  worse  con- 
dition yet.  "Things  are  going  badly  for  the  pro- 
duction of  coal  and  petroleum"  we  are  told.  Upon 
their  reoccupation  of  the  Donetz  Basin  the  Bolshe- 
viki  found  coal  on  the  surface,  ready  to  be  shipped, 
which  was  estimated  at  100,000,000  poods.  "But 
until  the  reconstruction  of  bridges  and  re-estab- 
lishment of  railroad  communications  in  the  Donetz 
territory  these  coal-supplies  cannot  be  utilized." 
Of  course  the  havoc  wrought  by  war  in  the  Donetz 
Basin  must  be  taken  into  account  and  full  allowance 
made  for  it.  But  what  is  the  explanation  of  condi- 
tions in  the  coal-fields  of  the  Moscow  region,  which 
from  the  very  first  has  been  under  Bolshevist  rule, 
and  never  included  in  the  territory  of  war,  civil  or 
otherwise?     Says  Rykov: 

The  fields  of  Moscow  not  only  have  not  given  what 
they  ought  to  have  given  for  the  fuel-supply  of  Soviet 
Russia,  but  the  production  of  coal  remained  in  1919  at 
the  same  level  as  in  1918  and  it  did  not  reach  the  figure 
of  30,000,000  poods;  whereas,  under  the  Czar  at  the  time 
of  the  Imperialist  War,  the  Czar's  officials,  with  the 
aid  of  prisoners  of  war,  knew  how  to  increase  the  pro- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  297 

duction  of  coal  in  the  Moscow  fields  to  the  extent  of 
40,000,000  poods  and  even  more. 

This  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  most  vitally 
important  fact  of  all,  namely,  the  relatively  low 
productivity  of  labor  under  nationalization  of  in- 
dustry as  practised  in  the  sorry  Utopia  of  the 
Bolsheviki.  This  is  evident  in  every  branch  of 
industry.  "When  we  speak,  in  the  factories  and 
mills,  of  the  increase  of  the  productivity  of  labor, 
the  workmen  always  answer  us,"  says  Rykov, 
"with  the  same  demand  and  always  present  us 
with  the  same  complaint,  Give  us  bread  and  then 
we  will  work."  But  the  demand  for  bread  could 
not  be  met,  despite  the  fact  that  there  was  a  con- 
siderable store  of  wheat  and  other  flour  grains. 
Whereas  at  the  beginning  of  1919  there  was  a  wheat 
reserve  of  60,000,000  poods,  on  January  1,  1920, 
the  reserve  was  90,000,000  poods.  Rykov  ad- 
mits that  this  is  really  not  a  great  deal,  and 
explains  that  in  1919  the  government  had  only 
been  able  to  collect  about  half  the  wheat  demanded 
from  the  peasants,  despite  the  vigorous  policy  pur- 
sued. He  says  that  "in  the  grain  elevators  there 
are  reserves  which  assure  the  supply  for  workmen 
and  peasants  for  three  months."  This  calculation 
is  based  upon  the  near-famine  rationing,  for  Rykov 
is  careful  to  add  the  words,  "according  to  the 
official  food  rations." 

So,  the  whole  reserve,  if  fairly  distributed,  would 
last  until  April.  But  again  the  problem  of  trans- 
portation comes  in:    "If  the  workers  and  peasants 


298  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

have  until  now  received  no  bread,  and  if  up  to  this 
time  a  food  shortage  exists  in  the  greater  part  of 
the  starving  consuming  localities,  the  cause  does 
not  lie  in  inadequate  preparations,  but  in  the  fact 
that  we  are  unable  to  ship  and  distribute  the  grain 
already  carted  and  stored  in  the  granaries."  As  a 
result  of  these  conditions  the  workers  in  the 
factories  at  mass-meetings  "demand  the  breach 
of  the  economic  front  of  Bolshevism,"  that  is  to 
say,  the  re-establishment  of  free  and  unrestricted 
commerce.  In  other  words,  their  demand  is  for  the 
abolition  of  the  nationalization  policy.  It  is  from 
the  proletariat  that  this  cry  comes,  be  it  observed; 
and  it  is  addressed  to  rulers  who  claim  to  represent 
the  "dictatorship  of  the  proletariat"!  Could  there 
be  more  conclusive  evidence  that  Bolshevism  in 
practice  is  the  dictatorship  of  a  few  men  over  the 
proletariat? 

What  remedial  measures  does  this  important 
official,  upon  whom  the  organization  of  the  work 
of  economic  reconstruction  chiefly  depends,  pro- 
pose to  his  colleagues  ?  All  that  we  get  by  way  of 
specific  and  definite  plans  is  summed  up  in  the 
following  paragraph: 

The  Council  of  People's  Commissaries  has  already 
decided  to  call  upon  individual  workmen  as  well  as  groups 
of  them  to  repair  the  rolling-stock,  granting  them  the 
right  to  use  the  equipment  which  they  shall  have  re- 
paired with  their  own  forces  for  the  transportation  of 
food  to  those  factories  and  mills  which  repair  the  loco- 
motives and  cars.  Recently  this  decision  has  been  also 
extended  to  the  fuel-supply.  Each  factory  and  each 
mill   now  has   the  opportunity   to   carry   its  own   fuel, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  299 

provided  they  repair  with  their  own  forces  the  disabled 
locomotives  and  cars  they  obtain  from  the  commissariat 
of  ways  and  communications. 

Was  ever  such  madness  as  this  let  loose  upon  a 
suffering  people?  Let  those  who  have  dilated  upon 
the  "statesmanship"  and  the  "organizing  genius" 
of  these  men  contemplate  the  picture  presented  by 
the  decision  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries. 
Each  factory  to  repair  with  its  own  forces  the  dis- 
abled locomotives  and  cars  it  needs  to  transport 
fuel  and  raw  materials.  Textile-workers,  for  in- 
stance, must  repair  locomotives  and  freight-cars 
or  go  without  bread.  Individual  workmen  and 
groups  of  workmen  and  individual  factories  are 
thus  to  be  turned  loose  upon  what  remains  of  an 
organized  transportation  system.  Not  only  must 
this  result  in  the  completion  of  the  destruction 
of  railway  transportation,  but  it  must  inevitably 
cripple  the  factories.  Take  workers  from  unre- 
lated industries,  unused  to  the  job,  and  set  them  to 
repairing  locomotives  and  freight-cars;  every  man 
who  has  ever  had  anything  to  do  with  the  actual 
organization  and  direction  of  working  forces  knows 
that  such  men,  especially  when  the  special  equip- 
ment and  tools  are  lacking,  cannot  perform,  man 
for  man,  one-tenth  as  much  as  men  used  to  the  work 
r.nd  equipped  with  the  proper  tools  and  equipment. 
And  then  to  tell  these  factory  workers  that  they 
have  "the  right  to  use  the  equipment  which  they 
shall  have  repaired"  means,  if  it  means  anything 
at  all,  that  from  the  factories  are  to  be  diverted 
further  forces  to  operate  railway  trains  and  collect 


300 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


food,  fuel,  and  raw  materials.  What  that  means 
we  have  already  noted  in  the  case  of  the  decline 
of  production  in  the  match-factories,  "owing  to  the 
wholesale  dispersing  of  workmen  in  the  search  for 
bread,  to  field  work  and  unloading  of  wood."  l  Of 
all  the  lunacy  that  has  come  out  of  Bolshevist 
Russia,  even,  this  is  perhaps  the  worst. 

Rykov  tells  us  that  at  the  end  of  1919  4,000 
industrial  establishments  had  been  nationalized. 
"That  means,"  he  says,  "that  nearly  the  whole  in- 
dustry has  been  transferred  to  the  state,  to  the 
Soviet  organizations,  and  that  the  industry  of 
private  owners,  of  manufacturers,  has  been  done 
away  with,  for  the  old  statistics  estimated  the 
total  number  of  industrial  establishments,  including 
peasants'  homework  places,  to  be  around  10,000. 
The  peasants'  industry  is  not  subject  to  nationaliza- 
tion, and  4,000  nationalized  industrial  establish- 
ments include  not  only  the  largest,  but  also  the 
greater  part  of  the  middle-sized,  industrial  enter- 
prises of  Soviet  Russia." 

What  is  the  state  of  these  nationalized  factories, 
and  are  the  results  obtained  satisfactory?  Again 
Rykov's  report  gives  the  answer  in  very  clear 
terms:  "Of  these  4,000  establishments  only  2,000 
are  working  at  present.  All  the  rest  are  closed  and 
idle.  The  number  of  workers,  by  a  rough  estimate, 
is  about  1,000,000.  Thus  you  can  see  that  both 
in  point  of  number  of  the  working-men  employed 
as  well  as  in  point  of  numbers  of  still  working 
establishments,  the  manufacturing  industry  is  also 
in  the  throes  of  a  crisis."     The  explanation  offered 

1  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  No.  225. 


4 

IN  ALL  HISTORY"  301 

by  Trotsky,  that  the  industrial  failure  was  due  to 
the  destruction  of  technical  equipment,  Rykov 
sweeps  aside.  "  The  Soviet  state,  the  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Power,  could  not  utilize  even  those  lathes, 
machines,  and  factory  equipment  which  were  still  at 
its  disposal.  And  a  considerable  part  of  manu- 
facturing enterprises  was  shut  down,  while  part  is 
still  working  only  in  a  few  departments  and  work- 
shops." On  every  hand  it  is  evident  that  shortage 
of  raw  materials  and  of  skilled  labor  are  the  really 
important  causes,  not  lack  of  machinery.  Of  1,191 
metallurgical  plants  614  had  been  nationalized. 
The  government  had  undertaken  to  provide  these 
with  about  30  per  cent,  of  the  metals  required,  but 
had  been  able  to  supply  only  15  per  cent.,  "less 
than  one-quarter  of  the  need  that  must  be  satisfied 
in  order  to  sustain  a  minimum  of  our  industrial 
life." 

Take  the  textile  industry  as  another  example: 
Russia  was  the  third  country  in  Europe  in  textile 
manufacture,  England  and  Germany  alone  leading 
her,  the  latter  by  no  large  margin.  No  lack  of 
machinery  accounts  for  the  failure  here,  for  of  the 
available  looms  only  11  per  cent,  were  used  in  1919, 
and  of  the  spindles  only  7  per  cent.  The  decline 
of  production  in  1919  was  enormous,  so  that  at  the 
end  of  that  year  it  was  only  10  per  cent,  of  the 
normal  production.  We  are  told  that:  "During 
the  period  of  January-March,  1919,  100,000  to 
200,000  poods  of  textile  fabrics  were  produced  per 
month;  during  the  period  of  September-November 
only   25,000  to   68,000   poods  were   produced   per 

month.     Therefore  we  have  to  face  an  almost  com- 
20 


302  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

plete  stoppage  of  all  textile  production  in  central 
Russia,  which  dominated  all  the  other  textile  re- 
gions in  Russia." 

Rykov  seems  to  have  no  illusions  left  concerning 
the  prospects  for  the  immediate  future.  He 
realizes  that  Bolshevism  has  nothing  to  offer  the 
working-people  of  Russia  in  the  way  of  immediate 
improvement.  He  confesses  "that  in  regard  to 
industry  the  supplying  of  the  population  with  foot- 
wear, clothing,  metals,  and  so  on,  Soviet  Russia 
is  living  only  one-third  of  the  life  which  Russia 
lived  in  times  of  peace."  As  to  the  future  he  has 
only  this  to  say:  "Such  a  condition  might  last  one 
or  two  years,  during  which  we  might  live  on  former 
reserves,  thanks  to  that  which  remained  from  the 
preceding  period  of  Russian  history.  But  these 
reserves  are  being  exhausted  and  from  one  day  to 
another,  from  one  hour  to  another,  we  are  approach- 
ing a  complete  crisis  in  these  branches  of  industry." 

But  what  of  the  human  element  in  industry, 
the  workers  themselves,  that  class  whose  interests 
and  aspirations  Bolshevism  is  supposed  to  repre- 
sent? We  have  already  noted  Rykov's  admission 
that  the  workers  and  peasants  lack  bread  and  his 
explanation.  Upon  this  same  matter,  Tomsky, 
president  of  the  Central  Council  of  the  Trades- 
Unions,  says: 

So  far  as  food-supplies  are  concerned  it  is  evident  that 
under  the  present  condition  of  transport  we  will  not 
be  able  to  accumulate  reserves  of  provisions  sufficiently 
great  so  that  each  workman  may  have  a  sufficient  ra- 
tion.    We  must  renounce  the  principle  of  equality  in 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  303 

rationing  and  reduce  the  latter  to  two  or  three  categories 
of  workman's  ration.  We  must  recognize  that  making 
our  first  steps  upon  the  road  of  ameliorating  the  situ- 
ation of  industrial  workers,  we  must  introduce  a  system 
of  so-called  "supply  of  essential  occupation/'  "Above 
all,  we  will  have  to  supply  those  groups  of  workmen 
who  are  especially  necessary  to  production." 

Two  and  a  quarter  years  after  the  forcible  seizure 
of  power  by  the  Bolsheviki  one  of  their  "states-5 
men"  prates  to  his  colleagues  about  making  the 
"first  steps"  toward  "ameliorating  the  situation  of 
industrial  workers."  The  leading  speakers  who  ad- 
dressed the  congress  discussed  at  length  the  bear- 
ing of  these  conditions  upon  what  Trotsky  called 
"the  dissipation  of  the  working-class" — that  is,  the 
disappearance  of  the  proletariat  from  the  industrial 
centers.     Rykov  explained  that: 

The  crisis  of  skilled  labor  has  a  special  importance  for 
our  industry,  because  even  in  those  industrial  branches 
which  work  for  our  army  we  make  vain  efforts  because 
of  the  lack  of  qualified  workmen.  Sometimes  for  weeks 
and  even  entire  months  we  could  not  find  the  necessary 
number  of  workmen  skilled  and  knowing  the  trade  of 
which  the  factories  and  mills  had  such  need,  in  order 
to  give  to  the  Red  Army  rifles,  machine-guns,  and  cannon 
and  thereby  save  Moscow.  We  experienced  enormous 
difficulties  to  find  even  as  few  as  twenty  or  thirty  work- 
men. We  hunted  for  them  everywhere,  at  the  employ- 
ment bureaus,  among  trades-unions,  in  the  regiments,  and 
in  the  villages.  The  wastage  of  the  most  precious  ele- 
ment which  production  calls  for — that  is  to  say,  skilled 
labor — is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  phenomena  of  our 
present  economic  life.    This  wastage  has  reached  to-day 


304  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

colossal  and  unheard-of  dimensions  and  there  are  in- 
dustrial enterprises  which  we  cannot  operate  even  if  we  had 
fuel  and  raw  materials,  because  competent  skilled  labor  is 
lacking. 

That  Rykov  is  not  an  alarmist,  that  his  state- 
ments are  not  exaggerated,  we  may  be  quite  as- 
sured. Even  Trotsky  protested  that  conditions 
were  worse  than  Rykov  had  described  them,  and 
not  better.  While  Rykov  claimed  that  there  were 
1,000,000  workmen  engaged  in  the  nationalized 
factories,  Trotsky  said  that  in  reality  there  were 
not  more  than  850,000.  But  how  is  this  serious 
decrease  in  the  number  of  workmen  to  be  ac- 
counted for?  An  insatiable  hunger,  idle  factories, 
unused  raw  materials,  a  government  eagerly  seeking 
workmen,  and  yet  the  workmen  are  not  forth- 
coming. Trotsky  offers  this  explanation :  "Hunger, 
bad  living  conditions,  and  cold  drive  the  Russian 
workmen  from  industrial  centers  to  the  rural  dis- 
tricts, and  not  only  to  those  districts,  but  also 
into  the  ranks  of  profiteers  and  parasites."  Kamenev 
agrees  with  Trotsky  and  says  that  "profiteering  is 
the  enemy  whom  the  Moscow  proletariat  has  felt 
already  for  sbme  time  to  be  present,  but  who  has 
succeeded  in  growing  up  to  full  height  and  is  now 
eating  up  the  entire  fabric  of  the  new  socialistic 
economic  structure."  Tomsky  answers  the  question 
in  a  very  similar  manner.     He  says: 

If  in  capitalistic  society  a  shortage  of  labor  power 
marks  the  most  intensive  activity  of  industry,  in  our 
own  case  this  has  been  caused  by  conditions  which  are 
unique  and  unprecedented  in  capitalist  economic  ex- 
perience.   Only  part  of  our  industry  is  at  work,  and  yet 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  305 

there  is  a  shortage  of  labor  power  felt  in  the  cities  and 
industrial  centers.  We  observe  an  exodus  of  laborers 
from  industrial  centers,  caused  by  poor  living  conditions. 
Those  hundreds  of  skilled  laborers  whom  we  are  at  pres- 
ent lacking  for  the  most  elementary  and  minimal  require- 
ments of  industry  have  gone  partly  to  the  country,  to 
labor  communes,  Soviet  farms,  producers'  associations, 
while  another  part,  a  very  considerable  one,  serves  in  the 
army.  But  the  proletariat  also  leaks  away  to  join  the  ranks 
of  petty  profiteers  and  barter-traders,  we  are  ashamed  and 
sorry  to  confess.  This  fact  is  being  observed  and  there  is  no 
use  concealing  or  denying  it.  There  is  also  another  cause 
which  hurts  the  industrial  life  and  hinders  a  systematic 
organization  of  work.  This  is  the  migration  of  the  work- 
ers from  place  to  place  in  search  of  better  living  condi- 
tions. All  of  this,  again,  is  the  result  of  the  one  funda- 
mental cause — the  very  critical  food  situation  in  the  cities 
and,  in  general,  the  hard  conditions  of  life  for  the  in- 
dustrial proletariat. 

Finally,  some  attention  must  be  given  to  the 
speech  of  Lenin,  reported  in  Izvestia,  January  29, 
1920.  Discussing  the  question  whether  industry 
should  be  administered  by  a  "collegium"  or  by  a 
single  individual  clothed  with  absolute  authority, 
Lenin  defended  the  latter  as  the  only  practical 
method,  illustrating  his  case  by  reference  to  the 
Red  Army.  The  Soviet  organization  in  the  army 
was  well  enough  at  first,  as  a  start,  but  the  system 
of  administration  has  now  become  "administra- 
tion by  a  single  individual  as  the  only  proper  method 
of  work."  He  explains  this  point  in  the  following 
words : 

Administration  by  "colleges"  as  the  basic  type  of  the 
organization  of  the  Soviet    administration    presents  in 


f 


306  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

itself  something  fundamental  and  necessary  for  the 
first  stage  when  it  is  necessary  to  build  anew.  But  with 
the  establishing  of  more  stable  forms,  a  transition  to 
practical  work  is  bound  up  with  administration  by  a 
single  individual,  a  system  which,  most  of  all,  assures 
the  best  use  of  human  powers  and  a  real  and  not  verbal 
control  of  work. 


Thus  the  master  pronounces  the  doom  of  indus- 
trial Sovietism.  No  cry  of,  "All  power  to  the  So- 
viets!" comes  from  his  lips  now,  but  only  a  demand 
that  the  individual  must  be  made  all-powerful. 
Lenin  the  ruler  pours  scorn  upon  the  vision  of 
Lenin  the  leader  of  revolt.  His  ideal  now  is  that 
of  every  industrial  despot  everywhere.  He  has 
no  pity  for  the  toiler,  but  tells  his  followers  that 
they  must  "replace  the  machines  which  are  lack- 
ing and  those  which  are  being  destroyed  by  the 
strength  of  the  living  laborer."  That  means 
|  rope  haulage  instead  of  railway  transportation; 
it  means  that,  instead  of  being  masters  of  great 
machines,  the  Russian  toilers  must  replace  the 
machines. 

What  a  picture  of  "the  dictatorship  of  the  prole- 
tariat" these  utterances  of  the  leading  exponents 
of  Bolshevism  make!  Proletarians  starving  in  a 
land  of  infinite  abundance;  forced  by  hunger,  cold, 
and  oppression  to  leave  homes  and  jobs  and  go  back 
to  village  life,  or,  much  worse,  to  become  either 
vagabonds  or  petty  profiteers  trafficking  in  the 
misery  of  their  fellows.  Their  tragic  condition, 
worse  than  anything  they  had  to  endure  under 
czarism,  suggests  the  lines: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  307 

The  hungry  sheep  look  up  and  are  not  fed, 

But,  swollen  with  wind  and  the  rank  mist  they  draw, 

Rot  inwardly,  and  foul  contagion  spread. 

We  do  not  wonder  at  Krassin's  confession,  pub- 
lished early  this  year  in  the  Economicheskaya  Zhizny 
urging  "a  friendly  liquidation  of  Bolshevism  in 
Russia"  and  declaring  that:  "The  Communistic 
regime  cannot  restore  the  life  of  the  country,  and 
the  fall  of  Bolshevism  is  inevitable.  The  people 
are  beginning  to  recognize  that  the  Bolshevist 
experiment  has  plunged  them  into  a  sea  of  blood 
and  torment  and  aroused  no  more  than  a  feeling  of 
fatigue  and  disappointment." 

Here,  then,  is  a  picture  of  nationalized  industry 
under  Bolshevism,  drawn  by  no  unfriendly  or  mali- 
cious critic,  but  by  its  own  stout  upholders,  its 
ablest  champions.  It  is  a  self-portrait,  an  auto- 
biographical sketch.  In  it  we  can  see  Bolshevism 
as  it  is,  a  repellent  and  terrifying  thing  of  malefic^ 
might  and  purpose.  Possessed  of  every  vice  am 
every  weakness  of  capitalism,  with  none  of  its  vir- 
tues, Bolshevism  is  abhorrent  to  all  who  love  liberty 
and  hold  faith  in  mankind.  Promising  plenty,  it 
gives  only  famine;  promising  freedom,  it  gives  only 
fetters;  promising  love,  it  gives  only  hate;  promising 
order,  it  gives  only  chaos;  promising  righteous  and 
just  government,  it  gives  only  corrupt  despotism; 
promising  fraternity,  it  gives  only  fratricide. 

Yet,  despite  the  overwhelming  mass  of  evidence, 
there  will  still  be  defenders  and  apologists  of  this 
monstrous  perversion  of  the  democratic  Socialist 
ideal.     We  shall  be  told  that  the  Bolsheviki  have 


308  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

had  to  contend  against  insurmountable  obstacles; 
that  when  they  entered  into  power  they  found  the 
industrial  system  already  greatly  demoralized;  that 
they  have  been  compelled  to  devote  themselves  to 
war  instead  of  to  reconstruction;  that  they  have 
been  isolated  and  deprived  of  those  things  with 
which  other  nations  hitherto  supplied  Russia. 

All  these  things  are  true,  but  in  what  way  do  they 
excuse  or  palliate  the  crimes  of  the  Bolsheviki? 
When  they  overthrew  the  Provisional  Government 
and  by  brute  force  usurped  its  place  they  knew 
that  the  industrial  life  of  the  nation,  including  the 
transportation  system,  had  been  gravely  injured. 
They  knew,  moreover,  that  it  was  recovering  and 
that  its  complete  restoration  could  only  be  brought 
about  by  the  united  effort  of  all  the  freedom-loving 
elements  in  the  land.  They  knew,  or  ought  to 
have  known,  just  as  every  sane  person  in  and  out 
of  Russia  knew,  that  if  they  deserted  the  Allies  in 
the  time  of  their  gravest  peril,  and,  by  making 
peace  with  Germany,  aided  her  upon  the  western 
front,  the  Allies  would  not — could  not  and  dare  not 
— continue  to  maintain  their  friendly  and  co- 
operative relations  with  Russia.  They  knew,  or 
ought  to  have  known,  as  every  sane  person  in  and 
out  of  Russia  did,  that  if  they  tried  to  impose  their 
rule  upon  the  nation  by  force  of  arms,  they  would  be 
resisted  and  there  would  be  civil  war.  All  these 
things  Lenin  and  his  followers  had  pointed  out  to 
them  by  clear-visioned  Socialists.  All  of  them  are 
written  large  upon  history's  pages. 

No  defense  of  Bolshevism  has  yet  been  made 
which  is  not  itself  an  accusation. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  309 


XI 

FREEDOM    OF    PRESS    AND   ASSEMBLY 

IN  1903,  after  the  split  of  the  Russian  Social 
Democratic  Party  into  two  factions — the  Bol- 
sheviki  and  the  Mensheviki — the  late  Rosa  Luxem- 
burg, in  an  article  which  she  contributed  to  Iskra 
(Spark),  gave  a  keen  analysis  of  Lenin.  She 
charged  that  he  was  an  autocrat  at  heart,  that  he 
despised  the  workers  and  their  rights.  In  burning 
words  she  protested  that  Lenin  wanted  to  rule 
Russia  with  an  iron  fist,  to  replace  one  czarism  by 
another.  Now,  Rosa  Luxemburg  was  no  "mere 
bourgeois  reformer,"  no  "sentimental  opportunist"; 
even  at  that  time  she  was  known  in  the  interna- 
tional Socialist  movement  as  "Red  Rosa,"  a 
revolutionist  among  revolutionists,  one  of  the  red- 
dest of  them  all.  Hating  despotism  and  autocracy 
as  such,  and  not  merely  the  particular  manifestation 
of  it  in  the  Romanov  regime,  she  saw  quite  clearly, 
and  protested  against,  the  contempt  for  democracy 
and  all  its  ways  which,  even  at  that  time,  she 
recognized  as  underlying  Lenin's  whole  conception 
of  the  revolutionary  struggle. 

A  very  similar  estimate  of  Lenin  was  made  ten 
years    later,    in    1913,    by   one   of   his    associates, 


310  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

P.  Rappaport.  When  we  remember  that  it  was 
written  a  year  before  the  World  War  began,  and 
five  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Russian  Revo- 
lution in  March,  1917,  this  estimate  of  Lenin,  writ- 
ten by  Rappaport  in  1913,  is  remarkable:  "No 
party  in  the  world  could  live  under  the  regime  of  the 
Czar  Social  Democrat,  who  calls  himself  a  liberal 
Marxist,  and  who  is  only  a  political  adventurer  on 
a  grand  scale." 

These  estimates  of  Lenin  by  fellow-Socialists 
who  knew  him  well,  and  who  were  thoroughly 
familiar  with  his  thought,  possess  no  small  amount 
of  interest  to-day.  Of  course,  we  are  concerned 
with  the  individual  and  with  the  motivation  of  his 
thought  and  actions  only  in  so  far  as  the  individual 
asserts  an  influence  upon  contemporary  develop- 
ments, either  directly,  by  deeds  of  his  own,  or  in- 
directly through  others.  There  is  much  significance 
in  the  fact  that  "Bolshevism"  and  "Leninism"  are 
already  in  use  as  synonyms,  indicating  that  a  move- 
ment which  has  spread  with  great  rapidity  over  a 
large  part  of  the  world  is  currently  regarded  as 
exemplifying  the  thought  and  the  purpose  of  the 
man,  Ulianov,  whom  posterity,  like  his  contem- 
poraries, will  know  best  by  his  pseudonym.  Nicolai 
Lenin's  contempt  for  democratic  ways,  and  his 
admiration  for  autocratic  and  despotic  ways,  are 
thus  of  historical  importance. 

There  was  much  that  was  infamous  in  the  regime 
of  the  last  of  the  Romanovs,  Nicholas  II,  but  by 
comparison  with  that  of  his  successor,  "Nicholas 
III,"  it  was  a  regime  of  benignity,  benevolence,  and 
freedom.     No  government  that  has  been  set  up  in 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  311 

modern  times,  among  civilized  peoples,  has  been  so 
thoroughly  tyrannical,  so  intolerant  and  hostile  to 
essential   freedom,    as  the   government  which   the 
Bolsheviki  established  in  Russia  by  usurpation  of 
power  and  have  maintained  thus  far  by  a  relentless 
and  conscienceless  use  of  every  instrumentality  of 
oppression    and    suppression    known    to   the  hated 
Romanovs.     Without  mandate  of  authority  from  the 
people,  or  even  any  considerable  part  of  the  people, 
this  brutal  power  dissolved  the  Constituent  Assembly 
and  annulled  all  its  acts;    chose  its  own  agents  and 
conferred  upon  them  the  title  of  representatives  of  the 
people;    disbanded  the  courts  of  law  and  substituted 
therefor  arbitrary   tribunals,   clothed  with   unlimited 
power;    without  semblance  of  lawful  trial,  sentenced 
men  and  women  to  death,   many  of  them  not  even 
accused  of  any  crime  whatsoever;  seized  innocent  men, 
women,  and  children  as  hostages  for  the  conduct  of 
others;   shot  and  otherwise  executed  innocent  persons, 
including  women  and  children,  for  crimes  and  offenses 
of  others,   of  which  they   admittedly   knew  nothing; 
deprived  citizens  of  freedom,  and  imprisoned  them  in 
vile  dungeons,  for  no  crime  save  written  or  spoken 
appeal  in  defense  of  lawful  rights;    arbitrarily  sup- 
pressed the  existing  freedom  of  assemblage  and  of 
publication;   based  civic  rights  upon  the  acceptance  of 
particular  beliefs;    by  arbitrary  decree  levied  unjust, 
unequal,   and  discriminatory  taxes;    filled  the  land 
with  hireling  secret  spies  and  informers;    imposed  a 
constitution  and  laws  upon  the  people  without  their 
consent,  binding  upon  the  people,  but  not  upon  it- 
self; placed  the  public  revenues  at  the  disposal  of  a 
political  faction  representing  only  a  minority  of  the 


312  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

people;  and,  finally,  by  a  decree  restored  involuntary 
servitude. 

This  formidable  indictment  is  no  more  than  a 
mere  outline  sketch  of  the  despotism  under  which 
Russia  has  suffered  since  November,  191 7.  There 
is  not  a  clause  in  the  indictment  which  is  not  fully 
sustained  by  the  evidence  given  in  these  pages. 
Lenin  is  fond  of  quoting  a  saying  of  Marx  that, 
"The  domination  of  the  proletariat  can  most  easily 
be  accomplished  in  a  war-weary  country — i.e.,  in  a 
worn-out,  will-less,  and  weakened  land."  He  and 
his  associates  found  Russia  war  weary,  worn  out, 
and  weakened  indeed,  but  not  "will-less."  On  the 
contrary,  the  great  giant,  staggering  from  the  weak- 
ness and  weariness  arising  from  years  of  terrible 
struggle,  urged  by  a  mighty  will  to  make  secure 
the  newly  conquered  freedom,  was  already  turn- 
ing again  to  labor,  to  restore  industry  and  build  a 
prosperous  nation.  By  resorting  to  the  methods 
and  instrumentalities  which  tyrants  in  all  ages  have 
used  to  crush  the  peoples  rightly  struggling  to  be 
free,  the  Bolsheviki  have  imposed  upon  Russia  a 
tyranny  greater  than  the  old.  That  they  have  done 
this  in  the  name  of  liberty  in  no  wise  mitigates  their 
crime,  but,  on  the  contrary,  adds  to  it.  The  classic 
words  of  the  English  seventeenth-century  pam- 
phleteer come  to  mind:  "Almost  all  tyrants  have 
been  first  captains  and  generals  for  the  people, 
under  pretense  of  vindicating  or  defending  their 
liberties.  .  .  .  Tyrants  accomplish  their  ends  much 
more  by  fraud  than  force  .  .  .  with  cunning, 
plausible  pretenses  to  impose  upon  men's  under- 
standings, and  in  the  end  they  master  those  that 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  313 

had  so  little  wit  as  to  rely  upon  their  faith  and 
integrity." 

The  greatest  liberty  of  all,  that  liberty  upon  which 
all  other  liberties  must  rest,  and  without  which 
men  are  slaves,  no  matter  by  what  high-sounding 
names  they  may  be  designated,  is  the  liberty  of 
discussion.  Perhaps  no  people  in  the  world  have 
realized  this  to  the  same  extent  as  the  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  peoples,  or  have  been  so  solicitous  in  main- 
taining it.  Only  the  French  have  approached  us 
in  this  respect.  The  immortal  words  of  a  still 
greater  seventeenth-century  pamphleteer  constitute 
a  part  of  the  moral  and  political  heritage  of  our  race. 
Who  does  not  thrill  at  Milton's  words,  "Give  me 
the  liberty  to  know,  to  utter,  and  to  argue  freely 
according  to  conscience,  above  all  liberties."  That 
fine  declaration  was  the  inspiration  of  Patrick 
Henry's  sublime  demand,  "Give  me  liberty  or  give 
me  death."  Upon  that  rock,  and  that  rock  alone, 
was  built  "government  of  the  people,  by  the  people, 
and  for  the  people." 

The  manner  in  which  the  Bolsheviki  have  stifled 
protest,  discussion,  and  appeal  through  the  sup- 
pression of  the  opposition  newspapers  constitutes 
one  of  the  worst  chapters  in  their  infamous  history. 
Yet,  strangely  enough,  of  such  perversity  is  the 
human  mind  capable,  they  have  found  their  chief 
defenders,  outside  of  Russia,  among  individuals  and 
groups  devoted  to  the  upholding  of  popular  liberties. 
Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  case  of  Mr.  William 
Hard  and  his  laborious  and  ingenious — though  dis- 
ingenuous— articles  in  defense  of  the  Bolsheviki, 
published  in  the  New  Republic  and  elsewhere: 


314  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

In  an  earlier  volume,1  written  at  the  close  of  191 8, 
and  published  in  March,  1919,  the  present  writer 
said  of  the  Bolsheviki,  "When  they  came  into  power 
they  suppressed  all  non-Bolshevist  papers  in  a  man- 
ner differing  not  at  all  from  that  of  the  Czar's 
regime,  forcing  the  other  Socialist  partizan  groups 
to  resort  to  pre-Revolution  underground  methods." 
The  statement  that  the  "other  Socialist  partizan 
groups"  were  forced  to  "resort  to  pre-Revolution 
underground  methods,"  made  in  the  connection  it 
was,  conveyed  to  every  person  reading  that  para- 
graph who  knew  anything  at  all  of  the  history  of  the 
Russian  revolutionary  struggle  the  information  that 
the  statement  that  the  Bolsheviki  "suppressed  all 
non-Bolshevist  papers"  was  not  to  be  interpreted 
as  meaning  the  suppression  was  absolute.  Even 
if  it  had  not  been  pointed  out  elsewhere — as  it  was, 
upon  the  authority  of  a  famous  Socialist-Revolu- 
tionist— that  in  some  instances  suppressed  papers 
managed  to  appear  in  spite  of  the  authorities,  simply 
changing  their  names,  precisely  as  they  had  done 
under  czarism,  the  statement  quoted  above  would 
have  been  justified  as  a  substantially  correct  state- 
ment of  the  facts,  particularly  in  view  of  the  boast 
of  responsible  Bolsheviki  themselves  that  they  had 
suppressed  the  entire  opposition  press  and  that  only 
the  Bolshevist  press  remained.  Certainly  when 
one  speaks  or  writes  of  the  suppression  of  newspapers 
under  czarism  one  does  not  deny  that  the  revolu- 
tionists from  time  to  time  found  ways  and  means  of 
circumventing  the  authorities,  and  that  it  was  more 
or  less  common  for  such  suppressed  newspapers  to 

1  Bolshevism,  by  John  Spargo,  New  York,  1919. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  315 

reappear  under  new  names.  The  whole  point  of 
the  paragraph  in  question  was  that  the  characteris- 
tic conditions  of  czarism  had  been  restored. 

With  a  mental  agility  more  admirable  than  either 
his  controversial  manners  or  his  political  morals, 
by  a  distortion  of  facts  worthy  of  his  mentors,  but 
not  of  himself  or  of  his  reputation,  Mr.  Hard  makes 
it  appear  that  the  Bolsheviki  only  suppressed  the 
opposition  newspapers  after  the  middle  of  1918, 
when,  as  he  alleges,  the  opposition  to  the  Bolsheviki 
assumed  the  character  of  "open  acute  civil  war." 
Mr.  Hard  admits  that  prior  to  this  time  there  were 
suppressions  and  that  "if  any  paper  tried  not 
merely  to  criticize  the  Lenin  administration,  but  to 
utterly  destroy  the  Bolshevik  Soviet  idea  of  the 
state,  its  editor  was  likely  to  find  his  publishing  life 
quite  frequently  interrupted." 

Now  the  facts  in  the  case  are  as  different  from 
Mr.  Hard's  presentation  as  a  normal  mind  can  well 
conceive.  Mr.  David  N.  Shub,  a  competent  au- 
thority, made  an  exhaustive  reply  to  Mr.  Hard's 
article,  a  reply  that  was  an  exposure,  in  the  columns 
of  Struggling  Russia.  Before  reproducing  Mr. 
Shub's  reply  it  may  be  well  to  set  forth  a  few  facts 
of  record  which  are  of  fundamental  importance: 
On  the  very  day  on  which  the  Bolsheviki  -published  the 
decree  on  the  establishment  of  the  Soviet  -power,  No- 
vember 10,  1917-,  they  published  also  a  decree  directed 
against  the  freedom  of  the  press.  The  decree  proper 
was  accompanied  by  a  characteristic  explanatory 
statement.  This  statement  recited  that  it  had  been 
necessary  for  the  Temporary  Revolutionary  Com- 
mittee to  "adopt  a  series  of  measures  against  the 


316  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

counter-revolutionary  press  of  various  shades"; 
that  protests  had  been  made  on  all  sides  against 
this  as  a  violation  of  the  program  which  provided 
for  the  freedom  of  the  press;  repressive  measures 
were  temporary  and  precautionary,  and  that  they 
would  cease  and  complete  freedom  be  given  to  the 
press,  in  accordance  with  the  widest  and  most  pro- 
gressive law,  "as  soon  as  the  new  regime  takes  firm 
root."     The  decree  proper  read: 

I.  Only  those  organs  of  the  press  will  be  suspended 

(a)  Which  appeal  for  open  resistance  to  the  govern- 
ment of  workmen  and  peasants. 

(b)  Which  foment  disorders  by  slanderously  falsify- 
ing facts. 

(c)  Which  incite  to  criminal  acts — i.e.,  acts  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  police  courts. 

II.  Provisional  or  definitive  suspension  can  be  executed 
only  by  order  of  the  Council  of  People's  Commis- 
saries. 
III.  These  regulations  are  only  of  a  provisional  nature 
and  shall  be  abrogated  by  a  special  ukase  when 
life  has  returned  to  normal  conditions. 


If  Mr.  Hard  or  any  of  the  numerous  journalistic 
apologists  of  the  Bolsheviki  in  this  country  will 
look  the  matter  up  he  or  they  will  find  that  this 
decree  copied  the  forms  usually  used  by  the  Czar's 
government.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  restoration 
of  freedom  of  the  press  was  already  made  dependent 
upon  that  czaristic  instrument,  the  ukase.  On  the 
16th  of  November  the  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Soviets  adopted  a  resolution  which  read: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  317 

The  closure  of  the  bourgeois  papers  was  caused  not 
only  by  the  purely  fighting  requirements  in  the  period 
of  the  rising  and  the  suppression  of  counter-revolutionary 
attempts,  but  likewise  as  a  necessary  temporary  measure 
for  the  establishment  of  a  new  regime  in  the  sphere  of 
the  press,  under  which  the  capital  proprietors  of  printing- 
works  and  paper  would  not  be  able  to  become  autocratic 
beguilers  of  public  opinion.  .  .  .  The  re-establishment  of 
the  so-called  freedom  of  the  press,  viz.,  the  simple  return 
of  printing-offices  and  paper  to  capitalists,  poisoners  of 
the  people's  conscience,  would  be  an  unpermissible  sur- 
render to  the  will  of  capital — i.e.,  a  counter-revolution- 
ary measure. 

At  the  meeting  when  this  resolution  was  adopted, 
and  speaking  in  its  support,  Trotsky  made  a 
speech  remarkable  for  its  cynical  dishonesty  and 
its  sinister  menace.  He  said,  according  to  the 
report  in  Pravda  two  days  later: 

Those  measures  which  are  employed  to  frighten  in- 
dividuals must  be  applied  to  the  press  also.  .  .  .  All  the  re- 
sources of  the  press  must  be  handed  over  to  the  Soviet 
Power.  You  say  that  formerly  we  demanded  freedom 
of  the  press  for  the  Pravda?  But  then  we  were  in  a 
position  to  demand  a  minimum  program;  now  we  insist 
on  the  maximum  program.  When  the  power  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  bourgeoisie  we  demanded  juridical  freedom  of 
the  press.  When  the  power  is  held  by  the  workmen  and 
peasants — we  must  create  conditions  for  the  freedom  of 
the  press. 

Quite  obviously,  as  shown  by  their  own  official 
reports,  Mr.  Hard  and  gentlemen  of  the  New 
Republic,  Mr.  Oswald  Villard  and  gentlemen  of  The 

21 


318  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Nation,  and  you,  too,  Mr.  Norman  Thomas,  who 
find  Mr.  Hard's  disingenuous  pleading  so  convinc- 
ing,1 the  hostility  of  the  Bolsheviki  to  freedom  of  the 
press  was  manifest  from  the  very  beginning  of  their 
rule.  On  the  night  of  November  30th  ten  im- 
portant newspapers  were  suppressed  and  their 
offices  closed,  among  them  being  six  Socialist  news- 
papers. Their  offense  lay  in  the  fact  that  they 
urged  their  readers  to  stand  by  the  Constituent 
Assembly.  Not  only  were  the  papers  suppressed 
and  their  offices  closed,  but  the  best  equipped  of 
them  all  was  "requisitioned"  for  the  use  of  a 
Bolshevist  paper,  the  Soldatskaia  Pravda.  The 
names  of  the  newspapers  were:  Nasha  Rech,  Sov- 
remennoie  Delo,  Utro,  Rabochaia  Gazeta,  Folia 
Naroda,  Trudovoe  Slovo,  Edinstvo,  and  Rabotcheie 
Dclo.  The  suppression  of  the  Rabochaia  Gazeta, 
official  organ  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  caused  a  vigorous  protest  and 
the  Central  Committee  of  the  party  decided  "to 
bring  to  the  knowledge  of  all  the  members  of  the 
party  that  the  central  organ  of  the  party,  the 
Rabochaia  Gazeta,/\s  closed  by  the  Military  Revolu- 
tionary Committee.  While  branding  this  as  an 
arbitrary  act  in  defiance  of  the  Russian  and  inter- 
national proletariat,  committed  by  so-called  Social- 
ists on  a  Social-Democrat  paper  and  the  Labor 
Party,  whose  organ  it  is,  the  Central  Committee  has 
decided  to  call  upon  the  party  to  organize  a  move- 
ment of  protest  against  this  act  in  order  to  open  the 
eyes  of  the  labor  masses  to  the  character  of  the 
regime  which  governs  the  country." 

1  See  The  World  Tomorrow,  February,  1920,  p.  61. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  319 

In  consequence  of  the  tremendous  volume  of 
protest  and  through  the  general  adoption  of  the 
devices  familiar  to  the  revolutionaries  under  czarism 
— using  new  names,  changing  printing-offices,  and 
the  like — most  of  the  papers  reappeared  for  a  brief 
while  in  one  form  or  another.  But  in  February, 
1918,  all  the  anti-Bolshevist  papers  were  again  sup- 
pressed, save  one,  the  principal  organ  of  the  Cadets, 
formerly  the  Rech,  but  later  appearing  as  the  Nash 
Viek.  This  paper  was  suffered  to  appear  for  reasons 
which  have  never  been  satisfactorily  explained. 
Mr.  Shub's  article  contains  a  detailed,  though  by 
no  means  full,  account  of  the  further  suppressions: 

A  few  days  after  the  Bolshevist  coup,  in  November, 
1917,  the  Bolsheviki  closed  down,  among  others,  the 
organ  of  the  Mensheviki-Internationalists,  Rabochaya 
Gazeta;  the  central  organ  of  the  Party  of  Socialists- 
Revolutionists,  Dyelo  Naroda;  the  Folia  Naroda,  pub- 
lished by  Catherine  Breshkovsky;  the  Yedinstvo,  pub- 
lished by  George  Plechanov;  the  Russkaya  Folia, 
published  by  Leonid  Andreiev;  the  Narodnoye  Slovo,  the 
organ  of  the  People's  Socialists,  and  the  Dien,  published 
by  the  well-known  Social-Democrat,  Alexander  Potresov. 

The  printing-presses  which  belonged  to  Andreiev  were 
confiscated  and  his  paper,  Russkaya  Folia,  never  again 
appeared  under  any  other  name.  The  editor-in-chief  of 
the  Folia  Naroda — the  newspaper  published  by  Catherine 
Breshkovsky — A.  Agunov,  was  incarcerated  by  the 
Bolsheviki  in  the  Fortress  of  Saints  Peter  and  Paul  and 
this  paper  was  never  able  to  appear  again,  even  under  a 
changed  name.  The  offices  of  the  Dyelo  Naroda  were  for 
a  time  guarded  by  groups  of  armed  soldiers  in  sympathy 
with  the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists,  and  not- 
withstanding all  orders  by  the  Commissary  of  the  Press 


320  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

to  cease  publication,  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  man- 
aged from  time  to  time  to  issue  their  newspapers,  in 
irregular  form,  under  one  name  or  another.  But  the 
copies  of  the  paper  would  be  confiscated  from  the  news- 
dealers immediately  upon  their  appearance,  and  the 
newsboys  who  risked  the  selling  of  it  were  subjected  to 
unbelievable  persecutions.  There  were  even  cases  when 
the  sellers  of  these  "seditious"  Socialist  papers  were 
shot  by  the  Bolsheviki.  These  facts  were  recorded  by 
every  newspaper  which  appeared  from  time  to  time  in 
those  days  in  Petrograd  and  Moscow. 

The  Dien  (Day)  did  not  appear  at  all  for  some  time 
after  its  suppression.  Later  there  appeared  in  its  place 
the  Polnotch  (Midnight),  which  was  immediately  sup- 
pressed for  publishing  an  expose  of  the  Bolshevist  Com- 
missary, Lieutenant  Schneuer,  an  ex-provocateur  of  the 
Tzar's  government  and  a  German  spy,  the  same  Schneuer 
who  conducted  negotiations  with  the  German  command 
for  an  armistice,  and  who  later,  together  with  Krylenko, 
led  the  orgy  called  "the  capture  of  the  General  Head- 
quarters," in  the  course  of  which  General  Dukhonine,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Russian  Army,  was  brutally 
murdered  and  mutilated  for  his  refusal  to  conclude  an 
armistice  with  the  Germans. 

A  few  days  after  the  Polnotch  was  closed  another 
paper  appeared  in  its  place,  called  Notch  (Night),  but 
this  one  was  just  as  rapidly  suppressed.  Again  V  Glook- 
hooyou  Notch  (In  the  Thick  of  Night)  appeared  for  a 
brief  period,  and  still  later  V  Temnooyou  Notch  (In  the 
Dark  of  Night).  The  paper  was  thus  appearing  once  a 
week,  and  sometimes  once  every  other  week,  under  dif- 
ferent names.  I  have  all  these  papers  in  my  possession, 
and  their  contents  and  fate  would  readily  convince  the 
reader  how  "tolerantly"  the  Bolsheviki,  in  the  early 
days  of  their  "rule,"  treated  the  adverse  opinions  of 
even  such  leading  Socialists  as  Alexander  Potresov,  one 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  321 

of  the  founders  of  the  Russian  Social-Democratic  Labor 
Party,  who,  for  decades,  was  one  of  the  editors  of  the 
central  organs  of  the  party. 

The  publication  of  G.  V.  Plechanov's — Russia's  great- 
est Socialist  writer  and  leader — the  Yedinstvo,  after  it 
was  suppressed,  appeared  in  the  end  of  December,  1917, 
under  the  name  Nashe  Yedinstvo,  but  was  closed  down 
in  January,  1918,  and  the  Bolsheviki  confiscated  its  funds 
kept  in  a  bank  and  ordered  the  confiscation  of  all  moneys 
coming  in  by  mail  to  its  office.  This  information  was 
even  cabled  to  New  York  by  the  Petrograd  correspond- 
ent of  the  New  York  Jewish  pro-Bolshevist  newspaper, 
the  Daily  Forward.  The  Nashe  Yedinstvo,  at  the  head 
of  which,  besides  George  Plechanov,  there  were  such 
widely  known  Russian  revolutionists  and  Socialists  as 
Leo  Deutsch,  Vera  Zasulitch,  Dr.  N.  Vassilyev,  L.  Axel- 
rod-Orthodox,  and  Gregory  Alexinsky,  was  thus  perma- 
nently destroyed  by  the  Bolsheviki  in  January,  or  early 
in  February,  1918,  and  never  appeared  again  under  any 
other  name. 

The  newspapers  Dien,  Dyelo  Naroda,  the  Menshevist 
Novy  Looch,  and  a  few  others  did  make  an  attempt  to 
appear  later,  but  on  the  eve  of  the  conclusion  of  the 
Brest-LitovskTreaty  all  oppositional  Socialist  newspapers 
were  again  suppressed  wholesale.  In  the  underground 
Socialist  bulletins,  which  were  at  that  time  being  pub- 
lished by  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  and  Social 
Democrats,  it  was  stated  that  this  move  was  carried 
out  by  order  of  the  German  General  Staff.  The  prom- 
inent Social  Democrat  and  Internationalist,  L.  Martov, 
later,  at  an  open  meeting  of  the  Soviet,  flung  this  accusa- 
tion in  the  face  of  Lenin,  who  never  replied  to  it  by  either 
word  or  pen. 

When  the  Germans,  after  the  Brest-Litovsk  Treaty, 
still  continued  their  offensive  movement,  occupying  one 
Russian    city    after    another,    and    the    Bolsheviki    had 


322  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

reasons  to  believe  that  they  were  nearing  their  end, 
they  somewhat  relaxed  their  regime  and  some  news- 
papers obtained  the  possibility  of  appearing  again,  on 
condition  that  all  such  newspapers,  under  threat  of  fine  and 
confiscation,  were  to  print  on  their  first  pages  all  the 
Bolshevist  decrees  and  all  distorted  information  and  ex- 
planations by  the  Bolshevist  commissaries.  Aside  from 
that,  the  press  was  subject  to  huge  fines  for  every  bit 
of  news  that  did  not  please  the  eye  of  the  Bolshevist 
censor.  Thus,  for  instance,  Novaya  Zhizn,  Gorky's 
organ,  was  fined  35,000  rubles  for  a  certain  piece  of 
"unfavorable"  news  which  it  printed. 

However,  early  in  May,  1918 — i.e.,  before  the  beginning 
of  the  so-called  "intervention"  by  the  Allies — even  this 
measure  of  "freedom"  of  the  press  appeared  too  frivolous 
for  the  Bolshevist  commissaries,  and  they  permanently 
closed  down  Dyelo  Naroda,  Dien,  and  Novy  Looch,  and, 
somewhat  later,  all  the  remaining  opposition  papers, 
including  Gorky's  Novaya  Zhizn,  and  since  that  time 
none  of  them  have  reappeared.  In  spite  of  endless  at- 
tempts, Maxim  Gorky  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  per- 
mission to  establish  his  paper  even  six  months  afterward, 
when  he  had  officially  made  peace  with  the  Soviet  regime. 
The  Bolsheviki  are  afraid  of  the  free  speech  of  even  their 
official  "friends,"  and  that  is  the  true  reason  why  there 
is  not  in  Soviet  Russia  to-day  a  single  independent  organ 
of  the  press.1 

With  one  kick  of  the  Red  Army  boot  was  thus  de- 
stroyed Russia's  greatest  treasure,  her  independent  press. 
The  oldest  and  greatest  founts  of  Russian  culture  and 
social  justice,  such  as  the  monthly  magazine,  Russkoye 
Bogatstvo,  and  the  daily  Russkya  Viedomosti,  which  even 
the  Czar's  government  never  dared  to  suppress  per- 
manently, were  brutally  strangled.  These  organs  have 
raised  entire  generations  of  Russian  radicals  and  Social- 

1  April,  1919. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  323 

i.sts  and  had  among  their  contributors  and  editors  the 
greatest  savants,  publicists,  and  journalists  of  Russia, 
such  as  Nicholas  Chernishevsky,  Glieb  Uspensky,  Nicho- 
las Mikhailovsky,  N.  Zlatovratsky,  Ilya  Metchnikov, 
Professor  N.  Kareiev,  Vladimir  Korolenko,  Peter  Kropot- 
kin,  and  numerous  others. 


Let  us  look  at  the  subject  from  a  slightly  different 
angle:  one  of  the  first  things  they  did  was  to  declare 
the  "nationalization"  of  the  printing-establish- 
ments of  certain  newspapers,  which  they  immedi- 
ately turned  over  to  their  own  press.  In  this  man- 
ner the  printing-establishment  of  the  Novoye 
Vremia  was  seized  and  used  for  the  publication  of 
Izvestia  and  Pravda,  the  latter  being  an  organ  of  the 
party  and  not  of  the  government.  Here  was  a  new 
form  of  political  nepotism  which  a  Tweed  might 
well  envy  and  only  a  Nash  could  portray.  We  are 
at  the  beginning  of  the  nepotism,  however.  On 
November  20,  1917,  the  advertising  monopoly  was 
decreed,  and  on  December  10th  following  it  went 
into  effect.  This  measure  forbade  the  printing  of 
advertisements  in  any  except  the  official  journals, 
thereby  cutting  off  the  revenue  from  advertising, 
upon  which  newspapers  depend,  from  all  except 
official  journals.  This  measure  alone  had  the  effect 
of  limiting  the  possibility  of  publication  practically 
to  the  official  papers  and  those  which  were  heavily 
subsidized.  Moreover,  the  Bolsheviki  used  the 
public  revenues  to  subsidize  their  own  newspapers. 
They  raised  the  postal  rates  for  sending  newspapers 
by  mail  to  a  prohibitive  height,  and  then  carried 
the  newspapers  of  their  own  partizans  free  of  charge 


324  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

at  the  public  expense.  They  "nationalized"  the 
sale  of  newspapers,  v/hich  made  it  unlawful  for 
unauthorized  persons  to  obtain  and  offer  for  sale 
any  save  the  official  Bolshevist  newspapers  and 
those  newspapers  published  by  its  partizans  which 
supported  the  government.  The  decree  forbade  tak- 
ing subscriptions  for  the  "unauthorized"  papers  at 
the  post-offices,  in  accordance  with  custom,  forbade 
their  circulation  through  the  mails,  and  imposed  a 
special  tax  upon  such  as  were  permitted  to  appear. 
Article  III  of  this  wonderful  decree  reads: 

Subscriptions  to  the  bourgeois  and  pseudo-Socialist 
newspapers  are  suppressed  and  will  not  hereafter  be 
accepted  at  the  post-office.  Issues  of  these  journals  that 
may  be  mailed  will  not  be  delivered  at  their  destination. 

Newspapers  of  the  bourgeoisie  will  be  subject  to  a  tax 
which  may  be  as  great  as  three  rubles  for  each  num- 
ber. Pseudo-Socialist  journals  such  as  the  Vperiod 
and  the  Troud  Vlast  Naroda1  will  be  subject  to  the  same 
tax. 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  by  the  latter  part  of  May, 
1918,  the  anti-Bolshevist  press  had  been  almost 
entirely  exterminated  except  for  the  fitful  and 
irregular  appearance  of  papers  published  surrepti- 
tiously, and  the  few  others  whose  appearance  was 
due  to  the  venality  of  some  Bolshevist  officials? 
Was  there  ever,  in  the  history  of  any  nation,  since 
Gutenberg's  invention  of  movable  type  made  news- 
papers possible,  such  organized  political  nepotism? 
Was  there  ever,  since  men  organized  governments, 
anything  more  subversive  of  freedom  and  political 

1  These  were  organs  of  the  Mensheviki  and  the  Social  Revolutionists. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  325 

morality?  Yet  there  is  worse  to  come;  as  time 
went  on,  new  devices  suggested  themselves  to  these 
perverters  of  democracy  and  corrupters  of  govern- 
ment. On  July  27,  191 8,  Izvestia  published  the  in- 
formation that  the  press  department  would  grant 
permits  for  periodical  publications,  provided  they 
accepted  the  Soviet  platform.  In  carrying  out  this 
arrangement,  so  essentially  despotic,  the  press  de- 
partment reserved  to  itself  the  right  to  determine 
whether  or  not  the  population  was  in  need  of  the 
proposed  publication,  whether  it  was  advisable  to 
permit  the  use  of  any  of  the  available  paper-supply 
for  the  purpose,  and  so  forth  and  so  on.  Under  this 
arrangement  permission  was  given  to  publish  a 
paper  called  the  Mir.  Ostensibly  a  pacifist  paper, 
the  Mir  was  very  cordially  welcomed  by  the 
Bolshevist  papers  to  the  confraternity  of  privileged 
journals.  That  the  Mir  was  subsidized  by  the 
German  Government  for  the  propaganda  of  inter- 
national pacificism  (this  was  in  the  summer  of  191 8) 
seems  to  have  been  established.1  The  closing  chap- 
ter of  the  history  of  this  paper  is  told  in  the 
following  extract  from  Izvestia,  October  17,  191 8, 
which  is  more  interesting  for  its  disclosures  of 
Bolshevist  mentality  than  anything  else: 

The  suppression  of  the  paper  Mir  (Peace). — In  ac- 
cordance with  the  decision  published  in  the  Izvestia  on 
the  27th  July,  No.  159,  the  Press  Department  granted 
permits  to  issue  to  periodical  publications  which  accepted 
the  Soviet  platform.  When  granting  permission  the 
Press  Department  took  into  consideration  the  available 
supplies  of  paper,  whether  the  population  was  in  need  of 
1  See  Dumas,  op.  cit.,  p.  80. 


: 


326  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  proposed  periodical  publication,  and  also  the  necessity 
of  providing  employment  for  printers  and  pressmen. 
Thus  permission  was  granted  to  issue  the  paper  Mir, 
especially  in  view  of  the  publisher's  declaration  that  the 
paper  was  intended  to  propagate  pacifist  ideas.  At  the 
present  moment  the  requirements  of  the  population  of  the 
Federal  Socialist  Republic  for  means  of  daily  information 
are  adequately  met  by  the  Soviet  publications;  employment 
for  those  engaged  in  journalistic  work  is  secured  in  the 
Soviet  papers;  a  paper  crisis  is  approaching.  The  Press 
Department,  therefore,  considers  it  impossible  to  permit 
the  further  publication  of  the  Mir  and  has  decided  to 
suppress  this  paper  forever. 

Another  device  which  the  Bolsheviki  resorted  to 
was  the  compulsion  of  people  to  purchase  the 
official  newspapers,  whether  they  wanted  them  or 
not.  On  July  20,  191 8,  there  was  published 
"Obligatory  Regulation  No.  27,"  which  provided 
for  the  compulsory  purchase  by  all  householders  of 
the  Severnaya  Communa.  This  unique  regulation 
read  as  follows: 

Obligatory  Regulation  No.  27 

Every  house  committee  in  the  city  of  Petrograd  and 
other  towns  included  in  the  Union  of  Communes  of 
the  Northern  Region  is  under  obligation  to  subscribe 
to,  paying  for  same,  one  copy  of  the  newspaper,  the 
Severnaya  Communa,  the  official  organ  of  the  Soviets  of 
the  Northern  Region. 

The  newspaper  should  be  given  to  every  resident  in 
the  house  on  the  first  demand. 

Chairman  of  the  Union  of  the  Communes  of  the 
Northern  region,  Gr.  Zinoviev. 

Commissary  of  printing,  N.  Kuzmin. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  327 

The  Severnaya  Communay  on  November  10,  191 8, 
published  the  following  with  reference  to  this 
beautiful  scheme: 

To  the  Notice  of  the  House  Committees  of  the  Poor: 

On  20th  July  of  the  present  year  there  was  published 
obligatory  regulation  No.  27,  to  the  following  effect: 

"Every  house  committee  in  the  city  of  Petrograd  and 
other  towns  included  in  the  Union  of  Communes  of  the 
Northern  Region  is  under  obligation  to  subscribe  to, 
paying  for  same,  one  copy  of  the  newspaper,  the  Severnaya 
Communa,  the  official  organ  of  the  Soviets  of  the  North- 
ern Region. 

"The  newspaper  should  be  given  to  every  resident  in 
the  house  on  the  first  demand. 

"Chairman  of  the  Union  of  the  Communes  of  the 
Northern  region,  Gr.  Zinoviev. 

"Commissary  of  printing,  N.  Kuzmin." 

However,  until  now  the  majority  of  houses  inhabited 
mainly  by  the  bourgeoisie  do  not  fulfil  the  above- 
expressed  obligatory  regulation,  and  the  working  popu- 
lation of  such  houses  is  deprived  of  the  possibility  of 
receiving  the  Severnaya  Communa  in  its  house  committees. 

Therefore,  the  publishing  office  of  the  Severnaya 
Communa  brings  to  the  notice  of  all  house  committees 
that  it  has  undertaken,  through  the  medium  of  especial 
emissaries,  the  control  of  the  fulfilment  by  house  com- 
mittees of  the  obligatory  regulation  No.  27,  and  all 
house  committees  which  cannot  show  a  receipt  for  a  sub- 
scription to  the  newspaper,  the  Severnaya  Communa,  will 
be  immediately  called  to  the  most  severe  account  for 
the  breaking  of  the  obligatory  regulation. 

Subscriptions  will  be  received  in  the  main  office  and 
branches  of  the  Severnaya  Communa  daily,  except  Sun- 
days and  holidays,  from  10  to  4. 


x 


328  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

After  this  it  is  something  of  an  anticlimax  to  even 
take  note  of  the  tremendous  power  wielded  by  the 
Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the  Press,  Section  of 
Political  Crimes,  which  was  created  in  March,  191 8. 
The  decree  relating  to  this  body  and  outlining  its 
functions,  dated  December  18,  1917,  read  as 
follows : 

The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the  Press 

1.  Under  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  is  created  a 
Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the  Press.  This  Tribunal 
will  have  jurisdiction  of  crimes  and  offenses  against  the 
people  committed  by  means  of  the  press. 

2.  Crimes  and  offenses  by  means  of  the  press  are  the 
publication  and  circulation  of  any  false  or  perverted 
reports  and  information  about  events  of  public  life,  in 
so  far  as  they  constitute  an  attempt  upon  the  rights  and 
interests  of  the  revolutionary  people. 

3.  The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the  Press  consists 
of  three  members,  elected  for  a  period  not  longer  than 
three  months  by  the  Soviet  of  Workmen's,  Soldiers', 
and  Peasants'  Deputies.  These  members  are  charged 
with  the  conduct  of  the  preliminary  investigation  as 
well  as  the  trial  of  the  case. 

4.  The  following  serve  as  grounds  for  instituting  pro- 
ceedings: reports  of  legal  or  administrative  institutions, 
public  organizations,  or  private  persons. 

5.  The  prosecution  and  defense  are  conducted  on 
the  principles  laid  down  in  the  instructions  to  the  general 
Revolutionary  Tribunal. 

6.  The  sessions  of  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the 
Press  are  public. 

7.  The  decisions  of  the  Revolutionary  Tribunal  of 
the  Press  are  final  and  are  not  subject  to  appeal. 

8.  The  Revolutionary  Tribunal  imposes  the  following 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  329 

penalties:  (i)  fine;  (2)  expression  of  public  censure, 
which  the  convicted  organ  of  the  Press  brings  to  the 
general  knowledge  in  a  way  indicated  by  the  Tribunal; 
(3)  the  publication  in  a  prominent  place  or  in  a  special 
edition  of  a  denial  of  the  false  report;  (4)  temporary  or 
permanent  suppression  of  the  publication  or  its  exclusion 
from  circulation;  (5)  confiscation  to  national  ownership 
of  the  printing-shop  or  property  of  the  organ  of  the 
Press  if  it  belongs  to  the  convicted  parties. 

9.  The  trial  of  an  organ  of  the  Press  by  the  Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal  of  the  Press  does  not  absolve  the  guilty 
persons  from  general  criminal  responsibility. 

Under  the  provisions  of  this  body  the  newspapers 
which  were  appearing  found  themselves  subject  to 
a  new  terror.  An  offensive  reference  to  Trotsky 
caused  the  Outre  Rossii  to  be  mulcted  to  the  extent 
of  10,000  rubles.  Even  the  redoubtable  Martov 
was  punished  and  the  Vperiod,  organ  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  suppressed.  The  Nache  Slovo 
was  fined  25,000  rubles  and  the  Ranee  Outre  was 
mulcted  in  a  like  amount  for  printing  a  news 
article  concerning  some  use  of  the  Lettish  sharp- 
shooters by  the  Bolsheviki,  though  there  was  no 
denial  that  the  facts  were  as  stated.  It  was  a 
common  practice  to  impose  fines  of  anywhere  from 
10,000  to  50,000  rubles  upon  papers  which  had  in- 
dulged in  criticism  of  the  government  or  anything 
that  could  be  construed  as  "an  offense  against  the 
people"  or  "an  attempt  upon  the  rights  and  in- 
terests of  the  revolutionary  people." 

Here,  then,  is  a  summary  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  Bolsheviki  have  suppressed  the  freedom  of  the 
press.     It  is  a   record  which   cannot   be  equaled, 


330  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

nor  approached,  in  all  the  history  of  Russia  during 
the  reign  of  Nicholas  Romanov  II.  Mr.  Hard 
attempts  to  cover  the  issue  with  confusion  by 
asking,  "Is  there  any  government  in  the  world  that 
permits  pro-enemy  papers  to  be  printed  within  its 
territory  during  a  civil  war?"  and  he  is  applauded 
by  the  entire  claque  of  so-called  "Liberal"  and 
"Radical"  pro-Bolshevist  journals.  It  was  done 
in  this  country  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
Mr.  Hard;  it  has  been  done  in  Ireland  under 
"British  tyranny."  The  Bolshevist  records  show, 
first,  that  the  suppression  of  non-Bolshevist  jour- 
nals was  carried  out  upon  a  wholesale  scale  when 
there  was  no  state  of  civil  war,  no  armed  resistance 
to  the  Bolsheviki;  that  it  was,  in  fact,  carried  out 
upon  a  large  scale  during  the  period  when  prepara- 
tions were  being  made  for  holding  the  Constituent 
Assembly  which  the  Bolsheviki  themselves,  in  re- 
peated official  declarations,  had  sworn  to  uphold 
and  defend.  The  records  show,  furthermore,  that 
the  Bolsheviki  sought  not  merely  to  suppress  those 
journals  which  were  urging  civil  war,  but  that,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  they  suppressed  the  papers  which 
urged  the  contrary — that  is,  that  the  civil  war  be 
brought  to  an  end.  The  Vsiegda  Vperiod  is  a  case 
in  point.  In  February,  19 19,  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Soviets  announced  that  it 
had  confirmed  the  decision  to  close  this  newspaper, 
"as  its  appeals  for  the  cessation  of  civil  war  appear 
to  be  a  betrayal  of  the  working-class." 

No,  Mr.  Hard.  No,  Mr.  Oswald  Villard.  No, 
Mr.  Norman  Thomas.  No,  gentlemen  of  the  New 
Republic.     No,   gentlemen  of   The  Nation.     There. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  331 

can  be  no  escape  through  the  channels  of  such 
juggling  with  facts.  When  you  defend  the  Bolshe- 
vist regime  you  defend  a  monstrous  organized  op- 
pression, and  you  thereby  disqualify  yourselves  to 
set  up  as  champions  and  defenders  of  Freedom. 
When  you  protest  against  restrictions  of  popular 
liberties  here  the  red  ironic  laughter  of  the  tyrants 
you  have  defended  drowns  the  sound  of  your 
voices.  When  you  speak  fair  words  for  Freedom 
in  America  your  fellow-men  hear  only  the  echoes 
of  your  louder  words  spoken  for  tyranny  in  Russia. 
You  do  not  approach  the  bar  with  clean  hands  and 
clean  consciences.  You  are  forsworn.  By  what 
right  shall  you  who  have  defended  Bolshevism  in 
Russia,  with  all  its  brutal  tyranny,  its  loathsome 
corruption,  its  unrestrained  reign  of  hatred,  presume 
to  protest  when  Liberty  is  assailed  in  America? 
Those  among  us  who  have  protested  against  every 
invasion  of  popular  liberties  at  home,  and  have  at 
the  same  time  been  loyal  to  our  comrades  in  Russia 
who  have  so  bravely  resisted  tyranny,  have  the 
right  to  enter  the  lists  in  defense  of  Freedom  in 
America,  and  to  raise  our  voices  when  that  Free- 
dom is  assailed.  You  have  not  that  right,  gen- 
tlemen; you  cannot  speak  for  Freedom,  in  America 
or  anywhere  else,  without  bringing  shame  upon 
her. 

In  all  the  platforms  and  programs  of  the  Socialist 
parties  of  the  world,  without  a  single  exception,  the 
demand  for  freedom  of  the  press  has  held  a  prom- 
inent place.  No  accredited  spokesmen  of  the 
Socialist  movement,  anywhere,  at  any  time,  has 
suggested  that  this  demand  was  made  with  mental 


332  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

reservations  of  any  kind,  or  that  when  Socialists 
came  into  power  they  would  suppress  the  publica- 
tion of  views  hostile  to  their  own,  or  the  views  of 
parties  struggling  to  introduce  other  changes.  Yet 
we  find  Lenin  at  the  meeting  of  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Soviets  held  on  November 

18,  1917,  saying:  "We,  the  Bolsheviki,  have 
always  said  that  when  we  came  into  power  we 
would  shut  down  the  bourgeois  newspapers.  To 
tolerate  bourgeois  newspapers  is  to  quit  being 
Socialists."  And  Trotsky  supported  this  position 
and  affirmed  it  as  his  own. 

We  have  here  only  the  beginnings  of  a  confession 
of  moral  bankruptcy,  of  long-continued,  systematic, 
studied  misrepresentation  of  their  purpose  and 
deception  of  their  comrades  and  of  all  who  believed 
the  words  they  said,  unsuspecting  the  serious 
reservations  back  of  the  words.  Theses  Respecting 
the  Social  Revolution  and  the  Tasks  of  the  Proletariat 
During  Its  Dictatorship  in  Russia  is,  as  might  be 
inferred  from  its  title,  a  characteristic  piece  of 
Lenin's  medieval  scholasticism,  in  which,  with 
ponderous  verbosity,  he  explains  and  interprets 
Bolshevism.    Let  us  consider  Theses  Nos.  17,  18, 

19,  and  20: 

(17)  The  former  demands  for  a  democratic  republic, 

and  general  freedom  (that  is  freedom  for  the  middle 

classes  as  well),  were  quite  correct  in  the  epoch  that  is 

now  past,  the  epoch  of  preparation    and  gathering  of 

jtstrength.     The  worker  needed  freedom  for  his  press,  while 

I  the  middle-class  press  was  noxious  to  him,  but  he  could 

I  not  at  this  time  put  forward  a  demand  for  the  suppression 

I  of  the  middle-class  press.     Consequently,  the  proletariat 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  333 

demanded  general  freedom,  even  freedom  for  reactionary 
assemblies,  for  black  labor  organizations. 

(18)  Now  we  are  in  the  period  of  the  direct  attack  on 
capital,  the  direct  overthrow  and  destruction  of  the  im- 
perialist robber  state,  and  the  direct  suppression  of  the 
middle  class.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely  clear  that  in 
the  present  epoch  the  principle  of  defending  general 
freedom  (that  is  also  for  the  counter-revolutionary  mid- 
dle class)  is  not  only  superfluous,  but  directly  dangerous. 

(19)  This  also  holds  good  for  the  press,  and  the 
leading  organizations  of  the  social  traitors.  The  latter 
have  been  unmasked  as  the  active  elements  of  the 
counter-revolution.  They  even  attack  with  weapons 
the  proletarian  government.  Supported  by  former  offi- 
cers and  the  money-bags  of  the  defeated  finance  capital, 
they  appear  on  the  scene  as  the  most  energetic  organiza- 
tions for  various  conspiracies.  The  proletariat  dictator- 
ship is  their  deadly  enemy.  Therefore,  they  must  be 
dealt  with  in  a  corresponding  manner. 

(20)  As  regards  the  working-class  and  the  poor  peas- 
ants, these  possess  the  fullest  freedom. 

What  have  we  here  ?  One  reads  these  paragraphs 
and  is  stunned  by  them;  repeated  readings  are 
necessary.  We  are  told,  in  fact,  that  all  the  de- 
mands for  freedom  of  the  press,  including  the 
bourgeois  press,  made  by  Socialists  out  of  office, 
during  the  period  of  their  struggle,  were  hypo- 
critical; that  the  demand  for  freedom  for  all  was 
made  for  no  other  reason  than  the  inability  of  those 
making  it  to  secure  their  freedom  by  themselves 
and  apart  from  the  general  freedom;  that  there 
was  always  an  unconfessed  desire  and  intention  to 
use  the  power  gained  through  the  freedom  thus 
acquired  to  suppress  the  freedom  already  possessed 

22 


334  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

by  others.  What  a  monstrous  confession  of  du- 
plicity and  deceit  long  practised,  and  what  a  burden 
of  suspicion  and  doubt  it  imposes  upon  all  who 
hereafter  in  the  name  of  Socialism  urge  the  freedom 
of  the  press.1 

Let  us  hear  from  another  leading  Bolshevist 
luminary,  Bucharin,  who  shares  with  Lenin  the 
heaviest  tasks  of  expounding  Bolshevist  theories 
and  who  is  in  some  respects  a  rival  theologian.  In 
July,  1918,  Bucharin  published  his  pamphlet,  The 
Program  of  the  Communists ',  authorized  by  the  Com- 
munist Party,  of  whose  organ,  Pravda,  he  is  the 
editor.  A  revolutionary  organization  in  this  coun- 
try published  the  greater  part  of  this  pamphlet,  and 
it  is  significant  that  it  omitted  Chapter  VII,  in 
which  Bucharin  reveals  precisely  the  same  attitude 
as  Lenin.  He  goes  farther  in  that  he  admits  the 
same  insincerity  of  attitude  toward  equal  suffrage 
and  the  Constituent  Assembly  based  on  the  will  of 
the  majority.     He  says: 

If  we  have  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  stifle  the  bourgeoisie,  to  compel  it  to  give 
up  its  attempts  for  the  restoration  of  the  bourgeois  au- 
thority, then  it  is  obvious  that  there  can  be  no  talk  of 
allowing  the  bourgeoisie  electoral  rights  or  of  a  change  from 
soviet  authority  to  a  bourgeois-republican  parliament. 

The  Communist  (Bolshevik)  party  receives  from  all 
sides  accusations  and  even  threats  like  the  following: 
"You  close  newspapers,  you  arrest  people,  you  forbid 
meetings,  you  trample  underfoot  freedom  of  speech  and 
of  the  press,  you  reconstruct  autocracy,  you  are  op- 
pressors and  murderers." 

1  See  Kautsky,  The  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  335 

It  is  necessary  to  discuss  in  detail  this  question  of 
"liberties"  in  a  Soviet  republic. 

At  present  the  following  is  clear  for  the  working-men 
and  the  peasants.  The  Communist  party  not  only  does 
not  demand  any  liberty  of  the  press,  speech,  meetings, 
unions,  etc.,  for  the  bourgeois  enemies  of  the  people, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  it  demands  that  the  government 
should  be  always  in  readiness  to  close  tbe  bourgeois  press; 
to  disperse  the  meetings  of  the  enemies  of  the  people; 
to  forbid  them  to  lie,  slander,  and  spread  panic;  to 
crush  ruthlessly  all  attempts  at  a  restoration  of  the 
bourgeois  regime.  This  is  precisely  the  meaning  of 
the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

Another  question  may  be  put  to  us:  "Why  did  the 
Bolsheviki  not  speak  formerly  of  the  abrogation  of  full 
liberty  for  the  bourgeoisie?  Why  did  they  formerly 
support  the  idea  of  a  bourgeois-democratic  republic? 
Why  did  they  support  the  idea  of  the  Constituent  Assembly 
and  did  not  speak  of  depriving  the  bourgeoisie  of  the  right 
of  suffrage?  Why  have  they  changed  their  program  so 
far  as  these  questions  are  concerned? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  very  simple.  The  working- 
class  formerly  did  not  have  strength  enough  to  storm  the 
bulwarks  of  the  bourgeoisie.  It  needed  preparation,  accu- 
mulation of  strength,  enlightenment  of  the  masses,  organi- 
zation. It  needed,  for  example,  the  freedom  of  its  own 
labor  press.  But  it  could  not  come  to  the  capitalists  and 
to  their  governments  and  demand  that  they  shut  down  their 
own  newspapers  and  give  full  freedom  to  the  labor  papers. 
Everybody  would  merely  laugh  at  the  working-men.  Such 
demands  can  be  made  only  at  the  time  of  a  storming  attack. 
And  there  had  never  been  such  a  time  before.  This  is  why 
the  working-men  demanded  {and  our  party,  too)  "Freedom 
of  the  press."  {Of  the  whole  press,  including  the  bourgeois 
press.) 


336  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

A  more  immoral  doctrine  than  that  contained  in 
these  utterances  by  the  foremost  intellectual  leaders 
of  Russian  Bolshevism  can  hardly  be  conceived  of. 
How  admirably  their  attitude  and  their  method  is 
summed  up  in  the  well-known  words  of  Frederick  II 
of  Prussia:  "I  understand  by  the  word  'policy' 
that  one  must  make  it  his  study  to  deceive  others; 
that  is  the  way  to  get  the  better  of  them."  And 
these  are  the  men  and  this  the  policy  which  have 
found  so  many  champions  among  us!  When  or 
where  in  all  the  history  of  a  hundred  years  was  such 
a  weapon  as  this  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  reaction- 
ists? Here  are  the  spokesmen  of  what  purports  to 
be  a  Socialist  republic,  and  of  the  political  party 
which  claims  to  present  Socialism  in  its  purest  and 
undiluted  form,  saying  to  the  world,  "Socialists 
do  not  believe  in  freedom  of  the  press;  they  find 
it  convenient  to  say  they  do  while  they  are  weak, 
in  order  to  gain  protection  and  aid  for  their  own 
press,  but  whenever  and  wherever  they  obtain  the 
power  to  do  so  they  will  suppress  the  press  of  all 
who  disagree  with  them  or  in  any  way  oppose 
them."  That,  and  not  less  than  that,  is  the  mean- 
ing of  these  declarations. 

The  Socialist  Party  of  America  has  always  de- 
clared for  the  fullest  freedom  of  the  press,  without 
any  expressed  qualifications  or  reservations.  Tens 
of  thousands  of  honest  men  and  women  have  ac- 
cepted the  party's  declarations  upon  this  subject 
in  good  faith,  and  found  satisfaction  and  joy  in  up- 
holding them.  No  doubt  of  the  sincerity  of  the  pro- 
fessions of  loyalty  to  the  principle  of  freedom  and 
equality    for    all    ever    entered    their    minds;     no 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  337 

thought  or  suspicion  of  sinister  secret  reservations 
or  understandings  ever  disturbed  their  faith.  Not 
once,  but  hundreds  of  times,  when  unjust  dis- 
crimination by  government  officials  and  others 
seemed  to  imperil  the  safety  of  some  Socialist  paper, 
men  and  women  who  were  not  Socialists  at  all,  but 
who  were  believers  in  freedom  of  the  press,  rushed 
to  their  aid.  This  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Americans  have  done,  because  they  believed  the 
Socialists  were  sincere  in  their  professions  that  they 
wanted  only  justice,  not  domination;  that  they 
sought  only  that  measure  of  freedom  they  them- 
selves would  aid  others  in  securing  and  maintaining. 
If  at  any  time  some  one  had  challenged  the  good 
faith  of  the  Socialists,  and  charged  that  in  the  event 
of  their  obtaining  control  of  the  government  they 
would  use  its  powers  to  cripple  and  suppress  the 
opposition  press,  he  would  have  been  denounced  as 
a  malignant  libeler  of  honest  men  and  women.  Yet 
here  come  Lenin  and  Bucharin,  and  others  of  the 
same  school,  affirming  that  this  has  always  been  a 
Socialist  principle;  that  the  Bolsheviki  at  least 
have  always  said  they  would  act  in  precisely  that 
manner.  What  say  American  Socialists?  The 
Socialist  Party  has  declared  its  support  of  the  party 
of  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and  Bucharin;  its  national 
standard-bearer  has  declared  himself  to  be  a  Bol- 
shevik; the  party  has  joined  the  party  of  the 
Russian  Bolsheviki  in  the  Third  International,  for- 
saking for  that  purpose  association  with  the  non- 
Bolshevist  Socialist  parties  and  the  Second  In- 
ternational. 

Unless    and   until   they    unequivocally    and   unre- 


338  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

servedly  repudiate  the  vicious  doctrine  set  forth  by  the 
leading  theorists  oj  Bolshevism,  the  spokesmen  of 
American  Socialism  will  be  properly  and  justly  open 
to  the  suspicion  that  they  cherish  in  their  hearts  the 
intention  to  use  the  powers  of  government  whensoever, 
and  in  whatsoever  manner,  these  shall  fall  under  their 
control,  to  abolish  the  principle  of  equal  freedom  for 
all,  and  to  suppress  by  force  the  organs  of  publicity 
of  all  who  do  not  agree  with  them. 

If  they  are  not  willing  to  repudiate  this  doctrine, 
and  to  deny  the  purpose  imputed  to  them,  let  them 
be  honest  and  admit  the  belief  and  the  purpose. 
Silence  cannot  save  them  in  the  face  of  the  words  of 
Lenin  and  Bucharin.  Silence  is  eloquent  confes- 
sion henceforth.  Behind  every  Socialist  speaker 
who  seeks  to  obscure  this  issue  with  rhetoric,  or  to 
remain  silent  upon  it,  every  American  who  believes 
in  and  loves  Freedom — thousands  of  Socialists 
among  the  number — will  see  the  menacing  specter 
of  Bolshevism,  nursling  of  intriguing  hate  and  lying 
treason.  America  will  laugh  such  men  to  scorn 
when  they  invoke  Freedom's  name.  Against  the 
masked  spirit  of  despotism  which  resides  in  the 
Bolshevist  propaganda  America  will  set  her  own 
traditional  ideal,  so  well  expressed  in  Lincoln's  fine 
saying,  "As  I  would  not  be  a  slave,  so  I  would  not 
be  a  master,"  and  Whitman's  line,  so  worthy  to 
accompany  it — "By  God!  I  want  nothing  for 
myself  that  all  others  may  not  have  upon  equal 
terms." 

That  is  the  essence  of  democracy  and  of  liberty; 
that  is  the  sense  in  which  these  great  words  live  in 
the  heart  of  America.     And  that,  too,  be  it  said, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  339 

is  the  sense  in  which  they  live  in  the  Socialism  of 
Marx — of  which  Bolshevism  is  a  grotesque  and 
indecent  caricature.  That  is  the  central  idea  of 
Marx's  vision  of  a  world  free  from  class  divisions 
and  class  strife — a  world  where  none  is  master  and 
none  is  slave;  where  all  good  things  are  accessible 
to  all  upon  equal  terms,  and  where  burdens  are 
shared  with  the  equality  that  is  fraternal. 

With  the  freedom  of  the  press  freedom  of  as- 
semblage and  of  speech  is  closely  interwoven.  The 
foes  of  the  freedom  of  the  press  are  always  and 
everywhere  equally  the  foes  of  the  right  to  assemble 
for  discussion  and  argument.  And  the  Bolsheviki 
are  no  exception  to  the  rule.  From  the  beginning, 
as  soon  as  they  had  consolidated  their  power  suf- 
ficiently to  do  so,  they  have  repressed  by  all  the 
force  at  their  command  the  meetings,  both  public 
and  private,  of  all  who  were  opposed  to  them,  even 
meetings  of  Socialists  called  for  no  purpose  other 
than  to  demand  government  by  equal  suffrage  and 
meetings  of  workmen's  unions  called  for  the  purpose 
of  explaining  their  grievances  in  such  matters  as 
wages,  hours  of  labor,  and  shop  management. 
Hundreds  of  pages  of  evidence  in  support  of  this 
statement  could  be  given  if  that  were  necessary. 
Here,  for  example,  is  the  testimony  of  V.  M.  Zen- 
zinov,  member  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
Socialists-Revolutionists  Party: 

The  Bolsheviki  are  the  only  ones  who  are  able  to  hold 
political  meetings  in  present-day  Russia;  everybody  else 
is  deprived  of  the  right  to  voice  his  political  opinions, 
for  "undesirable"  speakers  are  promptly  arrested  on  the 


340  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

spot  by  the  Bolshevist  police.  All  the  Socialist,  non- 
Bolshevist  members  of  the  Soviets  were  ejected  by  force 
of  arms;  many  leaders  of  Socialist  parties  have  been 
arrested.  The  delegates  to  the  Moscow  Congress  of 
the  Party  of  Socialists-Revolutionists  scheduled  for 
May,  19 1 8,  were  arrested  by  the  Bolsheviki,  yet  nobody 
will  attempt  to  claim  that  this  party,  which  has  partici- 
pated in  every  International  Socialist  Congress,  is  not  a 
Socialist  Party. 

It  was  during  my  stay  in  Petrograd  in  April,  1918, 
that  a  conference  of  factory  and  industrial  plants  em- 
ployees of  Petrograd  and  vicinity  was  held,  to  which 
100,000  Petrograd  working-men  (out  of  a  total  of 
132,000)  sent  delegates.  The  conference  adopted  a 
resolution  sharply  denouncing  the  Bolshevist  regime. 
Following  this  conference  an  attempt  was  made  in  May 
to  call  together  an  All-Russian  Congress  of  workmen's 
deputies  in  Moscow,  but  all  the  delegates  were  arrested 
by  the  Bolsheviki,  and  to  this  day  I  am  ignorant  of  the 
fate  that  befell  my  comrades.  For  all  I  know  they 
may  have  been  put  to  death,  as  a  number  of  other 
Socialists  have  been. 

Here  is  the  testimony  of  Oupovalov,  Social 
Democrat  and  trades-unionist,  who  once  more 
speaks  only  of  matters  of  which  he  has  personal 
knowledge: 

On  June  22,  1918,  the  Social  Democratic  Committee 
at  Sormovo  called  a  Provincial  Non-Party  Labor  Con- 
ference for  the  purpose  of  discussing  current  events; 
350  delegates  were  present,  representing  350,000  work- 
men. The  afternoon  meeting  passed  off  safely,  but 
before  the  opening  of  the  evening  meeting  a  large  crowd 
of  local  workmen  who  had  gathered  in  front  of  the  con- 
ference premises  were  fired  upon  by  a  Lettish  detach- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  341 

ment  by  order  of  the  commissaries.  The  result  was  that 
several  peaceful  workmen  were  killed  and  wounded. 
The  conference  was  dispersed,  and  I,  being  one  of  the 
speakers,  was  arrested.  After  a  fortnight's  confinement 
in  a  damp  cellar,  with  daily  threats  of  execution,  I  was 
released,  owing  to  energetic  protests  on  the  part  of  my 
fellow-workmen,  but  not  for  long. 

A  Labor  meeting  was  convoked  at  Sormovo  by  a 
commissar  of  the  People's  Economic  Soviet  from  Mos- 
cow for  the  purpose  of  discussing  the  question  of  food- 
supply.  I  was  delegated  by  the  Social  Democratic  Party 
to  speak  at  this  meeting  and  criticize  the  Bolsheviks' 
food  policy.  The  resolution  proposed  by  me  demanded 
the  cessation  of  civil  war,  the  summoning  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  the  right  for  co-operatives  to  purchase  foodstuffs 
freely.  Out  of  the  18,000  persons  present  only  350  voted 
against  the  resolution. 

That  same  night  I  was  arrested  and  sentenced  to  be 
shot.  The  workmen  declared  a  strike,  demanding  my 
release.  The  Bolsheviks  sent  a  detachment  of  Letts, 
who  fired  on  the  unarmed  workmen  and  many  were  killed. 
Nevertheless,  the  workmen  would  not  give  in,  and  the 
Bolsheviki  mitigated  their  sentence  and  deported  me 
to  the  Perm  Province. 

But  what  is  the  use  of  citing  any  number  of  such 
instances?  When  a  score,  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand 
have  been  cited  we  shall  hear  from  the  truculent 
defenders  of  Bolshevism  that  no  testimony  offered 
by  Russian  revolutionists  of  the  highest  standing 
is  worth  anything  as  compared  to  the  testimony  of 
the  Ransomes,  Goodes,  Coppings,  Lansburys,  et  aL, 
the  human  phonograph  records  who  repeat  with 
such  mechanical  precision  the  words  which  the 
Bolsheviki  desire  the  world  outside  of  Russia  to 


342  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

hear.  Against  this  logic  of  unreason  no  amount 
of  testimony  can  prevail.  It  is  not  so  easy,  how- 
ever, to  dispose  of  a  "decree"  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment— for  is  not  a  "decree"  a  thing  to  be  regarded 
as  the  Mohammedan  regards  the  Koran?  Here, 
then,  is  a  Bolshevist  decree — not,  it  need  hardly 
be  said,  to  be  found  included  in  any  of  the  collec- 
tions of  Bolshevist  laws  and  decrees  issued  to  im- 
press the  public  of  America  in  favor  of  the  Bolshe- 
viki.  Read,  mark,  and  learn,  and  inwardly  digest 
it,  Mr.  Oswald  Villard,  Mr.  Norman  Thomas,  Mr. 
William  Hard,  gentlemen  of  the  Civil  Liberties 
Bureau,  and  you  others  who  find  America  so 
reactionary  and  tyrannical.  It  is  taken  from  the 
Severnaya  Communa,  September  13,  1919,  and  is 
signed  by  Zinoviev: 

Decree  Regulating  Right  of  Public  Associations 

and  Meetings 

(1)  All  societies,  unions,  and  associations — political, 
economic,  artistic,  religious,  etc. — formed  on  the  territory 
of  the  Union  of  the  Commune  of  the  Northern  Region 
must  be  registered  at  the  corresponding  Soviets  or  Com- 
mittees of  the  Village  Poor. 

(2)  The  constitution  of  the  union  or  society,  a  list  of 
founders  and  members  of  the  committee,  with  names  and 
addresses,  and  a  list  of  all  members,  with  their  names 
and  addresses,  must  be  submitted  at  registration. 

(3)  All  books,  minutes,  etc.,  must  always  be  kept  at 
the  disposal  of  representatives  of  the  Soviet  Power  for 
purposes  of  revision. 

(4)  Three  days'  notice  must  be  given  to  the  Soviet 
or  to  the  Committee  of  the  Village  Poor,  of  all  public 
and  private  meetings. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  343 

(5)  All  meetings  must  be  open  to  the  representatives 
of  the  Soviet  Power,  viz.,  the  representatives  of  the 
Central  and  District  Soviet,  the  Committee  of  the  Poor, 
and  the  Kommandantur  of  the  Revolutionary  Secret 
Police  Force. 

(6)  Unions  and  societies  which  do  not  comply  with 
those  regulations  will  be  regarded  as  counter-revolu- 
tionary organizations  and  prosecuted. 

This  document,  like  so  many  others  issued  by  the 
Bolsheviki,  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  the 
regulations  which  were  issued  under  Czar  Nicholas 
II.  There  is  not  the  slightest  suggestion  of  a  spirit 
and  purpose  more  generous  in  its  regard  for  free- 
dom. Nowhere  is  there  any  evidence  of  a  different 
psychology.  Of  course,  it  may  be  said  in  defense, 
or  extenuation  if  not  defense,  of  the  remarkable 
decree  just  quoted  that  it  was  a  military  measure; 
that  it  was  due  to  the  conditions  of  civil  warfare 
prevailing.  That  defense  might  be  seriously  con- 
sidered but  for  the  fact  that  similar  regulations  have 
been  imposed  in  places  far  removed  from  any 
military  activity,  where  there  was  no  civil  warfare, 
where  the  Bolsheviki  ruled  a  passive  people.  More 
important  than  this  fact,  however,  is  the  evidence 
of  the  attitude  of  the  Bolsheviki,  as  revealed  by 
their  accredited  spokesmen.  From  this  it  is  quite 
clear  that,  regardless  of  this  or  that  particular 
decree  or  proclamation,  the  Bolsheviki  look  upon  the 
continuous  and  permanent  suppression  of  their  op- 
ponents' right  to  hold  meetings  as  a  fundamental 
policy.  The  decree  under  consideration,  with  its 
stringent    provisions    requiring    registration    of   all 


344  ."THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

societies  and  associations  of  every  kind,  the  list 
and  addresses  of  all  members,  and  of  all  who  attend 
the  meetings,  and  the  arrangement  for  the  attend- 
ance of  the  "Kommandantur  of  the  Revolutionary 
Secret-Police  Force"  at  meetings  of  every  kind, 
trades-union  meetings  and  religious  gatherings  no 
less  than  political  meetings,  is  fully  in  harmony 
with  the  declaration  of  fundamental  policy  made  by 
the  intellectual  leaders  of  Bolshevism.  Pravda, 
December  7,  1919,  quotes  Baranov  as  saying  at  the 
seventh  Ail-Russian  Congress:  "We  do  not  allow 
meetings  of  Mensheviki  and  Cadets,  who  in  these 
meetings  would  speak  of  counter-revolution  within 
the  country.  The  Soviet  Power  will  not  allow  such 
meetings,  of  course,  just  as  it  will  not  allow  freedom 
of  the  press,  as  there  are  appearing  sufficient  White 
Guardists'  leaflets."  But  let  us  listen  once  more 
to  the  chief  sophist: 

7.  "Freedom  of  meeting"  may  be  taken  as  an  ex- 
ample of  the  demands  for  "pure  democracy."  Any 
conscious  workman  who  has  not  broken  with  his  own 
class  will  understand  immediately  that  it  would  be  stupid 
to  permit  freedom  of  meetings  to  exploiters  at  this  period, 
and  under  the  present  circumstances,  when  the  ex- 
ploiters are  resisting  their  overthrow,  and  are  fighting 
for  their  privileges.  When  the  bourgeoisie  was  revolu- 
tionary, in  England  in  1649,  and  in  France  in  1793,  it 
did  not  give  "freedom  of  meetings"  to  monarchists  and 
nobles  who  were  calling  in  foreign  troops  and  who  were 
"meeting"  to  organize  attempts  at  restoration.  //  the 
■present  bourgeoisie,  which  has  been  reactionary  for  a  long 
time  now,  demands  of  the  proletariat  that  the  latter  guarantee 
in  advance  freedom  of  meetings  for  exploiters  no  matter 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  345 

what  resistance  the  capitalists  may  show  to  the  measures 
of  expropriation  directed  against  them,  the  workmen  will 
only  laugh  at  the  hypocrisy  of  the  bourgeoisie. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  workmen  know  very  well  that 
"freedom  of  meetings,"  even  in  the  most  democratic 
bourgeois  republic,  is  an  empty  phrase,  for  the  rich  have 
all  the  best  public  and  private  buildings  at  their  dis- 
posal, and  also  sufficient  leisure  time  for  meetings  and 
for  the  protection  of  these  meetings  by  the  bourgeois 
apparatus  of  authority.  The  proletarians  of  the  city 
and  of  the  village  and  the  poor  peasants — that  is,  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  population,  have  none  of 
these  three  things.  So  long  as  the  situation  is  such, 
"equality" — that  is,  "pure  democracy" — is  sheer  fraud. 
In  order  to  secure  genuine  equality,  in  order  to  realize 
in  fact  democracy  for  the  toilers,  one  must  first  take  away 
from  the  exploiters  all  public  and  luxurious  private 
dwellings,  one  must  give  leisure  time  to  the  toilers, 
one  must  protect  the  freedom  of  their  meetings  by  armed 
workmen,  and  not  by  noble  or  capitalist  officers  with  brow- 
beaten soldiers. 

Only  after  such  a  change  can  one  speak  of  freedom  of 
meetings  and  of  equality,  without  scoffing  at  workmen, 
toilers,  and  the  poor.  And  no  one  can  bring  about  this 
change  except  the  advance-guard  of  the  toilers — that  is, 
the  proletariat — by  overthrowing  the  exploiters,  the 
bourgeoisie. 

8.  "Freedom  of  press"  is  also  one  of  the  main  argu- 
ments of  "pure  democracy,"  but  again  the  workmen 
know  that  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  have  asserted 
millions  of  times  that  this  freedom  is  a  fraud  so  long  as 
the  best  printing  machinery  and  the  largest' supplies  of  paper 
have  been  seized  by  the  capitalists,  and  so  long  as  the  power 
of  capital  over  the  press  continues,  which  power  in  the 
whole  world  is  clearly  more  harsh  and  more  cynical  in  pro- 
portion to  the  development  of  democratism  and  the  repub- 


346  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

lie  an  principle,  as,  for  example,  in  America.  In  order 
to  secure  actual  equality  and  actual  democracy  for  the 
toilers,  for  workmen  and  peasants,  one  must  first  take 
fro?n  capitalists  the  possibility  of  hiring  writers,  of  buying 
up  publishing  houses,  of  buying  up  newspapers,  and  to  this 
end  one  must  overthrow  the  yoke  of  capital,  overthrow  the 
exploiters,  and  put  down  all  resistance  on  their  part.  The 
capitalists  have  always  called  "freedom"  the  freedom 
to  make  money  for  the  rich  and  the  freedom  to  die  of 
hunger  for  workmen.  The  capitalists  call  "  freedom " 
the  freedom  of  the  rich,  freedom  to  buy  up  the  press, 
freedom  to  use  wealth,  to  manufacture  and  support  so- 
called  public  opinion.  The  defenders  of  "pure  democ- 
racy" again  in  actual  fact  turn  out  to  be  the  defenders 
of  the  most  dirty  and  corrupt  system  of  the  rule  of  the 
rich  over  the  means  of  education  of  the  masses.  They 
deceive  the  people  by  attractive,  fine-sounding,  beautiful, 
but  absolutely  false  phrases,  trying  to  dissuade  the 
masses  from  the  concrete  historic  task  of  freeing  the  press 
from  the  capitalists  who  have  gotten  control  of  it. 
Actual  freedom  and  equality  will  exist  only  in  the  order 
established  by  the  Communists,  in  which  it  will  be  im- 
possible to  become  rich  at  the  expense  of  another,  where 
it  will  be  impossible,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  sub- 
ject the  press  to  the  power  of  money,  where  there  will 
be  no  obstacle  to  prevent  any  toiler  (or  any  large  group 
of  such)  from  enjoying  and  actually  realizing  the  equal 
right  to  the  use  of  public  printing-presses  and  of  the 
public  fund  of  paper. 

These  are  "theses"  from  the  report  of  Lenin  on 
"  Bourgeois  and  Proletarian  Democracies,"  pub- 
lished in  Pravda,  March  8,  1919.  That  the  very 
term  "proletarian  democracy"  is  an  absurd  self- 
contradiction,     just     as     "capitalist     democracy" 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  347 

would  be,  since  democracy  is  inherently  incom- 
patible with  class  domination  of  any  kind,  is  worthy 
of  remark  only  in  so  far  as  the  use  of  the  phrase 
shows  the  mentality  of  the  man.  Was  ever  such 
a  farrago  of  nonsense  put  forward  with  such 
solemnly  pretentious  pedantry?  The  unreasoning 
hatred  and  shallow  ignorance  of  the  most  demagogic 
soap-box  Socialist  propaganda  are  covered  with  the 
verbiage  of  scholasticism,  and  the  result  is  given 
to  the  world  as  profound  philosophy.  If  there  is 
any  disposition  to  question  the  justice  of  this 
summary  judgment  a  candid  consideration  of  the 
two  "theses"  just  quoted  should  suffice  to  settle  all 
doubts. 

In  the  first  place,  the  dominant  note  is  hatred 
and  retaliation:  In  1649  the  bourgeoisie  of  England 
suppressed  the  right  of  assemblage,  and  in  1793  the 
bourgeoisie  of  France  did  likewise.  Therefore,  if 
the  present  bourgeoisie,  "which  has  been  reaction- 
ary for  a  long  time,"  now  demands  that  the  workers 
guarantee  freedom  of  meetings,  the  workers  will 
only  laugh  at  their  hypocrisy.  One  is  reminded  of 
the  ignorant  pogrom-makers  who  gave  the  cruci- 
fixion of  Jesus  as  their  reason  for  persecuting  Jews 
in  the  twentieth  century.  Upon  what  higher  level 
is  Lenin's  justification  than  the  ignorant  feeling  of 
hostility  toward  England,  still  found  in  some  dark 
corners  of  American  life,  because  of  the  mis- 
government  of  the  Colonies  by  the  England  of 
George  the  Third?  Is  there  to  be  no  allowance 
for  the  advance  made,  even  by  the  bourgeoisie, 
since  the  struggles  of  1649  and  1793;  no  considera- 
tion of  the  fact  that  the  bourgeoisie  of  England  and 


348  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

France  in  later  years  have  gone  far  beyond  the 
standards  set  by  their  forerunners  in  1649  and 
1793;  that  they  have  granted  freedom  of  assemblage, 
even  to  those  struggling  to  overthrow  them?  Is 
twentieth-century  Socialism  to  have  no  higher  ideal 
than  capitalism  already  had  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries?  Waiving  the  greater  ques- 
tion of  whether  or  not  the  claim  of  any  class  to  suc- 
ceed to  power  is  worthy  of  attention  unless  its 
ideals  are  measurably  higher  than  those  of  the  class 
it  would  displace,  is  it  not  quite  clear  that  Lenin's 
appeal  to  "history"  is  arrant  demagoguery? 

Consider  the  argument  further:  There  is  no 
freedom  of  meetings,  "even  in  the  most  democratic 
bourgeois  republic,"  we  are  told,  because  "the 
rich"  have  the  halls  in  which  to  meet,  the  leisure 
for  meeting  and  the  "bourgeois  apparatus  of  au- 
thority" for  the  protection  of  their  meetings.  This 
absurd  travesty  of  facts  which  are  well  known  to 
all  who  know  life  in  democratic  nations  is  put  for- 
ward by  a  man  who  is  hailed  as  a  philosopher- 
statesman,  though  his  ponderous  "theses"  show 
him  to  be  among  the  most  blatant  demagogues  of 
modern  history,  his  greatest  mental  gift  being  un- 
scrupulous cunning.  The  workers  lack  leisure  for 
meetings,  we  are  told,  therefore  no  freedom  of 
meeting  exists — in  the  bourgeois  democracies.  Well, 
what  of  the  Utopia  of  the  Bolsheviki,  the  Utopia 
of  Lenin's  own  fashioning?  Is  there  greater  leisure 
for  the  worker  there?  By  its  own  journals  we  are 
informed  that  the  Russian  worker  now  works 
twelve  hours  a  day,  but  let  us  not  take  advantage 
of  that  fact,  which  is  admittedly  due  to  a  desperate 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  349 

economic  condition — for  which,  however,  the  Bol- 
sheviki  are  mainly  responsible.  But  in  the  very 
much  praised  labor  laws  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federal  Soviet  Republic  an  eight-hour  workday  is 
provided  for.  Are  we  to  assume  that  this  leaves 
sufficient  leisure  to  the  workers  to  make  freedom 
of  meeting  possible  for  them?  Very  well.  To  a 
very  large  extent  the  eight-hour  day  prevails  in  this 
poor  despised  "bourgeois  democracy,"  either  as  a 
result  of  legislation  or  of  trades-union  organization. 
Nay,  more,  the  forty-four-hour  week  is  with  us, 
and  even  the  six-hour  day,  in  some  trades.  The 
unattained  ideal  of  Sovdepia's  labor  legislation  is 
thus  actually  below  what  is  rapidly  coming  to  be 
our  common  practice.  Anybody  who  knows  any- 
thing at  all  of  the  facts  knows  that  the  conditions 
here  set  forth  are  true  of  this  country  and,  to  a  very 
large  degree,  of  England. 

Is  it  true  that  freedom  of  assemblage  is  impos- 
sible in  this  poor  old  "bourgeois  democracy,"  be- 
cause, forsooth,  the  workers  lack  the  halls  in  which 
to  meet?  Is  that  the  condition  in  England,  or  in 
any  of  the  western  nations  in  which  the  much- 
despised  "bourgeois  democracy"  prevails?  How 
many  communities  are  there  in  America  where 
meeting-halls  are  accessible  only  to  "the  rich," 
where  they  cannot  be  had  by  the  workers  upon 
equal  terms  with  all  other  people?  Over  the  greater 
part  of  America — wherever  "bourgeois  democracy" 
exists — our  publicly  owned  auditoriums,  the  city 
halls,  and  school  halls,  are  open  to  all  citizens  upon 
equal  terms.     Even  where  private  halls  have  to  be 

hired,  and  stiff"  rents  paid,  it  is  common  for  the 
23 


350  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

collections  to  cover  expenses  and  even  leave  a 
profit.  In  many  of  the  cities  the  organized  workers 
own  their  own  auditoriums.  In  England,  Belgium, 
Denmark,  and  other  European  countries — "bour- 
geois democracies"  all — a  great  many  of  the  finest 
auditoriums  are  those  owned  and  controlled  by  the 
workmen's  organizations,  and  they  are  frequently 
hired  by  "the  rich."  Finally,  wherever  the  govern- 
ment of  any  city  has  come  under  the  control  of 
Socialist  or  Labor  movements,  auditoriums  freely 
accessible  to  the  workers  have  been  provided,  and 
this  obstacle  to  freedom  of  assemblage  which  gives 
Lenin  such  concern  has  been  removed.  This  has 
been  done,  moreover,  without  descending  to  the  level 
of  old  oppressors,  and  it  has  not  been  necessary  to 
resort  to  "armed  workmen,"  any  more  than  to 
"browbeaten  soldiers"  with  capitalist  officers  to 
protect  the  freedom  of  assemblage. 

So,  too,  with  the  freedom  of  the  press.  In  the 
nations  where  democratic  laws  prevail  the  workers' 
press  is  just  as  strong  and  powerful  as  the  interest 
and  will  of  the  workers  themselves  decree.  If  the 
Socialist  press  in  our  cities  is  weak  and  unin- 
fluential,  that  fact  is  the  natural  and  inevitable 
corollary  of  the  weakness  of  the  Socialist  move- 
ment itself.  Was  UHumanite,  when  it  was  still 
a  great  and  powerful  newspaper,  or  were  the  Berlin 
Forwdrts,  Le  Peuple  of  Brussels,  and  V Avanti  of 
Rome,  less  "free"  than  other  newspapers?  Were 
they  less  "free"  than  Pravda,  even,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  anti-Bolshevist  papers  opposed  to  Bol- 
shevism? True,  they  had  not  the  privilege  of 
looting  the  public  treasuries;    they  could  not  force 


IN  ALL  HISTORY'*  351 

an  oppressive,  discriminatory,  and  confiscatory  tax 
upon  the  other  newspapers;  they  could  not  utilize 
the  forces  of  the  state  to  seize  and  use  the  plants 
belonging  to  their  rivals;  they  could  not  rely  upon 
the  power  of  the  state  to  compel  people  against 
their  will  to  "subscribe"  to  them.  In  other  words, 
the  freedom  they  possessed  was  the  freedom  to 
publish  their  views  and  to  gain  as  many  readers 
as  possible  by  lawful  methods;  the  only  "freedom" 
they  lacked  was  the  freedom  of  brigandage,  the 
right  to  despoil  and  oppress  others. 

So  much,  then,  for  the  labored  sophistry  of  the 
chief  Talmudist  of  Bolshevism  and  his  tiresome 
"theses"  with  their  demagogic  cant  and  their  ap- 
peals to  the  lowest  instincts  and  passions  of  his  fol- 
lowers. The  record  herein  set  forth  proves  beyond 
shadow  of  a  doubt  that  neither  in  the  regime  Lenin 
and  his  co-conspirators  have  thus  far  maintained 
nor  in  the  ideal  they  set  for  themselves  is  there  any 
place  for  that  freedom  of  speech  and  thought  and 
conscience  without  which  all  other  liberties  are  un- 
availing. These  men  prate  of  freedom,  but  they 
are  tyrants.  If  they  be  not  tyrants,  "we  then  ex- 
tremely wrong  Caligula  and  Nero  in  calling  them 
tyrants,  and  they  were  rebels  that  conspired  against 
them."  If  Lenin,  Trotsky,  Zinoviev,  and  Bucharin 
are  not  tyrants,  but  liberators,  so  were  the  Grand 
Inquisitors  of  Spain. 


352  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


XII 


"the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat" 


IN  a  pamphlet  entitled  Two  Tactics,  published  in 
Geneva,  in  1905,  at  the  time  of  the  first  Russian 
Revolution,  Lenin  wrote: 

Whoever  wants  to  try  any  path  to  Socialism  other  than 
political  democracy  will  inevitably  come  to  absurd  and 
reactionary  conclusions,  both  in  an  economic  and  a  political 
sense.  If  some  workmen  ask  us,  "Why  not  achieve  the 
maximum  program?"  we  shall  answer  them  by  pointing 
out  how  alien  to  Socialism  the  democratic  masses  are, 
how  undeveloped  are  the  class  contradictions,  how  un- 
organized are  the  proletarians.  .  .  .  The  largest  possible 
realization  of  democratic  reform  is  necessary  and  requi- 
site for  the  spreading  of  socialistic  enlightenment  and 
for  introducing  appropriate  organization. 

These  words  are  worth  remembering.  In  the 
light  of  the  tragic  results  of  Bolshevism  they  seem 
singularly  prophetic,  for  certainly  by  attempting  to 
achieve  Socialism  through  other  methods  than  those 
of  political  democracy  Lenin  and  his  followers  have 
"come  to  absurd  and  reactionary  conclusions,  both 
in  an  economic  and  a  political  sense."  They  pro- 
fess, for  example,  to  have  established  in  Russia  a 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  353 

"dictatorship  of  the  proletariat."  In  reality  they 
have  set  up  a  tyrannical  rule  over  the  proletariat, 
together  with  the  rest  of  the  population,  by  an 
almost  infinitesimal  part  of  the  population  of  Rus- 
sia. Lenin  and  his  followers  claim  to  be  the  logical 
exemplars  of  the  teachings  of  Karl  Marx,  whereas 
their  whole  theory  is  no  more  than  a  grotesque 
travesty  of  Marx's  teachings. 

More  than  seventy  years  have  elapsed  since  the 
publication  of  Marx's  Communist  Manifesto,  in 
which  he  set  forth  his  theory  of  the  historic  role  of 
the  proletariat.  Thirty-seven  years — more  than  a 
full  generation — have  elapsed  since  his  death  in 
1883.  Even  if  it  were  true  that  during  the  period 
spanned  by  these  two  dates  Karl  Marx  believed  in 
and  advocated  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in 
the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  used  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  that  fact  would  possess  little  more  than 
historical  interest.  Much  has  happened  since  the 
death  of  Marx,  and  still  more  since  the  early 
'seventies,  when  his  life-work  virtually  ended,  which 
the  political  realist  needs  must  take  into  account. 
Marx  did  not  utter  the  last  word  of  human  wisdom 
upon  the  laws  and  methods  of  social  progress  and 
so  render  new  and  fresh  judgments  unnecessary  and 
wrong.  No  one  can  study  the  evolution  of  Marx 
himself  and  doubt  that  if  he  were  alive  to-day  he 
would  hold  very  different  views  from  those  which 
he  held  in  1847  and  subsequently.  Our  only  justi- 
fication for  considering  the  relation  of  Leninism  to 
Marxism  lies  in  the  fact  that  in  this  and  other 
countries  outside  of  Russia  a  considerable  element 
in   the   Socialist   movement,   deceived   by   Lenin's 


354  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

use  of  certain  Marxian  phrases,  gives  its  support  to 
Leninism  in  the  belief  that  it  is  identical  with 
Marxism.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the 
teachings  of  Marx  than  the  oppressive  bureaucratic 
dictatorship  by  an  infinitesimal  minority  set  up  by 
Lenin  and  his  disciples. 

In  the  Communist  Manifesto  Marx  used  the  term 
"proletariat"  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  used  by 
Barnave  and  other  Intellectuals  of  the  French 
Revolution,  not  as  it  is  commonly  used  to-day,  as  a 
synonym  for  the  wage-earning  class.  The  term  as 
used  by  Marx  connoted  not  merely  an  absence  of 
property,  not  merely  poverty,  but  a  peculiar  state 
of  degradation.  Just  as  in  Roman  society  the  term 
was  applied  to  a  large  class,  including  peasants, 
wage  laborers,  and  others  without  capital,  property, 
or  assured  means  of  support,  unfit  and  unworthy  to 
exercise  political  rights,  so  the  term  was  used  by 
Marx,  as  it  had  been  by  his  predecessors,  to  designate 
a  class  in  modern  society  similarly  denied  the  rights 
of  citizenship.  When  Marx  wrote  in  1847  this  was 
the  condition  of  the  wage-earning  class  in  every 
European  country.  In  no  one  of  these  countries 
did  the  working-class  enjoy  the  right  of  suffrage. 
Marx  saw  no  hope  of  any  amelioration  of  the  lot 
of  this  class.  On  the  contrary,  he  believed  that  the 
evolution  of  society  would  take  the  form  of  a  relent- 
less, brutal  process,  unrestrained  by  any  humane 
consciousness  or  legislation,  which  would  cul- 
minate in  a  division  of  society  into  two  classes,  on 
the  one  hand  a  very  small  ruling  and  owning  class, 
on  the  other  hand  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
population.     He   specifically   rejected   the   idea   of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  355 

minority  rule:  "All  previous  historical  movements 
were  movements  of  minorities,  or  in  the  interest  of 
minorities.  The  proletarian  movement  is  the  self- 
conscious  independent  movement  of  the  immense 
majority,  in  the  interest  of  the  immense  majority. 
The  proletariat,  the  lowest  stratum  of  our  present 
society,  cannot  stir,  cannot  raise  itself  up,  without 
the  whole  superincumbent  strata  of  official  society 
being  sprung  into  the  air." 

Not  only  does  Marx  here  present  the  proletarian 
uprising  as  the  culmination  of  a  historical  process 
which  has  made  proletarians  of  "the  immense 
majority,"  but,  what  is  more  significant,  perhaps, 
he  presents  this  movement,  not  as  a  conscious  ideal, 
but  as  an  inevitable  and  inescapable  condition.  In 
1875,  in  a  famous  letter  criticizing  the  Gotha  pro- 
gram of  the  German  Social  Democrats,  he  wrote: 
"Between  capitalist  and  communist  society  lies  the 
period  of  the  revolutionary  transformation  of  the 
one  into  the  other.  This  requires  a  political 
transition  stage,  which  can  be  nothing  less  than  the 
revolutionary  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat."  It  is 
mainly  upon  this  single  quotation  that  Lenin  and 
his  followers  rely  in  claiming  Marxian  authority  for 
the  regime  set  up  in  Russia  under  the  title  the 
Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat.  The  passage  cited 
cannot  honestly  and  fairly  be  so  interpreted.  We 
are  bound  to  bear  in  mind  that  Marx  still  held  to 
the  belief  that  the  revolution  from  capitalist  to 
communist  society  could  only  take  place  when  the 
proletariat  had  become  "the  immense  majority." 

Moreover,  it  is  quite  clear  that  he  was  still  think- 
ing, in  1875,  of  dictatorship  by  this  immense  majority 


35G  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

as  a  temporary  measure.  Of  course,  the  word 
"dictatorship"  is  a  misnomer  when  it  is  so  used, 
but  not  more  so  than  when  used  to  describe  rule 
by  any  class.  Strictly  speaking,  dictatorship  refers 
to  a  rule  by  a  single  individual  who  is  bound  by 
no  laws,  the  absolute  supremacy  of  an  individual 
dictator.  Friedrich  Engels,  who  collaborated  with 
Marx  in  writing  the  Communist  Manifesto  and  in 
much  of  his  subsequent  work,  and  who  became  his 
literary  executor  and  finished  Das  Kapital,  cer- 
tainly knew  the  mind  of  Marx  as  no  other  human 
being  did  or  could.  Engels  has,  fortunately,  made 
quite  clear  the  sense  in  which  Marx  used  the  term 
"dictatorship  of  the  proletariat."  In  his  Civil  War 
in  France,  Marx  described  the  Paris  Commune  as 
"essentially  a  government  of  the  working-class,  the 
result  of  the  struggle  of  the  producing  class  against 
the  appropriating  class,  the  political  form  under 
which  the  freedom  of  labor  could  be  attained  being 
at  length  revealed."  He  described  with  glowing 
enthusiasm  the  Commune  with  its  town  councilors 
chosen  by  universal  suffrage,  and  not  by  the  votes 
of  a  single  class.  As  Kautsky  remarks,  "the  dic- 
tatorship of  the  proletariat  was  for  him  a  condition 
which  necessarily  arose  in  a  real  democracy,  because 
of  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  proletariat."1 
That  this  is  a  correct  interpretation  of  Marx's 
thought  is  attested  by  the  fact  that  in  his  introduc- 
tion to  the  Civil  War  in  France  Engels  describes  the 
Commune,  based  on  the  general  suffrage  of  the  whole 
people,  as  "the  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat." 
Of  course,   the   evolution   of  modern   industrial 

1  Kautsky,  The  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat,  p.  45. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  357 

nations  has  proceeded  upon  very  different  lines 
from  those  forecasted  by  Marx.  The  middle  class 
has  not  been  exterminated  and  shows  no  signs  of 
being  submerged  in  the  wage-earning  class;  the 
workers  are  no  longer  disfranchised  and  outside  the 
pale  of  citizenship;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  ac- 
quired full  political  rights  and  are  becoming  in- 
creasingly powerful  in  the  parliaments.  In  other 
words,  the  wage-earning  class  is,  for  the  most  part, 
no  longer  "proletarian"  in  the  narrow  sense  in 
which  Marx  used  the  term.  Quite  apart  from  these 
considerations,  however,  it  is  very  obvious  that  the 
theory  of  Lenin  and  his  followers  that  the  whole 
political  power  of  Russia  should  be  centered  in  the 
so-called  industrial  proletariat,  which  even  the 
Bolsheviki  themselves  have  not  estimated  at  more 
than  3  per  cent,  of  the  entire  population,  bears  no 
sort  of  relation  to  the  process  Marx  always  had  in 
mind  when  he  referred  to  "proletarian  dictator- 
ship." Not  only  is  there  no  sanction  for  the  Len- 
inist view  in  Marxian  theory,  but  the  two  are 
irreconcilably  opposed. 

The  Bolshevist  regime  does  not  even  represent 
the  proletariat,  however.  The  fact  is  thoroughly 
well  established  that  the  political  power  rests  in 
the  Communist  Party,  which  represents  only  a 
minority  of  the  proletariat.  What  we  have  before 
us  in  Russia  is  not  even  a  dictatorship  of  the  pro- 
letariat, but  a  dictatorship  over  an  entire  people, 
including  the  proletariat,  by  the  Communist  Party. 
The  testimony  of  the  Bolsheviki  themselves  upon 
this  point  is  abundant  and  conclusive.  If  any  good 
purpose  were  served  thereby,  pages  of  statements  to 


358  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

this  effect  by  responsible  Bolshevist  leaders  could 
be  cited;  for  our  present  purpose,  however,  the 
following  quotations  will  suffice: 

In  a  letter  to  workmen  and  peasants  issued  in 
July,  1918,  Lenin  said,  "The  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  is  carried  out  by  the  party  of  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  which,  as  early  as  1905,  and  earlier,  became 
one  with  the  entire  revolutionary  proletariat."  In 
an  article  entitled,  "The  Party  and  the  Soviets," 
published  in  Pravda,  February  13,  1919,  Bucharin, 
editor-in-chief  of  that  important  official  organ  of  the 
Communist  Party,  said:  "It  is  no  secret  for  any  one 
that  in  a  country  where  the  working-class  and  the 
poorest  peasantry  are  in  power,  that  party  is  the 
directing  party  which  expresses  the  interests  of 
these  groups  of  the  population — the  Communist 
Party.  All  the  work  in  the  Soviet  goes  on  under 
the  influence  and  the  political  leadership  of  our 
party.  It  is  the  forms  which  this  leadership  should 
assume  that  are  the  subject  of  disagreement." 
In  Pravda,  November  5,  1919,  the  leading  editorial 
says  of  the  "adventure  of  Yudenich"  that  in  the 
last  analysis  "this  ordeal  has  strengthened  the 
cause  of  revolution  and  has  strengthened  the  hegemony 
of  the  Communist  Party."  In  the  Samara  Kom- 
muna,  April  11,  1919,  we  read  that  "The  Communist 
Party  as  a  whole  is  responsible  for  the  future  of  the 
young  Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  for  the  whole 
course  of  the  world  Communist  revolution.  In  the 
country  the  highest  organ  of  authority,  to  which  all 
Soviet  institutions  and  officials  are  subordinate,  is 
again  the  Communist  Party." 

Not  only  do  we  find  that  the  Bolshevist  regime 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  359 

rests  upon  the  theory  ot  the  hegemony  of  the 
Communist  Party,  but  in  practice  the  party  func- 
tions as  a  part  of  the  state  machinery,  as  the 
directing  machinery,  in  point  of  fact,  placing  the 
Soviets  in  a  subordinate  position.  At  times  the 
Communist  Party  has  exercised  the  entire  power  of 
government,  as,  for  example,  from  July,  191 8,  to 
January,  1919.  Thus  we  read  in  Izvestia,  Novem- 
ber 6,  1919,  "  From  October,  1917,  up  to  July,  1918, 
is  the  first  period  of  Soviet  construction;  from  July, 
1918,  up  to  January,  1919,  the  second  period,  zvhen 
the  Soviet  work  was  conducted  exclusively  by  the  power 
of  the  Russian  Communist  Party;  and  the  third 
period  from  January  this  year,  when  in  the  work 
of  Soviet  construction  broad  non-partizan  masses 
participated." 

This  condition  was,  of  course,  made  possible  by 
the  predominance  of  Communist  Party  members 
in  the  Soviet  Government,  a  predominance  due 
to  the  measures  taken  to  exclude  the  anti-Bolshe- 
vist parties.  Thus  88  per  cent,  of  the  members  of 
the  Executive  Committees  of  the  Provincial  So- 
viets were  members  of  the  Communist  Party,  ac- 
cording to  Izvestia,  November  6,  1919.  In  the 
army,  while  their  number  was  relatively  small,  not 
more  than  10,000  in  the  entire  army,  members  of 
the  Communist  Party  held  almost  all  the  responsible 
posts.  Trotsky,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  reported 
to  the  seventh  Congress,  according  to  the  Red 
Baltic  Fleet,  December  11,  1919,  "our  Army  con- 
sists of  peasants  and  workmen.  Workmen  repre- 
sent scarcely  more  than  75  to  iS  per  cent.,  but  they 
maintain  the  same  directing  position  as  throughout 


3G0  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Soviet  Russia.     This  is  a  privilege  secured  to  them 
because  of  their  greater   consciousness,   compact- 
ness, and  revolutionary  zeal.     The  army  is  the  re- 
flection of  our  whole  social  order.     It  is  based  on  the 
rule  of  the  working-class,  in  which  latter  the  party 
of  Communists  plays  the  leading  role."     Trotsky 
further  said:    "The  number  of  members  of  this 
party  in  the  army  is  about  ten  thousand.     The  re- 
sponsible posts  of  commissaries   are  occupied   by 
them  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of  instances. 
In   each   regiment   there   is   a   Communist   group. 
The  significance  of  the  Communists  in  the  army  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  when  conditions  become 
unfavorable  in  a  given  division  the  commanding 
staff  appeals  to  the  Revolutionary  Military  Soviet 
with  a  request  that  a  group  of  Communists  be  sent 
down."     Accordingly,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find 
the  party  itself  exercising  the  functions  of  govern- 
ment and  issuing  orders.     In  Izvestia  and  Pravday 
during  April,  1919,  numerous  paragraphs  were  pub- 
lished relating  to  the  mobilization  of  regiments  by 
the  Communist  Party. 

From  figures  published  by  the  Bolsheviki  them- 
selves it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  tolerably  accurate 
idea  of  the  actual  numerical  strength  of  the  Com- 
munist Party.  During  the  second  half  of  191 8, 
when,  as  stated  in  the  paragraph  already  quoted 
from  Izvestia,  "the  Soviet  work  was  conducted 
exclusively  by  the  power  of  the  Russian  Communist 
Party,"  there  was  naturally  a  considerable  increase 
in  the  party  membership,  for  very  obvious  reasons. 
In  Severnaya  Communa,  February  22,  1919,  ap- 
peared the  following: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  361 

At  the  session  of  the  Moscow  Committee  of  the  Rus- 
sian Communist  Party,  on  February  15,  1919,  the  fol- 
lowing resolutions  were  carried:  Taking  into  account — 
(1)  That  the  uninterrupted  growth  of  our  party  during 
the  year  of  dictatorship  has  inevitably  meant  that  there 
have  entered  its  ranks  elements  having  absolutely  nothing 
in  common  with  Communism,  joining  in  order  to  use  the 
authority  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  for  their  own 
personal,  selfish  aims;  (2)  That  these  elements,  taking 
cover  under  the  flag  of  Communism,  are  by  their  acts 
discrediting  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  the  prestige  and 
glorious  name  of  our  Proletarian  Party;  (3)  That  the 
so-called  "Communists  of  our  days"  by  their  outrageous 
behavior  are  arousing  discontent  and  bitter  feeling  in  the 
people,  thus  creating  a  favorable  soil  for  counter-revo- 
lutionary agitation — taking  all  this  into  account,  the 
Moscow  Committee  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party 
declares: 

(a)  That  the  party  congress  about  to  be  held  should 
call  on  all  party  organizations  to  check  up  in  the  strictest 
manner  all  members  of  the  party  and  cleanse  its  ranks 
of  elements  foreign  to  the  party;  (b)  that  one  must  carry 
on  a  decisive  struggle  against  those  elements  whose  acts 
create  a  counter-revolutionary  state  of  mind;  (c)  that 
one  must  make  every  effort  to  raise  the  moral  level  of 
members  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  and  educate 
them  in  the  spirit  of  true  Proletarian  Communism; 
(d)  that  one  must  direct  all  efforts  toward  strengthening 
party  discipline  and  establishing  strict  control  by  the 
party  over  all  its  members  in  all  fields  of  Party-Soviet 
activity. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  the  inflation  of  party  mem- 
bership here  referred  to,  we  find  Izvestia  reporting 
in  that  same  month,  February,  1919,  as  follows: 
"The  secretary  of  the  Communist   Party  of  the 


362  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Moscow  Province  states  that  the  total  number  of 
party  members  throughout  the  whole  province  is 
2,881."  At  the  eighth  Congress  of  the  Communist 
Party,  March,  1919,  serious  attention  was  given  to 
the  inflation  of  the  party  membership  by  the  ad- 
mission of  Soviet  employees  and  others  who  were 
not  Communists  at  heart,  and  it  was  decided  to 
cleanse  the  party  of  such  elements  and,  after  that 
was  done,  to  undertake  a  recruiting  campaign  for 
new  members.  Yet,  according  to  the  official 
minutes  of  this  Congress,  "the  sum  total  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  throughout  Soviet  Russia  represents 
about  one-half  of  one  per  cent,  of  the  entire  popula- 
tion." We  find  in  Izvestia,  May  8,  1919,  that 
out  of  a  total  of  more  than  two  million  inhabitants 
in  the  Province  of  Kaluga  the  membership  of  the 
Communist  Party  amounted  to  less  than  one-fifth 
of  one  per  cent,  of  the  population:  "According  to 
the  data  of  the  Communist  Congress  of  the  Prov- 
ince of  Kaluga  there  are  3,861  registered  members 
of  the  party  throughout  the  whole  province."  On 
the  following  day,  May  9,  1919,  Izvestia  reported: 
"At  the  Communist  Congress  of  the  Riazan  Prov- 
ince 181  organizations  were  represented,  numbering 
5,994  members."  As  the  population  of  the  Riazan 
Province  was  well  over  3,000,000  it  will  be  seen 
that  here  again  the  Communist  Party  membership 
was  less  than  one-fifth  of  one  per  cent,  of  the 
population. 

At  this  time  various  Bolshevist  journals  gave  the 
Communist  Party  membership  at  20,000  for  the 
city  of  Moscow  and  12,000  for  Petrograd.  Then 
took  place  the  so-called  "re-registration,"  to  "re- 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  363 

lieve  the  party  of  this  ballast,"  as  Pravda  said  later 
on,  "those  careerists  of  the  petty  bourgeois  groups 
of  the  population."  In  Petrograd  the  membership 
was  reduced  by  nearly  one-third  and  in  some 
provincial  towns  by  from  50  to  75  per  cent.  The 
result  was  that  in  September,  1919,  Pravda  re- 
ported the  number  of  Communist  Party  members 
in  Petrograd  as  9,000,  "with  at  least  50,000  ardent 
supporters  of  the  anti-Bolshevist  movement."  This 
official  journal  did  not  regard  the  9,000  as  a  united 
body  of  genuine  and  sincere  Communists:  "Are  the 
9,000  upholding  the  cause  of  Bolshevism  acting 
according  to  their  convictions?  No.  Most  of  them 
are  in  ignorance  of  the  principles  of  the  Communists, 
which  at  heart  they  do  not  believe  in,  but  all  the 
employees  of  the  Soviets  study  these  principles  much 
the  same  as  under  the  rule  of  the  Czar  they  turned 
their  attention  to  police  rules  in  order  to  get  ahead.,y 
On  October  I,  1919,  Pravda  published  two  sig- 
nificant circular  letters  from  the  Central  Committee 
of  the  Communist  Party  to  the  district  and  local 
organizations  of  the  party.  The  first  of  these 
called  for  "a  campaign  to  recruit  new  members  into 
the  party"  and  to  induce  old  members  to  rejoin. 
To  make  joining  the  party  easier  "entry  into  the 
party  is  not  to  be  conditioned  by  the  presentation 
of  two  written  recommendations  as  before."  The 
appeal  to  the  party  workers  says,  "During  'party- 
week'  we  ought  to  increase  the  membership  of  our 
party  to  half  a  million"  The  second  circular  is  of 
interest  because  of  the  following  sentences:  "The 
principle  of  administration  by  'colleges'  must  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum.     Discussions  and  considera- 


364  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

tions  must  be  given  up.  The  party  must  be  as  soon 
as  possible  rebuilt  on  military  lines,  and  there  must 
be  created  a  military  revolutionary  apparatus 
which  would  work  solidly  and  accurately.  In  this 
apparatus  there  must  be  clearly  distributed  priv- 
ileges and  duties." 

The  frenzied  efforts  to  increase  the  party  mem- 
bership by  "drives"  in  which  every  device  and 
every  method  of  persuasion  and  pressure  was  used 
brought  into  the  party  many  who  were  not  Com- 
munists at  all.  Thus  we  find  Pravda  saying,  De- 
cember 12,  1919:  "The  influx  of  many  members 
to  the  collectives  (Soviet  Management  groups)comes 
not  only  from  the  working-class,  but  also  from  the 
middle  bourgeoisie  which  formerly  considered  Com- 
munists as  its  enemies.  One  of  the  new  collectives 
is  a  collective  at  the  estate  of  Kurakin  (a  children's 
colony).  Here  entered  the  collective  not  only 
loyal  employees,  but  also  representatives  of  the 
teaching  staff."  Pravda  adds  that  "this  inrush  of 
the  bourgeoisie,  the  bourgeoisie  that  formerly  con- 
sidered the  Communists  as  its  enemies,  is  not  at  all 
to  our  interest.  Of  course,  there  may  be  honest 
Soviet  officials  who  have  in  fact  shown  their 
loyalty  to  the  great  ideas  of  Communism,  and  such 
can  find  their  place  in  our  ranks."  Other  Bolshe- 
vist journals  wrote  in  the  same  spirit  deploring  the 
admission  of  so  many  "bourgeois"  Soviet  officials 
into  the  party. 

In  spite  of  this  abnormal  and  much-feared  infla- 
tion of  the  party  membership,  Pravda  reported  on 
March  18,  1920,  that  with  more  than  300,000  work- 
men  in    Petrograd   the   total   membership   of  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  365 

Communist  Party  in  that  city  was  only  30,000. 
That  is  to  say,  including  all  the  Soviet  officials 
and  "bourgeois  elements,"  the  party  membership 
amounted  to  rather  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the 
industrial  proletariat,  and  that  in  the  principal 
center  of  the  party,  the  first  of  the  two  great  cities. 
Surely  this  is  proof  that  the  Communist  Party 
really  represents  only  a  minority  of  the  industrial 
proletariat.  If  even  with  all  its  bourgeois  elements 
it  amounts  in  the  principal  industrial  city,  its 
stronghold,  to  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the  number 
of  working-men,  we  may  be  quite  certain  that  in  the 
country  as  a  whole  the  percentage  is  very  much 
smaller. 

Even  if  we  take  into  account  only  the  militant 
portion  of  the  organized  proletariat,  the  Com- 
munist Party  is  shown  to  represent  only  a  minority 
of  it.  Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  October  15,  1919, 
published  an  elaborate  statistical  analysis  of  the 
First  Trades-Union  Conference  of  the  Moscow 
Government.  We  learn  that  in  the  Union  of 
Textile  Workers,  the  largest  union  represented,  of 
131  delegates  present  only  27,  or  20.6  per  cent., 
declared  themselves  to  be  Communists;  while  94, 
or  71.7  per  cent.,  declared  themselves  to  be  non- 
party, and  3  declared  that  they  were  Mensheviki. 
Of  the  21  delegates  of  the  Union  of  Compositors 
13,  or  62.3  per  cent.,  declared  themselves  to  be 
Mensheviki;  7,  or  33  per  cent.,  to  be  non-party, 
and  only  1  registered  as  a  Communist.  The 
Union  of  Soviet  employees  naturally  sent  a  ma- 
jority of  delegates  who  registered  as  Communists, 

45  out  of  67  delegates,  or  6j  per  cent.,  so  registering 
24 


366  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

themselves.     The   unions   were   divided   into   four 
classes  or  categories,  as  follows: 

Cateeorv  No.  of  No.  of  Members 

s    y  Delegates  Represented 

First:    Workers  employed  in 

large  industries 287  266,660 

Second:  Workers  employed  in 

small  industries 1 13  806,200 

Third:     "Mixed  unions"  of 

Soviet  employees,  etc 197  204,100 

Fourth:   Intellectual  workers' 

unions 183  132,800 

If  we  take  the  first  two  categories  as  representing 
the  industrial  proletariat  as  a  whole  we  get  1,072,860 
proletarians  represented  by  400  delegates;  in  the 
third  and  fourth  categories,  representing  Soviet 
officials,  Intellectuals,  and  "petty  bourgeois  ele- 
ments," we  get  380  delegates  representing  336,900 
members.  Thus  the  industrial  proletariat  secured 
only  about  one-third  of  the  representation  in  pro- 
portion to  membership  secured  by  the  other  ele- 
ments.    Representation  was  upon  this  basis: 

Category  °**  D*%f  ^ 

First:   Workers  in  large  industries 610  workers 

Second:    Workers  in  small  industries. . .  .  1,427 
Third:      "Mixed    unions" — Soviet   em- 
ployees, city  employees,  etc 247 

Fourth:   Intellectuals 237 


(i 


With  all  this  juggling  and  gerrymandering  the 
Bolsheviki  did  not  manage  to  get  a  majority  of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  367 

out-and-out  Communists,  and  only  by  having  a 
separate  classification  for  "sympathizers"  did  they 
manage  to  attain  such  a  majority,  namely,  52  per 
cent,  of  all  delegates.  If  we  take  the  delegates  of 
workers  engaged  in  the  large  industries,  the  element 
which  Lenin  has  so  often  called  "the  kernel  of  the 
proletariat,"  we  find  that  only  28  per  cent,  declared 
themselves  as  belonging  to  the  Communist  Party. 
At  the  All-Russian  Conference  of  Engineering 
Workers,  reported  in  Economicheskaya  Zhizn  (No. 
219),  we  find  that  of  the  delegates  present  those 
declaring  themselves  to  be  Communists  were  40 
per  cent.,  those  belonging  to  no  party  46  per  cent., 
and  Mensheviki  8  per  cent. 

In  considering  these  figures  we  must  bear  in  mind 
these  facts:  First,  delegates  to  such  bodies  are 
drawn  from  the  most  active  men  in  the  organiza- 
tions; second,  persecution  of  all  active  in  opposition 
to  the  Bolsheviki  inevitably  lessened  the  number  of 
active  opponents  among  the  delegates;  third,  for 
two  years  there  had  been  no  freedom  of  press, 
speech,  or  assemblage  for  any  but  the  Communists; 
fourth,  by  enrolling  as  a  Communist,  or  even  by 
declaring  himself  to  be  a  "sympathizer,"  a  man 
could  obtain  a  certain  amount  of  protection  and  a 
privileged  position  in  the  matter  of  food  distribu- 
tion. When  all  these  things  are  duly  taken  into 
account  the  weakness  of  the  hold  of  the  Bolsheviki 
upon  the  minds  of  even  the  militant  part  of  the 
proletariat  is  evident. 

What  an  absurdity  it  is  to  call  the  Bolshevist 
regime  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  even  if  we 
accept  the  narrow  use  of  this  term  upon  which  the 


368  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Bolsheviki  insist  and  omit  all  except  about  5  per 
cent,  of  the  peasantry,  a  class  which  comprises 
85  per  cent,  of  the  entire  population.  It  is  a  dic- 
tatorship by  the  Communist  Party,  a  political 
faction  which,  according  to  its  own  figures,  had 
in  its  membership  in  March,  1919,  about  one-half 
of  one  per  cent,  of  the  population — or,  roughly, 
one  and  a  half  per  cent,  of  the  adult  population  en- 
titled to  vote  under  the  universal  franchise  intro- 
duced by  the  Provisional  Government;  a  party 
1  which,  after  a  period  of  confessedly  dangerous  infla- 
tion by  the  inclusion  of  non-proletarian  elements  in 
exceedingly  large  numbers,  had  in  March  of  this 
year,  in  the  greatest  industrial  center,  a  member- 
ship amounting  to  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the 
number  of  working-men.  To  say  that  Soviet 
Russia  is  governed  by  the  proletariat  is,  in  the  face 
of  these  figures,  a  grotesque  and  stupid  mis- 
statement. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  369 


XIII 

STATE    COMMUNISM   AND   LABOR  CONSCRIPTION 

MANY  of  the  most  influential  critics  of  modern 
Socialism  have  argued  that  the  realization 
of  its  program  must  inevitably  require  a  complete 
and  intolerable  subjection  of  the  individual  to  an 
all-powerful,  bureaucratic  state.  They  have  con- 
tended that  Socialism  in  practice  would  require 
the  organization  of  the  labor  forces  of  the  nation 
upon  military  lines;  that  the  right  of  the  citizen 
to  select  his  or  her  own  occupation  subject  only  to 
economic  laws,  and  to  leave  one  job  for  another  at 
will,  would  have  to  be  denied  and  the  sole  authority 
of  the  state  established  in  such  matters  as  the 
assignment  of  tasks,  the  organization  and  direction 
of  industry. 

Writers  like  Yves  Guyot,  Eugene  Richter,  Her- 
bert Spencer,  Huxley,  Goldwin  Smith,  and  many 
others,  have  emphasized  this  criticism  and  assailed 
Socialism  as  the  foe  of  individual  freedom.  Terri- 
fying pictures  have  been  drawn  of  the  lot  of  the 
workers  in  such  a  society;  their  tasks  assigned  to 
them  by  some  state  authority,  their  hours  of  labor, 
and  their  remuneration  similarly  controlled,  with 
no  freedom  of  choice  or  right  of  change  of  occupa- 
tion.    Just  as  under  the  adscriptio  glebes  of  feudal- 


370  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ism  the  worker  was  bound  to  the  soil,  so,  these 
hostile  critics  of  Socialism  have  argued,  must  the 
workers  be  bound  to  bureaucratically  set  tasks 
under  Socialism.  Just  as,  immediately  prior  to 
the  breaking  up  of  the  Roman  Empire,  workers 
were  thus  bound  to  certain  kinds  of  work  and, 
moreover,  to  train  their  children  to  the  same  work, 
so,  we  have  been  told  a  thousand  times,  it  must 
necessarily  be  in  a  Socialist  state. 

Of  course  all  responsible  Socialists  have  repudi- 
ated these  fantastic  caricatures  of  Socialism.  They 
have  uniformly  insisted  that  Socialism  is  compatible 
with  the  highest  individualism;  that  it  affords  the 
basis  for  a  degree  of  personal  freedom  not  other- 
wise obtainable.  They  have  laughed  to  scorn  the 
idea  of  a  system  which  gave  to  the  state  the  power 
to  assign  each  man  or  woman  his  or  her  task. 
Every  Socialist  writer  has  insisted  that  the  selec- 
tion of  occupation,  for  example,  must  be  personal 
and  free,  and  has  assailed  the  idea  of  a  regimenta- 
tion or  militarization  of  labor,  pointing  out  that 
this  would  never  be  tolerated  by  a  free  democracy; 
that  it  was  only  possible  in  a  despotic  state,  un- 
democratic, and  not  subject  to  the  will  and  in- 
terest of  the  people.  Many  of  the  most  brilliant 
and  convincing  pages  of  the  great  literature  of 
modern  international  Socialism  are  devoted  to  its 
exoneration  from  this  charge,  particular  attention 
being  given  to  the  anti-statist  character  of  the 
Socialist  movement  and  to  the  natural  antagonism 
of  democracy  to  centralization  and  bureaucracy. 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that  from  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century  right  down  to  the  present 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  371 

day  the  extreme  radical  left  wing  of  the  Socialist 
movement  in  every  country  has  been  bitter  in  its 
denunciation  of  those  Socialists  who  assumed  the 
continued  existence  of  the  state,  rivaling  the  most 
extreme  individualists  in  abuse  of  "the  tyranny  of 
the  state."  Without  a  single  noteworthy  exception 
the  leaders  of  the  radical  left  wing  of  the  movement 
have  been  identified  with  those  revolts  against 
"statism"  which  have  manifested  themselves  in  the 
agitations  for  decentralized  autonomy.  They  have 
been  anti-parliamentarians  and  direct-actionists 
almost  to  a  man. 

By  a  strange  irony  of  history  it  has  remained  for 
the  self-styled  Marxian  Socialists  of  Russia,  the 
Bolsheviki,  who  are  so  much  more  Marxist  than 
Marx  himself,  to  give  to  the  criticism  we  are  dis- 
cussing the  authority  of  history.  They  have  lifted 
it  from  the  shadowy  regions  of  fantastic  speculation 
to  the  almost  impregnable  and  unassailable  ground 
of  established  law  and  practice.  The  Code  of 
Labor  Laws  of  Soviet  Russia,  recently  published 
in  this  country  by  the  official  bureau  of  the  Russian 
Soviet  Government,  can  henceforth  be  pointed  to 
by  the  enemies  of  social  democracy  as  evidence  of 
the  truth  of  the  charge  that  Socialism  aims  to  re- 
duce mankind  to  a  position  of  hopeless  servitude. 
Certainly  no  freedom-loving  man  or  woman  would 
want  to  exchange  life  under  capitalism,  with  all  its 
drawbacks  and  disadvantages,  for  the  despotic, 
bureaucratic  regime  clearly  indicated  in  this  most 
remarkable  collection  of  laws. 

As  we  have  seen,  Lenin  and  his  followers  were 
anti-statists.     Once  in  the  saddle  they  set   up   a 


372  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

powerful  state  machine  and  began  to  apotheosize 
the  state.  Not  only  did  the  term  "Soviet  State" 
come  into  quite  general  use  in  place  of  "Soviet 
Power";  what  is  still  more  significant  is  the  special 
sanctity  with  which  they  endowed  the  state.  In 
this  they  go  as  far  as  Hegel,  though  they  do  not 
use  his  spiritual  terminology.  The  German  phi- 
losopher saw  the  state  as  "the  Divine  Will  embodied 
in  the  human  will,"  as  "Reason  manifested,"  and 
as  "the  Eternal  personified."  Upon  that  concep- 
tion the  Prussian-German  ideal  of  the  state  was 
based.  That  the  state  must  be  absolute,  its  au- 
thority unquestioned,  is  equally  the  basic  concep- 
tion upon  which  the  Bolshevist  regime  rests.  In 
no  modern  nation,  not  even  the  Germany  of  Bis- 
marck and  Wilhelm  II,  has  the  authority  of  the 
state  been  so  comprehensive,  so  wholly  dependent 
upon  force  or  more  completely  independent  of  the 
popular  will.  Notwithstanding  the  revolutionary 
ferment  of  the  time,  so  arrogantly  confident  have 
the  self-constituted  rulers  become  that  we  find 
Zinoviev  boasting,  "Were  we  to  publish  a  decree 
ordering  the  entire  population  of  Petrograd,  under 
fifty  years  of  age,  to  present  themselves  on  the 
field  of  Mars  to  receive  twenty-five  birch  rods,  we 
are  certain  that  75  per  cent,  would  obediently 
form  a  queue,  and  the  remaining  25  per  cent,  would 
bring  medical  certificates  exempting  them  from  the 
flogging." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  in  the  writings  of  Lenin 
the  Machiavellian  manner  in  which,  even  before 
the  coup  d'etat  of  November,  1917,  he  began  to 
prepare  the  minds  of  his  followers  for  the  abandon- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  373 

ment  of  anti-statism.  Shortly  before  that  event 
he  published  a  leaflet  entitled,  "Shall  the  Bolsheviki 
Remain  in  Power?"  In  this  leaflet  he  pointed 
out  that  the  Bolsheviki  had  preached  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  state  only  because,  and  so  long  as>  the 
state  was  in  the  possession  of  the  master  class.  He 
asked  why  they  should  continue  to  do  this  after 
they  themselves  had  taken  the  helm.  The  state,  he 
argued,  is  the  organized  rule  of  a  privileged  minority 
class,  and  the  Bolsheviki  must  use  the  enemy's 
machinery  and  substitute  their  minority.  Here 
we  have  revealed  the  same  vicious  and  unscrupulous 
duplicity,  the  same  systematic,  studied  deception, 
as  in  such  matters  as  freedom  of  speech  and  press, 
equal  suffrage,  and  the  convocation  of  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly — a  fundamental  principle  so  long 
as  the  party  was  in  revolt,  anti-statism  was  to  be 
abandoned  the  moment  the  power  to  give  it  effect 
was  secured.  Other  Socialists  had  been  derided 
and  bitterly  denounced  by  the  Bolsheviki  for 
preaching  the  "bourgeois  doctrine"  of  controlling 
and  using  the  machinery  of  the  state;  nothing  but 
the  complete  destruction  of  the  state  and  its 
machinery  would  satisfy  their  revolutionary  minds. 
But  with  their  first  approach  to  power  the  tune  is 
changed  and  possession  and  use  of  the  machinery  of 
the  state  are  held  to  be  desirable  and  even  essential. 
For  what  is  this  possession  of  the  power  and 
machinery  of  the  state  desired?  For  no  construc- 
tive purpose  of  any  sort  or  kind  whatever,  if  we  may 
believe  Lenin,  but  only  for  destruction  and  oppres- 
sion. In  his  little  book,  The  State  and  the  Revolution, 
written  in  September,  1917,  he  says:   "As  the  state 


374  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

is  only  a  transitional  institution  which  we  must 
use  in  the  revolutionary  struggle  in  order  forcibly  to 
crush  our  opponents,  it  is  a  pure  absurdity  to  speak 
of  a  Free  People's  State.  While  the  proletariat  still 
needs  the  state,  it  does  not  require  it  in  the  interests 
of  freedom,  but  in  the  interests  of  crushing  its  an- 
tagonists." Here,  then,  is  the  brutal  doctrine  of 
the  state  as  an  instrument  of  coercion  and  re- 
pression which  the  arch  Bolshevist  acknowledges; 
a  doctrine  differing  from  that  of  Treitschke  and 
other  Prussians  only  in  its  greater  brutality.  The 
much-discussed  Code  of  Labor  Laws  of  the  Soviet 
Government,  with  its  elaborate  provisions  for  a 
permanent  conscription  of  labor  upon  an  essentially 
military  basis,  is  the  logical  outcome  of  the  Bolshe- 
vist conception  of  the  state. 

The  statement  has  been  made  by  many  of  the 
apologists  of  the  Bolsheviki  that  the  conscription 
of  labor,  which  has  been  so  unfavorably  commented 
upon  in  the  western  nations,  is  a  temporary  measure 
only,  introduced  because  of  the  extraordinary  con- 
ditions prevailing.  It  has  been  stated,  by  Mr. 
Lincoln  Eyre  among  others,  that  it  was  adopted 
on  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Royal  C.  Keely,  an 
American  engineer  who  was  employed  by  Lenin  to 
make  an  expert  report  upon  Russia's  economic  po- 
sition and  outlook,  and  whose  report,  made  in 
January  of  this  year,  is  known  to  have  been  very 
unfavorable.  A  brief  summary  of  the  essential 
facts  will  show  (i)  that  the  Bolsheviki  had  this 
system  in  mind  from  the  very  first,  and  (2)  that 
quite  early  they  began  to  make  tentative  efforts 
to  introduce  it. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  375 

When  the  Bolsheviki  appeared  at  the  convoca- 
tion of  the  Constituent  Assembly  and  demanded 
that  that  body  adopt  a  document  which  would 
virtually  amount  to  a  complete  abdication  of  its 
functions,  that  document  contained  a  clause — ■ 
Article  II,  Paragraph  4 — which  read  as  follows: 
"To  enforce  general  compulsory  labor,  in  order  to 
destroy  the  class  of  parasites,  and  to  reorganize 
the  economic  life."     In  April,  1918,  Lenin  wrote: 

The  delay  in  introducing  obligatory  labor  service  is 
another  proof  that  the  most  urgent  problem  is  precisely 
the  preparatory  organization  work  which,  on  one  hand, 
should  definitely  secure  our  gains,  and  which,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  necessary  to  prepare  the  campaign  to 
"surround  capital"  and  to  "compel  its  surrender."  The 
introduction  of  obligatory  labor  service  should  be  started 
immediately,  but  it  should  be  introduced  gradually  and  with 
great  caution,  testing  every  step  by  practical  experience, 
and,  of  course,  introducing  first  of  all  obligatory  labor 
service  for  the  rich.  The  introduction  of  a  labor  record- 
book  and  a  consumption-budget  record-book  for  every 
bourgeois,  including  the  village  bourgeois,  would  be  a 
long  step  forward  toward  a  complete  "siege"  of  the 
enemy  and  toward  the  creation  of  a  really  universal  ac- 
counting and  control  over  production  and  distribution.1 

Some  idea  of  the  extent  to  which  the  principle 
of  compulsory  labor  was  applied  to  the  bourgeoisie, 
as  suggested  by  Lenin,  can  be  gathered  from  the 
numerous  references  to  the  subject  in  the  official 
Bolshevist  press,  especially  in  the  late  summer  and 
early  autumn  of  191 8.     The  extracts  here  cited  are 

1  The  Soviets  at  Work,  p.  19 


376  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

entirely  typical:  as  early  as  April  17,  191 8,  Izvestia 
published  a  report  by  Larine,  one  of  the  People's 
Commissaries,  on  the  government  of  Moscow,  in 
which  he  said:  "A  redistribution  of  manual  labor 
must  be  made  by  an  organized  autonomous  govern- 
ment composed  of  workers;  compulsory  labor  for 
workmen  must  be  prohibited;  it  would  subject  the 
proletariat  to  the  peasants  and  on  the  whole  could 
be  of  no  use,  seeing  the  general  stoppage  of  all  labor. 
Compulsion  can  be  used  only  for  those  who  have  no 
need  to  work  for  their  living — members  of  hereto- 
fore ruling  classes."  Bednota,  an  official  organ  of 
the  Communist  Party,  on  September  20,  191 8,  pub- 
lished an  interesting  item  from  the  Government  of 
Smolensk,  saying:  "We  shall  soon  have  a  very 
interesting  community:  we  are  bringing  together  all 
the  landed  proprietors  of  the  district,  are  assigning 
them  one  property,  supplying  them  with  the 
necessary  inventory,  and  making  them  work. 
Come  and  see  this  miracle!  It  is  evident  that  this 
community  is  strictly  guarded.  The  affair  seems 
to  promise  well." 

Here  are  seven  typical  news  items  from  four  is- 
sues of  Bednota,  the  date  of  the  paper  being  given 
after  each  item: 

The  mobilization  of  the  bourgeoisie. — In  the  Govern- 
ment of  Aaratov  the  bourgeoisie  is  mobilized.  The 
women  mend  the  sacks,  the  men  clear  the  ruins  from  a 
big  fire.  In  the  Government  of  Samara  the  bourgeois 
from  18  to  50  years  of  age,  not  living  from  the  results 
of  their  labor,  are  also  called  up.     (September  19,  1918.) 

Viatka,  24th  September. — The  mobilization  of  the 
idlers  (bourgeois)  has  been  decided.  (September  26,  1918.) 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  377 

Nevel,  26th  September. — The  executive  committee 
has  decreed  the  mobilization  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  town 
and  country.  All  the  bourgeois  in  fit  state  to  work  are 
obliged  to  do  forced  labor  without  remuneration.  (Sep- 
tember 27,  1918.) 

Kostroma,  26th  September. — The  mobilized  bourgeoisie 
is  working  at  the  paving  of  the  streets.  (September 
27,  1918.) 

The  executive  committee  of  the  Soviet  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Moscow  has  decided  to  introduce  in  all  the  dis- 
tricts the  use  of  forced  labor  for  all  persons  from  18  to 
50  years  of  age,  belonging  to  the  non-working  class. 
(September  27,  1918.) 

Voronege,  28th  September. — The  poverty  committee 
has  decided  to  call  up  all  the  wealthy  class  for  communal 
work  (ditch-making,  draining  the  marshes,  etc.).  (Sep- 
tember 29,  1918.) 

Svotschevka,  28th  September. — The  concentration  of 
the  bourgeoisie  is  being  proceeded  with  and  the  transfer 
of  the  poor  into  commodious  and  healthy  dwellings. 
The  bourgeois  is  cleaning  the  streets.  (September 
29,  1918.) 

From  other  Bolshevist  journals  a  mass  of  similar 
information  might  be  cited.  Thus  Goloss  Kresti- 
anstva,  October  1,  1918,  said:  "Mobilization  of  the 
parasites. — Odoeff,  28th  September. — THe  Soviet  of 
the  district  has  mobilized  the  bourgeoisie,  the 
priests,  and  other  parasites  for  public  works:  re- 
pairing the  pavements,  cleaning  the  pools,  and  so 
on."  On  October  6,  191 8,  Pravda  reported:  "Chem- 
bar. — The  bourgeoisie  put  to  compulsory  work  is 
repairing  the  pavements  and  the  roads."  On 
October  nth  the  same  paper  reported  Zinoviev  as 
saying,  in  a  speech:  "If  you  come  to  Petrograd  you 


378  "THE   GREATEST  FAILURE 

will  see  scores  of  bourgeoisie  laying  the  pavement 
in  the  courtyard  of  the  Smolny.  ...  I  wish  you  could 
see  how  well  they  unload  coal  on  the  Neva  and  clean 
the  barracks."  Izvestia,  October  19,  1918,  pub- 
lished this:  "Orel. — To-day  the  Orel  bourgeoisie 
commenced  compulsory  work  to  which  it  was  made 
liable.  Parties  of  the  bourgeoisie,  thus  made  to 
work,  are  cleaning  the  streets  and  squares  from 
rubbish  and  dirt."  The  Krasnaya  Gazeta,  October 
16,  1918,  said,  "Large  forces  of  mobilized  bour- 
geoisie have  been  sent  to  the  front  to  do  trench 
work."  Finally,  the  last-named  journal  on  Novem- 
ber 6,  1918,  said:  "The  District  Extraordinary 
Commission  (Saransk)  has  organized  a  camp  of 
concentration  for  the  local  bourgeoisie  and  kulaki.1 
The  duties  of  the  confined  shall  consist  in  keeping 
clean  the  town  of  Saransk.  The  existence  of  the 
camp  will  be  maintained  at  the  expense  of  the  same 
bourgeoisie." 

That  a  great  and  far-reaching  social  revolution 
should  deny  to  the  class  overthrown  the  right  to 
live  in  idleness  is  neither  surprising  nor  wrong.  A 
Socialist  revolution  could  not  do  other  than  insist 
that  no  person  able  to  work  be  entitled  to  eat  with- 
out rendering  some  useful  service  to  society.  No 
Socialist  will  criticize  the  Bolsheviki  for  requiring 
work  from  the  bourgeoisie.  What  is  open  to 
criticism  and  condemnation  is  the  fact  that  compul- 
sory labor  for  the  bourgeoisie  was  not  a  measure  of 
socialization,  but  of  stupid  vengeance.  The  bour- 
geois members  of  society  were  not  placed  upon  an 
equality  with   other  citizens   and   told   that  they 

1  i.e.,  "close-fists." 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  379 

must  share  the  common  lot  and  give  service  for 
bread.     Instead  of  that,  they  were  made  a  class 
apart  and  set  to  the  performance  of  tasks  selected 
only  to  degrade  and  humiliate  them.     In  almost 
every    reference   to    the    subject    appearing    in  the 
official    Bolshevist    press    we    observe    that    the 
bourgeoisie — the  class  comprising  the  organizers  of 
industry  and  business  and  almost  all  the  technical 
experts  in  the  country — was  set  to  menial   tasks 
which    the   most   illiterate    and    ignorant   peasants 
could  better  do.     Just  as  high  military  officers  were 
set  to  digging  trenches  and  cleaning  latrines,  so  the 
civilian   bourgeoisie   were   set   to   cleaning   streets, 
removing  night  soil,  and  draining  ditches,  and  not 
even  given  a  chance  to  render  the  vastly  greater 
services  they  were  capable  of,  in  many  instances; 
services,  moreover,  of  which  the  country  was  in  dire 
need.     A  notable   example   of  this   stupidity  was 
when   the   advocates   of  Saratov   asked   the   local 
Soviet  authorities  to  permit  them  to  open  up  an 
idle  soap-factory  to  make  soap,  of  which  there  was 
a  great  scarcity.     The  reply  given  was  that  "the 
bourgeoisie  could  not  be  suffered  to  be  in  competition 
with  the  working-class,'"     Not  only  was  this  a  brutal 
policy,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  greater  part  of 
the  bourgeoisie  had  been  loyal  to  the  March  Revo- 
lution;  it  was  as  stupid  and  short-sighted  as  it  was 
brutal,  for  it  did  not,   and  could  not,  secure  the 
maximum  services  of  which  these  elements  were 
capable.     It  is  quite  clear  that,  instead  of  being 
dominated  by  the  generous  idealism  of  Socialism,  they 
were  mastered  by  hatred  and  a  passion  for  revenge. 
Of  course  the  policy  pursued  toward  the  bour- 


380  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

geoisie  paved  the  way,  as  Lenin  intended  it  to  do, 
for  the  introduction  of  the  principle  of  compulsory 
labor  in  general.  By  pandering  to  the  lowest  in- 
stincts and  motives  of  the  unenlightened  masses, 
causing  them  to  rejoice  at  the  enslavement  of  the 
formerly  rich  and  powerful,  as  well  as  those  only 
moderately  well-to-do,  Lenin  and  his  satellites  knew 
well  that  they  were  surely  undermining  the  moral 
force  of  those  who  rejoiced,  so  that  later  they  would 
be  incapable  of  strong  resistance  against  the  ap- 
plication of  the  same  tyranny  to  themselves.  The 
publication  of  the  Code  of  Labor  Laws,  in  1919, 
was  the  next  step.  This  code  contains  193  regu- 
lations with  numerous  explanatory  notes,  with  all 
of  which  the  ordinary  workman,  who  is  a  conscript 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  is  presumed  to  be 
familiar.  Only  a  few  of  its  outstanding  features 
can  be  noted  here.  The  principle  of  compulsion  and 
the  extent  of  its  application  are  stated  in  the  first 
article  of  the  Code : 

Article  I 
On  Compulsory  Labor 

1.  All  citizens  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federated 
Soviet  Republic,  with  the  exceptions  stated  in  Section 
2  and  3,  shall  be  subject  to  compulsory  labor. 

2.  The  following  persons  shall  be  exempt  from  com- 
pulsory labor: 

(a)  Persons  under  16  years  of  age; 

(b)  All  persons  over  50  years; 

(c)  Persons  who  have  become  incapacitated  by  in- 
jury or  illness. 

3.  Temporarily  exempt  from  compulsory  labor  are: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  381 

(a)  Persons  who  are  temporarily  incapacitated  ow- 
ing to  illness  or  injury,  for  a  period  necessary  for 
their  recovery. 

(b)  Women,  for  a  period  of  8  weeks  before  and  8 
weeks  after  confinement. 

4.  All  students  shall  be  subject  to  compulsory  labor 
at  the  schools. 

5.  The  fact  of  permanent  or  temporary  disability 
shall  be  certified  after  a  medical  examination  by  the 
Bureau  of  Medical  Survey  in  the  city,  district  or  prov- 
ince, by  accident  insurance  office  or  agencies  repre- 
senting the  former,  according  to  the  place  of  residence 
of  the  person  whose  disability  is  to  be  certified. 

Note  I.  The  rules  on  the  method  of  examination  of 
disabled  workmen  are  appended  hereto. 

Note  II.  Persons  who  are  subject  to  compulsory 
labor  and  are  not  engaged  in  useful  public  work  may 
be  summoned  by  the  local  Soviets  for  the  execution  of 
public  work,  on  conditions  determined  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  in  agreement  with  the  local  Soviets  of 
trades-unions. 

6.  Labor  may  be  performed  in  the  form  of: 

(a)  Organized  co-operation; 

(b)  Individual  personal  service; 

(c)  Individual  special  jobs. 

7.  Labor  conditions  in  government  (Soviet)  establish- 
ments shall  be  regulated  by  tariff"  rules  approved  by 
the  Central  Soviet  authorities  through  the  People's 
Commissariat  of  Labor. 

8.  Labor  conditions  in  all  establishments  ^Soviet,  na- 
tionalized, public,  and  private)  shall  be  regulated  by 
tarifFrules  drafted  by  the  trades-unions,  in  agreement  with 
the  directors  or  owners  of  establishments  and  enterprises, 
and  approved  by  the  People's  Commissariat  of  Labor. 

Note.     In  cases  where  it  is  impossible  to  arrive  at 

an  understanding  with  the  directors  or  owners  of  estab- 
25 


382  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

lishments  or  enterprises,  the  tariff  rules  shall  be  drawn 
up  by  the  trades-unions  and  submitted  for  approval  to 
the  People's  Commissariat  of  Labor. 

9.  Labor  in  the  form  of  individual  personal  service 
or  in  the  form  of  individual  special  jobs  shall  be  regu- 
lated by  tariff  rules  drafted  by  the  respective  trades- 
unions  and  approved  by  the  People's  Commissariat  of 
Labor. 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  subjection  to  labor 
conscription  applies  to  "all  citizens"  except  for 
certain  exempted  classes.  Women,  therefore,  are 
equally  liable  with  men,  except  for  a  stated  period 
before  and  after  childbirth.  It  will  also  be  ob- 
served that  apparently  a  great  deal  of  control  is 
exercised  by  the  trades-unions.  We  must  bear  in 
mind,  however,  at  every  point,  that  the  trades- 
unions  in  Soviet  Russia  are  not  free  and  autonomous 
organs  of  the  working-class.  A  free  trades-union — ■ 
that  is,  a  trades-union  wholly  autonomous  and  in- 
dependent of  government  control,  does  not  exist  in 
Russia.  The  actual  status  of  Russian  trades-unions 
is  set  forth  in  the  resolution  adopted  at  the  ninth 
Congress  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party,  in 
March,  1920,  which  provides,  that  "All  decisions 
of  the  All-Russian  Central  Soviet  of  Trades-Unions 
concerning  the  conditions  and  organization  of  labor 
are  obligatory  for  all  trades-unions  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Communist  Party  who  are  employed  in 
them,  and  can  be  canceled  only  by  the  Central  Com- 
mittee of  the  Party."  The  hierarchy  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  is  supreme,  the  trades-unions,  the  co- 
operatives, and  the  Soviet  Government  itself  being 
subordinate  to  it. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  383 

Article  II  deals  with  the  manner  in  which  the 
compulsion  to  labor  is  to  be  enforced.  Paragraph 
16  of  this  article  provides  that  "the  assignment  of 
wage-earners  to  work  shall  be  carried  out  through 
the  Departments  of  Labor  Distribution."  Para- 
graph 24  reads  as  follows:  "An  unemployed  person 
has  no  right  to  refuse  an  offer  of  work  at  his  vocation, 
provided  the  working  conditions  conform  with  the 
standards  fixed  by  the  respective  tariff  regulations, 
or  in  the  absence  of  the  same  by  the  trades-unions." 
Paragraphs  27  to  30,  inclusive,  show  the  extraor- 
dinary power  of  the  Departments  of  Labor  Distribu- 
tion over  the  workers: 

27.  Whenever  workers  are  required  for  work  outside 
of  their  district,  a  roll-call  of  the  unemployed  registered 
in  the  Department  of  Labor  Distribution  shall  take  place, 
to  ascertain  who  are  willing  to  go;  if  a  sufficient  number 
of  such  should  not  be  found,  the  Department  of  Labor 
Distribution  shall  assign  the  lacking  number  from  among 
the  unemployed  in  the  order  of  their  registration,  provided 
that  those  who  have  dependents  must  not  be  given 
preference  before  single  persons. 

28.  If  in  the  Departments  of  Labor  Distribution, 
within  the  limits  of  the  district,  there  be  no  workmen 
meeting  the  requirements,  the  District  Exchange  Bureau 
has  the  right,  upon  agreement  with  the  respective 
trades-union,  to  send  unemployed  of  another  class  ap- 
proaching as  nearly  as  possible  the  trade  required. 

29.  An  unemployed  person  who  is  offered  work  out- 
side his  vocation  shall  be  obliged  to  accept  it,  on  the 
understanding,  if  he  so  wishes,  that  this  be  only  tempo- 
rary, until  he  receives  work  at  his  vocation. 

30.  A  wage-earner  who  is  working  outside  his  spe- 
cialty, and  who  has  stated  his  widi  that  this  be  only 


384  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

temporary,  shall  retain  his  place  on  the  register  on  the 
Department  of  Labor  Distribution  until  he  gets  work 
at  his  vocation. 


It  is  quite  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  the 
Department  of  Labor  Distribution  can  arbitrarily 
compel  a  worker  to  leave  a  job  satisfying  to  him  or 
her  and  to  accept  another  job  and  remain  at  it 
until  given  permission  to  leave.  The  worker  may 
be  compelled  by  this  power  to  leave  a  desirable  job 
and  take  up  a  different  line  of  work,  or  even  to 
move  to  some  other  locality.  It  is  hardly  possible 
to  imagine  a  device  more  effective  in  liquidating 
personal  grudges  or  effecting  political  pressure. 
One  has  only  to  face  the  facts  of  life  squarely  in 
order  to  recognize  the  potentiality  for  evil  embodied 
in  this  system.  What  is  there  to  prevent  the 
Soviet  official  removing  the  "agitator,"  the  political 
opponent,  for  "the  good  of  the  party"?  What 
man  wants  his  sister  or  daughter  to  be  subject  to 
the  menace  of  such  power  in  the  hands  of  un- 
scrupulous officials?  There  is  not  the  slightest 
evidence  in  the  record  of  Bolshevism  so  far  as  it 
has  been  tried  in  Russia  to  warrant  the  assumption 
that  only  saints  will  ever  hold  office  in  the  Depart- 
ments of  Labor  Distribution. 

Article  V  governs  the  withdrawal  of  wage-earners 
from  jobs  which  do  not  satisfy  them.     Paragraph 

51  of  this  article  clearly  provides  that  a  worker 
can  only  be  permitted  to  resign  if  his  reasons  are 
approved  by  what  is  described  as  the  "respective 
organ  of  workmen's  self-government."     Paragraph 

52  provides  that  if  the  resignation  is  not  approved 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  385 

by  this  authority  "the  wage-earner  must  remain  at 
work,  but  may  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the  com- 
mittee to  the  respective  professional  unions."  Pro- 
vision is  made  for  fixing  the  remuneration  of  labor 
by  governmental  authority.  Article  VI,  Para- 
graph 55,  provides  that  "the  remuneration  of  wage- 
earners  for  work  in  enterprises,  establishments,  and 
institutions  employing  paid  labor  .  .  .  shall  be 
fixed  by  tariff's  worked  out  for  each  kind  of  labor." 
Paragraph  57  provides  that  "in  working  out  the 
tariff"  rates  and  determining  the  standard  remunera- 
tion rates,  all  the  wage-earners  of  a  trade  shall  be 
divided  into  groups  and  categories  and  a  definite 
standard  of  remuneration  shall  be  fixed  for  each 
of  them."  Paragraph  58  provides  that  "the  stand- 
ard of  remuneration  fixed  by  the  tariff"  rates  must 
be  at  least  sufficient  to  cover  the  minimum  living 
expenses  as  determined  by  the  People's  Commissariat 
of  Labor  for  each  district  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federated  Soviet  Republic."  Paragraph  60  pro- 
vides that  "the  remuneration  of  each  wage-earner 
shall  be  determined  by  his  classification  in  a  definite 
group  and  category."  Paragraph  61,  with  an  addi- 
tional note,  explains  the  method  of  thus  classifying 
wage-earners.  "Valuation  commissions"  are  estab- 
lished by  the  "professional  organizations"  and  their 
procedure  is  absolutely  determined  by  the  local  So- 
viet official  called  the  Commissariat  of  Labor.  If  a 
worker  receives  more  than  the  standard  remunera- 
tion fixed,  "irrespective  of  the  pretext  and  form 
under  which  it  might  be  offered  and  whether  it  be 
paid  in  only  one  or  in  several  places  of  employ- 
ment"— Paragraph  65 — the  excess  amount  so  re- 


386  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ceived  may  be  deducted  from  his  next  wages,  ac- 
cording to  Paragraph  68. 

The  amount  of  work  to  be  performed  each  day 
is  arbitrarily  assigned.  Thus,  Article  VIII,  Para- 
graph 114,  provides  that  "every  wage-earner  must 
during  a  normal  working-day  and  under  normal 
working  conditions  perform  the  standard  amount 
of  work  fixed  for  the  category  and  group  in  which 
he  is  enrolled."  According  to  Paragraph  118  of 
the  same  article,  "a  wage-earner  systematically 
producing  less  than  the  fixed  standard  may  be 
transferred  by  decision  of  the  proper  valuation  com- 
mission to  other  work  in  the  same  group  and 
category,  or  to  a  lower  group  or  category,  with  a 
corresponding  reduction  of  wages."  If  it  is  judged 
that  his  failure  to  maintain  the  normal  output  is 
due  to  lack  of  good  faith  and  to  negligence,  he  may 
be  discharged  without  notice 

An  appendix  to  Section  80  provides  that  every 
wage-earner  must  carry  a  labor  booklet.  The  follow- 
ing description  of  this  booklet  shows  how  thoroughly 
registered  and  controlled  labor  is  in  Sovdepia: 

1.  Every  citizen  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federated 
Soviet  Republic,  upon  assignment  to  a  definite  group 
and  category  (Section  62  of  the  present  Code),  shall 
receive,  free  of  charge,  a  labor  booklet. 

Note.  The  form  of  the  labor  booklets  shall  be  worked 
out  by  the  People's  Commissariat  of  Labor 

2.  Each  wage-earner,  on  entering  the  employment  of 
an  enterprise,  establishment,  or  institution  employing 
paid  labor,  shall  present  his  labor  booklet  to  the  man- 
agement thereof,  and  on  entering  the  employment  of  a 
private  individual — to  the  latter. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  387 

Note.  A  copy  of  the  labor  booklet  shall  be  kept  by 
the  management  of  the  enterprise,  establishment,  in- 
stitution, or  private  individual  by  whom  the  wage- 
earner  is  employed. 

3.  All  work  performed  by  a  wage-earner  during  the 
normal  working-day  as  well  as  piece-work  or  overtime 
work,  and  all  payments  received  by  him  as  a  wage- 
earner  (remuneration  in  money  or  in  kind,  subsidies 
from  the  unemployment  and  hospital  funds),  must  be 
entered  in  his  labor  booklet. 

Note.  In  the  labor  booklet  must  also  be  entered  the 
leaves  of  absence  and  sick-leave  of  the  wage-earner,  as 
well  as  the  fines  imposed  on  him  during  and  on  account 
of  his  work. 

4.  Each  entry  in  the  labor  booklet  must  be  dated  and 
signed  by  the  person  making  the  entry,  and  also  by  the 
wage-earner  (if  the  latter  is  literate),  who  thereby  certi- 
fies the  correctness  of  the  entry. 

5.  The  labor  booklet  shall  contain: 

(a)  The  name,  surname,  and  date  of  birth  of  the 
wage-earner; 

(b)  The  name  and  address  of  the  trades-union  of 
which  the  wage-earner  is  a  member; 

(c)  The  group   and   category   to  which   the  wage- 
earner  has  been  assigned  by  the  valuation  commission. 

6.  Upon  the  discharge  of  a  wage-earner,  his  labor 
booklet  shall  under  no  circumstances  be  withheld  from 
him.  Whenever  an  old  booklet  is  replaced  by  a  new  one, 
the  former  shall  be  left  in  possession  of  the  wage-earner. 

7.  In  case  a  wage-earner  loses  his  labor  booklet,  he 
shall  be  provided  with  a  new  one  into  which  shall  be 
copied  all  the  entries  of  the  lost  booklet;  in  such  a  case 
a  fee  determined  by  the  rules  of  internal  management 
may  be  charged  to  the  wage-earner  for  the  new  booklet. 

8.  A  wage-earner  must  present  his  labor  booklet 
upon  the  request: 


3S8  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

(a)  Of  the  managers  of  the  enterprise,  establishment, 
or  institution  where  he  is  employed; 

(b)  Of  the  Department  of  Labor  Distribution; 

(c)  Of  the  trades  union; 

(d)  Of  the  officials  of  workmen's  control  and  of  labor 
protection; 

(e)  Of  the  insurance  offices  or  institutions  acting  as 
such. 

A  wireless  message  trom  Moscow,  dated  Febru- 
ary II,  1920,  referring  to  the  actual  introduction  of 
these  labor  booklets,  says: 

The  decree  on  the  establishment  of  work-books  is 
in  course  of  realization  at  Moscow  and  Petrograd.  The 
book  has  32  pages  in  it,  containing,  besides  particulars 
as  to  the  holder's  civil  status,  information  on  the  follow- 
ing points: 

Persons  dependent  on  the  holder,  degree  of  capacity 
for  work,  place  where  employed,  pay  allowanced  or  pen- 
sion, food-cards  received,  and  so  forth.  One  of  these 
books  should  be  handed  over  to  all  citizens  not  less  than 
16  years  old.  It  constitutes  the  proof  that  the  holder 
is  doing  his  share  of  productive  work.  The  introduction 
of  the  work-book  will  make  it  possible  for  us  to  ascertain 
whether  the  law  as  to  work  is  being  observed  by  citizens. 
This  being  the  object,  it  will  only  be  handed  to  workmen 
and  employees  in  accordance  with  the  lists  of  the  busi- 
ness concerns  in  which  they  are  working,  to  artisans 
who  can  produce  a  regular  certificate  of  their  registra- 
tion as  being  sick  or  a  certificate  from  the  branches  of 
the  Public  Welfare  Administration,  and  to  women  who 
are  engaged  in  keeping  house,  and  who  produce  a  certifi- 
cate by  the  House  Committee.  When  the  distribution 
has  been  completed,  all  sick  persons,  not  possessed  of 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  389 

work-books,  will  be  sent  to  their  work  by  the  branch  of 
the  Labor  Distribution  Administration. 

We  have  summarized,  in  the  exact  language  of  the 
official  English  translation  published  by  the  Soviet 
Government  Bureau  in  this  country,  the  charac- 
teristic and  noteworthy  features  of  this  remarkable 
scheme.  Surely  this  is  the  ultimate  madness  of 
bureaucratism,  the  most  complete  subjection  of  the 
individual  citizen  to  an  all-powerful  state  since  the 
days  of  Lycurgus.  At  the  time  of  Edward  III,  by 
the  Statute  of  Laborers  of  1349,  not  only  was  labor 
enforced  on  the  lower  classes,  but  men  were  not 
free  to  work  where  they  liked,  nor  were  their  em- 
ployers permitted  to  pay  them  more  than  certain 
fixed  rates  of  wages.  In  short,  the  laborer  was  a 
serf;  and  that  is  the  condition  to  which  this  Bol- 
shevist scheme  would  reduce  all  the  people  of 
Russia  except  the  privileged  bureaucracy.  It  is  a 
rigid  and  ruthless  rule  that  is  here  set  up,  making 
no  allowance  for  individual  likes  or  dislikes,  leaving 
no  opportunity  for  honest  personal  initiative.  The 
only  variations  and  modifications  possible  are  those 
resulting  from  favoritism,  political  influence,  and 
circumvention  of  the  laws  by  corruption  of  official 
and  other  illicit  methods. 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  what  we  are  consid- 
ering is  not  a  body  of  facts  relating  to  practical 
work  under  pressure  of  circumstance,  but  a  care- 
fully formulated  plan  giving  concrete  form  to  cer- 
tain aims  and  intentions.  It  is  not  a  record  of 
which  the  Bolsheviki  can  say,  "This  we  were  com- 
pelled to  do,"  but  a  prospectus  of  what  they  pro- 


390  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

pose  to  do.  As  such  the  Bolsheviki  have  caused 
the  wide-spread  distribution  of  this  remarkable  Code 
of  Labor  Laws  in  this  country  and  in  England, 
believing,  apparently,  that  the  workers  of  the  two 
countries  must  be  attracted  by  this  Communist 
Utopia.  They  have  relied  upon  the  potency  of 
slogans  and  principles  long  held  in  honor  by  the 
militant  and  progressive  portion  of  the  working- 
class  in  every  modern  nation,  such  as  the  right  to 
work  and  the  right  to  assured  living  income  and 
leisure,  to  win  approval  and  support.  But  they 
have  linked  these  things  which  enlightened  workers 
believe  in  to  a  system  of  despotism  abhorrent  to 
them.  After  two  full  years  of  terrible  experience 
the  Bolsheviki  propose,  in  the  name  of  Socialism 
and  freedom,  a  tyranny  which  goes  far  beyond  any- 
thing which  any  modern  nation  has  known. 

It  was  obvious  from  the  time  when  this  scheme 
was  first  promulgated  that  it  could  only  be  es- 
tablished by  strong  military  measures.  No  one  who 
knew  anything  of  Russia  could  believe  that  the 
great  mass  of  the  peasantry  would  willingly  ac- 
quiesce in  a  scheme  of  government  so  much  worse 
than  the  old  serfdom.  Nor  was  it  possible  to 
believe  that  the  organized  and  enlightened  workers 
of  the  cities  would,  as  a  whole,  willingly  and  freely 
place  themselves  in  such  bondage.  It  was  not  at 
all  surprising,  therefore,  to  learn  that  it  had  been 
decided  to  take  advantage  of  the  military  situation, 
and  the  existence  of  a  vast  organization  of  armed 
forces,  to  introduce  compulsory  labor  as  part  of 
the  military  system.  On  December  n,  1919,  The 
Red  Baltic  Fleet,  a  Bolshevist  paper  published  for 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  391 

the  sailors  of  the  Baltic  fleet,  printed  an  abstract 
of  Trotsky's  report  to  the  Seventh  Congress  of 
Soviets,  from  which  the  following  significant  para- 
graphs are  quoted: 

If  one  speaks  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  within  the 
next  months,  such  a  peace  cannot  be  called  a  permanent 
peace.  So  long  as  class  states  remain,  as  powerful  centers 
of  Imperialism  in  the  Far  East  and  in  America,  it  is  not 
impossible  that  the  peace  which  we  shall  perhaps  con- 
clude in  the  near  future  will  again  be  for  us  only  a  long 
and  prolonged  respite.  So  long  as  this  possibility  is 
not  excluded,  it  is  possible  that  it  will  be  a  matter  not 
of  disarming,  but  of  altering  the  form  of  the  armed  forces 
of  the  state. 

We  must  get  the  workmen  back  to  the  factories,  and 
the  peasants  to  the  villages,  re-establish  industries  and 
develop  agriculture.  Therefore,  the  troops  must  be 
brought  nearer  to  the  workers,  and  the  regiments  to 
the  factories,  villages,  and  cantons.  We  must  pass  to 
the  introduction  of  the  militia  system  of  armed  forces. 

There  is  a  scarcely  veiled  threat  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  in  Trotsky's  intimation  that  the  peace  they 
hope  to  conclude  will  perhaps  be  only  a  prolonged 
respite.  As  an  isolated  utterance,  it  might  perhaps 
be  disregarded,  but  it  must  be  considered  in  the 
light  of,  and  in  connection  with,  a  number  of  other 
utterances  upon  the  same  subject.  In  the  instruc- 
tions from  the  People's  Commissar  for  Labor  to  the 
propagandists  sent  to  create  sympathy  and  sup- 
port for  the  Labor  Army  scheme  among  the  soldiers 
we  find  this  striking  passage:  "The  country  must 
continue  to  remain  armed  for  many  years  to  come. 
Until   Socialist   revolution   triumphs   throughout   the 


392  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

world  we  must  continue  to  oe  armed  and  prepared  for 
eventualities"  A  Bolshevist  message,  dated  Mos- 
cow, March  II,  1920,  explains  that:  "The  utiliza- 
tion of  whole  Labor  Armies,  retaining  the  army 
system  of  organization,  may  only  be  justified  from 
the  point  of  view  of  keeping  the  army  intact  for 
military  purposes.  As  soon  as  the  necessity  for 
this  ceases  to  exist  the  need  to  retain  large  staffs 
and  administrations  will  also  cease  to  exist." 
There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  Bolsheviki 
contemplate  the  maintenance  of  a  great  army  to 
be  used  as  a  labor  force  until  the  time  arrives  when 
it  shall  seem  desirable  to  hurl  it  against  the  nations 
of  central  and  western  Europe  in  the  interests  of 
"world  revolution." 

On  January  15,  1920,  Lenin  and  Brichkina, 
president  and  secretary,  respectively,  of  the  Council 
of  Defense,  signed  and  issued  the  first  decree  for 
the  formation  of  a  Labor  Army.  The  text  of  the 
decree  follows: 

Decree  of  the  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Council  of 
Defense  on  the  First  Revolutionary  Labor  Army 

1.  The  Third  Workers'  and  Peasants'  Red  Army  is  to 
be  utilized  for  labor  purposes.  This  army  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  complete  organization;  its  apparatus  is 
neither  to  be  disorganized  nor  split  up,  and  it  is  to  be 
known  under  the  name  of  the  First  Revolutionary 
Labor  Army. 

2.  The  utilization  of  the  Third  Red  Army  for  labor 
purposes  is  a  temporary  measure.  The  period  is  to  be 
determined  by  a  special  regulation  of  the  Council  of 
Defense  in   accordance  with  the  military  situation   as 


IN  ALL   HISTORY"  393 

well  as  with  the  character  of  the  work  which  the  army 
will  be  able  to  carry  out,  and  will  especially  depend  on 
the  practical  productivity  of  the  labor  army. 

3.  The  following  are  the  principal  tasks  to  which  the 
forces  and  means  of  the  third  army  are  to  be  applied: 

First: 

{a)  The  preparation  of  food  and  forage  in  accordance 
with  the  regulation  of  the  People's  Commissariat  for 
Food,  and  the  concentration  of  these  in  certain  depots: 

(b)  The  preparation  of  wood  and  its  delivery  to 
factories  and  railway  stations; 

(c)  The  organization  for  this  purpose  of  land  trans- 
port as  well  as  water  transport; 

(d)  The  mobilization  of  necessary  labor  power  for 
work  on  a  national  scale; 

(e)  Constructive  work  within  the  above  limits  as 
well  as  on  a  wider  scale,  for  the  purpose  of  introducing, 
gradually,  further  works. 

Second: 

(/)    For  repair  of  agricultural  implements; 
(g)  Agricultural  work,  etc. 

4.  The  first  duty  of  the  Labor  Army  is  to  secure  pro- 
visions, not  below  the  Red  Army  ration,  for  the  local 
workers  in  those  regions  where  the  army  is  stationed; 
this  is  to  be  brought  about  by  means  of  the  army  organs 
of  supply  in  all  those  cases  where  the  President  of  the 
Food  Commissariat  of  the  Labor  Army  Council  (No.  7) 
will  find  that  no  other  means  of  securing  the  necessary 
provisions  for  the  above-mentioned  workers  are  to  be  had. 

5.  The  utilization  of  the  labor  of  the  third  army  in 
a  certain  locality  must  take  place  in  the  locality  in  which 
the  principal  part  of  the  army  is  stationed;  this  is  to  be 
determined  exactly  by  the  leading  organs  of  the  army 
(No.  6)  with  a  subsequent  confirmation  by  the  Council 
of  Defense. 

6.  The  Revolutionary  Council  of  the  Labor  Army 


394  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

is  the  organ  in  charge  of  work  appointed,  with  the  pro- 
vision that  the  locality  where  the  services  of  the  Labor 
Army  are  to  be  applied  is  to  be  the  same  locality  where 
the  services  of  the  Revolutionary  Council  of  the  Labor 
Army  enjoys  economic  authority. 

7.  The  Revolutionary  Council  of  the  Labor  Army 
is  to  be  composed  of  members  of  the  Revolutionary 
War  Council  and  of  authorized  representatives  of  the 
People's  Commissariat  for  Food,  the  Supreme  Council 
for  Public  Economy,  the  People's  Commissariat  for 
Agriculture,  the  People's  Commissariat  for  Communica- 
tion, and  the  People's  Commissariat  for  Labor. 

An  especially  authorized  Council  of  Defense  which  is 
to  enjoy  the  rights  of  presidency  of  the  Council  of  the 
Labor  Army  is  to  be  put  at  the  head  of  the  above 

Council. 

8.  All  the  questions  concerning  internal  military  or- 
ganizations and  defined  by  regulations  of  internal  mili- 
tary service  and  other  military  regulations  are  to  be 
finally  settled  upon  by  the  Revolutionary  War  Council 
which  introduces  in  the  internal  life  of  the  army  all  the 
necessary  changes  arising  in  consequence  of  the  demands 
of  the  economic  application  of  the  army. 

9.  In  every  sphere  of  work  (food,  fuel,  railway,  etc.) 
the  final  decision  in  the  matter  of  organizing  this  work 
is  to  be  left  with  the  representative  of  the  corresponding 
sphere  of  the  Labor  Army  Council. 

10.  In  the  event  of  radical  disagreement  the  case  is 
to  be  transferred  to  the  Council  of  Defense. 

11.  All  the  local  institutions,  Councils  of  Public 
Economy,  Food  Committees,  land  departments,  etc., 
are  to  carry  out  the  special  orders  and  instructions  of 
the  Labor  Army  Council  through  the  latter's  correspond- 
ing members  either  in  its  entirety  or  in  that  sphere  of  the 
work  which  is  demanded  by  the  application  of  the 
mass  labor  power. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  395 

12.  All  local  institutions  (councils  of  public  economy, 
food  committees,  etc.)  are  to  remain  in  their  particular 
localities  and  carry  out,  through  their  ordinary  appara- 
tus, the  work  which  falls  to  their  share  in  the  execution 
of  the  economic  plans  of  the  Labor  Army  Council; 
local  institutions  can  be  changed,  either  in  structure  or 
in  their  functions,  on  no  other  condition  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  corresponding  departmental  representa- 
tives who  are  members  of  the  Labor  Army  Council, 
or,  in  the  case  of  radical  changes,  with  the  consent  of  the 
corresponding  central  department. 

13.  In  the  case  of  work  for  which  individual  parts  of 
the  army  can  be  utilized  in  a  casual  manner,  as  well  as 
in  the  case  of  those  parts  of  the  army  which  are  stationed 
outside  the  chief  army,  or  which  can  be  transferred  be- 
yond the  limits  of  this  locality,  the  Army  Council  must 
in  each  instance  enter  into  an  agreement  with  the  per- 
manent local  institutions  carrying  out  the  corresponding 
work,  and  as  far  as  that  is  practical  and  meets  with  no 
obstacles,  the  separate  military  detachments  are  to  be 
transferred  to  their  temporary  economic  disposal. 

14.  Skilled  workers,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  indis- 
pensable for  the  support  of  the  life  of  the  army  itself, 
must  be  transferred  by  the  army  to  the  local  factories 
and  to  the  economic  institutions  generally  under  direc- 
tion of  the  corresponding  representatives  of  the  Labor 
Army  Council. 

Note:  Skilled  labor  can  be  sent  to  factories  under  no 
other  condition  except  with  the  consent  of  those  economic 
organs  to  which  the  factory  in  question  is  subject.  Mem- 
bers of  trades-unions  are  liable  to  be  withdrawn  from 
local  enterprises  for  the  economic  needs  in  connection 
with  the  problems  of  the  army  only  with  the  consent  of 
the  local  organs. 

15.  The  Labor  Army  Council  must,  through  its  cor- 
responding members,  take  all  the  necessary  measures 


396  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

toward  inducing  the  local  institutions  of  a  given  depart- 
ment to  control,  in  the  localities,  the  army  detachments 
and  their  institutions  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  latter's 
share  of  work  without  infringing  upon  the  respective 
by-laws,  regulations,  and  instructions  of  the  Soviet 
Republic. 

Note:  It  is  particularly  necessary  to  take  care  that 
the  general  state  rate  of  pay  is  to  be  observed  in  the  re- 
muneration of  peasants  for  the  delivery  of  food,  for  the 
preparation  of  wood  or  other  fuel. 

1 6.  The  Central  Statistical  Department  in  agree- 
ment with  the  Supreme  Council  for  Public  Economy 
and  the  War  Department  is  instructed  to  draw  up  an 
estimate  defining  the  forms  and  period  of  registration. 

17.  The  present  regulation  comes  into  force  with  the 
moment  of  its  publication  by  telegraph. 

President  of  the  Council  of  Defense, 

V.  Ulianov  (Lenin). 

S.   Brichkina,  Secretary. 
Moscow,  January  15,  1920. 

On  January  18,  .1920,  the  Krasnaya  Gazeta  pub- 
lished the  following  order  by  Trotsky  to  the  First 
Labor  Army: 

Order  to  the  First  Revolutionary  Labor  Army 

1.  The  First  Army  has  finished  its  war  task,  but  the 
enemy  is  not  completely  dispersed.  The  rapacious  im- 
perialists are  still  menacing  Siberia  in  the  extreme 
Orient.  To  the  East  the  armies  paid  by  the  Entente 
are  still  menacing  Soviet  Russia.  The  bands  of  the 
White  Guards  are  still  at  Archangel.  The  Caucasus  is 
not  yet  liberated.  For  this  reason  the  First  Russian 
Army  has  not  as  yet  been  diverted,  but  retains  its  in- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  397 

ternal  unity  and  its  warlike  ardor,  in  order  that  it  may 
be  ready  in  case  the  Socialist  Fatherland  should  once 
more  call  it  to  new  tasks. 

2.  The  First  Russian  Army,  which  is,  however,  de- 
sirous of  doing  its  duty,  does  not  wish  to  lose  any  time. 
During  the  coming  weeks  and  months  of  respite  it  will 
have  to  apply  its  strength  and  all  its  means  to  ameliorate 
the  agricultural  situation  in  this  country. 

3.  The  Revolutionary  War  Council  of  the  First 
Army  will  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Labor  Council. 
The  representatives  of  the  agricultural  institutions  of 
the  Red  Republic  of  the  Soviets  will  work  side  by  side 
with  the  members  of  the  Revolutionary  Council. 

4.  Food-supplies  are  indispensable  to  the  famished 
workmen  of  the  commercial  centers.  The  First  Labor 
Army  should  make  it  its  essential  task  to  gather  sys- 
tematically in  the  region  occupied  by  it  such  food- 
supplies  as  are  there,  as  well  as  also  to  make  an  exact 
listing  of  what  has  been  obtained,  to  rapidly  and  ener- 
getically forward  them  to  the  various  factories  and 
railway  stations,  and  load  them  upon  the  freight-cars. 

5.  Wood  is  needed  by  commerce.  It  is  the  important 
task  of  the  Revolutionary  Labor  Army  to  cut  and  saw 
the  wood,  and  to  transport  it  to  the  factories  and  to  the 
railway  stations. 

6.  Spring  is  coming;  this  is  the  season  of  agricultural 
work.  As  the  productive  force  of  our  factories  has  les- 
sened, the  number  of  new  farm  implements  which  can 
be  delivered  has  become  insufficient.  The  peasants 
have,  however,  a  tolerably  large  number  of  old  imple- 
ments which  are  in  need  of  repair.  The  Revolutionary 
Labor  Army  will  employ  its  workshops  as  well  as  its 
workmen  in  order  to  repair  such  tools  and  machinery 
as  are  needed.  When  the  season  arrives  for  work  in 
the  fields,  the  Red  cavalry  and  infantry  will  prove  that 
they  know  how  to  plow  the  earth. 

26 


398  "THE   GREATEST   FAILURE 

7.  All  members  of  the  army  should  enter  into  fra- 
ternal relations  with  the  professional  societies1  of  the 
local  Soviets,  remembering  that  such  organizations  are 
those  of  the  laboring  people.  All  work  should  be  done 
after  having  come  to  an  understanding  with  them. 

8.  Indefatigable  energy  should  be  shown  during  the 
work,  as  much  as  if  it  were  a  combat  or  a  fight. 

9.  The  necessary  efforts,  as  well  as  the  results  to 
be  obtained,  should  be  carefully  calculated.  Every 
pound  of  Soviet  bread,  and  every  log  of  national  wood 
should  be  tabulated.  Everything  should  contribute  to 
the  foundation  of  the  Socialist  activities. 

10.  The  Commandants  and  Commissars  should  be 
responsible  for  the  work  of  their  men  while  work  is 
going  on,  as  much  as  if  it  were  a  combat.  Discipline 
should  not  be  relaxed.  The  Communist  Societies  should 
during  the  work  be  models  of  perseverance  and  patience. 

11.  The  Revolutionary  Tribunals  should  punish  the 
lazy  and  parasites  and  the  thieves  of  national  property. 

12.  Conscientious  soldiers,  workmen,  and  revolu- 
tionary peasants  should  be  in  the  first  rank.  Their 
bravery  and  devotion  should  serve  as  an  example  to 
others  and  inspire  them  to  act  similarly. 

13.  The  front  should  be  contracted  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. Those  who  are  useless  should  be  sent  to  the  first 
ranks  of  the  workers. 

14.  Start  and  finish  your  work,  if  the  locality  permits 
it,  to  the  sound  of  revolutionary  hymns  and  songs. 
Your  task  is  not  the  work  of  a  laborer,  but  a  great  ser- 
vice rendered  the  Socialist  Fatherland. 

15.  Soldiers  of  the  Third  Army,  called  the  First 
Revolutionary  Army  of  Labor.  Let  your  example 
prove  a  great  one.  All  Russia  will  rise  to  your  call.  The 
Radio  has  already  spread  throughout  the  universe  all 
that  the  Third  Army  intends  in  being  transposed  into 

1  i.e.,  trades-unions. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  399 

the  First  Army  of  Labor.     Soldier  Workmen!     Do  not 
lower  the  red  standard! 

The  President  of  the  War  Council  of  the 
Revolutionary  Republic, 

[Signed]  Trotsky. 

There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  where  Lenin  and 
Trotsky  found  the  model  for  the  foregoing  orders 
and  the  inspiration  of  the  entire  scheme.  Almost 
exactly  a  century  earlier,  that  is  to  say  in  the  first 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Count  Arak- 
cheev,  a  favorite  of  Alexander  I,  introduced  into 
Russia  the  militarization  of  agricultural  labor. 
Peasant  conscripts  were  sent  to  the  "military  settle- 
ments," formed  into  battalions  under  command  of 
army  officers,  marched  in  proper  military  formation 
to  their  tasks,  which  they  performed  to  martial 
music.  The  arable  lands  were  divided  among  the 
owner-settlers  according  to  the  size  of  their  families. 
Tasks  were  arbitrarily  set  for  the  workers  by  the 
officers;  resignation  or  withdrawal  was,  of  course, 
impossible;  desertion  was  punished  with  great 
severity.  Elaborate  provisions  were  made  by  this 
monarchist  autocrat  for  the  housing  of  the  conscript- 
settlers,  for  medical  supervision,  and  for  the  educa- 
tion of  the  children.  Everything  seems  to  have 
been  provided  for  the  conscripts  in  these  settlements 
except  freedom. 

Travelers  gave  most  glowing  accounts  of  Arak- 
cheev's  Utopia,  just  as  later  travelers  did  of  the 
Russia  of  Nicholas  II,  and  as  the  Ransomes,  Goodes, 
Lansburys,  and  other  travelers  of  to-day  are  giving 
of  Bolshevist  Russia.     But  the  people  themselves 


400  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

were  discontented  and  unhappy,  a  fact  evidenced 
by  the  many  serious  uprisings.  Robbed  of  freedom, 
all  initiative  taken  from  them,  so  that  they  became 
abject  and  cowed  and  almost  devoid  of  will  power, 
like  dumb  beasts  yet  under  the  influence  of  des- 
perate and  daring  leaders,  they  rose  in  revolt 
again  and  again  with  brutal  fury.  Arakcheev's 
Utopia  was  not  intended  to  be  oppressive  or  un- 
just, we  may  well  believe.  There  are  evidences 
that  it  was  conceived  in  a  noble  and  even  gener- 
ous spirit.  It  inevitably  became  cruel  and  oppres- 
sive, however,  as  every  such  scheme  that  attempts 
to  disregard  the  variations  in  human  beings, 
and  to  compel  them  to  conform  to  a  single  pat- 
tern or  plan,  must  do.  At  a  meeting  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  in  Petrograd 
Trotsky  protested  that  only  the  "petty  bourgeois 
intellectuals"  could  liken  his  system  of  militarized 
labor  to  Arakcheev's,  but  the  facts  speak  for  them- 
selves. And  in  all  Russia's  tragic  history  there 
are  no  blacker  pages  than  those  which  record  her 
great  experiments  with  militarized  labor. 

Addressing  the  joint  meeting  of  the  third  Russian 
Congress  of  Soviets  of  National  Economy,  the 
Moscow  Soviet  of  Deputies  and  the  Administrative 
Boards  of  the  Trades-Unions,  on  January  25,  1920, 
Trotsky  made  a  report  which  required  more  than 
two  hours  for  its  delivery.  Defining  labor  con- 
scription, he  said: 

We  shall  succeed  if  qualified  and  trained  workers 
take  part  in  productive  labor.  They  must  all  be  regis- 
tered and  provided  with  work  registration  books.  Trades- 
unions  must  register  qualified  workmen  in  the  villages, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  401 

Only  in  those  localities  where  trades-union  methods  are 
inadequate  other  methods  must  be  introduced,  in  par- 
ticular that  of  compulsion,  because  labor  conscription 
gives  the  state  the  right  to  tell  the  qualified  workman 
who  is  employed  on  some  unimportant  work  in  his 
villages,  ''You  are  obliged  to  leave  your  present  em- 
ployment and  go  to  Sormova  or  Kolomna,  because 
there  your  work  is  required." 

Labor  conscription  means  that  qualified  workmen  who 
leave  the  army  must  take  their  work  registration  books 
and  proceed  to  places  where  they  are  required,  where 
their  presence  is  necessary  to  the  economic  system  of 
the  country.  Labor  conscription  gives  the  Labor  State 
the  right  to  order  a  workman  to  leave  the  village  industry 
in  which  he  is  engaged  and  to  work  in  state  enterprises 
which  require  his  services.  We  must  feed  these  workmen 
and  guarantee  them  the  minimum  food  ration.  A  short 
time  ago  we  were  confronted  by  the  problem  of  defend- 
ing the  frontiers  of  the  Soviet  Republic,  now  our  aim 
is  to  collect,  load,  and  transport  a  sufficient  quantity 
of  bread,  meat,  fats,  and  fish  to  feed  the  working-class. 
We  are  not  only  confronted  by  the  question  of  the  in- 
dustrial proletariat,  but  also  by  the  question  of  utilizing 
unskilled  labor. 

■  ••••«• 

There  is  still  one  way  to  the  reorganization  of  national 
economy — the  way  of  uniting  the  army  and  labor  and 
changing  the  military  detachments  of  the  army  into 
labor  detachments  of  a  labor  army.  Many  in  the  army 
have  already  accomplished  their  military  task,  but  they 
cannot  be  demobilized  as  yet.  Now  that  they  have 
been  released  from  their  military  duties,  they  must  fight 
against  economic  ruin  and  against  hunger;  they  must 
work  to  obtain  fuel,  peat,  and  inflammable  slate;  they 
must  take  part  in  building,  in  clearing  the  lines  of  snow, 
in  repairing  roads,  building  sheds,  grinding  flour,  and  so 


402  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

on.  We  have  already  got  several  of  these  armies.  These 
armies  have  already  been  allotted  their  tasks.  One  must 
obtain  foodstuffs  for  the  workmen  of  the  district  in  which 
it  was  formerly  stationed,  and  there  also  it  will  cut  down 
wood,  cart  it  to  the  railways,  and  repair  engines.  An- 
other will  help  in  the  laying  down  of  railway  lines  for 
the  transport  of  crude  oil.  A  third  will  be  used  for  re- 
pairing agricultural  implements  and  machines,  and  in 
the  spring  for  taking  part  in  working  the  land.  At  the 
present  time  among  the  working  masses  there  must  be 
the  greatest  exactitude  and  conscientiousness,  together 
with  responsibility  to  the  end;  there  must  be  utter  strict- 
ness and  severity,  both  in  small  matters  and  in  great.  If 
the  most  advanced  workmen  in  the  country  will  devote 
all  their  thoughts,  all  their  will,  and  all  their  revol- 
utionary duty  to  the  cause  of  regulating  economic 
affairs,  then  I  have  no  doubt  that  we  shall  lead  Russia 
on  a  new  free  road,  to  the  confounding  of  our  enemies 
and  the  joy  of  our  friends. 

Going  into  further  details  concerning  the  scheme, 
Trotsky  said,  according  to  Izvestia,  January  29, 
1920: 

Wherein  lies  the  meaning  of  this  transformation?  We 
possess  armies  which  have  accomplished  their  military 
tasks.  Can  we  demobilize  them?  In  no  case  whatever. 
If  we  have  learned  anything  in  the  civil  war  it  is  certainly 
circumspection.  While  keeping  the  army  under  arms, 
we  may  use  it  for  economic  purposes,  with  the  possibility 
of  sending  it  to  the  front  in  case  of  need. 

Such  is  the  present  condition  of  the  Third  Soviet 
Army  at  Ekaterinburg,  some  units  of  which  are  quar- 
tered in  the  direction  of  Omsk.  It  numbers  no  less  than 
1 50,000  men,  of  whom  7,000  are  Communists  and  0,000 
are  sympathizers.     Such  an  army  is  class-conscious  to  a 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  403 

high  degree.  No  wonder  it  has  offered  itself  for  employ- 
ment for  labor  purposes.  The  labor  army  must  perform 
definite  and  simple  tasks  requiring  the  application  of 
mass  force,  such  as  lumbering  operations,  peat-cutting, 
collecting  grain,  etc.  Trades-unions,  political  and  Soviet 
organizations  must,  of  course,  establish  the  closest  con- 
tact with  the  Labor  Army.  An  experienced  and  com- 
petent workman  is  appointed  as  chief  of  staff  of  this 
army,  and  a  former  chief  of  staff,  an  officer  of  the  general 
staff,  is  his  assistant.  The  Operative  Department  is 
renamed  the  Labor-Operative  Department,  and  controls 
requisitions  and  the  execution  of  the  labor-operative 
orders  and  the  labor  bulletins. 

A  great  number  of  labor  artels,  with  a  well-ordered 
telegraph  and  telephone  system,  is  thus  at  our  disposal. 
They  receive  orders  and  report  on  their  execution  the 
same  day.  This  is  but  the  beginning  of  our  work.  There 
will  be  many  drawbacks  at  first,  much  will  have  to  be 
altered,  but  the  basis  itself  cannot  be  unsound,  as  it 
is  the  same  on  which  our  entire  Soviet  structure  is 
founded. 

In  this  case  we  possess  several  thousand  Ural  workmen, 
who  are  placed  at  the  head  of  the  army,  and  a  mass  of 
men  under  the  guidance  of  these  advanced  workmen. 
What  is  it?  It  is  but  a  reflection  on  a  small  scale  of 
Soviet  Russia,  founded  upon  millions  upon  millions  of 
peasants,  and  the  guiding  apparatus  is  formed  of  more 
conscious  peasants  and  an  overwhelming  majority  of 
industrial  workers.  This  first  experiment  is  being  made 
by  the  other  armies  likewise.  It  is  intended  to  utilize 
the  Seventh  Army,  quartered  at  the  Esthonian  frontier, 
for  peat-cutting  and  slate-quarrying.  If  these  labor 
armies  are  capable  of  extracting  raw  materials,  of  giving 
new  life  to  our  transport,  of  providing  corn,  fuel,  etc., 
to  our  main  economic  centers,  then  our  economic  or- 
ganism will  revive. 


404  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

This  experiment  is  of  the  most  vital  moral  and  ma- 
terial importance.  We  cannot  mobilize  the  peasants  by 
means  of  trades-unions,  and  the  trades-unions  themselves 
do  not  possess  any  means  of  laying  hold  of  millions  of 
peasants.  They  can  best  be  mobilized  on  a  military 
footing.  Their  labor  formations  will  have  to  be  organ- 
ized on  a  military  model — labor  platoons,  labor  compa- 
nies, labor  battalions,  disciplined  as  required,  for  we  shall 
have  to  deal  with  masses  which  have  not  passed  through 
trades-union  trading.  This  is  a  matter  of  the  near  future. 
We  shall  be  compelled  to  create  military  organizations 
such  as  exist  already  in  the  form  of  our  armies.  It  is 
therefore  urgent  to  utilize  them  by  adapting  them  to 
economic  requirements.  That  is  exactly  what  we  are 
doing  now. 

At  the  ninth  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party  in 
March,  according  to  Izvestia  of  March  21,  1920, 
Trotsky  made  another  report  on  the  militarization 
of  labor,  in  which  he  said : 

At  the  present  time  the  militarization  of  labor  is  all 
the  more  needed  in  that  we  have  now  come  to  the  mo- 
bilization of  peasants  as  the  means  of  solving  the  prob- 
lems requiring  mass  action.  We  are  mobilizing  the 
peasants  and  forming  them  into  labor  detachments  which 
very  closely  resemble  military  detachments.  Some  of 
our  comrades  say,  however,  that  even  though  in  the  case 
of  the  working  power  of  mobilized  peasantry  it  is  nec- 
essary to  apply  militarization,  a  military  apparatus  need 
not  be  created  when  the  question  involves  skilled  labor 
and  industry  because  there  we  have  professional  unions 
performing  the  function  of  organizing  labor.  This 
opinion,  however,  is  erroneous. 

At  present  it  is  true  that  professional  unions  distribute 
labor  power  at  the  demand  of  social-economic  organiza- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  405 

tions,  but  what  means  and  methods  do  they  possess  for 
insuring  that  the  workman  who  is  sent  to  a  given  factory 
actually  reports  at  that  factory  for  work? 

We  have  in  the  most  important  branches  of  our  in- 
dustry more  than  a  million  workmen  on  the  lists,  but 
not  more  than  eight  hundred  thousand  of  them  are 
actually  working,  and  where  are  the  remainder?  They 
have  gone  to  the  villages,  or  to  other  divisions  of  indus- 
try, or  into  speculation.  Among  soldiers  this  is  called 
desertion,  and  in  one  form  or  another  the  measures 
used  to  compel  soldiers  to  do  their  duty  should  be  ap- 
plied in  the  field  of  labor. 

Under  a  unified  system  of  economy  the  masses  of  workmen 
should  be  moved  about,  ordered  and  sent  from  -place  to  place 
in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  soldiers.  This  is  the  founda- 
tion of  the  militarization  of  labor,  and  without  this  we 
are  unable  to  speak  seriously  of  any  organization  of  in- 
dustry on  a  new  basis  in  the  conditions  of  starvation  and 
disorganization  existing  to-day.  .  .  . 

In  the  period  of  transition  in  the  organization  of  labor, 
compulsion  plays  a  very  important  part.  The  statement 
that  free  labor — namely,  freely  employed  labor — produces 
more  than  labor  under  compulsion  is  correct  only  when 
applied  to  feudalistic  and  bourgeois  orders  of  society. 

It  is,  of  course,  too  soon  to  attempt  anything  in 
the  nature  of  a  final  judgment  upon  this  new  form 
of  industrial  serfdom.  In  his  report  to  the  ninth 
Congress  of  the  Communist  Party,  already  quoted, 
Trotsky  declared  that  the  belief  that  free  labor  is 
more  productive  than  forced  labor  is  "correct  only 
when  applied  to  feudalistic  and  bourgeois  orders  of 
society."  The  implication  is  that  it  will  be  other- 
wise in  the  Communistic  society  of  the  future, 
but  of  that  Trotsky  can  have  no  knowledge.     His 


406  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

declaration  springs  from  faith,  not  from  knowledge. 
All  that  he  or  anybody  else  can  know  is  that  the 
whole  history  of  mankind  hitherto  shows  that  free 
men  work  better  than  men  who  are  not  free. 
Arakcheev's  militarized  peasants  were  less  pro- 
ductive than  other  peasants  not  subject  to  military 
rule.  So  far  as  the  present  writer's  information 
goes,  no  modern  army  when  engaged  in  productive 
work  has  equaled  civilian  labor  in  similar  lines, 
judged  on  a  per-capita  basis.  Slaves,  convicts,  and 
conscripts  have  everywhere  been  notoriously  poor 
producers. 

Will  it  be  better  if  the  conscription  is  done  by  the 
Bolsheviki,  and  if  the  workers  sing  revolutionary 
songs,  instead  of  the  hymns  to  the  Czar  sung  by 
Arakcheev's  conscript  settlers,  or  the  religious 
melodies  sung  by  the  negro  slaves  in  our  Southern 
States  ?  Those  whose  only  guide  to  the  future  is  the 
history  of  the  past  will  doubt  it;  those  who,  like 
Trotsky,  see  in  the  past  no  lesson  for  the  future  con- 
fidently believe  that  it  will.  The  thoughtful  and 
candid  mind  wonders  whether  the  following  para- 
graph, published  by  the  Krasnaya  Gazeta  in  March, 
may  not  be  regarded  as  a  foreshadowing  of  Bolshe- 
vist disillusionment: 

The  attempts  of  the  Soviet  power  to  utilize  the  Labor 
Army  for  cleansing  Petrograd  from  mud,  excretions,  and 
rubbish  have  not  met  with  success.  In  addition  to  the 
usual  Labor  Army  rations,  the  men  were  given  an  in- 
creased allowance  of  bread,  tobacco,  etc.  Neverthe- 
less, it  was  found  impossible  to  get  not  only  any  intensive 
work,  but  even,  generally  speaking,  any  real  work  at 
all  out  of  the  Labor  Army  men.     Recourse,  therefore, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  407 

had  to  be  had  to  the  usual  means — the  men  had  to  be 
paid  a  premium  of  1,000  rubles  for  every  tramway-truck 
of  rubbish  unloaded.  Moreover,  the  tramway  brigade 
had  to  be  paid  300  rubles  for  every  third  trip. 

In  hundreds  of  statements  by  responsible  Bol- 
shevist officials  and  journals  the  wonderful  morale 
of  the  Petrograd  workers  has  been  extolled  and 
held  up  to  the  rest  of  Russia  for  emulation.  If 
these  things  are  possible  in  "Red  Peter"  at  the  be- 
ginning, what  may  we  not  expect  elsewhere — and 
later?  The  Novaya  Russkaya  Zhizn,  published  at 
Helsingfors,  is  an  anti-Bolshevist  paper.  The  fol- 
lowing quotation  from  its  issue  of  March  6,  1920, 
is  of  interest  and  value  only  in  so  far  as  it  directs 
attention  to  a  Bolshevist  official  report: 

In  the  Soviet  press  we  find  a  brilliant  illustration  (in 
figures)  of  the  latest  "new"  tactics  proclaimed  by  the 
Communists  of  the  Third  International  on  the  subject 
of  soldiers  "stacking  their  rifles  and  taking  to  axes, 
saws,  and  spades." 

"The  56th  Division  of  the  Petrograd  Labor  Army, 
during  the  fortnight  from  1st  to  14th  February,  loaded 
60  cars  with  wood-fuel,  transported  225  sagenes,1  stacked 
43  cubic  sagenes,  and  sawed  up  39  cubic  sagenes."  Be- 
sides this,  the  division  dug  out  "several  locomotives" 
from  under  the  snow. 

In  Soviet  Russia  a  regiment  is  about  1,000  strong, 
and  a  division  is  about  4,000.  In  the  course  of 
a  fortnight  the  division  worked  twelve  days.  Accord- 
ing to  our  calculation  this  works  out,  on  an  average, 
at  a  fraction  over  one  billet  of  wood  per  diem  per  Red 
Army  man  handled  by  him  in  one  way  or  another. 
xOne  sagcne  equals  seven  feet. 


408  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Thus  it  took  4,000  men  a  fortnight  to  do  what 
could,  in  former  days,  be  easily  performed  by  ten 
workmen. 

Unfortunately,  the  Bolsheviks  have  not  yet  calculated 
the  cost  to  the  Workmen's  and  Peasants'  Government 
of  the  wood-fuel  which  was  loaded,  transported,  stacked, 
and  sawn  up  by  the  56th  Division  of  the  Labor  Army 
in  the  course  of  a  fortnight. 

These  quotations  are  not  offered  as  proof  of  the 
uneconomical  character  of  compulsory  labor.  It 
is  useless  to  argue  that  question  further  than  we 
have  already  done.  But  there  is  a  question  of 
vastly  greater  importance  than  the  volume  of  pro- 
duction— namely,  the  effect  upon  the  human  ele- 
ments involved,  the  producers  themselves.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  this  universal  conscription  of  the 
laborers  cannot  be  carried  out  without  a  large 
measure  of  adscription  to  the  jobs  assigned  them, 
however  modified  in  individual  cases.  It  is  equally 
certain  that  under  the  conditions  described  by 
Lenin  and  Trotsky  in  the  official  utterances  we 
have  quoted,  nothing  worthy  the  name  of  personal 
freedom  can  by  any  possibility  exist.  The  condi- 
tion of  the  workers  under  such  a  system  cannot  be 
fundamentally  different  from  that  of  the  natives  of 
Paraguay  in  the  theocratic-communist  regime  es- 
tablished by  the  Jesuits  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
or  from  that  of  Arakcheev's  militarized  serfs. 
External  and  superficial  differences  there  may  be, 
but  none  of  fundamental  importance.  The  Bol- 
shevist regime  may  be  less  brutal  and  more  humane 
than  Arakcheev's,  but  so  was  the  Jesuit  rule  in 
Paraguay.     Yet  in  the  latter,  as  in  the  former,  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  409 

workers  were  reduced  to  the  condition  of  mere 
automatons  until,  led  by  daring  spirits,  they  rose 
in  terrible  revolt  of  unparalleled  brutality. 

Such  is  the  militarization  of  labor  in  the  Bol- 
shevist paradise,  and  such  is  the  light  that  history 
throws  upon  it.  We  do  not  wonder  that  Pravda 
had  to  admit,  on  March  28,  1920,  that  mass-meet- 
ings to  protest  against  the  new  system  were  being 
held  in  all  parts  of  Soviet  Russia.  That  the 
Russian  workers  will  submit  for  long  to  the  new 
tyranny  is,  happily,  unthinkable. 


410  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


XIV 

LET  THE  VERDICT  BE  RENDERED 

PHE  men  and  women  of  America  are  by  the 
•*■  force  of  circumstance  impaneled  as  a  jury  to 
judge  the  Bolshevist  regime.  The  evidence  sub- 
mitted in  these  pages  is  before  them.  It  is  no  mere 
chronicle  of  scandal;  neither  is  it  a  cunningly 
wrought  mosaic  of  rumors,  prejudiced  inferences, 
exaggerated  statements  by  hostile  witnesses,  sensa- 
tional incidents  and  utterances,  selected  because 
they  are  calculated  to  provoke  resentment.  On  the 
contrary,  the  most  scrupulous  care  has  been  taken 
to  confine  the  case  to  the  well-established  and  ac- 
knowledged characteristic  features  of  the  Bolshevist 
regime.  The  bulk  of  the  evidence  cited  comes  from 
Bolshevist  sources  of  the  highest  possible  authority 
and  responsibility.  The  non-Bolshevist  witnesses 
are,  without  exception,  men  of  high  character, 
identified  with  the  international  Socialist  movement. 
There  is  not  a  reactionist  or  an  apologist  for  the 
capitalist  order  of  society  among  them.  In  each 
case  special  attention  has  been  directed  to  their 
anti-Bolshevist  views,  so  that  the  jury  can  make 
full  allowance  therefor.  Moreover,  in  no  instance 
has  the  testimony  of  witnesses  of  anti-Bolshevist 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  411 

views  been  cited  without  ample  corroborative  evi- 
dence from  responsible  and  authoritative  Bolshe- 
vist sources.  The  jury  must  now  pass  upon  this 
evidence  and  render  its  verdict. 

It  is  urged  by  the  Bolsheviki  and  by  their  de- 
fenders that  the  time  for  passing  judgment  has  not 
yet  arrived;  that  we  are  not  yet  in  possession  of 
sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  a  decision.  Neither 
the  Bolsheviki  nor  their  defenders  have  the  right 
to  make  this  plea,  for  the  simple  reason  that  they 
themselves  have  long  since  demanded  that,  with 
less  than  a  thousandth  part  of  the  testimony  now 
before  us,  we  pass  judgment — and,  of  course,  give 
our  unqualified  approval  to  Bolshevism  and  its 
works.  It  is  a  matter  of  record  and  of  common 
knowledge  that  soon  after  the  Bolshevist  regime 
was  instituted  in  Russia  a  vigorous,  systematic 
propaganda  in  its  favor  and  support  was  begun 
in  all  the  western  nations,  including  the  United 
States.  By  voice  and  pen  the  makers  of  this 
propaganda  called  upon  the  people  of  the  western 
nations  to  adopt  Bolshevism.  They  presented 
glowing  pictures  of  the  Bolshevist  Utopia,  depicting 
it,  not  as  an  experiment  of  uncertain  outcome,  to 
be  watched  with  sympathetic  interest,  but  as  an 
achievement  so  great,  so  successful  and  beneficent, 
that  to  refrain  from  copying  it  was  both  stupid  and 
wrong.  In  this  country,  as  in  the  other  western 
nations,  pamphlets  extolling  the  merits  of  the 
Soviet  regime  were  extensively  circulated  by  well- 
organized  groups,  while  certain  "Liberal"  weeklies 
devoted  themselves  to  the  task  of  presenting 
Bolshevism   as   a   great   advance  in   political   and 


412  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

economic  practice,  a  triumph  of  humanitarian 
idealism.  Organizations  were  formed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  molding  our  public  opinion  in  favor  of 
Bolshevism. 

It  was  not  until  this  pro-Bolshevist  propaganda 
was  well  under  way  that  anything  in  the  nature  of 
a  counter-propaganda  was  begun.  For  a  consid- 
erable period  of  time  this  counter-propaganda  in  de- 
fense of  existing  democratic  forms  of  government 
was  relatively  weak,  and  even  now  it  has  to  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  pro-Bolshevist  books  and  pamphlets 
in  circulation  in  this  country  greatly  outnumber 
those  on  the  other  side.  In  view  of  these  facts,  the 
defenders  of  Bolshevism  have  no  moral  right  to 
demand  suspension  of  judgment  now.  They  them- 
selves rushed  to  the  bar  of  public  opinion  with  a 
flimsy  case,  composed  in  its  entirety  of  ex  parte  and 
misleading  statements  by  interested  witnesses,  many 
of  them  perjured,  and  demanded  an  instant  verdict 
of  approval.  Upon  what  intellectual  or  moral 
grounds,  then,  shall  others  be  denied  the  right  to 
appear  before  that  same  court  of  public  opinion, 
with  a  much  more  complete  case,  composed  mainly 
of  unchallenged  admissions  and  records  of  the 
Bolsheviki  themselves,  and  to  ask  for  a  contrary 
verdict  ? 

There  is  not  the  slightest  merit  in  the  claim 
that  we  do  not  possess  sufficient  evidence  to  war- 
rant a  conclusive  verdict  in  the  case.  Whether 
the  Soviet  form  of  government,  basing  suffrage  upon 
occupation  and  economic  functioning,  is  better 
adapted  for  Russia  than  the  types  of  representative 
parliamentary  government   familiar  to   us   in   the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  413 

western  nations,  does  not  enter  into  the  case  at 
all.  The  issue  is  not  Sovietism,  but  Bolshevism. 
It  is  the  tragic  failure  of  Bolshevism  with  which 
we  are  concerned.  It  has  failed  to  give  the  people 
freedom  and  failed  to  give  them  bread.  We  know 
that  there  is  no  freedom  in  Russia,  and,  what  is 
more,  that  freedom  can  never  be  had  upon  the  basis 
of  the  Bolshevist  philosophy.  Whether  in  Russia 
or  in  this  country,  government  must  rest  upon  the 
consent  of  the  governed  in  order  to  merit  the 
designation  of  free  government;  upon  any  other 
basis  it  must  be  tyrannical.  It  is  as  certain  now 
as  it  will  be  a  generation  or  a  century  hence,  as 
certain  as  that  yesterday  belongs  to  the  past  and 
is  irrevocable,  that  Bolshevism  is  government  by  a 
minority  imposed  upon  the  majority  by  force; 
that  its  sanctions  are  not  the  free  choice  and  consent 
of  the  governed. 

We  know  as  much  now  as  our  descendants  will 
know  a  couple  of  centuries  hence  concerning  the 
great  fundamental  issues  involved  in  this  con- 
troversy. More  than  seven  centuries  have  elapsed 
since  the  signing  of  Magna  Charta  at  Runnimede. 
Upon  every  page  of  the  history  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
people,  from  that  day  in  June,  121 5,  to  the  present, 
it  is  plainly  written  that  government  which  does 
not  rest  upon  the  consent  of  the  governed  cannot 
satisfy  free  men.  Throughout  that  long  period  the 
moral  and  intellectual  energy  of  the  race  has  been 
devoted  to  the  attainment  of  the  ideal  of  universal 
and  equal  suffrage  as  the  basis  of  free  government. 
There  are  many  persons  who  do  not  believe  in  that 

ideal,  and  it  is  possible  to  bring  against  it  arguments 

27 


414  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

which  do  not  lack  plausibility  or  force.  Czar 
Nicholas  II  did  not  believe  in  that  ideal;  George 
III  did  not  believe  in  it;  Nicolai  Lenin  does  not 
believe  in  it.  Lincoln  did  believe  in  it;  Marx 
believed  in  it;  the  American  people  believe  in  it. 
At  this  late  day  it  is  not  necessary  to  argue  the 
merits  of  democratic  government.  The  consensus 
of  the  opinion  of  mankind,  based  upon  long  experi- 
ence, favors  government  resting  upon  the  will  of  the 
majority,  with  proper  safeguards  for  the  rights  of 
the  minority,  as  against  government  by  minorities 
however  constituted.  Bolshevism,  admittedly  based 
upon  the  theory  of  rule  by  a  minority  of  the  people, 
thus  runs  counter  to  the  experience  and  judgment 
of  civilized  mankind  in  every  nation.  In  Russia  a 
democratic  government  conforming  to  the  experi- 
ence and  judgment  of  civilized  and  free  peoples 
was  being  set  up  when  the  Bolsheviki  by  violence 
destroyed  the  attempt. 

More  conclusive,  however,  is  the  moral  judgment 
of  the  conduct  of  the  Bolsheviki  as  exemplified  by 
their  attitude  toward  the  Constituent  Assembly: 
During  the  summer  of  1917,  the  period  immediately 
preceding  the  coup  d'etat  of  November,  while  the 
Provisional  Government  under  Kerensky  was  en- 
gaged in  making  preparations  for  the  holding  of 
the  Constituent  Assembly,  the  Bolsheviki  pro- 
fessed to  believe  that  the  Provisional  Government 
was  not  loyal  to  the  Constituent  Assembly,  and 
that  there  was  danger  that  this  instrument  of 
popular  sovereignty  would  be  crippled,  if  not 
wholly  destroyed,  unless  Kerensky  and  his  asso- 
ciates were   replaced   by   men   and   women   more 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  415 

thoroughly  devoted  to  the  Constituent  Assembly 
than  they.  It  was  as  champions  and  defenders  of 
the  Constituent  Assembly  that  the  Bolsheviki  ob- 
tained the  power  which  enabled  them  to  overthrow 
the  Provisional  Government.  As  late  as  October 
25th  Trotsky  denounced  Kerensky,  charging  him 
with  conspiring  to  prevent  the  convocation  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly.  He  demanded  that  the 
powers  of  government  be  taken  over  by  the  Soviets, 
which  would,  he  said,  convoke  the  Assembly  on 
December  12th,  the  date  assigned  for  it.  Imme- 
diately after  the  coup  d'etat,  the  triumphant  Bol- 
sheviki, •  at  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets, 
announced  that  "pending  the  calling  together  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  a  Provisional  Workers'  and 
Peasants'  Government  is  to  be  formed,  which  is  to 
be  called  the  Council  of  People's  Commissaries." 
On  the  day  following  the  coup  d'etat,  November  8, 
1917,  Lenin  made  this  very  positive  and  explicit 
statement  at  the  Soviet  Congress: 

As  a  democratic  government,  we  cannot  disregard  the 
will  of  the  masses,  even  though  we  disagree  with  it. 
In  the  fires  of  life,  applying  the  decree  in  practice, 
carrying  it  out  on  the  spot,  the  peasants  will  themselves 
understand  where  the  truth  is.  And  even  if  the  peasants 
will  continue  to  follow  the  Socialists-Revolutionists,  and 
even  if  they  will  return  a  majority  for  that  Party  in  the 
elections  to  the  Constituent  Assembly,  we  shall  still  say — 
let  it  be  thus!  Life  is  the  best  teacher,  and  it  will  show 
who  was  right.  And  let  the  peasants  from  their  end, 
and  us  from  ours,  solve  this  problem.  Life  will  compel 
us  to  approach  each  other  in  the  general  current  of 
revolutionary  activity,  in  the  working  out  of  new  forms 


416  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

of  statehood.  We  should  keep  abreast  of  life;  we  must 
allow  the  masses  of  the  people  full  freedom  of  crea- 
tiveness. 

On  that  same  day  the  "land  decree"  was  issued. 
It  began  with  these  words:  "The  land  problem  in 
its  entirety  can  be  solved  only  by  the  national 
Constituent  Assembly."  Three  days  after  the  re- 
volt Lenin,  as  president  of  the  People's  Commis- 
saries, published  a  decree,  stating: 

1.  That  the  elections  to  the  Constituent  Assembly 
shall  be  held  on  November  25th,  the  day  we  .set  aside 
for  this  purpose. 

2.  All  electoral  committees,  all  local  organizations, 
the  Councils  of  Workmen's,  Soldiers',  and  Peasants' 
Delegates  and  the  soldiers'  organizations  at  the  front 
are  to  bend  every  effort  toward  safeguarding  the  freedom 
of  the  voters  and  fair  play  at  the  elections  to  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  which  will  be  held  on  the  appointed 
date. 

If  language  has  any  meaning  at  all,  by  these 
declarations  the  Bolsheviki  were  pledged  to  recog- 
nize and  uphold  the  Constituent  Assembly. 

As  the  electoral  campaign  proceeded  and  it  be- 
came evident  that  the  Bolsheviki  would  not  re- 
ceive the  support  of  the  great  mass  of  the  voters, 
their  organs  began  to  adopt  a  very  critical  atti- 
tude toward  the  Constituent  Assembly.  There 
was  a  thinly  veiled  menace  in  the  following  pas- 
sages from  an  article  published  in  Pravda  on  No- 
vember 18,  1 91 7,  while  the  electoral  campaign  was 
in  full  swing: 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  417 

To  expect  from  the  Constituent  Assembly  a  painless  solu- 
tion of  all  our  accursed  problems  not  only  savors  of  par- 
liamentary imbecility,  but  is  also  dangerous  politically.  .  .  . 
The  victory  of  the  Petrograd  proletariat  and  garrison 
in  the  November  revolution  furnishes  the  only  possible 
guaranty  of  the  convocation  of  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
and,  what  is  not  less  important,  assures  success  to  such 
a  solution  of  our  political  and  social  problems  which  the 
War  and  the  Revolution  have  made  the  order  of  the 
day.  The  convocation  of  the  Constituent  Assembly 
stands  or  falls  with  the  Soviet  power. 

The  elections  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  were 
held  in  a  large  majority  of  electoral  districts  on  the 
12th,  19th,  and  26th  of  November,  1917 — that  is, 
after  the  coup  d'etat,  in  the  full  tide  of  Bolshevist 
enthusiasm.  The  Bolsheviki  were  in  power,  and 
there  is  abundant  evidence  that  they  resorted  to 
almost  every  known  method  of  coercion  and  intimi- 
dation to  secure  a  result  favorable  to  themselves. 
Of  703  deputies  elected  in  54  out  of  a  total  of  81 
election  districts,  only  168  belonged  to  the  Bol- 
shevist Party.  At  the  same  time  the  Party  of 
Socialists-Revolutionists  proper,  not  reckoning  the 
organizations  of  the  same  party  among  other 
nationalities  of  Russia,  won  twice  that  number  of 
seats — namely,  338.  Out  of  a  total  of  36,257,960 
votes  cast  in  54  election  districts  the  Bolshevist 
Party  counted  barely  25  per  cent.  The  votes  cast 
for  their  candidates  amounted  to  9,023,963,  whereas 
the  Socialists-Revolutionists  polled  20,893,734 — 
that  is,  58  per  cent,  of  all  the  votes  cast. 

When  the  election  results  were  known  Pravda 
and  Izvestia  both  took  the  position  that  the  vie- 


418  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

torious  people  did  not  need  a  Constituent  Assembly; 
that  a  new  instrument,  greatly  superior  to  the  old 
and  "obsolete"  democratic  instrument,  had  been 
created.  On  December  I,  1917,  Pravda  said:  "If 
the  lines  of  action  of  the  Soviets  and  the  Constituent 
Assembly  should  diverge,  if  there  should  arise  be- 
tween them  any  disagreements,  the  question  will 
arise  as  to  who  expresses  better  the  will  of  the 
masses.  We  think  it  is  the  Soviets  who  through  their 
peculiar  organization  express  more  clearly,  more  cor- 
rectly, and  more  definitely  the  will  of  the  workers, 
soldiers,  and  peasants.  .  .  .  This  is  why  the  Soviets 
will  have  to  propose  to  the  Constituent  Assembly 
to  adopt  as  the  constitution  of  the  Russian  Republic, 
not  that  political  system  which  forms  the  basis  of 
its  convocation  (i.e.,  Democracy),  but  the  Soviet 
system,  the  constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Workers', 
soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Soviets."  On  December  7, 
1917,  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Soviet  power 
published  a  resolution  which  indicated  that  this 
self-constituted  authority,  despite  the  most  solemn 
pledges,  was  already  tampering  with  the  newly 
elected  Constituent  Assembly.  The  resolution  as- 
serted that  the  Soviet  power  had  the  right  to  issue 
writs  for  new  elections  where  a  majority  of  the 
voters  expressed  themselves  as  dissatisfied  with  the 
result  of  the  elections  already  held.  In  other 
words,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  elections 
for  the  Constituent  Assembly  had  been  held  in 
November,  while  the  Bolsheviki  were  in  power, 
and  the  first  meeting  of  that  body  was  scheduled 
for  December  12th,  new  elections  might  be  ordered 
by  the  Soviet  power  in  response  to  a  request  from 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  419 

the  majority  of  the  electorate.  That  the  elections 
had  gone  so  overwhelmingly  against  the  Bolsheviki, 
most  of  their  candidates  being  badly  defeated, 
throws  a  sinister  light  upon  this  decision.  Pravda 
demanded  that  the  leading  members  of  the  Con- 
stitutional-Democratic Party  be  arrested,  including 
those  elected  to  the  Constituent  Assembly,  and  on 
December  13,  1917,  it  published  this  decree  of  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissaries:  "The  leading 
members  of  the  Constitutional-Democratic  Party, 
as  a  party  of  enemies  of  the  people,  are  to  be  ar- 
rested and  brought  to  trial  before  the  Revolutionary 
Tribunals." 

On  December  26,  1917,  Lenin  published  in 
Pravda  a  series  of  nineteen  "theses"  concerning  the 
Constituent  Assembly.  He  therein  set  forth  the 
doctrine  that  although  the  elections  had  taken 
place  after  the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat,  and  under  the 
authority  and  protection  of  the  temporary  Soviet 
power,  yet  the  elections  gave  no  clear  indication  of 
the  real  mind  of  the  masses  of  the  people,  because, 
forsooth,  the  Socialists-Revolutionists  Party,  whose 
candidates  had  been  elected  in  a  majority  of  the 
constituencies,  had  divided  into  a  Right  Wing  and 
a  Left  Wing  subsequent  to  the  elections.  That  the 
differences  between  these  factions  would  be  fully 
threshed  out  in  the  Constituent  Assembly  was 
obvious.  Nevertheless,  Lenin  announced  that  the 
Constituent  Assembly  just  elected  was  not  suitable. 
Again  we  are  compelled  to  connect  this  announce- 
ment with  the  fact  that  the  Bolsheviki  had  not 
succeeded  in  winning  the  support  of  the  electorate. 
In  these  tortuous   logomachies  we   encounter  the 


420  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

same  immoral  doctrine  that  we  have  noticed  in 
Lenin's  discussion  of  the  demand  for  freedom  of 
speech,  publication,  and  assemblage.  The  demand 
for  the  convocation  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  had 
been  "an  entirely  just  one  in  the  program  of 
revolutionary  Social-Democracy"  in  the  past,  but 
now  with  the  Bolsheviki  in  power  it  was  a  different 
matter!  Whereas  the  Soviets  had  been  declared 
to  be  the  loyal  protectors  of  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly, Lenin's  new  declaration  was,  "The  Soviet 
Republic  represents  not  only  a  higher  form  of 
democratic  institutions  (in  comparison  with  the 
middle-class  republic  and  the  Constituent  Assembly 
as  its  consummation),  it  is  also  the  sole  form  which 
renders  possible  the  least  painful  transition  to 
Socialism." 

When  the  Constituent  Assembly  finally  convened 
on  January  18,  191 8,  there  were  sailors  and  Lettish 
troops  in  the  hall  armed  with  rifles,  hand-grenades, 
and  machine-guns,  placed  there  to  intimidate  the 
elected  representatives  of  the  people.  The  Bol- 
shevist delegates  demanded  the  adoption  of  a 
declaration  by  the  Assembly  which  was  tantamount 
to  a  formal  abdication.  One  of  the  paragraphs  in 
this  declaration  read:  "Supporting  the  Soviet 
rule  and  accepting  the  orders  of  the  Council  of  People's 
Commissaries,  the  Constituent  Assembly  acknowl- 
edges its  duty  to  outline  a  form  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  society."  When  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
which  represented  more  than  thirty-six  million 
votes,  declined  to  adopt  this  declaration,  the  Bol- 
sheviki withdrew  and  later,  by  force  of  arms,  dis- 
persed the  Assembly.     It  was  subsequently  prom- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  421 

ised  that  arrangements  for  the  election  of  a  new 
Constituent  Assembly  would  be  made,  but,  as  all 
the  world  knows,  no  such  elections  have  been  held  to 
this  time. 

At  the  Congress  of  the  Bolshevist  Party — now 
Communist  Party — held  in  February,  191 8,  Lenin 
set  forth  a  brand-new  set  of  principles  for  adoption 
as  a  program.  He  declared  that  the  transition  to 
Socialism  necessarily  presupposes  that  there  can 
be  ''no  liberty  and  democracy  for  all,  but  only  for 
the  exploited  working-classes,  for  the  sake  of  their 
liberation  from  exploitation";  that  it  requires  "the 
automatic  exclusion  of  the  exploiting  classes,  and 
of  the  rich  representatives  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie" 
and  "the  abolition  of  parliamentary  government." 
On  the  basis  of  these  principles  the  Constitution  of 
the  Russian  Socialist  Federated  Soviet  Republic 
was  developed. 

To  say  that  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  judge 
such  a  record  as  this  is  an  insult  to  the  intelligence. 
A  century  hence  the  record  will  stand  precisely  as 
it  is  and  the  base  treachery  and  duplicity  of  the 
Bolsheviki  will  be  neither  more  nor  less  obvious. 
The  betrayal  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  by  the 
Bolsheviki  constitutes  one  of  the  blackest  crimes 
in  the  history  of  politics  and  is  incapable  of  defense 
by  any  honest  democrat.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
imagine  a  constitutional  convention  representing 
the  free  choice  of  the  electorate  in  any  state  of  the 
Union  thus  dealt  with  by  a  political  faction  repre- 
senting only  a  small  minority  of  the  population  to 
arrive  at  a  just  estimate  of  its  infamous  character. 
As   the   evidence   drawn    from    official    Bolshevist 


422  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

sources  shows,  the  Bolsheviki  have  not  respected 
the  integrity  of  the  Soviet  any  more  than  they 
respected  that  of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  When 
Soviet  elections  have  gone  against  them  they  have 
not  hesitated  to  suppress  the  Soviets.  Is  there  any 
room  for  rational  doubt  what  the  verdict  of  decent 
liberty-loving  and  law-respecting  men  and  women 
ought  to  be?  The  Bolshevist  regime  was  conceived 
in  dishonor  and  born  in  infamy. 

We  are  as  fully  competent  to  judge  the  Red 
Terror  organized  and  maintained  by  the  Bolsheviki 
as  our  descendants  will  be.  The  civilized  world 
has  long  since  made  up  its  mind  concerning  the 
Reign  of  Terror  in  the  French  Revolution.  Con- 
temporary foreign  opinion  became  the  judgment  of 
posterity.  That  it  did  not  help  the  cause  of  free- 
dom and  democracy,  which  the  Revolution  as  a 
whole  served,  is  so  plainly  apparent  and  so  uni- 
versally admitted  that  it  need  not  be  argued.  It 
rendered  aid  only  to  the  reaction.  When  the 
leaders  of  the  Bolsheviki  proclaimed  their  intention 
of  copying  the  methods  of  the  Reign  of  Terror  it  was 
already  possible  to  form  a  just  judgment  of  the  spirit 
of  their  undertaking.  The  civilized  world  had  no 
difficulty  in  judging  the  conduct  of  the  Germans  in 
shooting  innocent  hostages  during  the  war.  Neither 
has  it  any  difficulty  in  making  up  its  mind  concern- 
ing the  wholesale  shooting  of  innocent  hostages  by 
the  Bolsheviki.  From  their  own  records  we  have 
read  their  admissions  that  hundreds  and  thousands 
of  such  hostages — men,  women,  and  children — who 
were  not  even  accused  of  crime,  were  shot  down  in 
cold  blood.     To  say  that  we  lack  sufficient  evidence 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  423 

to  pronounce  judgment  upon  such  crimes  is  tanta- 
mount to  a  confession  of  lacking  elemental  moral 
sense. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  these  things  are  but  the 
violent  birth  pangs  which  inevitably  accompany 
the  birth  of  a  new  social  order.  With  such  flimsy 
evasions  it  is  difficult  to  have  patience.  This 
specious  defense  utterly  lacks  moral  and  intellectual 
sincerity.  It  is  a  craven  coward's  plea.  If  we  are 
to  use  the  facts  and  the  language  of  obstetrics  to 
illustrate  the  great  Russian  tragedy,  at  least  let 
us  be  honest  and  use  them  with  some  regard  to  the 
essential  realities.  In  terms  of  obstetrics,  Russia 
in  1917  was  like  unto  a  woman  in  the  agony  of  her 
travail.  From  March  onward  she  labored  to  give 
birth  to  her  child,  the  long-desired  democratic 
freedom.  She  was  carefully  watched  and  tenderly 
cared  for  by  the  accoucheur,  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. At  the  critical  moment  of  her  delivery  a 
ruthless  brute  drove  the  accoucheur  away  from  her 
side,  brutally  maltreated  her,  strangled  her  newly 
born  infant,  and  in  its  place  substituted  a  hideous 
monstrosity.  That  is  the  only  true  application  of 
the  obstetrical  simile  to  the  realities  of  the  Russian 
tragedy.  The  sufferings  of  Russia  under  the  Bol- 
sheviki  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  natural  birth 
pains  of  the  Russian  Revolution.  Nobody  ever 
expected  the  Russian  Revolution  to  be  accomplished 
without  suffering  and  hardship;  revolutions  do  not 
come  that  way.  For  all  the  natural  and  necessary 
pains  of  such  a  profound  event  as  the  birth  of  a 
new  social  order  every  friend  of  Russian  freedom 
was  prepared.     What  was  not  foreseen  or  antici- 


424  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

pated  by  anybody  was  that  when  the  agony  of 
parturition  was  practically  at  an  end,  and  the  birth 
of  the  new  order  an  accomplished  fact,  such  a  brutal 
assault  would  be  made  upon  the  maternal  body  of 
Russia.  It  is  upon  this  crime,  infamous  beyond 
infamy,  that  the  great  jury  of  civilized  public 
opinion  is  asked  to  pronounce  its  condemnation. 

There  is  absolutely  no  justification  for  the  view 
that  the  evils  of  the  Bolshevist  regime,  and  espe- 
cially its  terroristic  features,  should  be  regarded  as 
the  inevitable  incidental  evil  accompaniments  of  a 
great  beneficent  process.  Neither  is  any  useful 
purpose  served  by  dragging  in  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. The  champions  of  Bolshevism  cite  that  great 
event  and  assert  that  everybody  now  acknowledges 
that  it  was  a  great  liberating  force,  a  notable  ad- 
vance in  the  evolution  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
and  that  nobody  now  condemns  it  on  account  of  the 
Reign  of  Terror. 

This  argument  is  the  result  of  a  lamentable  mis- 
reading of  history,  where  it  is  not  a  deliberate  and 
carefully  studied  deception.  No  honest  parallel 
can  be  drawn  between  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  Bolshevist  Counter-Revolution.  That  there 
are  certain  similarities  between  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  eighteenth-century  France  and  that 
of  twentieth-century  Russia  is  fairly  obvious.  In 
both  cases  the  revolutions  were  directed  against 
corrupt,  inefficient,  and  oppressive  monarchical  ab- 
solutism. In  France  in  1789  the  peasantry  formed 
about  75  per  cent,  of  the  population,  the  bourgeoisie 
about  20  per  cent.,  the  proletariat  about  3  per  cent., 
and  the  "privileged"  class  about  1  per  cent.     In 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  425 

Russia  in  1917  the  peasantry  amounted  to  some- 
thing over  85  per  cent,  of  the  population,  the 
bourgeoisie — the  merchants,  manufacturers,  trades- 
men, and  investors — to  about  9  per  cent.,  the  pro- 
letariat to  about  3  per  cent.,  and  the  nobility  and 
clergy  to  1  per  cent.  Both  in  France  and  in  Russia 
the  peasantry  was  identified  with  the  struggle 
against  monarchical  absolutism,  being  motivated 
by  great  agrarian  demands. 

Moreover,  the  similarities  extend  to  the  moral 
and  psychological  factors  involved.  In  the  French 
Revolution,  precisely  as  in  the  Russian,  we  see  a 
great  mass  of  illiterate  peasants  led  by  a  few 
intellectuals,  abstract  thinkers  wholly  without 
practical  experience  in  government  or  economic 
organization.  In  both  cases  we  find  a  naive 
Utopianism,  a  conviction  that  a  sudden  transforma- 
tion of  the  whole  social  order  could  be  easily 
effected.  What  the  shibboleths  of  Karl  Marx  are 
to  the  Bolsheviki  the  shibboleths  of  Rousseau  were 
to  many  of  the  leaders  of  the  French  Revolution. 
And  just  as  in  1789  there  was  a  pathetic  dependence 
upon  anarchie  spontanee,  a  conviction,  wholly  non- 
rational  and  exclusively  mystical,  that  in  the  chaos 
and  disorder  creative  powers  latent  in  the  masses 
would  be  discovered — itself  an  evidence  of  the 
purely  abstract  character  of  their  thinking — so  it 
was  in  Russia  in  1917.  The  revolution  which  over- 
threw the  absolutism  of  Nicholas  II  of  Russia 
repeated  many  of  the  characteristic  features  of  that 
which  overthrew  the  absolutism  of  Louis  XVI  of 
France. 

Yet  the  true  parallel  to  the  French  Revolution 


426  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

is  not  the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat,  but  the  Revolution 
of  March,  1917.  It  was  not  the  Bolshevist  revo- 
lution that  overturned  the  throne  of  the  Romanovs 
and  destroyed  czarism.  That  was  done  by  the 
March  Revolution.  Whereas  the  French  Revolu- 
tion was  a  revolution  against  a  corrupt  and  oppres- 
sive monarchy,  the  Bolshevist  revolt  was  a  counter- 
revolution against  democracy.  The  Bolsheviki  had 
played  only  a  very  insignificant  part  in  the  revo- 
lution against  czarism.  They  rose  against  the 
Provisional  Government  of  the  triumphant  people. 
This  Provisional  Government  represented  the  forces 
that  had  overthrown  czarism;  it  was  not  a  reac- 
tionary body  of  aristocrats  and  monarchists,  but  was 
mainly  composed  of  Socialists  and  radicals  and  was 
thoroughly  devoted  to  republicanism  and  democ- 
racy. It  had  immediately  adopted  as  its  program 
all  that  the  French  Revolution  attained,  and  more: 
it  had  placed  suffrage  upon  an  even  more  generous 
basis,  and  dealt  much  more  thoroughly  with  the 
land  problem.  The  Directory  put  Gracchus  Ba- 
beuf  to  death  for  advocating  the  redistribution  of  the 
land  in  1795,  but  the  Provisional  Government  of 
Russia  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  for  that  in  1917 
and  to  create  the  machinery  for  carrying  it  into 
effect.  At  the  very  moment  when  it  was  over- 
thrown by  the  Bolsheviki  it  was  engaged  in  bring- 
ing about  the  election  of  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
the  most  democratic  body  of  its  kind  in  history. 

Finally,  just  as  the  French  Revolution  was  char- 
acterized by  a  passionate  national  consciousness 
and  pride,  so  that  it  is  customary  to  speak  of  it 
as  the  birth  of  French   nationalism,   so  the   Pro- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  427 

visional  Government  represented  a  newly  awakened 
Russian  nationalism.  Bolshevism,  on  the  con- 
trary, in  its  early  stages,  at  any  rate,  represented 
the  opposite,  a  violent  antagonism  to  the  ideology 
and  institutions  of  nationalism.  The  French  in 
1793,  and  throughout  the  long  struggle,  were 
zealous  for  France  and  in  her  defense;  the  Bolshe- 
viki  cared  nothing  for  Russia  and  would  sacrifice 
her  upon  the  altar  of  world  revolution.  In  view 
of  all  these  facts,  it  is  simply  absurd  to  liken 
the  Bolshevist  phase  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  the 
counter-revolutionary  phase  of  it,  to  the  French 
Revolution. 

There  were  phases  of  the  French  Revolution 
which  can  be  fairly  likened  to  the  Bolshevist  phase 
of  the  Russian  Revolution.  There  is  a  striking 
analogy  between  the  Reign  of  Terror  instituted  in 
1793  and  the  Red  Terror  which  began  in  Russia 
early  in  1918.  The  Montagnards  and  the  Bol- 
sheviki  are  akin;  the  appeal  of  the  former  to  the 
sansculottes  and  of  the  latter  to  the  proletariat  are 
alike.  In  both  cases  we  see  a  brutal  and  desperate 
attempt  to  establish  the  dictatorial  rule  of  a  class 
comprising  only  3  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
There  is  an  equally  striking  analogy  between  the 
struggle  of  the  Girondins  against  the  Jacobins  in 
France  and  the  struggle  of  the  Socialists-Revolu- 
tionists and  Social  Democrats  against  the  Bolshe- 
viki.  In  Russia  at  the  beginning  of  1920  the  sig- 
nificant term  "Thermidorians"  began  to  be  used. 
To  compare  Bolshevism  to  the  Jacobin  phase  of 
the  French  Revolution  is  quite  a  different  matter 
from  comparing  it  to  the  Revolution  as  a  whole. 


428  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

The  permanent  achievements  of  the  French 
Revolution  afford  no  justification  for  the  Reign 
of  Terror.  The  Revolution  succeeded  in  spite  of 
the  Terror,  not  because  of  it,  and  the  success  was 
attended  by  evils  which  might  easily  have  been 
averted.  To  condemn  the  Terror  is  not  to  decry 
the  Revolution.  Similarly,  the  Russian  Revolution 
will  succeed,  we  may  well  believe,  not  because  of  the 
Red  Terror  or  of  the  Bolsheviki,  but  in  spite  of 
them.  The  bitterest  opponents  of  the  Bolsheviki 
are  the  most  stalwart  defenders  of  the  Revolution. 
No  appeal  to  the  history  of  the  French  Revolution 
can  extenuate  or  palliate  the  crimes  of  the  Bolshe- 
viki. Perhaps  their  greatest  crime,  the  one  which 
history  will  regard  as  most  heinous,  is  their  wanton 
disregard  of  all  the  lessons  of  that  great  struggle. 
They  could  not  have  entertained  any  rational  hope 
of  making  their  terrorism  more  complete  or  more 
fearful  than  was  the  Reign  of  Terror,  which  utterly 
failed  to  maintain  the  power  of  the  proletariat. 
They  could  not  have  been  unaware  of  the  fierce 
resistance  the  Terror  provoked  and  evoked,  the 
counter-terror  and  the  reaction — the  Ninth  Ther- 
midor,  the  Directory,  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  Eigh- 
teenth Brumaire,  the  Empire.  They  could  not 
have  been  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  Reign  of 
Terror  divided  and  weakened  the  revolutionary 
forces.  That  they  embarked  upon  their  mad  and 
brutal  adventure  in  the  face  of  the  plain  lessons  of 
the  French  Revolution  is  the  unpardonable  crime 
of  the  Bolsheviki. 

Despite  their  copying  of  the  vices  of  the  worst 
elements  in  the  French  Revolution,  the  Bolsheviki 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  429 

are  most  closely  connected  in  their  ideals  and  their 
methods  with  those  cruel  and  adventurous  social 
rebels  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, 
whose  exploits,  familiar  to  every  Russian,  are 
practically  unknown  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Upon  every  page  of  the  record  of  the  Bolshevist 
regime  there  are  reminders  of  the  revolt  of  Bogdan 
Khnielnitski  (1644-53)  and  that  of  Stenka  Razin 
(1669-71).  These  cruel  and  bloodthirsty  men,  and 
others  of  the  same  kind  who  followed  them,  ap- 
pealed only  to  the  savage  hatred  and  envy  of  the 
serfs,  encouraged  them  to  wanton  destruction  and 
frightful  terror.  Quite  justly  does  the  Zionist 
organ,  Dos  Yiddishce  VolkJ-  say: 

The  slogans  of  Bolshevist  practice  are,  in  fact,  the 
old  Russian  slogans  with  which  the  Volga  bands  of 
Pubachev  and  Razin  ambushed  the  merchant  wagon- 
trains  and  the  Boyars.  It  is  very  characteristic  that  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  has  seen 
fit  to  unveil,  on  May  1st,  at  Moscow,  a  monument  to 
the  Ataman  Stenka  Razin,  the  hero  of  the  Volga  robber 
raids  in  the  seventeenth  century.  Razin,  indeed,  is  the 
legitimate  father  of  Bolshevist  practice. 

Here  we  may  as  well  give  attention  to  another 
appeal  which  the  Bolsheviki  and  their  champions 
make  to  French  history.  They  are  fond  of  citing 
the  Paris  Commune  of  1871,  and  claiming  it  as  the 
model  for  their  tactics.  This  claim,  which  is 
thoroughly  dishonest,  has  often  been  made  by 
Lenin  himself.  In  the  "Theses  on  Bourgeois  and 
Proletarian   Democracies,"  published    in    Pravda, 

28  ^u'y  «.  J9i9- 


430  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

March  8,  1919,  Lenin  says:  "Precisely  at  the  pres- 
ent moment  when  the  Soviet  movement,  covering 
the  whole  world,  continues  the  work  of  the  Paris 
Commune  before  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world,  the 
traitors  to  Socialism  forget  concrete  experiences  and 
the  concrete  lessons  of  the  Paris  Commune,  repeat- 
ing the  old  bourgeois  rubbish  about  'democracy  in 
general.'  The  Commune  was  not  a  parliamentary 
institution."  On  many  occasions  Lenin  has  made 
similar  references  to  the  Commune  of  1871.  The 
official  Bolshevist  press  constantly  indulges  in  such 
statements.  The  Krasnaya  Gazeta,  for  example,  pub- 
lished an  article  on  the  subject  on  December  17, 
1919,  parrot-like  repeating  Lenin's  sophistries. 

The  simple  facts  are  that  (1)  the  Paris  Commune 
had  nothing  to  do  with  Communism  or  any  other 
social  theory.  It  was  an  intensely  nationalistic 
movement,  inspired  by  resentment  of  a  peace  which 
it  regarded  as  dangerous  and  humiliating  to  France. 
It  was  a  movement  for  local  independence;  (2)  it 
was  not  a  class  movement,  but  embraced  the 
bourgeoisie  as  well  as  the  proletariat;  (3)  it  was 
a  "parliamentary  institution,"  based  upon  univer- 
sal, equal  suffrage;  (4)  the  first  act  of  the  revolu- 
tionists in  1871  was  to  appeal  to  the  will  of  the 
people,  through  popular  elections,  in  which  all 
parties  were  free  and  voting  was,  as  stated,  based 
on  equal  and  universal  suffrage;  (5)  within  two 
weeks  the  elections  were  held,  with  the  result  that 
sixty-five  revolutionists  were  chosen  as  against 
twenty-one  elected  by  the  opposition  parties.  The 
opposition  included  six  radical  Republicans  of  the 
Gambetta    school     and     fifteen     reactionaries    of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  431 

various  shades.  In  the  majority  were  representa- 
tives of  every  Socialist  group  and  faction;  (6)  the 
Communards  never  attempted  to  set  up  a  minority 
dictatorship,  but  remained  true  to  the  principles 
of  democracy.  This  Karl  Marx  himself  emphasized 
in  his  The  Civil  War  in  France.  Bolshevist  "his- 
tory" is  as  grotesque  as  Bolshevist  economics!  No 
matter  what  we  may  think  of  the  Commune  of  1871, 
it  cannot  justly  be  compared  to  the  cruel  betrayal 
of  Russian  democracy  by  the  Bolsheviki.  The 
Communards  were  democrats  in  the  fullest  sense  of 
the  term  and  their  brief  rule  had  the  sanction  of  a 
popular  majority. 

The  Bolsheviki  and  their  defenders  are  never 
tired  of  contending  that  most  of  the  sufferings  of 
the  Russian  people  during  the  Bolshevist  regime 
have  been  due,  not  to  those  responsible  for  that 
regime,  but  to  the  "blockade"  imposed  by  the 
Allies  upon  Russian  trade  with  foreign  nations. 
Perhaps  no  single  argument  has  won  so  much  sym- 
pathy from  sentimental  and  ill-informed  people  as 
this.  Yet  the  falsity  of  the  contention  has  been 
demonstrated  many  times,  even  by  those  Russians 
opposed  to  the  blockade.  A  brief  summary  of  the 
salient  facts  will  show  that  this  claim  has  been  used 
as  a  peg  upon  which  to  hang  a  propaganda  remark- 
able for  its  insincerity  and  its  trickery. 

The  blockade  was  declared  in  November,  1917, 
shortly  after  the  Bolsheviki  seized  the  machinery  of 
government.  It  was  already  quite  apparent  that 
they  would  make  a  separate  peace  with  Germany, 
and  that  Germany  would  be  the  dictator  of  the 
peace.     There  was  great  danger  that  supplies  fur- 


432  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

nished  to  Russia  under  these  conditions  would  be 
used  by  the  Germans.  As  a  policy,  therefore,  the 
blockade  was  dictated  by  military  considerations 
of  the  highest  importance  and  was  directed  against 
the  Central  Empires,  and  not  primarily  against  the 
Bolsheviki.  It  was,  of  course,  inevitable  that  it 
would  inflict  hardship  upon  Russia,  our  former  ally, 
and  not  merely  upon  the  Bolsheviki.  So  long  as  the 
Central  Empires  were  in  a  position  to  carry  on  the 
fight,  however,  and  especially  after  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  Peace  gave  Germany  such  a  command  over 
the  life  of  Russia,  the  maintenance  of  the  blockade 
seemed  to  be  of  the  highest  importance  from  a 
military  point  of  view.  That  it  entailed  hardship 
and  suffering  upon  people  who  were  our  friends  was 
one  of  the  numerous  tragedies  of  the  war,  not  more 
terrible,  perhaps — except  as  regards  the  number 
of  people  affected — than  many  of  the  measures 
taken  in  those  parts  of  France  occupied  by  the 
enemy  or  in  the  fighting-zone. 

After  the  armistice  and  the  cessation  of  actual 
fighting  the  question  at  once  took  on  a  new  aspect. 
Many  persons — the  present  writer  among  the  num- 
ber— believed  and  urged  that  the  blockade  should 
then  be  lifted  entirely.  The  issue  was  blurred, 
however,  by  the  fact  that  while  this  would  cer- 
tainly give  aid  to  the  Bolsheviki  there  was  no  as- 
surance that  it  would  in  any  degree  benefit  the 
people  in  Russia  who  were  opposed  to  them.  The 
discrimination  in  favor  of  the  Bolsheviki  practised 
in  the  distribution  of  food  and  everything  else  was 
responsible  for  this.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that   the   blockade   did   not   cut   off  from    Russia 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  433 

any  important  source  of  food-supply.  Russia  had 
never  depended  upon  other  nations  for  staple  foods. 
On  the  contrary,  she  was  a  food-exporting  country. 
She  practically  fed  the  greater  part  of  western 
Europe.  Cutting  off  her  imports  did  not  lessen  the! 
grain  she  had;  cutting  off  her  exports  certainly  had 
the  effect  of  increasing  the  stores  available  for  home 
consumption.  All  this  is  as  plain  as  the  proverbial 
pikestaff. 

The  starvation  of  the  Russian  people  was  not 
caused  by  the  blockade,  which  did  not  lessen  the 
amount  of  staple  foods  available,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, increased  it.  The  real  causes  were  these: 
the  breakdown  of  the  transportation  system,  which 
made  it  impossible  to  transport  the  grain  to  the 
great  centers  of  population;  the  stupid  policy  of  the 
Bolsheviki  toward  the  peasants  and  the  warfare  I 
consequent  thereon;  the  demoralization  of  industry  * 
and  the  resulting  inability  to  give  the  peasants  I 
manufactured  goods  in  exchange  for  their  grain. 
It  may  be  objected,  in  reply  to  this  statement,  that 
but  for  the  blockade  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
import  railway  equipment,  industrial  machinery, 
and  so  on,  and  that  therefore  the  blockade  was  an 
indirect  cause  of  food  shortage.  The  fallacy  in  this 
argument  is  transparent:  as  to  the  industrial  ma- 
chinery, Soviet  Russia  had,  and  according  to 
Rykov  still  has,  much  more  than  could  be  used. 
As  regards  large  importations  of  manufactured 
goods  and  railway  equipment,  what  would  have  been 
exported  in  exchange  for  such  imports?  The 
available  stocks  of  raw  materials,  especially  flax  and 
hides,  were  exceedingly  small  and  would  have  ex- 


434  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

changed  for  very  little.     We  have  the  authority  of 
Rykov  for  this  statement  also. 

What,  then,  was  there  available  for  export? 
The  answer  is — food  grains!  In  almost  every  state- 
ment issued  by  the  Bolsheviki  in  their  propaganda 
against  the  blockade  wheat  figured  as  the  most 
important  available  exportable  commodity.  The 
question  arises,  therefore,  how  could  the  export  of 
wheat  from  Russia  help  to  feed  her  starving  people? 
If  there  was  wheat  for  export,  hunger  was  surely 
an  absurdity!  Victor  Kopp,  representative  of  the 
Soviet  Government  in  Berlin,  in  a  special  interview 
published  in  the  London  Daily  Chronicle,  February 
28,  1920,  made  this  quite  clear,  pointing  out  that 
the  hope  that  Russia  would  be  able  to  send  food 
grains  to  central  Europe  in  exchange  for  manu- 
factured goods  was  entirely  unfounded,  because 
Russia  sorely  needed  all  her  foodstuffs  of  every 
kind.  Krassin,  head  of  the  department  of  Trade 
and  Commerce  in  the  Soviet  Government,  told 
Mr.  Copping— that  most  useful  of  phonographs! — 
that  the  shattered  condition  of  transportation 
"leaves  us  temporarily  unable  to  get  adequate 
supplies  of  food  for  our  own  cities,  and  puts  en- 
tirely out  of  the  question  any  possibility,  at  present, 
of  assembling  goods  at  our  ports  for  sending 
abroad."1  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  raising  of  the 
blockade,  if,  and  in  so  far  as,  it  led  to  an  export 
of  wheat  and  other  food  grains  in  return  for  manu- 
factured goods,  zuould  have  increased  the  hunger  and 
underfeeding  of  the  Russian  people. 

The  Bolsheviki  knew  this  quite  well  and  did  not 

1  Daily  Chronicle,  London,  February  26,  1920. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  435 

want  the  blockade  raised.  They  realized  that  the 
propaganda  in  other  countries  against  the  blockade 
was  an  enormous  asset  to  them,  whereas  removal 
of  the  blockade  would  reveal  their  weakness.  Sup- 
port is  given  to  this  contention  by  the  following 
passage  from  Rykov's  report  in  January  of  this 
year: 

It  is  the  greatest  fallacy  to  imagine  that  the  lifting 
of  the  blockade  or  conclusion  of  peace  is  able  in  any 
degree  to  solve  our  raw-material  crisis.  On  the  contrary, 
the  lifting  of  the  blockade  and  conclusion  of  peace,  if  such 
should  take  place,  will  mean  an  increased  demand  for 
raw  materials,  as  these  are  the  only  articles  which  Russia 
can  furnish  to  Europe  and  exchange  for  European  com- 
modities. The  supplies  of  flax  on  hand  are  sufficient  for 
a  period  of  from  eight  months  to  a  year.  But  we  shall 
not  be  able  to  export  large  quantities  of  flax  abroad,  and  the 
catastrophic  decline  in  flax  production  as  compared  with 
1919  raises  the  question  whether  the  flax  industry  shaH 
not  experience  in  1920  a  flax  shortage  similar  to  the  one 
experienced  by  the  textile  industry  in  cotton. 

In  the  spring  of  1919  Mr.  Alexander  Berkenheim, 
one  of  the  managers  of  the  "Centrosoyuz,"  with 
other  well-known  Russian  co-operators,  represented 
to  the  British  Government  that  the  blockade  of 
Russia  was  inflicting  hardship  and  famine  only,  or 
at  least  mainly,  upon  the  innocent  civil  population. 
They  argued  that  if  the  blockade  were  lifted  the 
Bolsheviki  would  see  to  the  feeding  of  the  general 
population.  Berkenheim  and  his  friends  applied 
for  permission  for  their  association  to  send  a  steamer 
to  Odessa  laden  with  foodstuffs,  medicines,  and 
other  supplies,  to  be  distributed  exclusively  among 


436  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

children  and  sick  and  convalescing  civilians.  Backed 
by  influential  British  supporters,  Berkenheim  and 
his  friends  gave  guaranties  that  not  a  single  pound 
of  such  supplies  would  reach  the  Red  Army.  All 
was  to  be  distributed  by  the  co-operatives  without 
any  interference  by  the  authorities.  The  Bolshe- 
vist Government  gave  a  similar  guaranty,  stated 
in  very  definite  and  unequivocal  terms.  Accord- 
ingly, the  British  Government  consented  to  allow 
the  steamer  to  sail,  and  in  June,  1919,  the  steamer, 
with  a  cargo  of  tea,  coffee,  cocoa,  and  rice,  consigned 
to  the  "Centrosoyuz,"  arrived  at  Odessa.  But  no 
sooner  had  the  steamer  entered  the  port  than  the 
whole  cargo  was  requisitioned  by  the  Soviet  au- 
thorities and  handed  over  to  the  organization  sup- 
plying the  Red  Army. 

This  treachery  was  the  principal  cause  of  the 
continuance  of  the  blockade.  That  it  was  intended 
to  have  precisely  that  effect  is  not  improbable. 
On  January  16,  1920,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  at  its  first  meeting,  upon  the 
proposal  of  the  British  Government,  decided  to  so 
greatly  modify  the  blockade  as  to  amount  to  its 
practical  abandonment.  Trade  was  to  be  opened 
up  with  Russia  through  the  co-operatives,  it  was 
announced.  The  co-operatives  were  to  act  as  im- 
porting and  exporting  agencies,  receiving  clothing, 
machinery,  medicines,  railroad  equipment,  and  so 
on,  and  exporting  the  "surplus"  grain,  flax,  hides, 
and  so  on,  in  return. 

Immediately  after  that  arrangement  was  an- 
nounced the  Bolsheviki  adopted  an  entirely  new 
attitude.     They  began  to  raise  hitherto  unheard-of 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  437 

objections.  They  could  not  permit  trade  with  the 
co-operatives  on  the  conditions  laid  down;  the  co- 
operatives were  not  independent  organizations,  but 
a  part  of  the  Soviet  state  machinery;  trade  must 
accompany  recognition  of  the  Soviet  Government, 
and  so  on.  Thus  the  "diplomatic"  arguments 
went.  In  Russia  itself  the  leaders  took  the  position 
expressed  by  Rykov  in  the  speech  already  quoted. 
To  sum  up:  the  blockade  was  a  natural  military 
measure  of  precaution,  rendered  necessary  by  the 
actions  of  the  Bolsheviki;  it  was  directed  primarily 
against  the  Germans;  it  was  not  at  any  time  a 
primary  cause  of  the  food  shortage  in  Russia.  When 
efforts  were  made  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the 
civil  population  by  raising  the  blockade  the  Bol- 
sheviki treacherously  defeated  such  efforts.  The 
prolonged  continuation  of  the  blockade  was  mainly 
due  to  the  policy  of  obstruction  pursued  by  the 
Bolsheviki.  No  large  volume  of  trade  could  have 
been  had  with  Russia  at  any  time  during  the 
Bolshevist  regime.  The  Bolsheviki  themselves  did 
not  want  the  blockade  removed,  and  finally  con- 
fessed that  such  removal  would  not  help  them. 
Certainly,  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  made 
many  mistakes  in  connection  with  the  blockade; 
but,  when  that  has  been  fully  admitted,  and  when 
all  that  can  fairly  be  said  against  that  policy  has 
been  said,  it  remains  the  fact  that  the  Bolsheviki 
were  responsible  for  creating  the  conditions  which 
made  the  blockade  necessary  and  inevitable,  and 
that  their  treachery  forced  its  continuation  long 
after  the  Allies  had  shown  themselves  ready  and 
even  anxious  to  abandon  it.     At  every  step  of  their 


438  "THE   GREATEST   FAILURE 

fatal  progress  in  the  devastation  and  spoliation  of 
Russia  the  treachery  of  the  Bolsheviki,  their  entire 
lack  of  honor  and  good  faith,  appear. 

Herein  lies  the  real  reason  why  no  civilized  gov- 
ernment can  with  safety  to  its  own  institutions — 
to  say  nothing  of  regard  for  its  own  dignity  and 
honor — enter  into  any  covenant  with  the  Bolshevist 
Government  of  Russia  or  hold  official  relations  with 
it.  At  the  root  of  Bolshevism  lies  a  negation  of 
everything  of  fundamental  importance  to  the 
friendly  and  co-operative  relations  of  governments 
and  peoples.  When  the  leaders  of  a  government 
that  is  set  up  and  maintained  by  brute  force,  and 
does  not,  therefore,  have  behind  it  the  sanction  of 
the  will  of  its  citizens,  being  subject  to  no  control 
other  than  its  own  ambitions,  declare  that  they  will 
sign  agreements  with  foreign  nations  without  feeling 
in  the  slightest  degree  obligated  by  such  agreements, 
they  outlaw  themselves  and  their  government. 

Not  only  have  the  Bolsheviki  boasted  that  this 
was  their  attitude,  but  they  have  gone  farther. 
Their  responsible  leaders  and  spokesmen — Lenin, 
Trotsky,  Zinoviev,  Kamenev,  Radek,  and  others — 
have  openly  declared  that  they  are  determined  to 
use  any  and  all  means  to  bring  about  revolts  in  all 
other  civilized  countries,  to  upset  their  governments 
and  institute  Bolshevist  rule.  They  have  declared 
that  only  by  such  a  universal  spread  of  its  rule 
can  Bolshevism  be  maintained  in  Russia.  "Soviet 
Russia  by  its  very  existence  is  a  ferment  and  a 
propagator  of  the  inevitable  world  revolution," 
wrote  Radek  in  Maximilian  Harden's  Zukunft,  in 
February,   1920.     Referring  to  the  Spartacist  up- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  439 

risings  in  Germany,  he  said:  "You  are  afraid  of 
Bolshevist  propaganda  penetrating  into  Germany 
with  other  goods.  You  recall  an  experiment  al- 
ready carried  out  by  Germany.  Yes,  I  glory  in  the 
results  of  our  work."  "One  does  not  demand  a 
patent  for  immortality  from  the  man  to  whom  one 
sells  a  suit  of  underclothing  .  .  .  and  our  only 
concern  is  trade,"  said  Radek  in  the  same  article. 
When  Radek  wrote  that  he  knew  that  he  was  lying. 
He  knew  that,  far  from  being  their  "only  concern, " 
trade  was  the  least  of  the  concerns  of  the  Bolshe- 
viki.  Upon  this  point  the  evidence  leaves  no  room 
for  doubt.  In  The  Program  of  the  Communist  Party, 
Chapter  XIX,  Bucharin  says,  "The  program  of  the 
Communist  Party  is  not  alone  a  program  of  liberat- 
ing the  proletariat  of  one  country;  it  is  the  program 
of  liberating  the  proletariat  of  the  world."  Lenin 
wrote  in  The  Chief  Tasks  of  Our  Times:  "Only  a 
madman  can  imagine  that  the  task  of  overthrowing 
international  imperialism  can  be  fulfilled  by  Rus- 
sians alone.  While  in  the  west  the  revolution  is 
maturing  and  is  making  appreciable  progress,  the 
task  before  us  is  as  follows:  We  who  in  spite  of 
our  weakness  are  in  the  forefront  must  do  all  in  our 
power  to  retain  the  occupied  positions.  .  .  .  We 
must  strain  every  nerve  in  order  to  remain  in  power 
as  long  as  possible,  so  as  to  give  time  for  a  development 
of  the  western  revolution,  which  is  growing  much 
more  slowly  than  we  expected  and  wished." 
Zinoviev  wrote  in  Pravda,  November  7,  191 9,  that 
"in  a  year,  in  two  years,  the  Communist  Inter- 
national will  rule  the  world."  Kalinin,  president 
of  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  of 


440  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  Soviet  Power,  in  his  New-Year's  greeting  for 
1920,  published  in  the  Krasnaya  Gazeta,  January  1, 
1920,  declared  that,  "Western  European  brothers 
in  the  coming  year  should  overthrow  the  rule  of 
their  capitalists  and  should  join  with  the  Russian 
proletariat  and  establish  the  single  authority  of  the 
Soviets  through  the  entire  world  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Third  International."  Many  other 
statements  of  a  similar  character  could  be  quoted 
to  show  that  the  Russian  Bolsheviki's  chief  concern 
is  not  trade,  but  world-wide  revolt  on  Bolshevist 
lines. 

That  the  Bolsheviki  would  use  the  privileges  and 
immunities  accorded  to  diplomatic  representatives 
to  foster  Bolshevist  agitation  and  revolt  is  made 
manifest  by  their  utterances  and  their  performances 
alike.  "We  have  no  desire  to  interfere  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  any  country,"  said  Kopp,  in  the 
interview  already  quoted,  and  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment has  repeatedly  stated  its  willingness  to  give 
assurances  of  non-interference  with  the  political 
or  economic  system  of  other  countries.  But  of 
what  use  are  assurances  from  men  who  boast  that 
they  are  willing  to  sign  agreements  without  the 
slightest  intention  of  being  bound  by  them? 
Take,  for  example,  Trotsky's  statement,  published 
at  Petrograd,  in  February,  191 8:  "If,  in  awaiting 
the  imminent  proletarian  flood  in  Europe,  Russia 
should  be  compelled  to  conclude  peace  with  the 
present-day  governments  of  the  Central  Powers, 
it  would  be  a  provisional,  temporary,  and  transitory 
peace,  with  the  revision  of  which  the  European 
Revolution  will  have  to  concern  itself  in  the  first 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  441 

instance.  Our  whole  policy  is  built  upon  the  ex- 
pectation  of  this  revolution."  Precisely  the  same  :. 
attitude  toward  the  Allies  was  more  bluntly  ex- 
pressed by  Zinoviev  on  February  2,  1919,  regarding 
the  proposed  Prinkipo  Conference:  "We  are  willing 
to  sign  an  unfavorable  peace  with  the  Allies.  ... 
It  would  only  mean  that  we  should  put  no  trust  what-\ 
ever  in  the  bit  of  paper  we  should  sign.  We  should 
use  the  breathing-space  so  obtained  in  order  to  ' 
gather  our  strength  in  order  that  the  mere  continued 
existence  of  our  government  would  keep  up  the 
world-wide  propaganda  which  Soviet  Russia  has 
been  carrying  on  for  more  than  a  year."  Of  the 
Third  International,  so  closely  allied  with  the 
Soviet  Government,  Zinoviev  is  reported  by  Mr. 
Lincoln  Eyre  as  saying:  "Our  propaganda  system 
is  as  strong  and  as  far-reaching  as  ever.  The 
Third  International  is  primarily  an  instrument  of 
revolution.  This  work  will  be  continued,  no  matter 
what  happens,  legally  or  illegally.  The  Soviet 
Government  may  pledge  itself  to  refrain  from 
propaganda  abroad,  but  the  Third  International, 
never.    1 

Finally,  there  is  the  speech  of  Lenin  before  the 
Council  of  the  People's  Commissaries  during  the 
negotiations  upon  the  ill-starred  Prinkipo  Con- 
ference proposal,  in  which  he  said: 

The  successful  development  of  the  Bolshevist  doctrine 

throughout  the  world  can  only  be  effected  by  means  of 

periods  of  rest   during  which  we  may  recuperate   and 

gather  new  strength  for  further  exertions.    I  have  never 

1  New  York  World,  February  26,  1920. 


442  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

hesitated  to  come  to  terms  with  bourgeois  governments, 
when  by  so  doing  I  thought  I  could  weaken  the  bour- 
geoisie. It  is  sound  strategy  in  war  to  postpone  opera- 
tions until  the  moral  disintegration  of  the  enemy  renders 
the  delivery  of  a  mortal  blow  possible.  This  was  the 
policy  we  adopted  toward  the  German  Empire,  and  it 
has  proved  successful.  The  time  has  now  come  for  us 
to  conclude  a  second  Brest-Litovsk,  this  time  with  the 
Entente.  We  must  make  peace  not  only  with  the 
Entente,  but  also  with  Poland,  Lithuania,  and  the 
Ukraine,  and  all  the  other  forces  which  are  opposing 
us  in  Russia.  We  must  be  prepared  to  make  every  con- 
cession, promise,  and  sacrifice  in  order  to  entice  our  foes 
into  the  conclusion  of  this  peace.  We  shall  know  that  we 
have  but  concluded  a  truce  permitting  us  to  complete 
our  preparations  for  a  decisive  onslaught  which  will 
assure  our  triumph. 

In  view  of  these  utterances,  and  scores  of  others 
like  them,  of  what  value  are  the  "assurances  of 
non-interference" — or  any  other  assurances — of- 
fered by  Chicherine,  Lenin,  and  the  rest?  But  we 
are  not  confined  to  mere  utterances:  there  are  deeds 
aplenty  which  fully  bear  out  the  inferences  we  have 
from  the  words  of  the  Bolshevist  leaders.  In  a 
London  court,  before  Mr.  Justice  Neville,  it  was 
brought  out  that  the  Bolshevist  envoy.  Litvinov, 
had  been  guilty  of  using  his  position  to  promote 
revolutionary  agitation.  Not  only  had  Litvinov 
committed  a  breach  of  agreement,  said  Mr.  Justice 
Neville,  but  he  had  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  public 
law.  A  circular  letter  to  the  British  trades-unions 
was  read  by  the  justice,  containing  these  words: 
"Hence  it  is  that  the  Russian  revolutionaries  are  sum- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  443 

moning  the  proletarians  of  all  countries  to  a  revolu- 
tionary fight  against  their  government."  Even  worse 
was  the  case  of  the  Bolshevist  ambassador,  Joffe, 
who  was  expelled  from  Berlin  for  using  his  dip- 
lomatic position  to  wage  a  propaganda  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  German  Government,  and  this 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  in  its  second  article  specifically  forbade 
"any  agitation  against  the  state  and  military 
institutions  of  Germany." 

In  an  official  note  to  the  German  Foreign  Office, 
published  in  Izvestia,  December  26,  191 8,  Chicher- 
ine  boasted  that  millions  of  rubles  had  been  sent  to 
Berlin  for  the  purpose  of  revolutionary  propaganda. 
The  duplicity  revealed  by  this  note  was  quite 
characteristic  of  the  Bolshevist  regime  and  in  keep- 
ing with  the  record  of  Chicherine  himself  in  his  rela- 
tions with  the  British  Government  during  his  stay 
in  London,  where  he  acted  as  one  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Russians  in  London  who  were  seeking 
repatriation.  Izvestia,  on  January  1,  1919,  con- 
tained an  article  by  JofFe  on  "Revolutionary 
Methods,"  in  which  he  said:  "Having  accepted 
this  forcibly  imposed  treaty  [Brest-Litovsk],  revo- 
lutionary Russia  of  course  had  to  accept  its  second 
article,  which  forbade  'any  agitation  against  the 
state  and  military  institutions  of  Germany.'  But 
both  the  Russian  Government  as  a  whole  and  its 
accredited  representative  in  Berlin  never  concealed 
the  fact  that  they  were  not  observing  this  article  and 
did  not  intend  to  do  so."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
agitation  against  the  German  Government  by  the 
Bolsheviki  continued  even  after  the  so-called  sup- 


444  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

plcmentary  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk,  dated  August 
27,  191 8,  which,  as  pointed  out  by  the  United 
States  Department  of  State,  were  not  signed  under 
duress,  as  was  the  original  treaty,  but  were  actively 
sought  for  and  gladly  signed  by  the  Bolsheviki. 

In  view  of  these  indisputable  facts,  is  there  any 
honest  and  worthy  reason  for  suspending  judgment 
upon  the  character  of  the  Soviet  Government? 
Surely  it  must  be  plainly  evident  to  every  candid 
and  dispassionate  mind  that  Bolshevism  is  prac- 
tically a  negation  of  every  principle  of  honor  and 
good  faith  essential  to  friendly  and  co-operative 
relations  among  governments  in  modern  civiliza- 
tion. The  Bolsheviki  have  outlawed  themselves 
and  placed  themselves  outside  the  pale  of  the 
community  of  nations. 

The  merits  of  Sovietism  as  a  method  of  govern- 
ment do  not  here  and  now  concern  us.  But  we 
are  entitled  to  demand  that  those  who  urge  us  to 
adopt  it  furnish  some  evidence  of  its  superiority  in 
practice.  Up  to  the  present  time,  no  such  evidence 
has  been  offered  by  those  who  advocate  the  change; 
on  the  other  hand,  all  the  available  evidence  tends 
to  show  that  Soviet  government,  far  from  being 
superior  to  our  own,  is  markedly  inferior  to  it. 
We  are  entitled,  surely,  to  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  so  far  as  it  has  been  tried  in  Russia,  Sovietism 
has  resulted  in  an  enormous  increase  in  bureau- 
cracy; that  it  has  not  done  away  with  corruption 
and  favoritism  in  government;  that  it  has  shown 
itself  to  be  capable  of  every  abuse  of  which  other 
forms  of  government,  whether  despotic,  oligarchic, 
or  democratic,  have  been  capable.     It  has  not  given 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  445 

Russia  a  government  one  whit  more  humane  or 
just,  one  whit  less  oppressive  or  corrupt  than 
czarism.  It  seems  to  be  inherently  bureaucratic 
and  therefore  inefficient.  Be  that  how  it  may,  it 
is  impossible  to  deny  that  it  has  failed  and  failed 
utterly.  Even  the  Bolsheviki,  whose  sole  excuse 
for  their  assault  upon  the  rapidly  evolving  democ- 
racy of  Russia  was  their  faith  in  the  superiority  of 
Sovietism  over  parliamentary  government,  have 
found  it  necessary  to  abandon  it,  not  only  in  govern- 
ment, but  in  industry  and  in  military  organization. 
In  industry  Sovietism,  so  far  as  it  has  been  tried 
in  Russia,  has  shown  itself  to  be  markedly  inferior 
to  the  methods  of  industrial  organization  common 
to  the  great  industrial  nations,  and  the  so-called 
Soviet  Government  itself,  which  is  in  reality  an 
oligarchy,  has  had  to  abandon  it  and  to  revert  to 
the  essential  principles  and  methods  of  capitalist 
industry.  This  is  not  the  charge  of  a  hostile  critic: 
it  is  the  confession  of  Lenin,  of  Trotsky,  of  Krassin, 
of  Rykov,  and  practically  every  acknowledged 
Bolshevist  authority.  We  do  not  say  that  the 
Soviet  idea  contains  nothing  of  good;  we  do  not 
deny  that,  under  a  democratic  government,  Soviets 
might  have  aided,  and  may  yet  aid,  to  democratize 
Russian  industrial  life.  What  we  do  say  is  that  the 
Bolsheviki  have  failed  to  make  them  of  the  slightest 
service  to  the  Russian  people;  that  Bolshevism 
has  completely  failed  to  organize  the  industrial  life 
of  Russia,  either  on  Soviet  lines  or  any  other,  and 
has  had  to  revert  to  capitalism  and  to  call  upon  the 
capitalists  of  other  lands  to  come  and  rescue  them 

from  utter  destruction.     After  ruthlessly  extermi- 
29 


446  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

nating  their  own  capitalists,  they  have  been  com- 
pelled to  offer  to  give  foreign  capitalists,  in  the 
shape  of  vast  economic  concessions,  a  mortgage 
upon  the  great  heritage  of  future  generations  of  the 
Russian  people  and  the  right  to  exploit  their  toil. 
So,  too,  with  the  military  organization  of  the 
country:  Starting  out  with  Soviet  management  in 
the  army,  the  present  rulers  of  Russia  soon  dis- 
covered that  the  system  would  not  work.  As  early 
as  January,  1918,  Krylenko,  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  military  forces  of  the  Bolsheviki,  reported 
to  the  Central  Executive  Committee  that  the 
soldiers'  committees  were  "the  only  remnant  of  the 
army."  In  May,  1919,  Trotsky  was  preaching  the 
necessity  of  "respect  for  military  science"  and  of 
"a  genuine  army,  properly  organized  and  firmly 
ruled  by  a  single  hand."  Conscription  was  intro- 
duced, not  by  law  enacted  by  responsible  elected 
representatives  of  the  people,  but  by  decree.  It 
was  enforced  with  a  brutality  and  savagery  un- 
known to  this  age  in  any  other  country.  Just  as  in 
industry  the  "bourgeois  specialists"  were  brought 
back  and  compelled  to  work  under  espionage  and 
duress,  so  the  officers  of  the  old  imperial  army 
were  brought  back  and  held  to  their  tasks  by  terror, 
their  wives  and  children  and  other  relatives  being 
held  as  hostages  for  their  conduct.  Izvestia  pub- 
lished, September  18,  191 8,  Trotsky's  famous 
Order  No.  903,  which  read:  "Seeing  the  increasing 
number  of  deserters,  especially  among  the  com- 
manders, orders  are  issued  to  arrest  as  hostages  all 
the  members  of  the  family  one  can  lay  hands  on: 
father,  mother,  brother,  sister,  wife,  and  children." 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  447 

Another  order  issued  by  Trotsky  in  the  summer 
of  1919  said,  "In  case  an  officer  goes  over  to  the 
enemy,  his  jamily  should  be  made  to  feel  the  con- 
sequences of  his  betrayal." 

Pravda  x  published  an  article  giving  an  account 
of  the  formation  of  a  Red  cavalry  regiment.  From 
that  article  we  learn  that  every  officer  mobilized 
in  the  Red  Army  had  to  sign  the  following  state- 
ment: 

I  have  received  due  notice  that  in  the  event  of  my 
being  guilty  of  treason  or  betrayal  in  regard  to  the 
Soviet  Government,  my  nearest  relatives  [names  given] 
residing  at  [full  address  given]  will  be  responsible  for  me. 

What  this  meant  is  known  irom  the  many  news 
items  in  the  Bolshevist  press  relating  to  the  arrest, 
imprisonment,  and  even  shooting  of  the  relatives  of 
deserters.  To  cite  only  one  example:  the  Krasnaya 
Gazeta,  November  4,  1919,  published  a  "pre- 
liminary list"  of  nine  deserting  Red  Army  officers 
whose  relatives — including  mothers,  fathers,  sis- 
ters, brothers,  and  wives — had  been  arrested. 
Izvestia  printed  a  list  of  deserters'  relatives  con- 
demned to  be  shot,  including  children  fourteen  and 
sixteen  years  old. 

At  the  Joint  Conference  on  National  Economy  in 
Moscow,  January,  1920,  Lenin  summed  up  the 
experience  of  the  Bolsheviki  with  Soviet  direction 
of  the  army,  saying,  "In  the  organization  of  the 
army  we  have  passed  from  the  principle  of  com- 
manding by  committee  to  the  direct  command  of 

^o.  11,  1919. 


448  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

the  chiefs.  We  must  do  the  same  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  government  and  industry."  And  again, 
"The  experience  of  our  army  shows  us  that  primi- 
tive organization  based  on  the  collectivist  principle 
becomes  transformed  into  an  administration  based 
upon  the  principle  of  individual  power."  In  the 
Program  of  the  Communists  we  read  that  "The 
demand  that  the  military  command  should  be 
elective  .  .  .  has  no  significance  with  reference  to 
the  Red  Army,  composed  of  class-conscious  work- 
men and  peasants."  In  a  pamphlet  issued  by  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  in  the 
latter  part  of  191 8  we  read  that  "Regimental 
Committees,  acting  as  administrative  organs,  can- 
not exist  in  the  Soviet  Army."  These  quotations 
amply  prove  that  Sovietism  in  the  army  was  found 
undesirable  and  unworkable  by  the  Bolsheviki 
themselves  and  by  them  abandoned. 

We  remember  the  glowing  promises  with  which 
the  first  Red  Army  was  launched:  volunteers  con- 
sidering it  an  honor  to  be  permitted  to  fight  for 
the  Communist  Utopia;  the  "collective  self- 
discipline";  the  direction  of  the  whole  military 
organization  by  soldiers'  committees,  and  all  the 
rest  of  the  wild  vision.  We  compare  it  with  the 
brutal  reality,  and  the  contrast  between  the  hope 
and  the  reality  is  the  measure  of  the  ghastly  failure 
of  Bolshevism.  The  military  system  of  the  Bol- 
sheviki is  infinitely  more  brutal  than  the  old 
Prussian  system  was.  The  Red  Army  is  an  army 
of  slaves  driven  by  terrorized  slaves.  Sovietism 
proved  a  fool's  fantasy.  The  old  military  discipline 
came  back  harsher  than  ever;    the  death  penalty 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  449 

was  restored;  conscription  and  mobilization  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  were  carried  out  with  a  ferocity 
never  equaled  in  any  modern  nation,  not  even  in 
Russia  under  Czar  Nicholas  II.  Was  there  ever  a 
more  complete  failure? 

The  mass  of  evidence  we  have  cited  from  Bol- 
shevist authorities  warrants  the  judgment  that 
Sovietism,  as  exemplified  during  the  Bolshevist 
regime,  in  every  department  of  the  national  life, 
is  at  best  an  utterly  impracticable  Utopian  scheme. 
Certainly  every  fair-minded  person  of  normal  in- 
telligence must  agree  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
record  of  the  experiment — a  record,  be  it  remem- 
bered, made  by  the  Bolsheviki  themselves — to 
rouse  enthusiastic  hopes  or  to  justify  any  civilized 
nation  in  throwing  aside  the  existing  machinery  of 
government  and  industrial  organization  and  im- 
mediately substituting  Sovietism  therefor. 

As  for  Bolshevism,  in  contradistinction  from 
Sovietism,  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in  reaching  a 
verdict  upon  the  evidence  supplied  by  its  own  ac- 
credited spokesmen  and  official  records.  We  have 
not  massed  the  isolated  crimes  of  individuals  and 
mobs  and  presented  the  result  as  a  picture  of  Rus- 
sian life.  That  would  be  as  unjust  as  to  list  all  the 
accounts  of  race  riots,  lynchings,  and  murders  in 
this  country  and  offering  the  list  as  a  fair  picture 
of  American  life.  Ignoring  these  things  completely, 
we  have  taken  the  laws  and  decrees  of  Soviet  Rus- 
sia; its  characteristic  institutions;  the  things  done 
by  its  government;  the  writings  and  speeches  of 
its  statesmen  and  recognized  interpreters;  the  cold 
figures  of  its  own  reports  of  industry  and  agricult- 


450  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ure.  The  result  is  a  picture  of  Bolshevism,  self- 
drawn,  more  ugly  and  repellent  than  the  most 
malicious  imagination  could  have  drawn. 

On  the  other  side  there  is  no  single  worthy 
creative  achievement  to  be  recorded.  There  are 
almost  innumerable  "decrees,"  some  of  them  at- 
tractive enough,  but  there  are  no  actual  achieve- 
ments of  merit  to  be  credited  to  the  Bolsheviki. 
Even  in  the  matter  of  education,  concerning  which 
we  have  heard  so  much,  there  is  not  a  scintilla  of 
evidence  that  will  bear  examination  which  tends 
to  show  that  they  have  actually  accomplished  any- 
thing which  Russia  will  gratefully  remember  or 
cherish  in  the  days  that  are  to  come.  The  much- 
vaunted  "Proletcult"  of  Soviet  Russia  is  in  prac- 
tice little  more  than  a  means  of  providing  jobs  for 
Communists.  The  Bolshevist  publicist,  Mizke- 
vich,  made  this  charge  in  Izvestia,  March  22,  1919. 
"The  Proletcult  is  using  up  our  not  very  numerous 
forces,  and  spending  public  money,  which  it  gets 
from  .  .  .  the  Commissariat  for  Public  Instruction, 
on  the  same  work  that  is  done  by  the  Public  In- 
struction departments  .  .  .  opposes  its  own  work 
for  the  creation  of  proletarian  culture  to  the  same 
work  of  the  agents  of  the  proletarian  authority, 
and  thus  creates  confusion  in  the  minds  of  the 
proletarian  mass." 

The  Bolsheviki  have  published  decrees  and  ar- 
ticles on  education  with  great  freedom,  but  they 
have  done  little  else  except  harm.  They  have 
weakened  the  great  universities  and  rudely  inter- 
rupted the  development  of  the  great  movement 
to  improve  and  extend  popular  education  initiated 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  451 

shortly  before  the  Revolution  by  Count  Ignatiev, 
the  best  friend  of  popular  education  that  ever  held 
office  in  Russia,  compared  to  whom  Lunacharsky 
is  a  cretin.  They  have  imposed  upon  the  uni- 
versities and  schools  the  bureaucratic  rule  of  men 
most  of  whom  know  nothing  of  university  require- 
ments, are  at  best  poorly  educated  and  sometimes 
even  illiterate. 

Promising  peace  and  freedom  from  militarism, 
they  betrayed  their  Allies  and  played  the  game 
of  their  foes;  they  brought  new  wars  upon  the 
already  war-weary  nation  and  imposed  upon  it  a 
militarism  more  brutal  than  the  old.  Promising 
freedom,  they  have  developed  a  tyranny  more 
brutal  and  oppressive  than  that  of  the  Romanovs. 
Promising  humane  and  just  government,  they 
instituted  the  Chresvychaikas  and  a  vast,  cor- 
rupt bureaucracy.  Promising  to  so  organize  pro- 
duction that  there  should  be  plenty  for  all  and 
poverty  for  none,  they  ruined  industrial  produc- 
tion, decreased  agricultural  production  to  a  peril- 
ously low  level  and  so  that  famine  reigned  in  a  land 
of  plentiful  resources,  human  and  material.  Prom- 
ising to  make  the  workers  masters  of  the  machines, 
free  citizens  in  a  great  industrial  democracy,  they 
have  destroyed  the  machines,  forced  the  workers 
to  take  the  places  of  beasts  of  burden,  and  made 
them  bond-slaves. 

The  evidence  is  in:  let  the  jury  render  its  verdict. 

FINIS 


DOCUMENTS 

I 

Decree  Regarding  Grain  Control 

THE  disastrous  undermining  of  the  country's  food- 
supply,  the  serious  heritage  of  the  four  years' 
war,  continues  to  extend  more  and  more,  and  to  be 
more  and  more  acute.  While  the  consuming  provincial 
governments  are  starving,  in  the  producing  govern- 
ments there  are  at  the  present  moment,  as  before,  large 
reserves  of  grain  of  the  harvests  of  1916  and  1917  not 
yet  even  threshed.  This  grain  is  in  the  hands  of  tight- 
fisted  village  dealers  and  profiteers,  of  the  village  bour- 
geoisie. Well  fed  and  well  provided  for,  having  ac- 
cumulated enormous  sums  of  money  obtained  during 
the  years  of  war,  the  village  bourgeoisie  remains  stub- 
bornly deaf  and  indifferent  to  the  wailings  of  starving 
workmen  and  peasant  poverty,  and  does  not  bring  the 
grain  to  the  collecting-points.  The  grain  is  held  with 
the  hope  of  compelling  the  government  to  raise  re- 
peatedly the  prices  of  grain,  at  the  same  time  that  the 
holders  sell  their  grain  at  home  at  fabulous  prices  to 
grain  speculators. 

An  end  must  be  put  to  this  obstinacy  of  the  greedy 
village  grain-profiteers.  The  food  experience  of  former 
years  showed  that  the  breaking  of  fixed  prices  and  the 
denial  of  grain  monopoly,  while  lessening  the  possibility 
of  feasting  for  our  group  of  capitalists,  would  make 
bread  completely  inaccessible  to  our  many  millions  of 


454  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

workmen  and  would  subject  them  to  inevitable  death 
from  starvation. 

The  answer  to  the  violence  of  grain-owners  toward  the 
starving  poor  must  be  violence  toward  the  bourgeoisie. 

Not  a  pood  should  remain  in  the  hands  of  those  hold- 
ing the  grain,  except  the  quantity  needed  for  sowing  the 
fields  and  provisioning  their  families  until  the  new 
harvest. 

This  policy  must  be  put  into  force  at  once,  especially 
since  the  German  occupation  of  the  Ukraine  compels 
us  to  get  along  with  grain  resources  which  will  hardly 
suffice  for  sowing  and  curtailed  use. 

Having  considered  the  situation  thus  created,  and 
taking  into  account  that  only  with  the  most  rigid  cal- 
culation and  equal  distribution  of  all  grain  reserves  can 
Russia  pass  through  the  food  crisis,  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  All  Russia  has  decreed: 

1.  Confirming  the  fixity  of  the  grain  monopoly  and 
fixed  prices,  and  also  the  necessity  of  a  merciless  struggle 
with  grain  speculators,  to  compel  each  grain-owner  to 
declare  the  surplus  above  what  is  needed  to  sow  the 
fields  and  for  personal  use,  according  to  established 
normal  quantities,  until  the  new  harvest,  and  to  sur- 
render the  same  within  a  week  after  the  publication  of 
this  decision  in  each  village.  The  order  of  these  declara- 
tions is  to  be  determined  by  the  People's  Food  Commis- 
sioner through  the  local  food  organizations. 

2.  To  call  upon  workmen  and  poor  peasants  to  unite 
at  once  for  a  merciless  struggle  with  grain-hoarders. 

3.  To  declare  all  those  who  have  a  surplus  of  grain 
and  who  do  not  bring  it  to  the  collecting-points,  and 
likewise  those  who  waste  grain  reserves  on  illicit  dis- 
tillation of  alcohol  and  do  not  bring  them  to  the  collect- 
ing-point, enemies  of  the  people;  to  turn  them  over  to 
the  Revolutionary  Tribunal,  imprison  them  for  not 
less  than  ten  years,  confiscate  their  entire  property,  and 


I 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  455 

drive  them  out  forever  from  the  communes;  while  the 
distillers  are,  besides,  to  be  condemned  to  compulsory 
communal  work. 

In  case  an  excess  of  grain  which  was  not  declared  for 
surrender,  in  compliance  with  Article  I,  is  found  in  the 
possession  of  any  one  the  grain  is  to  be  taken  away  from 
him  without  pay,  while  the  sum,  according  to  fixed 
prices,  due  for  the  undeclared  surpluses  is  to  be  paid, 
one-half  to  the  person  who  points  out  the  concealed 
surpluses,  after  they  have  been  placed  at  the  collecting- 
points,  and  the  other  half  to  the  village  commune. 
Declarations  concerning  the  concealed  surpluses  are 
made  by  the  local  food  organizations. 

Further,  taking  into  consideration  that  the  struggle 
with  the  food  crisis  demands  the  application  of  quick 
and  decisive  measures,  that  the  more  fruitful  realization 
of  these  measures  demands  in  its  turn  the  centralization 
of  all  orders  dealing  with  the  food  question  in  one 
organization,  and  that  this  organization  appears  to  be 
the  People's  Food  Commissioner,  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  of  All  Russia  hereby  orders,  for  the  more 
successful  struggle  with  the  food  crisis,  that  the  People's 
Food  Commissioner  be  given  the  following  powers: 

1.  To  publish  obligatory  regulations  regarding  the  food 
situation,  exceeding  the  usual  limits  of  the  People's  Food 
Commissioner's  competence. 

2.  To  abrogate  the  orders  of  local  food  bodies  and 
other  organizations  contravening  the  plans  and  actions 
of  the  People's  Commissioner. 

3.  To  demand  from  institutions  and  organizations  of 
all  departments  the  carrying  out  of  the  regulations  of 
the  People's  Food  Commissioner  in  connection  with  the 
food  situation  without  evasions  and  at  once. 

4.  To  use  the  armed  forces  in  case  resistance  is  shown 
to  the  removal  of  food  grains  or  other  food  products. 

5.  To    dissolve    or    reorganize    the    food    agencies    in 


456  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

places  where  they  might  resist  the  orders  of  the  People's 
Commissioner. 

6.  To  discharge,  transfer,  turn  over  to  the  Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal,  or  subject  to  arrest  officials  and  em- 
ployees of  all  departments  and  public  organizations  in 
case  of  interference  with  the  orders  of  the  People's 
Commissioner. 

7.  To  transfer  the  present  powers,  in  addition  to  the 
right  to  subject  to  arrest,  above,  to  other  persons  and 
institutions  in  various  places,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Council  of  the  People's  Commissioners. 

8.  All  understandings  of  the  People's  Commissioner, 
related  in  character  to  the  Department  of  Ways  of  Com- 
munication and  the  Supreme  Council  of  National 
Economy,  are  to  be  carried  through  upon  consultation 
with  the  corresponding  departments. 

9.  The  regulations  and  orders  of  the  People's  Com- 
missioner, issued  in  accordance  with  the  present  powers, 
are  verified  by  his  college,  which  has  the  right,  without 
suspending  their  operation,  of  referring  them  to  the 
Council  of  Public  Commissioners. 

10.  The  present  decree  becomes  effective  from  the 
date  of  its  signature  and  is  to  be  put  into  operation  by 
telegraph. 

Published  May  14,  1918. 

II 

Regulation    Concerning   the   Administration 
or   National   Undertakings 

Part  I 

1.  The  Central  Administration  of  Nationalized  Un- 
dertakings, of  whatever  branch  of  industry,  assigns  for 
each  large  nationalized  undertaking  technical  and 
administrative  directors,  in  whose  hands  are  placed  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  457 

actual  administration  and  direction  of  the  entire  activity 
of  the  undertaking.  They  are  responsible  to  the  Central 
Administration  and  the  Commissioner  appointed  by  it. 

2.  The  technical  director  appoints  technical  employees 
and  gives  all  orders  regarding  the  technical  administra- 
tion of  the  undertaking.  The  factory  committee  may, 
however,  complain  regarding  these  appointments  and 
orders  to  the  Commissioner  of  the  Central  Administra- 
tion, and  then  to  the  Central  Administration  itself; 
but  only  the  Commissioner  and  Central  Administration 
may  stop  the  appointments  and  order  of  the  technical 
director. 

3.  In  connection  with  the  Administrative  Director 
there  is  an  Economic  Administrative  Council,  consisting 
of  delegates  from  laborers,  employees,  and  engineers  of 
the  undertaking.  The  Council  examines  the  estimates 
of  the  undertaking,  the  plan  of  its  works,  the  rules  of 
internal  distribution,  complaints,  the  material  and  moral 
conditions  of  the  work  and  life  of  the  workmen  and 
employees,  and  likewise  all  questions  regarding  the 
progress  of  the  undertaking. 

4.  On  questions  of  a  technical  character  relating  to  the 
enterprise  the  Council  has  only  a  consultative  voice, 
but  on  other  questions  a  decisive  voice,  on  condition, 
however,  that  the  Administrative  Director  appointed 
by  the  Central  Administration  has  the  right  to  appeal 
from  the  orders  of  the  Council  to  the  Commissioner  of 
the  Central  Administration. 

5.  The  duty  of  acting  upon  decisions  of  the  Economic 
Administrative  Council  belongs  to  the  Administrative 
Director. 

6.  The  Council  of  the  enterprise  has  the  right  to 
make  representation  to  the  Central  Administration  re- 
garding a  change  of  the  directors  of  the  enterprise,  and 
to  present  its  own  candidates. 

7.  Depending   on   the   size    and    importance    of  the 


458  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

enterprise,    the    Central    Administration    may  appoint 
several  technical  and  administrative  directors. 

8.  The  composition  of  the  Economic  Administrative 
Council  of  the  enterprise  consists  of  (a)  a  representative 
of  the  workmen  of  the  undertaking;  (b)  a  representative 
of  the  other  employees;  (c)  a  representative  of  the 
highest  technical  and  commercial  personnel;  (d)  the 
directors  of  the  undertaking,  appointed  by  the  Central 
Administration;  (e)  representatives  of  the  local  or  re- 
gional council  of  professional  unions,  of  the  people's 
economic  council,  of  the  council  of  workmen's  deputies, 
and  to  the  professional  council  of  that  branch  of  industry 
to  which  the  given  enterprise  belongs;  (/)  a  representative 
of  the  workmen's  co-operative  council;  and  (g)  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  Soviet  of  peasants'  deputies  of  the 
corresponding  region. 

9.  In  the  composition  of  the  Economic  Administrative 
Council  of  the  enterprise,  representatives  of  workmen 
and  other  employees,  as  mentioned  in  points  (a)  and  (b) 
of  Article  VIII,  may  furnish  only  half  of  the  number  of 
members. 

10.  The  workmen's  control  of  nationalized  undertak- 
ings is  realized  by  leaving  all  declarations  and  orders 
of  the  factory  committee,  or  of  the  controlling  commis- 
sion, to  the  judgment  and  decision  of  the  Economic 
Administrative  Council  of  the  enterprise. 

11.  The  workmen,  employees,  and  highest  technical 
and  commercial  personnel  of  nationalized  undertakings 
are  in  duty  bound  before  the  Russian  Soviet  Republic 
to  observe  industrial  discipline  and  to  carry  out  con- 
scientiously and  accurately  the  work  assigned  to  them. 
To  the  Economic  Administrative  Council  are  given 
judicial  rights,  including  that  of  dismissal  without 
notice  for  longer  or  shorter  periods,  together  with  the 
declaration  of  a  boycott  for  non-proletariat  recognition 
of  their  rights  and  duties. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  459 

12.  In  the  case  of  those  industrial  branches  for  which 
Central  Administrations  have  not  yet  been  formed,  all 
their  rights  are  vested  in  provincial  councils  of  the 
national  economy,  and  in  corresponding  industrial  sec- 
tions of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  National  Economy. 

13.  The  estimates  and  plan  of  work  of  a  nationalized 
undertaking  must  be  presented  by  its  Economic  Adminis- 
trative Council  to  the  Central  Administration  of  a  given 
industrial  branch  at  least  as  often  as  once  in  three 
months,  through  the  provincial  organizations,  where 
such  have  been  established. 

14.  The  management  of  nationalized  undertakings, 
where  such  management  has  heretofore  been  or- 
ganized on  other  principles  because  of  the  absence  of  a 
general  plan  and  general  orders  for  the  whole  of  Russia, 
must  now  be  reorganized,  in  accordance  with  the  present 
regulation,  within  the  next  three  months  (i.e.,  by  the  end 
of  May,  new  style). 

15.  For  the  consideration  of  the  declarations  of  the 
Economic  Administrative  Council  concerning  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  directors  of  the  undertaking  at  the  Central 
Administration  of  a  given  branch  of  industry,  a  special 
section  is  established,  composed  one-third  of  representa- 
tives of  general  governmental,  political,  and  economic 
institutions  of  the  proletariat,  one-third  of  representa- 
tives of  workmen  and  other  employees  of  the  given  in- 
dustrial branch,  and  one-third  of  representatives  of  the 
directing,  technical,  and  commercial  personnel  and  its 
professional  organizations. 

16.  The  present  order  must  be  posted  on  the  premises 
of  each  nationalized  undertaking. 

Note. — Small  nationalized  enterprises  are  managed  on  similar  prin- 
ciples, with  the  proviso  that  the  duties  of  technical  and  administrative 
directors  may  be  combined  in  one  person,  and  the  numerical  strength 
of  the  Economic  Administrative  Council  may  be  cut  down  by  the  omis- 
sion of  representatives  of  one  or  another  institution  or  organization. 


460  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

Part  II 

17.  A  Central  Administration  [Principal  Committee]  for 
each  nationalized  branch  of  industry  is  to  be  estab- 
lished in  connection  with  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
National  Economy,  to  be  composed  one-third  of  repre- 
sentatives of  workmen  and  employees  of  a  given  in- 
dustrial branch;  one-third  of  representatives  of  the 
general  proletariat,  general  governmental,  political,  and 
economic  organizations  and  institutions  (Supreme  Coun- 
cil of  National  Economy,  the  People's  Commissioners, 
All-Russian  Council  of  Professional  Unions,  All-Russian 
Council  of  Workmen's  Co-operative  Unions,  Central 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Councils  of  Workmen's 
Delegates)  and  one-third  of  representatives  of  scientific 
bodies,  of  the  supreme  technical  and  commercial  per- 
sonnel, and  of  democratic  organizations  of  All  Russia 
(Council  of  the  Congresses  of  All  Russia,  co-operative 
unions  of  consumers,  councils  of  peasants'  deputies). 

18.  The  Central  Administration  selects  its  bureau, 
for  which  all  orders  of  the  Central  Administration  are 
obligatory,  which  conducts  the  current  work  and  carries 
into  effect  the  general  plans  for  the  undertaking. 

19.  The  Central  Administration  organizes  provincial 
and  local  administrations  of  a  given  industrial  branch, 
on  principles  similar  to  those  on  which  its  own  organiza- 
tion is  based. 

20.  The  rights  and  duties  of  each  Central  Administra- 
tion are  indicated  in  the  order  concerning  the  establish- 
ment of  each  of  them,  but  in  each  case  each  Central 
Administration  unites,  in  its  own  hands  (a)  the  manage- 
ment of  the  enterprises  of  a  given  industrial  branch, 
(b)  their  financing,  (c)  their  technical  unification  or  re- 
construction, (d)  standardization  of  the  working  condi- 
tions of  the  given  industrial  branch. 

21.  All  orders  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  National 


IN  ALL  HISTORY",  461 

Economy  are  obligatory  for  each  Central  Administra- 
tion; the  Central  Administration  comes  in  contact  with 
the  Supreme  Council  in  the  person  of  the  bureau  of 
productive  organization  of  the  Supreme  Council  of 
National  Economy  through  the  corresponding  productive 
sections. 

22.  When  the  Central  Administration  for  any  in- 
dustrial branch  which  has  not  yet  been  nationalized  is 
organized,  it  has  the  right  to  sequestrate  the  enterprises 
of  the  given  branch,  and  equally,  without  sequestration, 
to  prevent  its  managers  completely  or  in  part  from  en- 
gaging in  its  admininstration,  appoint  commissioners, 
give  orders,  which  are  obligatory,  to  the  owners  of  non- 
nationalized  enterprises,  and  incur  expenses  on  account 
of  these  enterprises  for  measures  which  the  Central 
Administration  may  consider  necessary;  and  likewise 
to  combine  into  a  technical  whole  separate  enterprises 
or  parts  of  the  same,  to  transfer  from  some  enterprises 
to  others  fuel  and  customers'  orders,  and  establish 
prices  upon  articles  of  production  and  commerce. 

23.  The  Central  Administration  controls  imports 
and  exports  of  corresponding  goods  for  a  period  which 
it  determines,  for  which  purpose  it  forms  a  part  of 
the  general  governmental  organizations  of  external 
commerce. 

24.  The  Central  Administration  has  the  right  to  con- 
centrate, in  its  hands  and  in  institutions  established  by  it, 
both  the  entire  preparation  of  articles  necessary  for  a 
given  branch  of  industry  (raw  material,  machinery,  etc.) 
and  the  disposal  to  enterprises  subject  to  it  of  all  products 
and  acceptances  of  orders  for  them. 

Part  III 

25.  Upon  the  introduction  of  nationalization  into  any 

industrial  branch,  or  into  any  individual  enterprise,  the 
30 


462  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

corresponding  Central  Administration  (or  the  temporary 
Central  Administration  appointed  with  its  rights)  takes 
under  its  management  the  nationalized  enterprises, 
each  separately,  and  preserves  the  large  ones  as  separate 
administrative  units,  annexing  to  them  the  smaller  ones. 

26.  Until  the  nationalized  enterprises  have  been  taken 
over  by  the  Central  Administration  (or  principal  com- 
missioner) all  former  managers  or  directorates  must 
continue  their  work  in  its  entirety  in  the  usual  man- 
ner, and  under  the  supervision  of  the  corresponding 
commissioner  (if  one  has  been  appointed),  taking 
all  measures  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the 
national  property  and  for  the  continuous  course  of 
operations. 

27.  The  Central  Administration  and  its  organs  estab- 
lish new  managements  and  technical  administrative  di- 
rectorates of  enterprises. 

28.  Technical  administrative  directorates  of  nation- 
alized enterprises  are  organized  according  to  Part  I 
of  this  Regulation. 

29.  The  management  of  a  large  undertaking,  treated 
as  a  separate  administrative  unit,  is  organized  with  a 
view  to  securing,  in  as  large  a  measure  as  possible,  the 
utilization  of  the  technical  and  commercial  experience 
accumulated  by  the  undertaking;  for  which  purpose 
there  are  included  in  the  composition  of  the  new  manage- 
ment not  only  representatives  of  the  laborers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  enterprise  (to  the  number  of  one-third  of 
the  general  numerical  strength  of  the  management)  and 
of  the  Central  Administration  itself  (to  the  number  of 
one-third  or  less,  as  the  Central  Administration  shall  see 
fit),  but  also,  as  far  as  possible,  members  of  former 
managements,  excepting  persons  specially  removed  by 
the  Central  Administration  and,  upon  their  refusal, 
representatives  of  any  special  competent  organizations, 
even   if  they   are    not    proletariat  (to   a   number   not 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  463 

exceeding  one-third  of  the  general  membership  of  the 
management). 

30.  When  nationalization  is  introduced,  whether  of  the 
entire  branch  of  the  industry  or  of  separate  enterprises, 
the  Central  Administrations  are  permitted,  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  change,  to  pay  to  the  highest  technical 
and  commercial  personnel  their  present  salaries,  and 
even,  in  case  of  refusal  on  their  part  to  work  and  the  im- 
possibility of  filling  their  places  with  other  persons,  to 
introduce  for  their  benefit  obligatory  work  and  to  bring 
suit  against  them. 

31.  The  former  management  of  each  nationalized  un- 
dertaking must  prepare  a  report  for  the  last  year  of 
operation  and  an  inventory  of  the  undertaking,  in 
accordance  with  which  inventory  the  new  management 
verifies  the  properties  taken  over.  The  actual  taking 
over  of  the  enterprise  is  done  by  the  new  management 
immediately  upon  its  confirmation  by  the  principal 
committee,  without  waiting  for  the  presentation  of  the 
inventory  and  report. 

32.  Upon  receipt  in  their  locality  of  notice  of  the 
nationalization  of  some  enterprise,  and  until  the  organ- 
ization of  the  management  and  its  administration  by  the 
Central  Administration  (or  the  principal  commissioner, 
or  institution  having  the  rights  of  the  principal  com- 
missioner) the  workmen  and  employees  of  the  given  en- 
terprise, and,  if  possible,  also  the  Council  of  Workmen's 
Deputies,  the  Council  of  National  Economy,  and  Coun- 
cil of  Professional  Unions,  select  temporary  com- 
missioners, under  whose  supervision  and  observation 
(and,  if  necessary,  under  whose  management)  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  undertaking  continues.  The  workmen 
and  employees  of  the  given  enterprise,  and  the  regional 
councils  of  national  economy,  of  professional  unions, 
and  of  workmen's  delegates  have  the  right  also  to  or- 
ganize   temporary    managements    and    directorates    of 


464  "THE  GREATEST   FAILURE 

nationalized  enterprises  until  the  same  are  completely 
established  by  the  Central  Administration. 

33.  If  the  initiative  for  the  nationalization  of  a  given 
enterprise  comes,  not  from  the  general  governmental 
and  proletariat  organs  authorized  for  that  purpose, 
but  from  the  workmen  of  a  given  enterprise  or  from 
some  local  or  regional  organization,  then  they  propose 
to  the  Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy,  in  the 
bureau  of  organization  of  production,  that  the  necessary 
steps  be  undertaken  through  the  proper  production  sec- 
tions, according  to  the  decree  of  28th  February  regarding 
the  method  of  confiscating  enterprises. 

34.  In  exceptional  cases  local  labor  organizations  are 
given  the  right  to  take  temporarily  under  their  manage- 
ment the  given  enterprise,  if  circumstances  do  not  permit 
of  awaiting  the  decision  of  the  question  in  the  regular 
order,  but  on  condition  that  such  action  be  immediately 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  nearest  provincial  council 
of  national  economy,  which  then  puts  a  temporary 
sequestration  upon  the  enterprise  pending  the  complete 
solution  of  the  question  of  nationalization  by  the  Supreme 
Council  of  National  Economy;  or,  if  it  shall  consider  the 
reasons  insufficient,  or  nationalization  clearly  inexpe- 
dient, or  a  prolonged  sequestration  unnecessary,  it  directs 
a  temporary  sequestration  or  even  directly  re-estab- 
lishes the  former  management  of  the  enterprise  under 
its  supervision,  or  introduces  into  the  composition  of  the 
management   representatives   of  labor  organizations. 

35.  The  present  order  must  be  furnished  by  the  pro- 
fessional unions  of  All  Russia  to  all  their  local  divisions, 
and  by  the  councils  of  factory  committees  to  all  factory 
committees,  and  must  be  published  in  full  in  the  Izvestia 
of  all  provincial  councils  of  workmen's  and  peasants' 
deputies. 

Published  March  7,  igi8. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  465 

III 

Instructions  on  Workers'  Control 
{Official  Text) 

I.  Agencies  of  Workers'  Control  in  Each  Enterprise. 

i.  Control  in  each  enterprise  is  organized  either 
by  the  Shop  or  Factory  Committee,  or  by 
the  General  Assembly  of  workers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  enterprise,  who  elect  a 
Special  Commission  of  Control. 
II.  The  Shop  or  Factory  Committee  may  be  in- 
cluded in  its  entirety  in  the  Control  Com- 
mission, to  which  may  be  elected  also  tech- 
nical experts  and  other  employees  of  the 
enterprise.  In  large-scale  enterprises,  par- 
ticipation of  the  employees  in  the  Control 
Commission  is  compulsory.  In  large-scale 
enterprises  a  portion  of  the  members  of  the 
Control  Commission  is  elected  by  trade  sec- 
tions and  classes,  at  the  rate  of  one  to  each 
trade  section  or  class. 

III.  The  workers  and  employees  not  members  of 
the  Control  Commission  may  not  enter  into 
relations  with  the  management  of  the  enter- 
prise on  the  subject  of  control  except  upon 
the  direct  order  and  with  the  previous  au- 
thorization of  the  Commission. 

IV.  The  Control  Commission  is  responsible  for 
its  activity  to  the  General  Assembly  of  em- 
ployees and  workers  of  the  enterprise,  as  well 
as  to  the  agency  of  workers'  control  upon 
which  it  is  dependent  and  under  the  direc- 
tion of  which  it  functions.  It  makes  a  re- 
port of  its  activity  at  least  twice  a  month  to 
these  two  bodies. 


466  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

II.   Duties  and  Privileges  of  the  Control  Commission. 

v.  The  Control  Commission  of  each  enterprise 
is  required: 

1.  To  determine  the  stock  of  goods  and  fuel 
possessed  by  the  plant,  and  the  amount 
of  these  needed  respectively  for  the  ma- 
chinery of  production,  the  technical  per- 
sonnel, and  the  laborers  by  specialties. 

2.  To  determine  to  what  extent  the  plant  is 
provided  with  everything  that  is  necessary 
to  insure  its  normal  operation. 

3.  To  forecast  whether  there  is  danger  of  the 
plant  closing  down  or  lowering  produc- 
tion, and  what  the  causes  are. 

4.  To  determine  the  number  of  workers  by 
specialties  likely  to  be  unemployed,  basing 
the  estimate  upon  the  reserve  supply  and 
the  expected  receipt  of  fuel  and  materials. 

5.  To  determine  the  measures  to  be  taken  to 
maintain  discipline  in  work  among  the 
workers  and  employees. 

6.  To  superintend  the  execution  of  the  de- 
cisions of  governmental  agencies  regulat- 
ing the  buying  and  selling  of  goods. 

7.  (a)  To  prevent  the  arbitrary  removal  of 
machines,  materials,  fuel,  etc.,  from  the 
plant  without  authorization  from  the  agen- 
cies which  regulate  economic  affairs,  and  to 
see  that  inventories  are  not  tampered  with, 
(b)  To  assist  in  explaining  the  causes  of 
the  lowering  of  production  and  to  take 
measures  for  raising  it. 

8.  To  assist  in  elucidating  the  possibility  of 
a  complete  or  partial  utilization  of  the 
plant  for  some  kind  of  production   (es- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  467 

pecialiy  how  to  pass  from  a  war  to  a  peace 
footing,    and    what    kind    of   production 
should  be  undertaken),  to  determine  what 
changes   should    be   made   in   the   equip- 
ment of  the  plant  and  in  the  number  of 
its  personnel  to  accomplish  this  purpose; 
to  determine  in  what  period  of  time  these 
changes   can    be   effected;    to   determine 
what  is  necessary  in  order  to  make  them, 
and  the  probable  amount  of  production 
after  the  change  is  made  to  another  kind 
of  manufacture. 
9.  To  aid  in  the  study  of  the  possibility  of 
developing   the   kinds   of  labor   required 
by  the  necessities    of   peace-times,   such 
as  the  method   of   using  three  shifts  of 
workmen,  or  any  other  method,  by  furnish- 
ing  information    on    the    possibilities    of 
housing  the  additional  number  of  laborers 
and  their  families. 

10.  To  see  that  the  production  of  the  plant  is 
maintained  at  the  figures  to  be  fixed  by  the 
governmental  regulating  agencies,  and,  until 
such  time  as  these  figures  shall  have  been 
fixed,  to  see  that  the  production  reaches  the 
normal  average  for  the  plant,  judged  by  a 
standard  of  conscientious  labor. 

11.  To  co-operate  in  estimating  costs  of  pro- 
duction of  the  plant  upon  the  demand  of 
the  higher  agency  of  workers'  control  or 
upon  the  demand  of  the  governmental 
regulating  institutions. 

VI.  Upon  the  owner  of  the  plant,  the  decisions 
of  the  Control  Commission,  which  are  in- 
tended to  assure  him  the  possibility  of  ac- 
complishing the  objects  stated  in  the  preced- 


468  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

ing  articles,  are  binding.  In  particular  the 
Commission  may,  of  itself  or  through  its 
delegates: 

1.  Inspect  the  business  correspondence  of  the 
plant,  all  the  books  and  all  the  accounts 
pertaining  to  its  past  or  present  operation. 

2.  Inspect  all  the  divisions  of  the  plant — 
shops,  stores,  offices,  etc. 

3.  Be  present  at  meetings  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  directing  agencies;  make 
statements  and  address  interpellations  to 
them  on  all  questions  relating  to  control. 

VII.  The  right  to  give  orders  to  the  directors  of  the 
plant,  and  the  management  and  operation  of 
the  plant  are  reserved  to  the  owner.  The 
Control  Commission  does  not  participate  in 
the  management  of  the  plant  and  has  no  re- 
sponsibility for  its  development  and  operation. 
This  responsibility  rests  upon  the  owner. 
viii.  The  Control  Commission  is  not  concerned 
with  financial  questions  of  the  plant.  If 
such  questions  arise  they  are  forwarded  to 
the  governmental  regulating  institutions. 
IX.  The  Control  Commission  of  each  enterprise 
may,  through  the  higher  organ  of  workers'  con- 
trol, recommend  for  the  consideration  of  the 
governmental  regulating  institutions  the  ques- 
tion of  the  sequestration  of  the  plant  or  other 
measures  of  constraint  upon  the  plant,  but 
it  has  not  the  right  to  seize  and  direct  the 
enterprise. 

III.   Resources  of  the  Control  Commission  of  each  Plant. 

x.  To  cover  the  expenses  of  the  Control  Com- 
mission, the  owner  is  bound  to  place  at  its 
disposal  not  more  than  two  per  cent,  of  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  469 

amount  paid  out  by  the  plant  in  wages. 
The  wages  lost  by  the  members  of  the  Fac- 
tory or  Shop  Committee  and  by  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Control  Commission  as  a  result 
of  performing  their  duties  during  working 
hours  when  they  cannot  be  performed  other- 
wise, are  paid  out  of  this  two-per-cent. 
account.  Control  over  expenditures  from 
the  above-mentioned  fund  is  exercised  by  the 
Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution  of 
the  trades-unions  of  the  industrial  branch 
concerned. 

IV.   Higher  Agencies  of  Workers'  Control. 

xr.  The  organ  immediately  superior  to  the  Con- 
trol Commission  of  each  enterprise  consists 
of  the  Commission  of  Control  and  Distribu- 
tion of  the  trades-union  of  the  industrial 
branch  to  which  the  plant  in  question 
belongs. 

All  decisions  of  the  Control  Commissions  of 
each  enterprise  may  be  appealed  to  the 
Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution  of 
the  trades-union  exercising  jurisdiction. 
XII.  At  least  half  of  the  members  of  the  Commis- 
sion of  Control  and  Distribution  are  elected 
by  the  Control  Commissions  (or  their  dele- 
gates) of  all  plants  belonging  to  the  same 
branch  of  industry.  These  are  convened  by 
the  directors  of  the  trades-union.  The  other 
members  are  elected  by  the  directors,  or  by 
delegates,  or  else  by  the  General  Assembly 
of  the  trades-union.  Engineers,  statisticians, 
and  other  persons  who  may  be  of  use,  are 
eligible  to  election  to  membership  in  the 
Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution. 


470  "THE   GREATEST  FAILURE 

xiii.  The  executive  directorate  of  the  union  is 
authorized  to  direct  and  review  the  activity 
of  the  Commission  of  Control  and  Distribu- 
tion and  of  the  Control  Commission  of  each 
plant  under  its  jurisdiction. 

xiv.  The  Control  Commission  of  each  plant  con- 
stitutes the  executive  agency  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Control  and  Distribution  for  its 
branch  of  industry,  and  is  bound  to  make  its 
activity  conform  to  the  decisions  of  the 
latter, 
xv.  The  Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution 
of  the  trades-union  has  the  authority  of  its 
own  accord  to  convene  the  General  Assembly 
of  workers  and  employees  of  each  enterprise, 
to  require  new  elections  of  Control  Com- 
missions of  each  plant,  and  likewise  to  pro- 
pose to  the  governmental  regulating  agencies 
the  temporary  closing  down  of  plants  or  the 
dismissal  of  all  the  personnel  or  of  a  part  of 
it,  in  case  the  workers  employed  in  the 
plant  will  not  submit  to  its  decisions. 

xvi.  The  Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution 
has  entire  control  over  all  branches  of  in- 
dustry within  its  district,  and  according  to 
the  needs  of  any  one  plant  in  fuel,  materials, 
equipment,  etc.,  assists  that  plant  in  obtain- 
ing supplies  from  the  reserve  of  other  plants 
of  the  same  kind  either  in  active  operation 
or  idle.  If  other  means  cannot  be  found,  it 
proposes  to  the  Governmental  Regulating 
Commissions  to  close  down  particular  plants 
so  that  others  may  be  sustained,  or  to  place 
the  workmen  and  employees  of  plants  which 
have  been  closed  down,  either  temporarily  or 
definitively,  in  other  plants  engaged  in  the 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  471 

same  kind  of  manufacture,  or  to  take  any 
other  measures  which  are  likely  to  prevent 
the  closing  down  of  plants  or  an  interruption 
in  their  operation,  or  which  are  thought 
capable  of  insuring  the  regular  operation  of 
said  plants  in  conformity  with  the  plans  and 
decisions  of  the  governmental  regulating 
agencies. 

Remark. — The  Commissions  of  Control  and 
Distribution  issue  technical  instructions  for 
the  Control  Commissions  of  each  plant  of 
their  branch  of  industry  and  according  to 
their  technical  specialties.  These  instruc- 
tions must  not  in  any  respect  be  inconsistent 
with  these  regulations. 

XVII.  Appeal  may  be  made  against  all  decisions 
and  all  acts  of  the  Commission  of  Control 
and  Distribution  to  the  regional  Council  of 
Workers'  Control. 

XViii.  The  operating  expenses  of  the  Commission 
of  Control  and  Distribution  for  each  branch 
of  industry  are  covered  by  the  balances  in  the 
treasury  of  each  plant  (Art.  17)  and  by 
equal  assessments  on  the  state  and  the 
trades-union  exercising  jurisdiction, 
xix.  The  Local  Council  of  Workers'  Control  con- 
siders and  decides  all  questions  of  a  general 
nature  for  all  or  for  any  of  the  Commissions 
of  Control  and  Distribution  of  a  given  lo- 
cality and  co-ordinates  their  activity  to  con- 
form with  advices  received  from  the  All- 
Russian  Council  of  Control  by  the  Workers. 
XX.  Each  Council  of  Workers'  Control  should 
enact  compulsory  regulations  to  govern  the 
working  discipline  of  the  workmen  and 
employees  of  the  plants  under  its  jurisdiction. 


472  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

xxi.  The  Local  Council  of  Workers'  Control  may 
establish  within  it  a  council  of  experts, 
economists,  statisticians,  engineers,  or  other 
persons  who  may  be  useful. 

xxn.  The  All-Russian  Council  of  Workers'  Con- 
trol may  charge  the  All-Russian  Trades- 
Union  or  the  regional  trades-union  of  any 
branch  of  industry  with  the  duty  of  forming 
an  All-Russian  Commission  or  a  Regional 
Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution,  for 
the  given  branch  of  industry.  The  regula- 
tions for  such  an  All-Russian  or  Regional 
Commission  of  Control  and  Distribution, 
drafted  by  the  Union,  must  be  approved  by 
the  All-Russian  Council  of  Workers'  Control. 

xxm.  All  decisions  of  the  All-Russian  Soviet  of 
Workers'  Control  and  all  decisions  of  other 
governmental  regulating  agencies  in  the 
realm  of  economic  regularization  are  binding 
upon  all  the  agencies  of  the  institution  of 
workers'  control. 

xxiv.  These  regulations  are  binding  upon  all  in- 
stitutions of  workers'  control,  and  apply 
in  toto  to  plants  which  employ  one  hundred 
or  more  workmen  and  employees.  Control 
over  plants  employing  a  smaller  personnel 
will  be  effected  as  far  as  possible  on  the 
basis  of  these  instructions  as  a  model. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


473 


INDEX 


Adjustment  committees,  203. 
Administrative    officials,    increase 

in,  236,  241,  242. 
Advertising    monopoly,    decreed, 

323- 

Aeroplane-factories,  decline  of  out- 
put in,  207. 

Agents,  provocative,  use  of,  4. 

Agriculture,  nationalization  of,  82, 
83,  84,  85.  _ 

Agunov,  A.,  incarcerated,  319. 

Alexander  Works,  strike  at,  248, 
250. 

Alexinsky,  Gregory,  reports  of 
Joint  Congress,  291,  321. 

Alien  agitators,  deportation  of, 
152,  153  n. 

Allies,  intervention  by,  155,  190; 
deserted  by  Bolsheviki,  308; 
and  blockade  of  Russia,  431- 
438. 

"Allotment  gardens"  scheme,  87, 
88. 

Alminsky,  on  Extraordinary  Com- 
mission, 159,  160. 

Anarchy,  among  peasants,  7,  72, 

74»  75»  96,  97»  99>  i°o,  212. 

Andreiv,  Leonid,  319. 

Anti-Bolshevist  press  extermi- 
nated, 324. 

Anti-Jewish  pogroms,  103. 


Antonelli,  Etienne,  155. 

Arakcheev,  Count,  and  militariza- 
tion of  agricultural  labor,  399. 

Arbitration  committees,  203. 

Armed  force,  failed,  124,  125,  136. 

Armistice,  the,  432. 

Army:  demoralization  of,  216;  la- 
bor, 391-409;  under  Soviet  di- 
rection, 446,  447. 

Arrests,  mass,  155. 

Arthur  Koppel  Works,  strike  at, 
248. 

Assemblage,  freedom  of,  339,  340, 
341,342,343,347,348. 

Astrov,  Cadet,  property  confis- 
cated, 165. 

Auditoriums,  publicly  owned,  349; 
controlled  by  workmen's  organ- 
izations, 350. 

Aviation  plant,  wage  system,  259. 

Axelrod-Orthodox,  321. 

B 

Babeuf,  Gracchus,  death,  426. 

Ballot,  secrecy  of,  49. 

Berkenheim,  Alexander,  and  block- 
ade, 435,  436. 

Bezhenov,  quoted,  287  n. 

Black  Hundreds,  reign  of  terror,  4. 

Blockade,  Russian,  431-438. 

Blue  gendarmes,  reign  of  terror,  4. 

Bogdanov,  N.,  report  on  nationali- 
zation of  agriculture,  83,  84,  85. 


474 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


Bolsheviki:  control  in  Russia,  i; 
methods,  2;  rule  of  blood  and 
iron,  3;  Red  Guards,  4;  system 
of  espionage,  4,  5;  abandoned 
theories,  5;  opposed  to  first 
Soviet,  12, 16,  22-28;  apologists, 
31;  discontent  and  hatred 
against,  33;  peasants  hostile  to, 
82;  and  transportation  system, 
91;  charged  with  brutality  and 
crime,  92;  and  distribution  of 
land,  97,  98,  99;  instigate  peas- 
ants to  murder,  103;  grain  de- 
cree, 104,  453-464;  create  com- 
mittees of  the  poor,  109;  and 
terrorism,  140-191;  brutal  meth- 
ods, 144,  145,  146,  147;  despotic 
and  tyrannical,  194;  demand 
abolition  of  death  penalty,  157; 
restore  death  penalty,  158;  tor- 
ture at  inquest,  174;  and  Soviet 
control  of  industry,  198;  decline 
of  productivity  under,  209,  210, 
211;  propaganda,  210,  220,  411, 
4i2;anddemoralizationof  army, 
210,  216;  and  maximum  pro- 
duction, 215;  and  seizure  of 
government,  215;  and  factory 
control,  216,  217,  218,  219;  and 
trades-unions,  247-258;  bureau- 
cracy of,  263-267;  and  civil 
war,  292,  308;  party  formed, 
309;  brutal  methods  to  main- 
tain power,  311;  suppression  of 
newspapers,  313-317;  hostility 
to  freedom  of  press,  317-319, 
329,  332-339;  and  public  as- 
semblage, 342-346;  and  con- 
scription of  labor,  374-383;  and 
labor  army,  391,  392,  406;  atti- 
tude toward  Constituent  Assem- 
bly, 414,  415,  421;  election 
against,  417,  419;  wholesale 
shootings,    422;     sufferings    of 


Russia  under,  423;  and  czar- 
ism,  426;  unpardonable  crime 
of,  428;  and  blockade,  431-438; 
treachery,  438;  agitation  against 
German  Government,  443,  444; 
and  Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  444; 
decree  on  education,  450;  and 
militarism,  451. 

Bolshevism:  developed  new  bu- 
reaucracy, 4;  defined,  16;  and 
nationalization  of  industry,  239, 
240,  241,  242,  243,  307;  fall  in- 
evitable, 307;  abhorrent,  307; 
perversion  of  Socialistic  idea, 
307;  tragic  failure,  413;  a 
government  by  force,  413;  uni- 
versal spread  of,  438,  439,  440. 

Bolshevist:  regime  tottering,  1; 
adaptability,  5;  propaganda, 
210,  220,  411,  412;  congress  of, 
421. 

Bonch-Bruyevich,  and  Red  Ter- 
ror, 141. 

Bourgeoisie,  massacre  of,  144;  mo- 
bilization of,  376,  377,  378,  379. 

Bread  scarcity,  261,  262,  297. 

Breshkovsky,  Catherine,  319. 

Brest-Litovsk  Treaty,  29,  30,  321, 
432,  442,  443,  444. 

Brichkina,  S.,  and  Labor  Army, 
392-396. 

Bryant,  Louise,  154. 

Bucharin,  and  trades-unions,  255; 
The  Program  of  the  Communists, 
334,  439;  and  freedom  of  the 
press,  335,  337;  a  tyrant,  351; 
editor  of  Pravda,  358. 

Bullitt,  William  C,  154. 

Bureaucracy:  developed,  4;  of 
the  Bolsheviki,  263-267;  cor- 
ruption of,  268-274;  efficiency 
of,  275-279;   increase,  444. 

Bureaucratic  red  tape,  284. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


475 


Capitalism,  return  to,  247. 
Capital  punishment,  abolition  of, 

157;   restoration  of,  158. 
"Centrosoym,"  435,  436. 
Chernov,  74,  76,  78. 
Chicherine,  relations  with  British 

Government,  443. 
Chief  Tasks  of  Our  Times,  The,  226, 

439- 
Children  executed,  145,  146. 
Chresvychaika,   The,  154,  155,  169, 

451- 
Civil  War  in  France,  Marx,  356. 
Civil  War  in  Russia,  292. 
Clergy  denied  right  to  vote,  46. 
Coal-mines,  low  production,  228, 

229,  262. 
Coal:     transportation,    283,    285; 

supply,  296. 
Code   of  Labor   Laws   of  Soviet 

Russia,  371,  374,  380,  381,  382, 

390. 

Commissars,  Council  of  People's, 

54,  55,  56,  57,  63,  66. 
Committee,    All-Russian    Central 

Executive,   53,   54,   56,   57,   58, 

59,  60,  61,  66. 
Committee  of  the  Poor  established, 

109,  no,  in,  112,  114,  115. 
Committees,  extraordinary,  brutal 

and  corrupt,  4. 
Commune  of  1871,  Paris,  356,  429, 

430,431. 
Communes,  agricultural,  86,  87. 
Communist  Manifesto,  Marx,  353, 

354*  35.6. 
Communist  Party:  hatred  of,  33; 
creation  of,  35;  dictatorship 
over  Russian  people,  357;  re- 
sponsibility, 358;  predominance 
of,  in  Soviet  Government,  359; 
in  the  army,  359;   mobilization 


of  regiments  by,  360;  member- 
ship, 360,  361,  362,  364;  cam- 
paign for  new  members,  363, 
364;  represents  minority  of  or- 
ganized proletariat,  365. 
Congresses    of  the    Soviets,   The, 

52»  5.3,  56,  57,  58,  59,  66. 
Conscription  by  decree,  446. 
Conscription  of  labor,  369,    374, 

375,  376,  377,  378,  379,  380,  381, 
382,  383,  400,  401,  406. 

Constituent  Assembly:  elections, 
15,  16,  193,  194,  195,  417,  418, 
426;  and  land  problem,  76-81; 
convocation  of,  141,  142,  158, 
414,  415,  416,  420;  dispersed, 
311,  420;     betrayal  of,  421. 

Constitution  of  the  Russian  So- 
cialist Federal  Soviet  Republic, 
62,  421. 

Control  Commission,  the,  instruc- 
tions to,  216,  217,  218,  219. 

Corn,  transport,  285. 

Corruption  of  the  bureaucracy, 
268-274. 

Cotton-factories,  idle,  286. 

"Cottonized"  flax,  288. 

Cotton  substitute,  288. 

Council  of  the  People's  Commis- 
saries, 22,  23,  193,  194. 

Council  of  Workmen's  Deputies  of 
Petrograd  organized,  12. 

Counter-revolutionists,  destruc- 
tion of,  156,  157. 

Courts  of  justice  abolished,  149. 

Cultivation,  decline  in,  113,  121. 

Czarism,  opposition  to,  2;  ruled 
by  brute  force,  3;  developed 
bureaucracy,  4,  139;  destroyed, 
426. 

D 

Das  Kapital,  356. 
Day-work  payments,  281. 


476 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


Death  penalty,  right  to  inflict,  156, 

157,  158,  159;   abolished,  190. 
Decree  No.  903,  167,  168. 
Deportation,  provisions  for,   152, 

I53-, 

Deputies,  Soviet  of,  59,  60. 
Deserters,  army,  446;   shooting  of 

relatives,  447. 
Desertion,  mass,  210. 
Deutsch,  Leo,  321. 
Dictatorship     of    the    Proletariat, 

225  n. 
Dictatorship    of   the    proletariat, 

298,  306 
Dien,   The,  suppressed,  319,  320, 

321,  322. 
Dioneo-Shklovsky,    on    wholesale 

massacres,  144. 
Disfranchisement,  right  of,  48,  49, 

Documents:  decree  regarding 
grain  control,  453-456;  regu- 
lation concerning  the  adminis- 
tration of  national  undertakings, 
456-464;  instructions  on  Work- 
ers' Control,  465-472. 

Donetz  Basin  coal-fields,  output, 
228;  supply  from,  296. 

Dukhonine,  General,  murdered, 
320. 

Dumas,  Charles,  on  village  wars, 
103;  on  Schastny  case,  173,  174. 

Dumas,  city,  195,  197. 

Dyelo  Naroda,  quoted,  35;  sup- 
pressed, 319,  321,  322. 

Dzerzhinsky,  proclamation  by, 
183,  184. 

E 

Economicheskaya  Zhizn,  quoted, 
88,  282,  282  n,  283,  284,  285, 
286,  287,  288,  289,  293,  307. 

Edinstvo,  suppressed,  318. 

Education,  decrees  on,  450. 


Efficiency  of  the  bureaucracy,  275- 

279. 
Eight-hour  day,  229,  232,  237,  349. 
Elections,  Soviet,  46,  47,  48. 
Electoral   franchise  withheld,  45, 

46,47,  51. 
Electorate,    divided    into    two 

groups,  63. 
Electric-lamp  factories  closed,  287. 
Engels,  Frederick,  and  the  modern 

state,  8;  quoted,  9,  10,  128;  and 

Marx,  356. 
Eroshkin,  M.  C,  on  Committees 

of  the  Poor,  114,  115;    and  up- 
risings   against     Soviets,     148, 

149. 
Estates,  nationalization  of,  82,  83, 

84,  85,  86,  95,  96;    confiscated, 

96,97,98,99,  100,  10 1. 
Eupatoria,  massacres  in,  144. 
Exchange  stations  established,  136, 

137-  _ 

Executions:  mass,  held  at  Rostov- 
on-Don,  145;  Mihont  trial,  222. 

Exports,  433,  434. 

Extraordinary  Commission  for 
Combating  Counter-revolution, 
created,  154,  155;  proclamation, 
156;  shooting  of  people  by,  158, 
159,  163,  164,  165,  166,  167,  168, 
169,  170,  171;  powers  limited, 
180. 

Eyre,  Lincoln,  and  the  Chresvychai- 
kas,  155;  on  compulsory  labor, 
374- 


Factories:  closing  of,  87,  300; 
confiscated,  205,  211,  216,  225, 
227,  237;  abandoned  by  owners, 
237;  nationalized,  300. 

Factory:  owners  forced  out,  198, 
204,  205;  councils,  198,  199,  200, 
201;  owners  recalled,  212;  con- 


IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


477 


trol  under  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, 216,  217,  218,  219. 

Famine,  121,  136,  138,  245,  246, 
289,  290. 

Feeding,  class  system  of,  185,  186. 

Fir  cones,  collected  for  fuel,  285. 

Flax,  production,  294,  295;  export, 

295>  435- 
Food:    army,  112;   hoarding,  122, 

123;  transportation,  285;  sup- 
ply* 4335   shortage,  435,  437. 

Food-requisitioning  detachments: 
formed,  107,  in,  112;  reports 
on,  114,  115,  116,  117,  118,  119, 
120;  unsuccessful  visits,  122, 
123;   resistance  to,  136. 

Freedom,  promise  of,  451. 

Free  trade,  forbidden,  185. 

Freight-tonnage,  decrease  in,  236. 

French  Revolution,  422,  424,  425, 
426,  427,  428. 

Fuel,  situation,  285;  shortage,  295, 
296. 

Fuel  supply,  failure  of,  244. 

G 

Gas,  absence  of,  288. 
Georgelll,  and  equal  suffrage,  414. 
Gendarmes,  Russia  ruled  by,  3,  4. 
Genzelli  brothers,  shot,  172. 
Germany,  peace  with  Russia,  308, 

431-  . 

Girondins,  427. 

Goldman,  L.  I.,  on  Jaroslav  up- 
risings, 23. 

Goode,  William  T.,  154;  on  ju- 
dicial system  of  Soviet  Russia, 
178,  179. 

Gorky,  Maxim,  on  village  wars, 
97,  103;  "The  Policy  of  De- 
spair," 107;  and  armed  force, 
124;  on  brutal  methods  of  the 
Bolsheviki,  144,  145;  paper  sup- 
pressed, 322. 
31 


Gostev,  on  nationalization  of  in- 
dustry, 239. 

Grain  control,  decree  regarding, 
4S3-4S6. 

Grain:  shipments,  123,  124;  ex- 
changed, 136;  control  of,  104, 
453-456;  profiteers,  105;  regu- 
lations, 105,  106;  requisitioned, 
107,  108,  109,  112;  curtailment 
of  production,  121;  hoarding, 
122,  123;  speculation  in,  122, 
123. 

Guards,  Red,  special  privileges,  4. 

Gukovsky,  commissar  of  finances, 
on  railway  system,  236;  on  ma- 
rine transportation  service,  236; 
report  on  Budget,  238. 

Guyot,  Yves,  369. 

H 

Hand-cart,  prize  for  invention  of, 

284. 
"Hangman's  Journal,  The,"  170. 
Hard,  William,  and  suppression  ot 

newspapers,  313,  314,  315,  316, 

317.318,330,342. 
Haulage  system,  rope,  introduced, 

285;  instead  of  railways,  306. 
Hides,  production,  295. 
Holidays,  increase  of,  228. 
Horses,  disappearance,  284. 
How  the  Russian  Peasants  Fought 

for  a  Constituent  Assembly,  142  n. 
Hunger,  unemployment  cause  of, 

87,  88. 
Huxley,  369. 

I 
Imports,  433. 

Industrial  allotments,  administra- 
tion of,  established,  87. 
Industrial   establishments,   policy 

of  subsidizing,  238. 
Industry:    nationalization  of,  82, 

236,   237,    239,    240,   241,   242, 


478 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


243;  Soviet  control  of,  198,  213, 
214,  215;   disorganized,  238. 

International,  Third,  an  instru- 
ment of  revolution,  440,  441. 

Ivanovsky,  Michael,  shooting  of, 
184. 

Jzvestia,  on  peasant  uprisings,  117, 
118,  119;  quoted,  24,  115,  118, 
138,  143,  163,  170,  183-187, 
195,  196,  197,  198,  205,  222- 
224,  262,  266,  268,  271,  305, 
328,  378,  402-405. 

J 

Jacobins,  427. 

"Jacqueries,"  revival  of,  74. 

Jandarmov,  on  production,  210, 
211,  212. 

Jaroslav  insurrection,  22,  23,  24. 

Jews,  persecuting  of,  347. 

Joffe,  on  "Revolutionary  Meth- 
ods," 443. 

Journals,  suppressed,  5. 

Judicial  system,  democratic,  149; 
of  Soviet  Russia,  178,  179. 

K 

Kalinin,  and  conciliation  of  the 
middle  peasantry,  134,  135,  136. 

Kamenev:  on  Constituent  Assem- 
bly, 15;  and  death  penalty,  157; 
and  constitutional  assembly, 
193;  on  profiteering,  304;  and 
universal  spread  of  Bolshevism, 
438. 

Kautsky,  and  the  dictatorship  of 
the  proletariat,  356. 

Keeling,  H.  V.,  on  suppression  of 
Soviets,  27;  on  Soviet  elections, 

33- 

Keely,  Royal  C,  and  compulsory 
labor,  374. 

Kerensky,  A.  F.,  Premier  of  Pro- 
vincial Government,  2,  3;   land 


program,  74,  76,  77;  and  de- 
moralization of  industry,  91; 
and  deserting  soldiers,  96;  and 
German  counter-revolutionists, 
157;  overthrow,  193;  on  in- 
creased production,  210;  and 
industrial  control,  219;  and 
help  for  industrial  establish- 
ments, 238 

Kerensky,  Alexander,  translator, 
283  n. 

Kerzheutzer,  on  "requisition  par- 
ties," 116,  117. 

Kiev,  massacres  in,  145. 

Knielnitski,  Bogdan,  revolt  of,  429. 

Kobozev,  Commissar  of  Communi- 
cations, on  inactivity  of  the 
workers,  237. 

Kohoshkin,  F.  F.,  murder  of,  143. 

Kopp,  Victor,  on   grain  exports, 

434- 

Kornilov,  on  decline  of  produc- 
tivity, 207. 

Krassin,  Leonid  B.,  and  reorgan- 
ization of  industry,  279;  ap- 
pointment as  commissary,  280; 
industrial  despot,  281;  reor- 
ganized system,  282;  and  trans- 
portation, 283,  284,  285;  on  the 
fall  of  Bolshevism,  307;  on 
grain  exports,  434. 

Krivoshayer,  report  on  requi- 
sitioning detachments,  120. 

Krylenko,  and  capture  of  General 
Headquarters,  320;  report  on 
military  organization,  446. 


Labor  booklet,  386,  387,  388,  389. 

Labor  distribution,  department  of, 
383,  384,  385,_  386. 

Labor,  time  limit,  212;  low  pro- 
ductivity, 297;  shortage,  304, 
305;    conscription  of,  369,  370, 


IN  ALL  HISTORY"  479 

374i  37S»376i  377.  378.  379.  38i»  346;    a  tyrant,  351;    Two  Tac- 

382,  383,  391,  400,  401,  409.  tics,   352;     and   Marxism,    353, 

Land  commissions  created,  71,  72,  354,  355;  on  dictatorship  of  the 

73,  74,  76,  81.  proletariat,    358;     anti-statists, 

Landowners  murdered,  72,  74.  371,  372,  373;    on  compulsory 

Land:    seized,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76;  labor,  375,  380;  and  labor  army, 

law,  78,  79;  socialization  of,  80,  392-396;     and    equal    suffrage, 

83,  87,  88,  89;    distribution  of,  414;  on  freedom  of  speech,  pub- 

95-103,  426.  lication,   and   assemblage,   420; 

Latzis,  on  conditions  in  Province  new  set  of  principles,  421;    and 

of  Vitebsk,  117.  Paris  Commune,  429,  430;   and 

V Avanti,  of  Rome,  350.  universal  spread  of  Bolshevism, 

La     Verit'e     sur     les     Bolsheviki,  438,  439;    and  Soviet  direction 

Charles  Dumas,  103  n.  of  army,  447. 

Laws,  Russian,  39,  40,  45,  46,  47,  Le  Peuple,  of  Brussels,  350. 

52>  53>  54>  55>  56-  Les  Bolsheviks  a  I'ceuvre,  147  n. 

League  of  Nations,  Supreme  Coun-  Levine,    Isaac    Don,    on    Soviet 

cil  of,  436.  Russia,  37,  154. 

Leather-factories,  output,  286,  287.  L'Humanite,  350. 

Lenin,    Nicolai,    internal    opposi-  Liberty,   the   right  of  discussion, 

tion,  1;   theories  abandoned,  5;  313. 

and    Constitutional    Assembly,  Lincoln,   Abraham,   quoted,   338; 

15,  415,  416,  417,  419;   opposed  and  equal  suffrage,  414. 

Soviets,  18;    report  on  peasant  Litvinov,   and   revolutionary   agi- 

uprisings,  119;    attitude  toward  tation,  442. 

peasantry,    127,    128-134;     ar>d  Livestock,decline  in  quantity, 295. 

Menshevist    Social    Democrats,  Lockerman,  M.,  on  terrorism,  147. 

127;  attempted  assassination  of,  Locomotives,    lack   of,    261,    262; 

140,  141,  148,  160,  161,  i62,'l64;  disabled,  292,  293,  299. 

on  terrorism,   147;    and   death  Lock-outs,  249. 

penalty,  157;   on  elections,  194;  Lomov,  and  return  to  capitalism, 

on  success  of  Socialism  in  Rus-  247. 

sia,  222,  223,  224;    and  Soviet  Louis  XVI,  overthrow,  425. 

meetings,    230;     and    new-born  y, 

bourgeoisie,  263;  on  administra- 
tion by  single  individual,  305,  Machine-shops  closed,  238. 

306;      analysis     of,     by     Rosa  Magna  Charta,  signing  of,  413. 

Luxemburg,   309;    estimate  of,  Malone,  M.  P.,  Colonel,  154,  155. 

by    P.    Rappaport,    310;     con-  Manufactured  goods,  lessening  of 

tempt  for  democratic  ways,  310;  production,   138. 

brutal  methods,  311,  312;    and  Marine  transportation  service,  na- 

freedom  of  the  press,  332,  333,  tionalized,     236;      demoralized, 

337;    report  on  "Bourgeois  and  236. 

Proletarian  Democracies,"  345,  Martov,  L.,  protest  against  resto- 


480 


"THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


ration  of  death  penalty,  157, 158; 
account  of  Schastny  trial,  174, 
175;  "on  red  tape  and  waste, 
284;  accuses  Lenin,  321. 

Marx,  Karl,  theory,  128,  425;  and 
social  evolution,  241;  Socialism 
of,  3395  teachings,  353;  Com- 
munist Manifesto,  353,  354; 
death,  353;  meaning  of  the 
term  "proletariat,"  354,  355, 
356;  and  universal  suffrage,  414; 
Civil  War  in  France,  431. 

Marxian  Socialists  of  Russia,  227, 
271. 

Marxism  and  Leninism,  353,  354. 

Marx  Printing  Works,  wage-sys- 
tem, 259. 

Massacres,  wholesale,  144,  145. 

Material,  raw,  lack  of,  238;  trans- 
portation, 293,  294. 

Match-factories,  output,  287. 

"Meeting-holding"  and  loss  of 
time,  230,  231. 

Melnikov,  P.,  and  execution  of 
children,  146. 

Memorandum  on  Certain  Aspects  0/ 
the  Bolshevist  Movement  in  Rus- 
sia, A,  quoted,  33. 

Menshekov,  on  Soviet  elections, 
35;    report  on  production,  208. 

Mensheviki:  opposed  to  Bolshe- 
viki,  12;  stand  on  Soviet  plat- 
form, 32;  faction  of  Social 
Democratic  Party,  67;  party 
formed,  309. 

Metal,  transportation,  294. 

Metal  workers  idle,  286. 

Militarism,  freedom  from,  451. 

Military  Revolutionary  commit- 
tees, 26. 

Miliukov,  and  government  em- 
ployees, 264. 

Miliutin,  on  nationalization  of  in- 
dustry, 239. 


Mir,  privileged  journal,  325. 

Mizkevich,  publicist,  450. 

Mobilization,  forcible,  125. 

Molot,  priest,  arrest,  164. 

Money,  loan,  238;  paper  issue,  238, 
246. 

Monks,  denied  right  to  vote,  46. 

Montagnards,  the,  427. 

Moscow  railway  workshops,  de- 
cline in  production,  228,  229. 

Mothers  petition  for  lives  of  their 
children,  146. 

Munition-works,  decline  of  out- 
put in,  207,  208. 

Mytishchy  Works,  Moscow,  loss  of 
production,  228,  229. 

N 

Nache  Slovo,  fined,  329. 

Narodnoye  Slovo,  suppressed,  319. 

blasha  Rech,  suppressed,  318. 

Nashe  Yedinstvo,  confiscated,  321. 

Nationalization:  of  the  land,  83, 
85,  88;  of  industry,  260,  280, 
282;  policy,  demand  for  aboli- 
tion, 298. 

Nationalized  industries,  financing, 
288;   picture  of,  307. 

Nemensky,  and  government  em- 
ployees, 264. 

Nevsky  Shipbuilding  and  Engi- 
neering Works,  premium  system 
restored,  259;    closed,  286. 

Newspaper,  compulsory  purchase 
of,  326. 

Newspapers:  suppressed,  313- 
319;  "nationalized,"  324;  fined, 
329;  denied  circulation  through 
mails,  324. 

Nicholas  II,  Czar,  62;  regulations, 
343;  and  equal  suffrage,  414; 
overthrow,  425. 

Nikolaiev,  on  agricultural  com- 
munes, 86. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY 


»» 


481 


Noble  Factory,  wage-system,  259. 
Notch,  suppressed,  320. 
Novayia  Zhizn,  suppressed,  322. 
Novotcherkassk,  massacres  in,  145. 
Novoye    Vremia,     establishment 

seized,  323. 
Novy  Loock,  suppressed,  321,  322. 

o 

Oberoucheff,  Gen.  C.  M.,  quoted, 

3- 

Obligatory  Regulation  No.  27,  326, 

327- 

"Off  days,"  increase  of,  228. 

Oil,  fuel,  deficiency,  285. 

Okhrana  (Czar's  Secret  Service), 
reign  of  terror,  4,  46. 

Origin  of  the  Family,  Private 
Property,  and  the  State,  10. 

Oupovalov,  J.  E.,  on  suppression 
of  Soviets,  29,  30;  on  increased 
production,  209;  and  trades- 
unions,  253;  on  public  assem- 
blage, 340,  341. 

Outre  Rossii,  fined,  329. 

Overtime,  281. 


Paper  currency,  worthless,  137, 
138. 

Pauper  committees  established, 
109,  no,  in,  112,  114,  115. 

Peasantry:  Lenin's  attitude 
toward,  127-134;  Kalinin  on, 
134-136. 

Peasants:  voters  discriminated 
against,  66;  uprisings  among, 
72,  73.  74.  75,  92,  96,  100,  101, 
102,  148,  149;  character,  92,  93; 
savage  brutality,  93,  94;  soldier 
deserters,  96,  97;  distribution 
of  land  among,  97,  98,  99;  con- 
flict with  Soviet  authorities,  98, 
99;      resist    grain    regulations, 


106,  107,  112;  city  proletariat 
against,  107;  opposed  to  Com- 
mittees of  the  Poor,  114,  115; 
resist  requisitioning  detach- 
ments, 120,  121,  122;  curtail 
production,  121;  revolt  against 
Soviet  rule,  121,  122;'  hoarding 
food,  122,  123;  resist  forcible 
mobilization,  125;  and  exchange 
stations,  136,  137;  robbed  of 
grain,  137;  and  Soviet  power, 
138. 

People's  commissaries,  32. 

People's  food  commissioner,  pow- 
ers of,  105,  106. 

People's  tribunals,  cases  and  sen- 
tences cited,  93,  94. 

Petrograd  Soviet  of  Workmen's 
Deputies  organized,  12,  13. 

Petrovsky,  call  for  mass  terror, 
162,  163. 

Piece-work  system,  247,  252,  259, 
280. 

Platonov,  on  agricultural  com- 
munes, 87. 

Plechanov,  George  V.,  publication 
confiscated,  319,  321. 

"Policy  of  Despair,  The,"  Gorky, 
107. 

Political  offenses,  special  tribunals 
for,  150,  151,  152. 

Politicians,  ousted,  281. 

Polnotch,  suppressed,  320. 

Potresov,  Alexander,  opinions  of, 
319,  320. 

Pravda,  quoted,  6,  26,  96,  no, 
125,  128-134,  159,  194,  261, 
317;  344-346,  363,  364>447- 

Premiums,  280. 

Press  Department,  325. 

Press,  Russian,  freedom  of,  315, 
316,  317,  318,  322,  329,  332,  333, 
334.  33S.  336,  337.  339,  35<=> 
3Si- 


482 


THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 


Prlnkipo  Conference,  441. 

Printing  establishments  "nation- 
alized," 323. 

Printers'  union,  suppressed,  252. 

Prisons,  city,  conditions  in,  179. 

Production,  decrease  under  Soviet 
government,  208,  209,  212,  227, 
228,  229,  241,  242. 

Productivity,  decline  in,  204,  206, 
207,  208. 

Profiteering,  proceedings  against, 
150. 

Program  of  the  Communists,  The, 

334.  439- 
Proletariat:    dictatorship   of  the, 

352.  353.  355.  3565  meaning  of, 

354;    uprising  of,  355. 
"Proletcult"    of    Soviet    Russia, 

450. 
Propaganda,  441. 
Provisional  Government,  the,  8,12, 

14,   15,  95,   197,  198,  203,  209, 

210,  211,  215,  216,  226,  308,  414, 

415.  426. 
Putilov  works,  strike  at,  248,  250. 

R 

Rabatcheie  Dclo,  suppressed,  318. 
Rabochaia  Gazeta,  suppressed,  318, 

3*9- 

Radek,  and  death  penalty,  157. 

Radek,  and  universal  spread  of 
Bolshevism,  438;  on  Spartacist 
uprisings,  439. 

Rakovsky,  and  death  penalty,  157. 

Railroad  Workers'  Unions:  Con- 
gress of,  254;  merged  with  the 
state,  254,  255. 

Railway  system:  demoralized, 
236;  operating  expenses  in- 
creased, 236. 

Railways:  nationalized,  235,  237, 
242,  243,  246;  deficits,  243; 
service  test,  243,  244;   collapse, 


244,   246;    wood   fuel  for,   244, 

245- 
Railway  transportation,  283,  292, 

293,  294,  296,  297,  299. 

Railway  workers'  councils  abol- 
ished, 236. 

Rakitnikov,  Inna,  report  on  open- 
ing of  Constituent  Assembly, 
141,  142. 

Ranee  Outre,  fined,  329. 

Ransome,  Arthur,  on  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment, 32;  Bolsheviki  sym- 
pathizer, 154;  on  Red  Terror, 
180;  on  powers  of  Extraordinary 
Commission,  181,  182. 

Raw  material,  shortage,  301. 

Razin,  Stenka,  revolt  of,  429. 

Red  army:  deserters,  187;  whole 
families  shot,  187,  188;  forma- 
tion of,  447,  448. 

Red  Terror:  a  reprisal,  140;  in- 
troduction of,  148;  a  mad  orgy, 
160;  extent  of,  177,  178;  ceased 
to  exist,  180;   beginning  of,  427. 

Reed,  John,  154. 

RevolutionaryTribunal,  the,  decree 
constituting,  151,  152,  153,  154. 

Revolutionary  Tribunal  of  the 
Press,  created,  328,  329. 

Richter,  Eugene,  369. 

Reign  of  Terror  in  French  Revo- 
lution, 422,  424,  427,  428. 

Robins,  Raymond,  154. 

Romanov  II,  Nicholas,  reign  of, 

330. 

Rope  haulage,  285,  306. 

Ross,  Professor,  on  strikes,  201; 
on  misuse  of  Soviet  power,  204, 
205;  on  decline  in  productivity, 
204,  205. 

Rostov-on-Don,  massacres  in,  145. 

Royd,  Fanny,  execution  of,  174. 

Rozanov,  on  agricultural  com- 
munes, 87. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY" 


483 


Russian:  Revolution,  195,  423, 
425,  426,  427,  428;  Social 
Democratic  Party,  split  of,  309; 
blockade,  431-438;  peace  with 
Germany,  431-433. 

Russkaya  Folia,   suppressed,  319. 

Russkoye  Bogatstvo,  suppressed, 
322. 

Russkya  Viedomasti,  suppressed, 
322. 

Rykov,  A.,  and  nationalization  of 
industries,  239,  300;  on  eco- 
nomic situation,  291,  292;  on 
transportation  problem,  292, 
293;  on  production  of  flax,  294, 
295;  and  hides,  295;  and  wool, 
295;  on  fuel  situation,  295,  296, 
297;  on  grain,  297;  remedial 
measures  proposed,  298,  299; 
on  textile  industry,  301,  302; 
as  to  the  future,  302;  and  skilled 
labor,  303,  304. 


Sabotage,  150,  207,  210,  215,  220, 
221,  223,  224. 

Salt,    disappeared    from    market, 
288,  289;   substitute,  289. 

Sawdust,  substitute  for  sugar,  288. 

Schastny,  Admiral,  trial  and  death, 
172,  173,  174. 

Scherbatchev  factory,  fall  in  pro- 
duction, 229. 

SchliapnikofF,   Commissar  of  La- 
bor, quoted,  282  n. 

Schneuer,     Lieutenant,     German 
spy,  320. 

Sebastopol,  massacres  in,  144. 

Seminov's  lumber  mill,  wage-sys- 
tem, 259. 

Sentences,  mass,  155. 

Serfdom  abolished,  92. 

Severnaya     Communa,     subscrip- 
tion  to,    obligatory,    326,    327; 


quoted,  25,  120,  166-169,  171, 
179,  184,  185,  250-251,  258, 
259-260,    342,  361. 

Shingarev,  A.  I.,  murder  of,  143. 

Shliapnikov,  protest  against  sab- 
otage, 221,  222. 

Shooting,  mass,  170. 

Shub,  David  N.,  on  suppression  of 
newspapers,  315,  319,  320,  321, 
322,323. 

Simferopol,  massacres  in,  144. 

Six-hour  day,  349. 

Skobelev,  on  seizure  of  factories, 
205;  on  decline  of  industrial  out- 
put, 206,  207. 

Smirnov,  M.,  and  execution  of 
children,  146. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  369. 

Socialism:  foe  of  individual  free- 
dom, 369;  critics  of,  369,  370. 

Socialism,  Utopian  and  Scien- 
tific, 9. 

Socialists,  Marxian,  8,  10,  II;  join 
first  Soviet,  12;  expelled  from 
New  York  Legislature,  29;  and 
freedom  of  the  press,  336;  press, 

350. 

Socialists-Revolutionists,  party  of, 
election,  417;    factions  in,  419. 

Soldatskaia  Pravda,  Bolshevist 
paper,  318. 

Soldiers,  peasant,  deserters,  96, 
210. 

Soromovo  Works,  output,  227. 

Soronov,  shot,  184. 

Sosnovsky,  report  on  conditions 
in  Tver  Province,  117. 

Soviet:  government  in  Russia,  16, 
17;  system,  17,  18;  elections, 
21,  22,  33,  34,  35,_  36;  form  of 
government  explained,  38,  39; 
estates,  83,  84,  85;  power,  mis- 
use of,  205;  increased  cost  of 
production    under,    208;     con- 


484  "THE  GREATEST  FAILURE 

trol    of    industries,    213,    214,  Strumillo,   J.,   on   suppression    of 

215,  219,  230,  231,  234;    con-  ^  Soviets,  30,  31. 

trol    of   factories,   216;    decree  Substitutes    for    needed    articles, 

of     instructions,      217,      218,  288. 

220,  225;  economic  situation  in  Suffrage,    44,    45,    46,     47,    48, 

1919,  289;  official  organ,  326,  334,  335,  339,    354,  413,  414, 

327-_  426.  _ 

Sovietism:     merits    of,    444;     in-  Sugar   industry,   liquidated,    288; 

creased    bureaucracy,    444;     in  sawdust  substitute,  288. 

industry,  445;   and  direction  of  "Sukharevka,"  campaign  against, 

army,    446,    447;     impractical,  271,  272. 

449.  Syndicalism,  235. 

Soviets  at  Work,  The,  225  n,  226,  ~, 

234- 

Soviets:   formed,  12,  13;  irrespon-  Taylor    system    of   management, 

sible  bodies,   13;     cleansed,  22;  234. 

dissolved,   22,   23,   25,    26,   27;  Teachers  union,  suppressed,  252. 

uprisings     against,     148,     149;  Teaching  profession  denied  right 

waning  power  of,  195,  196,  197;  to  vote,  51,  52. 

and     decline    in     productivity,  Terrorism    and    the     Bolsheviki, 

208.  140-191. 

Sovremennoie     Delo,     suppressed,  Terror,  mass,  162,  163. 

318.  Textile  industries,  decline  in  pro- 

Spartacist  uprisings,  439.  duction,    229,    301,    302;     fac- 

Speech,  freedom  of,  339,  420.  tories  closed,  238;  idle  workers, 

Spencer,  Herbert,  369.  286. 

Spiridonova,  Maria,  on  nationali-  "Thermidorians,"  427. 

zation  of  estates,  82.  Thomas,  Norman,  330,  342. 

State  and  Revolution,  The,  226  n,  Tomsky,    on    food-supplies,    302, 

373.  303;   on  shortage  of  labor,  304, 

State  loans,  repudiation  of,  238.  305. 

St.  Bartholomew  massacres,   144,  Trades-unions,    Russian:    conser- 

145.  vatism  of,   17,   18;    and  repre- 

Steffens,  Lincoln,  on  Soviet  form  sentation,    32;     right  to  nomi- 

of  government,  38,  40.  nate,  50;  Congress,  86,  87;    and 

Steinberg,  I.  Z.,  "Instructions  to  agricultural  communes,  87;  and 

the    Revolutionary    Tribunal,"  strikes,   248,   252;     and  wage- 

151.  fixing,     248,     252;      and    state 

Strikers,  right  to,  201,  248,  252;  capitalism,     252;      suppressed, 

wasteful,   204;     among   factory  252,    253;     controlled    by    Bol- 

workers,   210;    treason   against  sheviki,  252,  253;    deprived  of 

state,    236;    epidemic   of,   248;  power,  281;   status  of,  382. 

suppressed  with  brutality,  248,  Transportation   system,   91,    238, 

249,  250,  251,  281.  283,  284,  285,  289,  308,  433. 


IN  ALL  HISTORY 


>> 


485 


Tribunals,  revolutionary,  critical 
and  corrupt,  4. 

Trotsky:  and  internal  opposition, 
1;  on  constitutional  assembly, 
15,  193;  and  Jaroslav  insurrec- 
tion, 23;  dispersed  constitu- 
tional assembly,  79,  80,  81;  and 
peasant  uprisings,  121,  122;  and 
forcible  mobilization,  125,  126; 
on  terrorism,  147,  183;  and 
guillotine,  148;  and  death  pen- 
alty, 157;  famous  decree  No. 
903,  167;  and  Admiral  Schas- 
tny,  173,  175,  176;  on  railway 
transportation,  293,  294;  on 
industrial  failure,  301;  on  dis- 
sipation of  working-class,  303, 
304;  on  freedom  of  the  press, 
317,  332;  a _  tyrant,  351;  and 
communists  in  army,  359,  360; 
and  labor  army,  391,  396-406; 
denounced  Kerensky,  415;  and 
universal  spread  of  Bolshevism, 
438>  439;    and   deserters,   446, 

447- 
Trudovoe  Slovo,  suppressed,  318. 

Trupp,  Eugene,  statement  by, 
163  n,  164  n. 

Tseretelli,  and  decline  of  pro- 
ductivity, 204. 

Tula  Munition  Works,  strike  at, 
248;  premium  system  restored, 
260. 

Tyrants,  defined,  312,  313. 

U 

Uprisings,  peasant,  72,  73,  74,  75, 
92,  96,  100,  101,  102,  148,  149. 

Urals  Workers'  and  Soldiers' 
Soviet,  21. 

Uritzky,  assassination  of,  140,  148, 
155,  158, 158  n,  159  n,  160,  161, 
162,  163,  164,  167,  174. 

UtrOy  suppressed,  318. 


Vandervelde,    Emile,    on    factory 

councils,  200. 
Vasiliev,  B.  C,  and  execution  of 

children,  145,  146. 
Vassilyev,  Dr.  N.,  321. 
Verstraete,  Maurice,  description  of 

Uritzky,  158  n,  159  n, 

V  Glookhooyou  Notch,  suppressed, 
320. 

Village  wars,  96,  97,  99,  100,  101, 

102,  103. 
Villard,  Oswald,  330,  342. 
Vlast  Naroda,  on  village  wars,  100, 

101,  102. 
Folia    Naroda,    suppressed,    318, 

319- 
Vorzvdrts,  Berlin,  350. 
V period,  suppressed,  329. 
Vsiegda      V  period,     suppressed, 

33°- 

V  Temnooyou  Notch,  suppressed, 

320. 

w 

Wages  committees,  202,  203. 

Wage-system:  daily  pay,  247, 
252,  259;  piece-work,  247,  252, 
259;  cash  bonuses,  247,  252; 
premiums,  259,  260. 

Wheat  reserve,  297. 

White  guards:  shooting  of,  166, 
186;  mass  terror  used  against, 
168. 

White  terror  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
140,  148. 

Whitley  Councils  of  England, 
198. 

Whitman,  Walt,  quoted,  338. 

Women,  liable  to  labor  conscrip- 
tion, 382. 

Wood  fuel,  transportation  of,  244, 
245,  284,  285,  295,  296. 


4SG 


THE   GREATEST  FAILURE 


Wool,  production,  295. 
Work-books,  386,  387,  388,  389. 
Workers'     Control     Commission, 

instructions  on,  217,  218,  234. 
Workers'  control,  abolished,  281, 

282  n. 
Workmen's   and   Peasants'   Revo- 
lutionary Tribunals  established, 

150. 
Workmen's:  supreme  council,  214; 

organs  of  control,  214;   superior 

court  of  control,  214. 
Workmen,  unemployed,  238. 
Workshop  committees,    199,   201, 

202. 


Yedinslvo,  suppressed,  319,  321. 

Z 

Zasulitch,  Vera,  321. 

Zemstvos,  local,   195. 

Zenzinov,  V.  M.,  on  the  Soviet 
Government,  31;  on  freedom  of 
assemblage,  339,  340. 

Zinoviev:  on  Constituent  Assem- 
bly, 15;  and  Red  Terror,  141, 
147;  and  death  penalty,  157; 
on  Soviet  Russia,  290;  a  tyrant, 
351;  and  universal  spread  of 
Bolshevism,  438,  439. 


THE     END 


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